Rights and Obligations of New Entrants into the Southern Bluefin Tuna and Other International Fisheries by Serdy, Andrew Leslie
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rights and Obligations of New Entrants into 
the Southern Bluefin Tuna and Other 
International Fisheries 
 
 
ANDREW LESLIE SERDY 
 
 
December 2008 
 
 
A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of 
Philosophy of The Australian National University 
  
 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This thesis is entirely my own original work. 
 
 3 
Abstract 
 
This thesis analyses the legal issues arising when a fully exploited or overexploited 
international fishery cannot, because a significant part of the fishing takes place on the 
high seas where there is a customary and conventional right of all States for their 
national to fish on the high seas, readily be closed to new entrants.  If the complete 
collapse of the fishery predicted by the economics literature (and in many instances 
borne out by real-world examples) is not to ensue, some way must be found of 
circumventing this problem of open access.  Drawing largely on the documented history 
of the interactions among the States (and Taiwan) involved in the southern bluefin tuna 
(SBT) fishery, supplemented where relevant by reports of meetings of treaty-based 
commissions managing other international fisheries, the thesis traces, and attempts to 
explain, the development of a property-rights mentality among existing participants in 
the fisheries implicit in the arguments they employ to minimise newcomers’ catch or 
keep them out altogether.  Though at odds with the formal rule, to which they 
nonetheless continue to appear attached, some accommodation of the property concept 
will be needed if the recovery of the stocks to the biomass that generates the maximum 
sustainable yield is ever to take place.  At present the participants in the SBT and other 
depleted international fisheries have insufficient incentive to insist on the catch 
reductions necessary to permit this recovery and thereby, it is argued, are collectively in 
breach of their obligations to all other States that are potential new entrants.  Among the 
possible solutions explored are the development of trading in fishery commission quotas 
– these, as shown by an analysis from first principles, are negative obligations (for catch 
not to exceed given limits) and thus lack the positive characteristics of truly tradable 
assets, but, as also demonstrated, they can even so be made to fulfil asset-like functions 
if the commission as a whole is willing.  The well developed system of accounting for 
catch that any worthwhile trading mechanism would require in turn gives rise to the 
conclusion that this, in the form of State responsibility – in terms of both attribution of 
fishing activities on the high seas to the flag State and the secondary obligation to wipe 
out the consequences of breach of a primary obligation that occurs when limits are 
exceeded – has hitherto been a neglected area of international fisheries law that invites 
further research.  Meanwhile, the paradoxical result is that the freedom to fish is not just 
the source of the overfishing problem but potentially also a necessary part of its solution, 
in that a small number of new entrants may be the only ones with a sufficient economic 
interest to enforce the obligation to permit the stocks’ recovery. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the more than forty years since Johnston wrote that “In a positive doctrinal sense, 
there is no international law of fisheries”,1 the fish species Thunnus maccoyii,2 
known in English as southern bluefin tuna (SBT), has played a larger part than most 
in the recent development of just such a corpus of law.  Among its other distinctions, 
a dispute over the fishing of this species between Australia and New Zealand on the 
one hand and Japan on the other was the subject of the first ever hearing by a tribunal 
constituted under Annex VII to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea
3
 (hereinafter UNCLOS).  Fishing for the species is potentially governed not only 
by UNCLOS and the related Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of 
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating 
to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly 
Migratory Fish Stocks
4
 (hereinafter the UN Fish Stocks Agreement) but also by one 
of the relatively few fisheries conventions dealing with a single species – the 1993 
Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna
5
 (hereinafter the 1993 
Convention) – and three other multi-species Conventions: the 1966 International 
                                                          
1
  D.M. Johnston, The International Law of Fisheries: A Framework for Policy-Oriented 
Inquiries (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), at xv. 
2
   This is the name appearing in the February 2008 version of the Aquatic Sciences and 
Fisheries Information System electronic database maintained by the Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations (FAO), <www.fao.org/fishery/collection/asfis> (visited on 11 
June 2008).  Many early classifications used Thynnus rather than Thunnus for the genus: see B.B. 
Collette and C.E. Nauen, FAO Species Catalogue Vol. 2: Scombrids of the World. An Annotated 
and Illustrated Catalogue of Tunas, Mackerels, Bonitos and Related Species Known to Date 
(FAO Fisheries Synopsis No 125 Vol. 2; Rome: FAO, 1983), passim. 
3
   1833 United Nations Treaty Series (UNTS) 3; Australian Treaty Series (ATS) 1994 No 
31; (1982) 21 International Legal Materials (hereinafter ILM) 1261. 
4
  Opened for signature at New York, 4 December 1995; 2167 UNTS 3; ATS 2001 No 8; 
(1995) 34 ILM 1542. 
5
   1819 UNTS 359; ATS 1994 No 16. 
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Convention on the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas
6
 (hereinafter the 1966 
Convention), the 1993 Agreement for the Establishment of the Indian Ocean Tuna 
Commission
7
 (hereinafter the IOTC Agreement) and the 2000 Convention on the 
Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and 
Central Pacific Ocean (hereinafter the Honolulu Convention).
8
  SBT is also 
mentioned, albeit only in the privative sense that it was not to be fished by one party, 
in the 1987 Treaty on Fisheries between the Governments of Certain Pacific Island 
States and the Government of the United States of America.
9
 
Not all treaties having some conceivable application to the SBT fishery are 
considered.  An example is the Agreement Establishing the Indo-Pacific Fishery 
Council
10
 – since, although the main objectives of the body it creates (now known as 
the Asia-Pacific Fisheries Commission) as set out in Article IV of the Agreement 
give it a broad mandate to formulate and recommend conservation and management 
measures, it has no regulatory powers.
11
  In the light of the biological information 
given below on SBT and other tunas, it is also not necessary to dwell on the 
Convention on Biological Diversity.
12
  This is because, while severe overfishing may 
well put the State responsible for it in breach of the generally worded obligation 
under Article 8 of that Convention to “(f) promote the recovery of threatened species, 
inter alia, through the development and implementation of plans or other 
management strategies”, a much lesser degree of overfishing will already be in 
                                                          
6
   Done at Rio de Janeiro, 14 May 1966; 673 UNTS 63. 
7
   Adopted by the Council of the FAO at its Hundred and Fifth Session, Rome, 25 
November 1993; 1927 UNTS 329; ATS 1996 No 20. 
8
   Done at Honolulu on 5 September 2000; 2275 UNTS 43; [2004] ATS 15; (2001) 40 ILM 
278. 
9
  Done at Port Moresby on 2 April 1987; ATS 1988 No 42; (1987) 26 ILM 1048. 
10
  Done at Baguio (Philippines), 26 February 1948; 120 UNTS 59; ATS 1949 No 4. 
11
  See the main objectives set out in Article IV of the Agreement.  It covers all living 
marine and living inland aquatic resources in an area of competence specified by Article VI as 
“the Asia-Pacific Area”, not given any precise definition by lines of longitude and latitude. 
12
  Done at Rio de Janeiro, 5 June 1992; 1760 UNTS 79; ATS 1993 No 32. 
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breach of the many more specific obligations discussed in this work, and with far 
more concrete legal consequences.  Similarly, despite the theoretical possibility that 
SBT could be listed under the Convention on International Trade in Endangered 
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora
13
 or the Convention on the Conservation of 
Migratory Species of Wild Animals,
14
 these are not in themselves worthy of 
investigation, as even in its depleted state the SBT stock still consists of several 
hundred thousand individuals and is thus not in any danger of extinction. 
Despite this proliferation of legal texts affecting the SBT fishery, for the past twenty 
years it has been in a deepening crisis, manifested in the unconcealed reluctance with 
which existing participants in the fishery act to reduce their catch despite obvious 
signs that the stock is being overfished.  This in turn is attributable at least in part to 
the absence of a mechanism to prevent the entry of new participants into the fishery.  
What the Secretariat of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 
(hereinafter FAO) described in 1992 as “The Fundamental Problem of Open Access” 
remains true today: 
The single most important issue that must be resolved to deal with the current 
massive waste in fisheries, is controlling open access.  The extension of jurisdiction 
was a necessary, but insufficient, step in this process.
15
 
The residual freedom of fishing on the high seas is also an obstacle to the efficacy of 
any intergovernmental entity endowed with jurisdiction over the particular area of 
ocean or fish stocks concerned.  Voluntary acceptance of regulation by some States 
through a fisheries commission suffers from the defect that those remaining outside 
the commission are, under the pure form of the principle, at liberty to disregard any 
regulation, gaining the advantage of the member States’ restraint and thus creating a 
                                                          
13
  Done at Washington, 3 March 1973; 993 UNTS 243; ATS 1976 No 29; (1973) 12 ILM 
1085. 
14
  Done at Bonn, 23 June 1979; 1651 UNTS 333; ATS 1991 No 32. 
15
  FAO, Marine Fisheries and Law of the Sea: A Decade of Change (FAO Fisheries 
Circular No 853; Rome: FAO, 1993), at 31 (the quotation is the heading under which the 
extracted text appears). 
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disincentive for the latter to accept that very restraint at all.
16
  As the Special 
Rapporteur on the High Seas of the International Law Commission (hereinafter ILC) 
put it: 
La protection des richesses de la mer fait l’objet d’un grand nombre de conventions 
entre les États interéssés…Cette manière de légiférer présente le grave inconvénient 
qu’un accord survenu entre deux ou plusieurs États interéssés risque de devenir 
inefficace au cas où un seul ou plusieurs autres États refusent de s’y conformer.  
Généraliser les mesures prévues dans les traités bilatéraux ou multilatéraux en les 
appliquant à des États qui ne seraient pas parties à ces conventions et se trouveraient 
ainsi liés par des stipulations inter alios, ne semble pas compatible avec les principes 
généraux du droit.
17
 
If all States were bound to abide by a commission’s measures, the problem would be 
largely solved.  Together with the principle pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt
18
 
alluded to by the Special Rapporteur, however – that States absent their consent are 
not bound by treaties to which they are not party – the desire of States within a 
commission to exclude new entrants irrespective of their political and legal claims to 
a share in the fishery explains why the law has neither progressed to this point, nor is 
likely to do so without significant qualification. 
How the law governing States’ efforts to overcome this dilemma has affected the 
SBT fishery, the beginning of whose international management roughly coincided 
                                                          
16
  A practical example is the anecdotal reports of Taiwanese vessels moving onto SBT 
fishing grounds vacated by Japanese vessels after the closure of the fishery for the latter when the 
quota was filled: A.E. Caton, “Commercial and Recreational Components of the Southern 
Bluefin Tuna Fishery”, in R.S. Shomura, J. Majkowski and S. Langi (eds), Interactions of Pacific 
Tuna Fisheries: Proceedings of the First FAO Expert Consultation on Interactions of Pacific 
Tuna Fisheries, 3-11 December 1991, Nouméa, New Caledonia, Vol 2 (FAO Technical Paper No 
336/2; Rome: FAO, 1994), 344 at 361. 
17
  UN doc A/CN.4/42 (10 April 1951), Deuxième rapport sur la haute mer par J.P.A. 
François, rapporteur spécial, reprinted in UN, Yearbook of the International Law Commission 
1951, Vol II (hereinafter ILC Yearbook 1951/II) (New York: UN, 1957), 75 at 88 (paragraph 78). 
18
  The principle is embodied in Article 34 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(done at Vienna, 23 May 1969; 1155 UNTS 331, ATS 1974 No 2). 
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with the adoption of UNCLOS, is the subject of this thesis.  It will canvass the legal 
problems to which the tragedy of the commons phenomenon that characterises high 
seas fisheries has led among the States whose nationals and vessels exploit the 
species and venture some suggestions as to how these problems might be resolved or 
lessened in significance. 
A purely legal approach to such questions, however, relying on abstract exegesis of 
the pertinent treaty texts, would not be likely to be fruitful.  International fisheries 
law can only be fully understood against the background of the combined effect of 
the biological and economic factors operating on international fisheries.  It is not 
possible to define these problems away by, for example, simply mandating that 
States must follow scientific advice in setting catch limits, as that offers them no 
guidance as to how to act when scientists, as often occurs, disagree with each other, 
or when the scientific advice itself proves overly optimistic.  Equally, failure to take 
account of economic forces is among the main reasons for the legal regime having 
repeatedly shown itself inadequate to prevent stock collapses.  In short, for any legal 
argumentation to make a worthwhile contribution to policymaking of States and the 
international institutions through which they operate, the lawyer offering it must first 
master the necessary scientific and economic briefs. 
Accordingly, Chapter I introduces the factors at work in the SBT stock and fishery, 
and how they interrelate.  It begins with the basic biological facts of tunas in general 
and SBT in particular, then moves to the economic concept known as the tragedy of 
the commons, namely that under open access, hitherto the rule in high seas fisheries, 
depletion of a stock is inevitable, even though it is contrary to the collective interest, 
because that is rational behaviour for each individual participant in the fishery.  At 
the national level the most successful antidote to this has been the introduction of 
property rights, most fully through individual transferable quotas (ITQs), which is 
how the Australian and New Zealand SBT fisheries are managed.  Two further 
complicating factors – the notions of discounting of future earnings and game theory 
 17 
– complete the first half of the chapter.  The second half offers a historical overview 
of the SBT fisheries in Australia, Japan, New Zealand and elsewhere, relating first 
how they each developed in isolation and then began to interact with each other.  The 
chapter ends with a description of the current state of the SBT stock. 
Chapter II opens with an account of how the trilateral (Australia/Japan/New Zealand) 
management mechanism that governed the SBT fishery from 1983 to 1994 came into 
being.  Thereafter it is devoted to cataloguing and discussing the issues surrounding 
new entrants into the fishery from outside these States that arose in that period.  
Having established and then reduced quotas under the trilateral arrangements 
because the SBT stock was being overfished, as well as settled on a formula for 
adjusting their catch shares as the stock recovered, the three States found their 
expectations of that recovery frustrated in part by the appearance on the scene of 
these newcomers.  Examination of the unpublished documents of the period reveals 
the new entrants as a principal motivating factor behind the creation by treaty – the 
1993 Convention
19
 – of an international organisation, the Commission for the 
Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT) to manage the fishery.  It was at 
this stage also that the three States developed a rudimentary policy on new entrants 
aimed at limiting their catch; the reasons for its ineffectiveness are canvassed.  The 
last part of the chapter deals with the 1993 Convention’s negotiation and assesses 
what difference it made to the management of the fishery.  It looks in particular at the 
degree of prescriptiveness in the Convention as to what form management measures 
should take, discerning preference for catch limits over effort limits and for allocated 
shares in the fishery.  Yet a supposed innovation – instead of the (qualified) majority 
rule coupled with an objection procedure common in other fisheries commissions, 
the 1993 Convention operates by consensus decisions – is shown merely to shift the 
locus of the veto on decisions implicit under the system it replaced to an earlier stage 
of the process.  It has thus not led to more efficient decision-making. 
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  Supra n 5. 
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Chapter III places the new entrants problem in the context of the principles guiding 
the allocation of access rights to fisheries in successive legal instruments, 
culminating in the UN Fish Stocks Agreement.  Beginning with the very sketchy 
treatment accorded the subject in the two relevant treaties that emerged from the First 
United Nations (UN) Conference on the Law of the Sea – the Convention on the 
High Seas
20
 and the Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living 
Resources of the High Seas
21
 – it moves on to consider the more elaborate provisions 
of UNCLOS, namely Articles 64 (along with Annex I) and 116-119 and then those of 
the UN Fish Stocks Agreement.  The last is sufficiently detailed for a hypothetical 
example to be essayed of what the most prominent remaining non-member of the 
CCSBT exploiting SBT, South Africa, might expect if it were to pursue the route of 
litigation as a means of achieving an allocation greater than the CCSBT has been 
prepared to offer it.  The next part of the chapter examines the first attempt at solving 
the new entrant problem – the abstention doctrine of the 1950s – and the reasons for 
the concerted and ultimately successful opposition it provoked.  This is then 
compared with the more balanced provisions of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement, 
which have nonetheless prompted a number of fisheries commissions to purport to 
exclude non-members peremptorily from access to stocks considered “fully fished”.  
Procedural considerations have made some non-members already fishing reluctant to 
join the commissions, but the analysis here reveals that States wholly new to the 
fisheries have largely accepted their exclusion.  It is concluded that the reason for 
this, in contrast to the failure of abstention, is that enough of them now have a stake 
in some international fishery somewhere for a subconscious property rights mentality 
to have developed.  That is, the benefit of ensuring that newcomers cannot perturb a 
fishery in which the State already participates is perceived to outweigh the burden of 
exclusion from all other fisheries in which it does not. 
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  Done at Geneva, 29 April 1958; 450 UNTS 11; ATS 1963 No 12. 
21
  Done at Geneva, 29 April 1958; 559 UNTS 285; ATS 1963 No 12. 
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In Chapter IV the narrative returns to the CCSBT and relates on the basis of the 
reports of its meetings over the years the legal history of its dealings with non-
members in an attempt to reduce their catch of SBT.  Initially a formula was adopted 
without consultation with them, which they ignored and allowed their catches to 
grow further.  There followed fitful and then sustained negotiations backed by the 
threat of trade restrictions by CCSBT members to enforce non-member cooperation.  
This yielded the desired results in 2001 and 2002 in the case of Korea and Taiwan, 
which accepted quota offers and joined the Commission (complicated in Taiwan’s 
case by its unique international status, which required a detailed arrangement to 
overcome).  Indonesia, though, took much longer and its membership dates only 
from 2008.  The position of the remaining significant non-members (South Africa, 
the Philippines and the European Community) is also considered, as are resolutions 
the CCSBT has adopted on flags of convenience and on a new category of 
participants also seen in other commissions, “Cooperating Non-Members”.  There 
then follows a broader examination of legal aspects of documentation of trade in 
SBT, namely the Trade Information Scheme the CCSBT has run since 2000 and its 
relationship with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
22
  The 
chapter concludes with an analysis of how the arguments made by members and non-
members of the CCSBT fit into the wider debate in other fishery commissions as part 
of the trend towards exclusion of the latter from the fisheries. 
By way of a possible solution to the problems addressed thus far, Chapter V 
introduces and analyses the idea of trading in CCSBT quota.  First, national 
allocations are found in the context of the residual freedom of fishing rule not to be 
tradable assets but limiting obligations owed to every other member of a fishery 
commission.  Thus (unless there are only two members) simple agreement between 
“vendor” and “purchaser” is not sufficient; rather, a generalised waiver mechanism is 
                                                          
22
  Since 1995 GATT has been maintained in force among Members of the World Trade 
Organization pursuant to the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, done at 
Marrakesh, 15 April 1994, 1867 UNTS 3, 1995 ATS No 8, 33 ILM 13 at 15. 
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needed.  It is found that the treaties governing specific marine living resources do not 
in general place any obstacles in the way of such a mechanism, although there is one 
prominent exception.  In fact several fisheries commissions permit trading already, 
by either ad hoc or blanket advance approvals; these are analysed.  The focus then 
reverts to the CCSBT’s own recent consideration of quota trading, with a number of 
significant documents having been generated and a debate of sorts having taken 
place, although it did not lead to any concrete outcome.  Since placing quota trading 
onto a systematic basis would raise the matter of accounting for catches to a more 
sophisticated level than has been necessary to date, the foreseeable issues are 
enumerated.  These notably include rules for the treatment and consequences of 
overcatch and undercatch, and the problem of bycatch and discarding.  It is suggested 
that if national allocations expressed as a proportion of the total allowable catch 
(TAC) were to become permanent, even in the absence of trading this would 
reinforce the trend towards property rights in high seas fisheries. 
Finally, conclusions are offered in Chapter VI.  These can be summarised by saying 
that, with one possible exception – a reinvigorated application of the disciplines of 
State responsibility to international fisheries – any solution to the new entrants 
problem will have to rely on legal policy rather than principle.  The many setbacks in 
the long struggle to develop a management strategy for SBT illustrate that, leaving 
aside the risks of failing to heed scientific advice, various allocative rules are 
possible.  The choice among them, as well as of the level of risk to be run in setting a 
TAC, are inevitably decisions of a political and therefore management character.  
Even in the absence of a substantive rule on allocation, the procedural device of 
dispute settlement, or more precisely its compulsory availability, can act as as the 
necessary incentive to political compromise.  Although economists argue in favour 
of ignoring the history of the fishery and closing it to new entrants unwilling to buy 
their way in, the applicable legal principles nonetheless require that the full history 
be taken into account.  The CCSBT itself exemplifies this: its management of the 
 21 
SBT stock has reached a point where the members are collectively no longer 
seriously attempting to comply with the UNCLOS obligation to restore depleted 
stocks to the level that can generate the maximum sustainable yield (MSY).  Here the 
various facets of State responsibility – especially the trend towards attribution of all 
high seas fishing to the flag State itself, and the rules on reparation for damage to 
injured States, which is argued to include any State that could profitably fish a stock 
restored to the level capable of generating the MSY – are the way forward.  Despite 
the freedom of fishing on the high seas being at the root of the new entrants problem, 
therefore, it would be undesirable to act on calls to abolish the freedom, since 
paradoxically the residue of it turns out to be a necessary element of any solution. 
There are four appendices.  The sequence in which they appear is not significant, 
simply matching that in which each is first mentioned in the main text.  Appendix A 
sets out new entrant aspects of the dispute about Japan’s experimental fishing for 
SBT.  Prefaced by an account of the origin of the dispute, it moves to the relevant 
written and oral arguments of the disputant parties in both phases of the dispute and 
ends with the salient features of the dispute’s resolution and a conspectus of the 
issues left unresolved because the case did not go to the merits.  Appendix B explains 
the principal elements of fishery science pertinent to SBT: MSY as a construct of the 
surplus production model of fisheries, as well as its shortcomings, the technique of 
“virtual population analysis” and a summary of the scientific advice given to SBT 
managers over the years.  Grouped in Appendix C are the most important extended 
treaty texts.  Part I is the full Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin 
Tuna, while Article VIII of the International Convention for the Conservation of 
Atlantic Tunas and Article 20 of the Convention for the Conservation and 
Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks of the Western and Central Pacific 
Ocean form Parts II and III respectively.  Appendix D reproduces in full a document 
not directly of treaty status: the CCSBT’s 2001 Resolution to Establish an Extended 
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Commission and an Extended Scientific Committee, together with its Annex on the 
Rules of Procedure of these bodies. 
The law is stated as at 1 December 2008, with the technical exception that any 
developments evidenced though reports of the meetings of fisheries commissions 
must reckon with the delay, typically of several months, in their publication.  No 
account is therefore taken of meetings whose reports were at that date not yet in the 
public domain, which in practice, given that annual meeting cycles culminate 
towards the end of the calendar year, means any meeting held since 1 January 2008. 
With that, it is possible to turn to the eponymous fish of the title and the influence it 
and its close relatives’ biology, and in turn the economics of the fisheries targeting 
them, have had on modern international fisheries law. 
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CHAPTER I 
Tunas and the bioeconomics of high seas fishing: 
new entrants and the tragedy of the commons 
A The fish 
Along with all but two of the 14 tuna species thought to exist, SBT is listed in Annex 
I to UNCLOS as a highly migratory species to which Article 64 applies.
23
  Ten of 
                                                          
23
 See infra Ch III, text accompanying nn 475-491, the negotiating history of Article 64 
and Annex I.  The fourteen species make up the tribe Thunnini in the family Scombridae and are 
grouped into four genera – Auxis, Euthynnus, Katsuwonus and Thunnus – to the last-named of 
which SBT belongs: J.S. Nelson, Fishes of the world 2nd edn (New York: Wiley, 1984), at 364; 
Collette and Nauen, supra Introduction n 2, at 87; J. Majkowski, “Global Resources of Tuna and 
Tuna-like Species”, in FAO, Review of the State of World Fishery Resources: Marine Fisheries 
(FAO Fisheries Circular No 920) (Rome: FAO, 1997), 118 at 118.  These authorities all identify 
thirteen species, but one of the thirteen has since been found to be in fact two species: P.J. Smith, 
L. Griggs and S. Chow, “DNA identification of Pacific bluefin tuna (Thunnus orientalis) in the 
New Zealand fishery”, (2001) 35 New Zealand Journal of Marine and Freshwater Research 843 
at 844.  Tunas generally prefer oceanic habitats; six of the eight species of the genus Thunnus 
have a wide distribution and migrate extensively: Collette and Nauen, supra n 2, at 3; the two 
species omitted are blackfin tuna (T. atlanticus) and longtail tuna (T. tonggol), calling into 
question the former’s listing in Annex I.  The other tuna species are more neritic (living in the 
water column superjacent to the continental shelf).  Apart from blackfin tuna they are black 
skipjack (Euthynnus lineatus) – the only other omission from UNCLOS Annex I – kawakawa (E. 
affinis), little tunny (E. alletteratus), bullet tuna (Auxis rochei) and frigate tuna (A. thazard). 
 24 
these are found in waters off or near Australia, including SBT,
24
 which is also one of 
the seven tuna species occurring in New Zealand waters.
25
  
Although the bluefin tunas have been recognised as a specialised group within the 
genus Thunnus,
26
 the FAO nomenclature
27
 followed by the drafters of Annex I to 
UNCLOS in listing the eleven tuna species they deemed highly migratory has been 
somewhat unstable as far as these species are concerned.  In Annex I, Thunnus 
thynnus appears simply as “Bluefin tuna”, though by 1983 the FAO English name 
had changed to “Northern bluefin tuna”.  Although there is no single universally 
accepted classification of fishes or any other living species, the weight of evidence or 
of scientific opinion may lead to one classification of a particular species being 
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 Nine (all but blackfin tuna, black skipjack, little tunny, Atlantic bluefin tuna and Pacific 
bluefin tuna (hereinafter PBT)) are found under Scombridae in D.F. Hoese, D.J. Bray, J.R. 
Paxton and G.R. Allen, Fishes, in P.L. Beesley and A. Wells (eds), Zoological Catalogue of 
Australia Vol 35.3 (Collingwood: CSIRO Publishing, 2006), 1769-1778, but this work does not 
cite Smith et al, supra n 23, and the regulation for some years by Australia of PBT catches along 
with SBT – see infra n 31 – would not have been necessary were this species not present in 
Australian waters. 
25
 The others being albacore, bigeye, frigate, skipjack and yellowfin: L.J. Paul, New 
Zealand Fishes: An Identification Guide (Auckland: Reed Methuen, 1986), at 124; and in small 
numbers PBT (ibid., at 125; Smith et al, supra n 23, at 843). 
26
   Collette and Nauen, supra Introduction n 2 at 3, corroborated by the systematic 
catalogue (at 21-23) which divides northern bluefin tuna, SBT, albacore and bigeye tuna from the 
remaining tunas and further subdivides the two resulting groups, such that northern bluefin tuna 
and SBT form one subgroup, albacore and bigeye tuna another. 
27
  FAO species names, each unique to one species, are selected on the basis of vernacular 
names or parts of names already in existence within the areas where the species is fished, in order 
to overcome the confusion caused by the use of a single name for multiple species, or several 
names denoting the same species: ibid., at 2.  An example of the latter is that “northern bluefin 
tuna” is also used in Australia to refer to Thunnus tonggol (longtail tuna): T.C. Roughley, Fish 
and Fisheries of Australia, 6th edn (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1966), at 102 (giving its old 
scientific name of Kishinoella tonggol, an example of the taxonomic mutability over time 
discussed infra n 28); E.M. Grant, Fishes of Australia (Scarborough, Qld: E.M. Grant Pty Ltd, 
1987), at 365. 
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replaced by another over time.
28
  Thus the common names of tunas and similar 
species may reflect changing views over time of what is a tuna and what is not.
29
 
The consequence of the foregoing is a tendency to take the expression “bluefin tuna” 
as encompassing not only SBT but also Atlantic bluefin tuna (ABT) and Pacific 
bluefin tuna (PBT) even when it is clear from the context that it is being used in its 
UNCLOS sense, in other words to treat SBT erroneously as covered by references to 
“bluefin tuna”.30  In Australia, PBT was from 1994 to 2002 regulated under the 
                                                          
28
  The name “northern bluefin tuna” has since itself been rendered obsolete by scientific 
advance, as in 1999 it was established that the Atlantic and Pacific stocks of this fish are in fact 
separate species.  With the scientific name Thunnus thynnus now reserved for the Atlantic species 
ABT, a previously discarded name Thunnus orientalis has been revived for PBT: Smith et al, 
supra n 23, at 844.  Another example of this phenomenon is yellowfin tuna, mentioned by name 
in Article II(1) of the 1949 Convention for the Establishment of an Inter-American Tropical Tuna 
Commission (done at Washington, 31 May 1949; 80 UNTS 3), followed by “Neothunnus” in 
parentheses, whereas in UNCLOS the Latin name is Thunnus albacares.  One 1950s authority 
gives six genera of tunas: Thunnus (bluefin), Neothunnus (yellowfin), Parathunnus (bigeye), 
Germo (albacore), Katsuwonus (skipjack) and Sarda (bonito), with which this nomenclature is 
consistent: W.F. Royce, “A Statement on the Ecology of Tunas” in UN doc A/CONF.10/7, 
Papers Presented at the International Technical Conference on the Conservation of the Living 
Resources of the Sea, Rome, 18 April to 10 May 1955 (New York: UN, 1956), 118 at 118. 
29
  The Eastern Pacific Ocean Tuna Fishing Agreement (done at San José, Costa Rica on 15 
March 1983, not in force; reprinted in FAO, Compendium of Basic Texts Concerning 
International Management and Development of Tuna Fisheries (FAO Fisheries Circular No 842) 
(Rome: FAO, 1992), 113; available online at <www.intfish.net/treaties/epta.htm> (visited on 11 
April 2008)) lists in Article II(C) the “species of tuna subject to this Agreement” in which are 
included, apart from eight species of the tribe Thunnini, Eastern Pacific bonito (Sarda chiliensis) 
and Indo-Pacific bonito (Sarda orientalis).  
30
  Misidentification also introduces an element of unreliability into the catch statistics and 
the stock assessments to which they are an input.  As SBT and the other bluefins sell for roughly 
the same price per unit of weight, in past years catches of fish of one species were regularly 
recorded under another: W.L Klawe, Long-line catches of tunas within the 200-mile economic 
zones of the Indian and Western Pacific Oceans (Rome: FAO, 1980), at 7.  Though this still 
occurs – see Report of the Eighth Annual Meeting, 15-19 October 2001, Miyako, Japan 
(hereinafter CCSBT8 Report), in CCSBT, Reports of the Meetings for the Seventh and Eighth 
Year of the Commission (including Financial Statements) (hereinafter CCSBT Blue Book 2002), 
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Southern Bluefin Tuna Management Plan under the Fisheries Management Act 1991 
(Cth)
31
 and a similar treatment of catches of this species occurred in New Zealand 
from 1995 to 2002.
32
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
61 at 71 (paragraph 85) – in recent years it may have become less of a problem as both SBT and 
ABT have come under international management with their catches systematically monitored: 
see the ICCAT and CCSBT trade information schemes, infra Ch IV nn 870 and 879 respectively, 
and as Japanese fishing for SBT has been increasingly confined to the Indian Ocean, where PBT 
occurs only sporadically: Klawe, supra this n, at 7.  In the case of SBT the small scale of the 
problem is shown by the fact that PBT represented less than 0.3% of the combined catch of the 
two species in New Zealand’s EEZ in the 1990s: Smith et al, supra n 23, at 843. 
31
   Catches of PBT were counted against the SBT quota by virtue of the definition of SBT 
in cl 3.1 of the Southern Bluefin Tuna Fishery Management Plan 1995 (Cth), made pursuant to s. 
17(1) of the Fisheries Management Act 1991 (Cth), as “fish of the species Thunnus maccoyii 
(Castelnau) or Thunnus thynnus.”  This is not because of the converse error to that in the text at n 
30 supra, but for a subtler reason.  According to the Explanatory Statement accompanying the 
Fisheries Management Regulations (Amendment) (Cth) (Statutory Rules 1994 No 419), persons 
charged with catching SBT in contravention of the Act could previously dispute whether the Act 
applied to them by claiming that the relevant fish were PBT rather than SBT.  Faced with such a 
defence, it was difficult for prosecuting authorities to prove their case because of the “expense, 
inconvenience and uncertainty involved” in testing to distinguish the species from each other, 
and difficulties in obtaining samples for those tests.  The result was that catches of PBT were 
debited against SBT quota both domestically (that is, against individual operators’ entitlements) 
and internationally (in that the SBT catch tonnages reported by Australia to the CCSBT in 
subsequent years represented not just SBT but also PBT).  PBT was removed from the definition 
in 2002 after a genetic testing procedure was developed to enable positive identification of both 
species: see Southern Bluefin Tuna Fishery Management Plan Amendment 2002 (No. SBT 04). 
32
  Regulation 2 of the Fisheries (Southern Bluefin Tuna) Regulations 1995 (Statutory 
Regulations 1995/117) made under the Fisheries Act 1983 (NZ) provided that “Southern bluefin 
tuna means the fish with the scientific name Thunnus maccoyi [sic]; and includes the fish with 
the scientific name Thunnus thynnus.”  In June 2002 the Fisheries (Southern Bluefin Tuna 
Quota) Amendment Regulations 2002 (Statutory Regulations 2002/150) amended the then 
governing instrument under the Fisheries Act 1996 (NZ), the Fisheries (Southern Bluefin Tuna 
Quota) Regulations 2000 (Statutory Regulations 2000/79), to reverse the change.  See also 
“Review of New Zealand SBT Fisheries for CCSBT-8” (Attachment K-4 to CCSBT8 Report), in 
CCSBT Blue Book 2002, supra n 30, 134 at 134; and the Regulatory Impact Statement on the 
Ministry of Fisheries website at <www.fish.govt.nz en-nz/Publications/Historical+Documents/ 
Environment+and+Sustainability+Archive/Regulatory+Impact+Statements+and+Business+Co
 27 
SBT is an epipelagic fish,
33
 ranging widely across the high seas regions of the 
southern temperate oceans, particularly between 30º and 45º South, but also 
traversing the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and territorial sea of several States 
including Australia, New Zealand, Indonesia and South Africa, as shown on Map 1 
on the next page.  This makes it the most widely dispersed stock of all the tunas.
34
  It 
spends most of its life cycle in waters whose temperature is between 5º and 20ºC; 
spawning fish and larvae, however, are encountered in waters with surface 
temperatures between 20º and 30ºC.
35
 
It is generally accepted that the global population of SBT comprises a single stock, 
with a single spawning ground situated in the tropical waters south of the Indonesian 
islands from Java to beyond Sumba and extending at its eastern end well into the 
                                                                                                                                                                    
mpliance+Costs+Statements/2002/Proposal+to+Amend+the+Definition+of+Southern+Bluefin
+Tuna+and+Introduction+of+Defence+Provision+for.htm>, visited on 10 April 2008.  With 
PBT no longer under SBT quota, New Zealand caught 55 tonnes of it in 2002: Report of the 
Extended Scientific Committee for the Eighth Meeting of the Scientific Committee, 1-4 September 
2003, Christchurch, New Zealand (Appendix 2 to Report of the Eighth Meeting of the Scientific 
Committee, 1-4 September 2003, Christchurch, New Zealand; hereinafter CCSBT-ESC2 Report), 
in CCSBT, Reports of the Meetings for the Tenth Year of the Commission (including Financial 
Statements) (hereinafter CCSBT Blue Book 2004), 111 at 114 (paragraph 13). 
33
   That is, it lives or feeds at the ocean surface or in the water column at depths at which 
photosynthesis can take place (to a maximum of about 200 metres): Paul, supra n 25, at 174. 
34
  T. Polacheck, “An overview of interaction issues among the fisheries for Southern 
Bluefin Tuna”, in Shomura et al, supra Introduction n 16, Vol 1 (FAO Technical Paper No 
336/1; Rome: FAO, 1994), 264 at 264; Report on Biology, Stock Status and Management of 
Southern Bluefin Tuna (Attachment 6 to Report of the Extended Scientific Committee for the 
Ninth Meeting of the Scientific Committee, 13-16 September 2004, Seogwipo City, Jeju, Republic 
of Korea (hereinafter CCSBT-ESC3 Report; Appendix 2 to Report of the Ninth Meeting of the 
Scientific Committee, 13-16 September 2004, Seogwipo City, Jeju, Republic of Korea)), in 
Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (hereinafter CCSBT), Reports of the 
Meetings for the Eleventh Year of the Commission (including Financial Statements) (hereinafter 
CCSBT Blue Book 2005); 204 at 204. 
35
 Collette and Nauen, supra Introduction n 2, at 87. 
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Australian EEZ in the vicinity of the Western Australian port of Broome.
36
  The 
spawning season extends throughout the southern summer from September to April, 
after which the growing fish migrate down the coast of Western Australia.  
Wintering in deeper oceanic waters, some fish then veer west into the Indian Ocean, 
where in the past they could be found in significant numbers off Cape Town from 
Map 1: Main Australian fishing grounds for southern bluefin tuna
37
 
                                                          
36
   A. Caton, K. McLoughlin and M.J. Williams, Southern Bluefin Tuna: Scientific 
Background to the Debate (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1990) at 7 
(map), 10. 
37
 From – but in mid-2008 no longer available at – <www.afma.gov>, the website of the 
Australian Fisheries Management Authority (hereinafter AFMA), visited on 24 July 2002. 
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May to August,
38
 while others swim east through the Great Australian Bight and 
around the southern tip of Tasmania, from where they may go up the coast of New 
                                                          
38
  Collette and Nauen, supra Introduction n 2, at 88.  Japan’s first proposal for 
experimental fishing, annexed to CCSBT, Report of the First Special Meeting, 3 – 6 October 
1995, Canberra, Australia (hereinafter CCSBTSM1(1) Report, available on the CCSBT website 
at <www.ccsbt.org/docs/pdf/meeting_reports/ccsbt_2/report_of_special_meeting1_part1.pdf> 
(visited on 13 June 2008), indicated that in the past fishing for SBT was conducted in an area 
extending well beyond the Cape of Good Hope, at least as far west as 15ºW. 
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South Wales or onwards across the Tasman Sea to New Zealand and beyond.
39
  SBT 
continue to live off southern and south-eastern Australia until six to nine years of 
age; thus those reaching New Zealand are aged five or more, with an average age of 
about ten.
40
  By maturity, most fish have dispersed into the deeper waters of the 
Indian, South Atlantic and south-west Pacific Oceans.  SBT tend to school in order to 
feed, making them susceptible to capture by longlining.
41
  Historically, adult fish 
were predominantly caught off New Zealand, Tasmania and on the spawning ground; 
fish aged five or more are seldom found in near-shore surface waters.
42
 
The SBT is well adapted for this migration of over 5000 kilometres.  Like other large 
tunas it maintains a stable body temperature that is generally warmer than the water 
because of its high metabolic rate.  It can swim at high speed, due to the abundance 
of respiratory pigment in the muscles, which gives the flesh its dark red colour.
43
 
SBT can grow up to 220 centimetres in length and weigh 200 kilograms, though 
weights vary considerably with the condition of the fish,
44
 and can live over 40 years 
(the oldest known individual was 42 years old when caught).
45
  There is some 
uncertainty as to when it reaches maturity and can begin spawning, but the mean age 
                                                          
39
   Collette and Nauen, supra Introduction n 2, at 87. 
40
   J.O.S. Kennedy, L. Davies and A. Cox, Joint Rent Maximisation and Open Access 
Competition in the Southern Bluefin Tuna Fishery (ABARE Conference Paper 99.1), 
<abareonlineshop.com/product.asp?prodid=11266> (visited on 11 June 2008), at 3; Paul, supra 
n 25, at 127. 
41
  Kennedy, Davies and Cox, supra n 40, at 3.  SBT is an opportunistic feeder on cold- and 
warm-water fish species from different depth strata, crustaceans and molluscs, and is preyed 
upon in turn by sharks, dolphins, seals and billfishes: Collette and Nauen, supra Introduction n 2, 
at 87. 
42
  Collette and Nauen, supra Introduction n 2, at 88; Attachment 6 to CCSBT-ESC3 
Report, supra n 34, at 204. 
43
   Nelson, supra n 23, at 363; Collette and Nauen, supra Introduction n 2, at 3. 
44
   Paul, supra n 25, at 127. 
45
   Attachment 6 to CCSBT-ESC3 Report, supra n 34, at 204. 
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for maturity is thought likely to be 11 or 12 years.
46
  Precisely because of its 
longevity coupled with life-long exposure to fishing pressure, however, SBT has 
been prone to overexploitation.  A consequence of this is that, once its numbers are 
depleted, they would not be expected to recover until some time after reduction in 
fishing effort.
47
  As section D shows, just such a depletion of the SBT stock has been 
the driving factor behind much of the effort to resist entry of newcomers into the 
SBT fishery that is the focus of this study.  The next section demonstrates that the 
weak legal and institutional disciplines on high seas fishing made this depletion 
almost inevitable. 
                                                          
46
  This was an element in the scientific and subsequently legal controversy of the 1990s: 
see Appendix A infra.  The report of the 1994 scientific meeting defined the parental stock as 
fish of age 8 and older, on the basis that although some 7-year-old fish were mature while not all 
9-year-old fish were mature, 50% of SBT were thought to be mature at age 8: Report of the 
thirteenth meeting of Australian, Japanese and New Zealand Scientists on southern bluefin tuna: 
Report to Management, Wellington, New Zealand, 20-29 April 1994 (hereinafter 13th Trilateral 
Scientific Meeting Report; unpublished, copy held by author extracted from files of the former 
Australian Government Department of Primary Industries and Energy (hereinafter DPIE)), at 8 
(Appendix 1, “Status of the stock and fishery indicators”, paragraph 4).  In 2001 the independent 
Advisory Panel found that the formerly agreed estimated age of 8, on which Japan had continued 
to insist in the face of newer evidence to the contrary, was “unlikely” and recommended the use 
of alternative hypotheses, ages 10 and 12: Report of the Second Meeting of the Stock Assessment 
Group, 19-28 August 2001, Tokyo, Japan (hereinafter CCSBT-SAG2 Report), in CCSBT Blue 
Book 2002, supra n 30, 181 at 184-185 (paragraph 14); see also “Working paper for maturity age 
group” (Attachment 4 to CCSBT-SAG2 Report), ibid., 209.  By implication the scientists settled 
on age 10 the following year, defining “adult mortality” by reference to that age in Report of the 
Third Meeting of the Stock Assessment Group, 3-7 September 2002, Canberra, Australia 
(hereinafter CCSBT-SAG3 Report), in CCSBT, Reports of the Meetings for the Ninth Year of the 
Commission (including Financial Statements) (hereinafter CCSBT Blue Book 2003), 167 at 172 
(paragraph 22). 
47
   Majkowski, supra n 23, at 125; see also infra Appendix 2.  Stocks of shorter-lived 
species, including most other species of tuna, recover much faster from depletion.  For example, 
yellowfin and skipjack tunas, caught primarily for the canned tuna market, reach maturity at a 
young age (less than 2 years) and are highly productive: Caton et al, supra n 36, at 10. 
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B The tragedy of the commons and its solutions 
1 The core of the problem: open access 
To the extent that SBT is fished on the high seas,
48
 it is subject to the economic 
phenomenon known as the tragedy of the commons, which is a consequence of the 
absence of property rights concomitant with the freedom of fishing on the high seas
49
 
– in other words, of the open access to the fishery.  Hardin, the originator of the 
phrase, illustrated the tragedy by way of a pastoral example, in which a rational 
newcomer considering keeping cattle (or owner of an existing herd) would calculate 
that there were benefits to be gained from adding an extra beast.  Even if these 
benefits were outweighed by the marginal costs of doing so in terms of degradation 
of the land, those costs would be distributed among all users of the commons and the 
newcomer’s own share of them would be less than the benefits.  The same incentive 
would lead all existing and potential users to keep and add animals irrespective of the 
carrying capacity of the land.  Hardin concluded:  
Each man is locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd without limit 
– in a world that is limited.  Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each 
pursuing his own interests in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons.  
Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all.
50
 
In the international or even domestic fisheries context, it suffices to substitute 
“catch” in the first sentence above for “herd”.  Until the emergence of the EEZ in the 
1970s – a wide band of ocean whose outer limit lay 200 nautical miles from the 
coastal State’s territorial sea baseline – fishery resources beyond the territorial sea 
and a narrow band of exclusive fisheries jurisdiction were, in the economic sense, 
common property.  From the point of view of the coastal State’s regulators, new 
operators, and from that of international law, new States, could continue to enter a 
                                                          
48
  In most years 50-60% of the global catch of SBT is taken on the high seas: see infra Ch 
III, text following n 444. 
49
  The freedom of fishing on the high seas is set out in Articles 87 and 116 of UNCLOS, 
reproduced infra Ch III, text following nn 492 and 495 respectively. 
50
  G. Hardin, “The Tragedy of the Commons”, (1968) 162 Science 1243 at 1244. 
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fishery and those already in it could continue to increase their effort until the stock’s 
carrying capacity (that is, its sustainable yield
51
) were exceeded.  After that, any 
additional effort would tend to deplete the stock, “ultimately reaching a point where 
it becomes economically disadvantageous to engage in fishing at all because of the 
very small size of the catch”.52  In a 1997 study, the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) concluded that “[t]he open access nature of 
marine fisheries is the fundamental cause of poor economic performance and 
biological overexploitation.”53 
There are two classic solutions to the tragedy of the commons.
54
  One is to distribute 
the land among individual herders, so that, while the benefit of adding one beast 
remains, whoever does so must bear the full cost, “thus working a natural constraint 
on the herdsman’s tendency to destroy the grazing capacity of his private property.”  
Since the high seas are not subject to appropriation,
55
 this option of private property 
rights has no equivalent in international fisheries.  The other is to keep the commons 
as public property but impose restrictions on it, including limitation and regulation of 
access.  This entails control by some governmental body over the right to enter, and a 
system of allocation designed to ensure that the carrying capacity of the commons is 
not exceeded.  For fisheries, in theory, an international organisation could be created 
with power to regulate access to high seas fisheries, and indeed the ILC briefly 
advocated this idea in draft articles it formulated and refined in the early 1950s. 
                                                          
51
  The concept of maximum sustainable yield is explained infra in Appendix B. 
52
  H.G. Knight, Managing the Sea’s Living Resources: Legal and Political Aspects of High 
Seas Fisheries (Lexington MA and Toronto: Lexington Books, 1977), at 4.  
53
  OECD, Towards Sustainable Fisheries: Economic Aspects of the Management of Living 
Resources (Paris: OECD, 1997), at 61.  See also the very useful brief summary in R. Arnason, 
“Ocean fisheries management: recent international developments” (1993) 17 Marine Policy 334. 
54
  Knight, supra n 52, at 3-4. 
55
  Article 89 of UNCLOS, supra Introduction n 3, provides that “No State may validly 
purport to subject any part of the high seas to its sovereignty.” 
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In the ILC’s 1951 Draft Articles on the Continental Shelf and Related Subjects, 
article 2 on “Resources of the Sea” was in the following terms: 
Competence should be conferred on a permanent international body to conduct 
continuous investigations of the world’s fisheries and the methods employed in 
exploiting them.  Such body should also be empowered to make regulations for 
conservatory measures to be applied by the States whose nationals are engaged in 
fishing in any particular area where the States concerned are unable to agree among 
themselves.
56
 
Paragraph 3 of the accompanying commentary stated that: 
This system [i.e. of regulation being left to the States concerned] might prove 
ineffective if the interested States were unable to reach agreement.  The best way of 
overcoming the difficulty would be to set up a permanent body which, in the event 
of disagreement, would be competent to submit rules which the States would be 
required to observe in respect of fishing activities by their nationals in the waters in 
question.  This matter would seem to lie within the general competence of the United 
Nations Food and Agriculture Organization.
57
 
In the ILC’s 1953 report the text of draft article 3, as it now was, read:  
States shall be under a duty to accept, as binding upon their nationals, any system of 
regulation of fisheries in any area of the high seas which an international authority, 
to be created within the framework of the United Nations, shall prescribe as being 
essential for the purpose of protecting the fishing resources of that area against waste 
or extermination.  Such international authority shall act at the request of any 
interested State.
58
 
There was more opposition to this from a minority within the ILC who “contended 
that the proposal to give an international authority power to issue regulations binding 
                                                          
56
  “Draft Articles on the Continental Shelf and Related Subjects” (Annex to Report of the 
International Law Commission covering the work of its third session, 16 May–27 July 1951 (UN 
doc A/1858)), reprinted in ILC Yearbook 1951/II, supra Introduction n 17, 123 at 143.  The 
history of the ILC’s work on the law of the sea is related by S. Oda, International Control of Sea 
Resources, 2nd edn (Dordrecht, Boston and London: Martinus Nijhoff, 1989), at 83-89. 
57
  ILC Yearbook 1951/II, supra Introduction n 17, at 143. 
58
  Report of the International Law Commission covering the work of its fifth session, 1 
June–14 August 1953 (UN doc A/2456), reprinted in UN, Yearbook of the International Law 
Commission 1953, Vol II (New York: UN, 1959) 200 at 218. 
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on the nationals of States was in conflict with the basic principles of international 
law”, than from governments:  
[I]t is significant of the present state of opinion and of the widely felt need for the 
removal of what is considered by many to be a condition approaching anarchy, that 
in the replies sent by governments, no opposition was voiced against the proposals 
then advanced by the Commission.
59
 
In its comprehensive overhaul of the draft articles in the wake of the 1955 
International Technical Conference on the Living Resources of the Sea,
60
 however, 
the ILC abandoned the idea of an international organisation in favour of compulsory 
arbitration. 
In the view of Knight, writing in the 1970s at the time of the Third UN Conference 
on the Law of the Sea, the fishery commissions of the day, though imperfect, had by 
and large achieved their objectives for a time, but in the past decade unrestrained 
increases in fishing effort had  
seriously reduced certain fish stocks in spite of the conservation regulations.  It seems 
abundantly clear that some new device is needed - a means of controlling fishing 
effort and effectively enforcing regulations on all those fishing common resources.
61
 
As to what that means might be, Knight discerned an evolutionary process applying 
to the whole law of the sea, moving through four phases: (1) unrestricted and 
                                                          
59
  Ibid. (paragraphs 97 and 99); see also at 241-269 Annex II to the 1953 report, 
“Comments by Governments on the draft articles on the continental shelf and related subjects 
prepared by the International Law Commission at its third session in 1951”. 
60
  The Conference was convened by the UN General Assembly in its Resolution 900(IX) 
of 14 December 1954 in order to “study the problem of the international conservation of the 
living resources of the sea and to make appropriate scientific and technical recommendations.”  
Based on this report, García Amador, a Cuban member of the ILC who had been Deputy 
Chairman of the Rome Conference, submitted to the ILC’s 1955 session new draft articles which 
were adopted with minor amendments: Report of the International Law Commission covering the 
work of its seventh session, 2 May–8 July 1955 (UN doc A/2934), reprinted in UN, Yearbook of 
the International Law Commission 1955, Vol II (New York: UN, 1960) 19 at 29-31; Oda, supra 
n 56, at 86. 
61
  Knight, supra n 52, at 48. 
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unregulated freedom; (2) reasonable use; (3) regulated use; (4) establishment of 
property rights,
 62
 but appeared unsure of what stage the process had reached.
63
  He 
saw that, when overcrowding begins to result in conflict or economic waste, and 
regulation is insufficient or unattainable, property rights would be required for 
rational and efficient management.  Allocation of harvesting rights among 
participating States would be a theoretical solution to the open access problem, 
Knight wrote, and there were instances on record where States had accepted the need 
to establish quotas and done so by negotiation, each pressing “within the context of 
its own national priorities for the maximum allocation of the stocks in which it has 
the greatest interest”.  There was, however, no legal barrier to entry of new States to 
the fishery, which “usually renders ineffective the conservation and allocation system 
agreed on by the parties”.  He correctly foresaw that  
the problem of the new entrant is likely to become more severe in the next two 
decades as a result of developing countries’ emphasis on fishery industries coupled 
with technical assistance from F.A.O. and other organizations.
64
  
The enclosure of the EEZ was a necessary if not sufficient condition for controlling 
fishing effort, bringing with it some if not all of the advantages of property rights, 
and assisting the creation of the latter by coastal States that were so minded.  
Acknowledging the EEZ as a major step in this direction, Knight nonetheless 
doubted whether isolated property systems would be sufficient without some 
interlinking set of international standards to govern the national regulation of 
activities within each zone.
65
  This doubt is particularly apposite for stocks such as 
SBT, which move back and forth between EEZs and the high seas, since for such 
stocks reduction of the area of the high seas was the major outcome of the Third UN 
Conference on the Law of the Sea, and within that reduced area the tragedy of the 
commons continued unabated. 
                                                          
62
  Ibid., at 27.  
63
  Ibid., at 28 (just entering the third phase) and 95 (“well into” the fourth phase). 
64
  Ibid., at 42-44. 
65
  Ibid., at 29. 
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From the empirical evidence gathered for its 1997 study, the OECD concluded that: 
management regimes which limit the total catch, or the number of fishing vessels, or 
which restrict the efficiency of the harvesting sector, including technical measures 
and TACs, have generally yielded poor results when used in isolation…The main 
reason …is that these regimes do not give the fisher the incentive to account for all 
the costs of his fishing activity.
66
 
The findings of the study supported the introduction of “rights-based management 
systems” such as individual quotas, despite this requiring governments to establish 
and maintain a legal framework for the rights, with a possible increase in 
administrative costs and the possibility of “structural adjustment consequences, 
including lower employment opportunities and distributional conflicts.”67  The 
recommended objective of regulation was to create economic incentives or legal 
sanctions to reduce externalities.
68
 
The OECD elaborated: 
From an economic point of view, the basic reason why government regulations of 
the use of living marine resource [sic] are needed is that, in an unregulated fishery, 
the decisions made by individual fishers and groups of fishers result in economic 
overexploitation. …[B]ecause each fisher does not…pay for the resource he uses, he 
tends to use them to the point at which additional use would be of no additional 
value to him.  This excludes higher valued uses by others, including the protection of 
the future abundance and productivity of the resource.
69
  
The applicability of this reasoning to the SBT fishery was confirmed by the 
Industries Assistance Commission (IAC), as it then was, in report of an inquiry set 
up by the Minister for Industry and Commerce on 30 November 1983.
70
  The open 
                                                          
66
  OECD, supra n 53, at 9-10. 
67
  Ibid., at 10. 
68
  Ibid., at 12.  Where costs are able to be imposed on others, they are known in economic 
terms as “externalities”.  In this case they are imposed on other fishing operators, the rest of 
society and the environment: ibid., at 11. 
69
  Ibid., at 62. 
70
  Industries Assistance Commission (IAC), Report on Southern Bluefin Tuna (Canberra: 
Australian Government Publishing Service, 1984), at 69. 
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access nature of the SBT resource to this point, the report stated, had both economic 
and biological consequences.  While property rights over other natural resources 
were a long-established part of the legal landscape, the high cost of delineating and 
enforcing marine property rights meant that fisheries had remained unaffected by this 
development, with open access still prevailing.  Yet, unless the costs of enforcing 
title to the resources were so high that they would outweigh the gains, open access 
represented an inefficient use of the fishery.  In the absence of delineated rights to a 
fish stock such as SBT, individuals could neither capture all the benefits of their 
actions nor be made to bear all the resulting costs, and access to the fishery remained 
“unpriced”.  In such a situation, the resources allocated to the catching of fish, the 
quantity of fish taken and the average cost of catching them would increase to levels 
beyond those which were economic in social terms, even though fishing activities 
might remain profitable for individual operators.
71
  Moreover, individuals would 
have little or no incentive to engage in conservation measures, increasing the risk 
that the stock would be exploited to the extent of becoming biologically incapable of 
sustaining itself as a commercial resource.  Should that happen, the income forgone 
which could otherwise have been derived in future years from the fishery would 
represent a loss to the community.
72
 
On the international plane too, externalities occur.  New entrants and non-parties 
weaken international conservation efforts, since States agreeing to subject their 
fishing to conservation measures cannot reap the full benefits from them even though 
they bear the costs.
73
  The evidence suggests that fisheries commissions have not 
                                                          
71
  It is noteworthy that the evidence to the inquiry of the Bureau of Agricultural 
Economics, that the SBT fishery was heavily overcapitalised, was accepted by the industry as 
correct: ibid., at 25. 
72
  Ibid., at 18. 
73
  OECD, supra n 53, at 18 and 140.  Vessels face the costs of compliance with mandatory 
requirements such as carriage of observers, modification of gear and use of particular equipment; 
in addition there are public administration costs in monitoring and controlling the fleet, for 
example mounting air and sea patrols and paying the salaries of port inspectors: at 142. 
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effectively conserved and managed their stocks due to failure to control effort, 
exacerbated for straddling and highly migratory stocks by the presence of new 
entrants and non-parties, with the consequence that measures tend not to be adopted 
until long after the resource has become overexploited, and then are insufficient to 
deal with the problems.
74
 
The OECD identified a tendency for resources exploited by fleets under the authority 
of different States to be overfished.  New forms of international collaboration were 
needed to “provide all actors with a stake in the success of the management effort by 
benefiting those who abide by the rules and penalising those who do not.”  
Acknowledging that there were “no universal solutions to fisheries management 
problems”, it called for political decisions to give stakeholders “a modest degree of 
secure tenure in the resource” as a powerful incentive to control their exploitation of 
it.
75
 
2 Economic and biological models of fisheries 
The points made by the OECD and Knight are illustrated by the simple fisheries 
model depicted in Figure 1 on the next page.  The upper diagram represents the 
sustainable harvest from a fishery (measured in units of yield), and the costs of  
                                                          
74
  Ibid., at 18 and 143. 
75
  Ibid., at 20-21. 
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Figure 1 – the simple economic model of fisheries76 
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76
  After World Trade Organization (WTO) doc WT/CTE/W/111 (11 March 1999), “On the 
Environmental Impact of Fisheries Subsidies: A short report by the Icelandic Ministry of 
Fisheries”.  The paper argues that fisheries subsidies, whether in the form of cost reduction or of 
price support, exacerbate the common property problem on the high seas by encouraging 
increased fishing effort and frustrating attempts to remedy the heavy overcapitalisation that is 
characteristic of depleted fisheries, and which in turn impedes authorities’ efforts to conserve the 
resource: T. Bjørndal and G. R. Munro, “The Economics of Fisheries Management: A Survey”, 
in T. Tietenberg and H. Folmer (eds), The International Yearbook of Environmental and 
Resource Economics 1998/1999: A Survey of Current Issues (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1999), 
153 at 154.  The paper asserts that, if the same level of capital efficiency in terms of yield per 
unit fleet capacity as achieved in Icelandic and several other fisheries around the world based on 
property rights could be replicated on average worldwide, the fleet size required to take a 
sustainable yield of 80 million tonnes would be just over a fifth of its then current size, implying 
that nearly 80 per cent of the capacity of the world’s fishing fleets was surplus to requirements, 
and that the yield could be achieved with a commensurate reduction in fishing effort.  See also 
FAO Fisheries Circular No 853, supra Introduction n 15, at 21-23. 
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obtaining it, as a function of fishing effort.
77
  The yield initially increases with rising 
fishing effort, but at a declining rate as the fish stock is reduced in biomass.  It reaches a 
maximum, usually referred to as the maximum sustainable yield or MSY, at effort level 
eMSY.  Any increase in fishing effort above this level merely reduces the sustainable yield 
until finally, at effort level e, the fishery collapses. 
Revenue is directly proportional to weight if the market price of fish is assumed to be 
unaffected by scarcity, so that fish from a more abundant stock will fetch the same 
price per kilogram as when the stock is depleted.  This is why it was formerly 
thought that a depleted fishery would be abandoned for economic reasons long 
before the stock became threatened by extinction.
78
  Though that is still true, if 
scarcity makes the price rise – a more realistic assumption79 – then it remains 
profitable for longer for fishing fleets to target the depleted stock, reducing it even 
                                                          
77
  It will be noted that the cost curve is almost linear; linearity (i.e. the cost of fishing is 
directly proportional to the effort) was assumed by H.S. Gordon, “Economic Theory of a 
Common Property Resource: The Fishery”, (1954) 62 Journal of Political Economy 124 at 129.  
M.B. Schaefer, “Some Considerations of Population Dynamics and Economics in Relation to the 
Management of Commercial Fisheries”, (1957) 14 Journal of the Fisheries Research Board of 
Canada 669 at 676 described this as no “very serious departure from reality”, since most 
elements of the costs will be dependent on the conditions in the general economy external to the 
fishery sector. 
78
  See e.g. the statement in Report of the Extended Commission of the Eleventh Annual 
Meeting of the Commission, 19-22 October 2004, Busan, Republic of Korea (hereinafter CCSBT-
EC3 Report; Appendix 3 to Report of the Eleventh Annual Meeting of the Commission, 19-22 
October 2004, Busan, Republic of Korea (hereinafter CCSBT11 Report)), in CCSBT Blue Book 
2005, supra n 34, 15 at 19 (paragraph 27) that “even in the low productivity scenarios, SBT 
spawner biomass would not be expected to decline to zero as most fisheries, particularly longline 
fisheries, would be forced to withdraw from the fishery for economic reasons before this 
occurred.”  Accord Knight, supra n 52 at 8, who says that extinction by overfishing is impossible 
for most species, though it can reduce them to levels from which recovery takes a very long time. 
79
  Fish was once a cheap source of protein, but its overall price trend has been to increase 
more rapidly than other protein sources, though it is possible that demand for it will stabilise 
when its price reaches that of those other sources: OECD, supra n 53, at 32; FAO Fisheries 
Circular No 853, supra Introduction n 15, at 25 and 37. 
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further before economic factors force a cessation of fishing.  The two diagrams in 
Figure 1 can also be combined to produce a model for the biological yield function, 
if revenues on the vertical axis are replaced by yield in weight, and the biomass on 
the vertical axis in the lower diagram is placed on the horizontal axis, as in Figure 2 
in Appendix B. 
In terms of exploitation, the curve is traced from right to left: it starts at virgin 
biomass where the stock is in equilibrium at the carrying capacity of the environment 
and on average generates no surplus, and proceeds along the curve through what is 
known as a fishdown phase.  The law relating to how far this curve may be followed 
has undergone an evolution.  UNCLOS Articles 61 and 119 call for movement to a 
point near, but not beyond, the top of the curve, and for movement back to the top in 
fisheries that have already passed it.  By Article 61(3), the coastal State’s 
conservation and management measures in its EEZ are to be “designed to maintain or 
restore populations of harvested species at levels which can produce the maximum 
sustainable yield, as qualified by relevant environmental and economic factors…”; 
Article 119(1)(a) uses exactly the same words to describe the conservation measures 
to be taken by States on the high seas.  The references to economic factors suggest 
that the catch at which economic yield is maximised (maximum economic yield, 
MEY) rather than MSY may be pursued by the coastal State in the EEZ.
80
  There is 
no legal impediment to its use on the high seas either, although the cost structures of 
fleets from different States, and possibly also different prices for the product in the 
markets in which in they sell, will mean that MEY for one State will probably not be 
the same as that for another.
81
 
By contrast, paragraph 7 of Annex II to the UN Fish Stocks Agreement treats the top 
of the curve as a limit not to be exceeded rather than as a target to be aimed for:  
                                                          
80
  Accord W.T. Burke, The New International Law of Fisheries: UNCLOS 1982 and 
Beyond (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), at 52-55. 
81
  For this reason Schaefer, supra n 77 at 680, regarded MEY as an unsuitable basis for 
managing an international fishery. 
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The fishing mortality rate which generates maximum sustainable yield should be 
regarded as a minimum standard for limit reference points.  For stocks which are not 
overfished, fishery management strategies shall ensure that fishing mortality does not 
exceed that which corresponds to maximum sustainable yield, and that the biomass 
does not fall below a predefined threshold.  For overfished stocks, the biomass which 
would produce maximum sustainable yield can serve as a rebuilding target.
 
 
Paragraph 5 of that Annex states that:  
Fisheries management strategies shall ensure that the risk of exceeding limit 
reference points is very low.  If a stock falls below a limit reference point or is at risk 
of falling below such a reference point, conservation and management action should 
be initiated to facilitate stock recovery. 
The promptness with which this needs to be done is indicated in the second sentence 
of Article 6, paragraph 2 of the Agreement, embodying the precautionary approach 
to fisheries.
82
  This makes clear that, if the conditions for such action are met, “[t]he 
absence of adequate scientific information shall not be used as a reason for 
postponing or failing to take conservation and management measures.” 
On the other hand, a fishery’s economic performance is maximised when the stock is 
maintained at a level where its natural rate of productivity is equal to the economy’s 
rate of interest plus a cost dividend.  The fish resource can be viewed as a valuable 
asset that yields a rate of return (its natural rate of growth each period) and a 
dividend (in the form of lower harvesting cost at higher stock sizes)...If the 
resource’s rate of return plus dividend is higher than the economy’s rate of interest, 
the stock should be allowed to grow and increase in value.  The capital and labor that 
would be used to harvest the resource would be best used elsewhere in the economy.  
On the other hand, if the resource’s rate of return plus dividend were lower than the 
economy’s rate of interest, economic performance can be improved by removing 
more fish, reducing the stock and investing some or all of the revenue elsewhere in 
the economy.
83
 
                                                          
82
  Article 6 bears the heading “Application of the precautionary approach”. 
83
  OECD, supra n 53, at 62-63.  This statement has profound implications for very long-
lived, slow-growing stocks such as orange roughy, which on this view it will always pay to 
“mine” as they though they were a non-renewable resource.  If the costs of fishing are zero or 
negative – a condition that ceases to be absurd when the effects of subsidies are taken into 
account – the economically optimal policy is to drive the stock to extinction: C.W. Clark, 
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The fishing effort that maximises net profits from the fishery is at e* in the diagram.  
By definition, MEY is always less than MSY, because, as Figure 1 shows, at the 
latter point effort and thus costs are increasing while yield is stagnant, hence at the 
margin catching extra fish leads to loss, while increasing effort beyond MSY merely 
reduces the yield and thus returns while adding to costs, so deepening the loss.
84
 
The “bionomic” equilibrium for the fishery occurs at eeq.  At this level of fishing 
effort, costs equal revenues, leaving no net profits in the fishery.  This is generally at 
a much higher fishing effort level than the optimal one.  Due to the forces of 
competition, this is the point at which most fisheries operate unless they are subject 
to an efficient management system based on property rights.  If the price per unit of 
weight fetched by the fish is high enough, then under open access the effort may be 
greater than that required to take the MSY; in that case yield can be increased by 
restricting fishing effort to that level, even if it is not held down to the optimum.  The 
increase in revenue and decrease in cost will be an economic yield that can benefit 
society if it is not dissipated by an increase in unit costs (though precisely that is the 
effect of maintaining open access when catch or effort is restricted, since the 
prospect of profit will draw newcomers into the fishery).
85
 
The lower diagram in Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between fishing effort and 
biomass, showing that biomass declines steadily as fishing effort increases.  Thus the 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Mathematical Bioeconomics: The Optimal Management of Renewable Resources, 2nd edn (New 
York: John Wiley & Sons, 1990), at 46-47.  For international fisheries in general and SBT in 
particular, the different interest rates prevailing in the economies of the States that fish it will 
have a strong influence on individual States’ preference as between conservation for the long 
term and exploitation in the short term – see infra text at nn 107-111. 
84
  See Schaefer, supra n 77, at 677-678 for a formal proof and two further propositions 
necessarily derived from the quadratic nature of the yield function (see infra Appendix 2, text at 
nn 1498-1501): (a) MSY is achieved when the fishing effort is half that required to reduce the 
stock to zero; and (b) if costs are proportional to effort, MEY must occur at half the fishing effort 
that would prevail in an open access fishery. 
85
  Ibid., at 678-680. 
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bionomic equilibrium fishing effort, eeq, corresponds to a relatively low biomass 
level, while the profit-maximising fishing effort level, e*, corresponds to a relatively 
high biomass level greater than that corresponding to the MSY, which from the 
diagram must fall between Beq and B*.  It follows that a policy aimed at maximising 
profits from a fishery is likely to pose less risk of depleting the stock than one aiming 
to extract the MSY from it. 
3 A possible solution: individual transferable quotas 
Merely limiting catch without limiting entry can initially cause the number of 
participants in a fishery to fall, but in the long run no resource rent is generated, 
because it is dissipated by the new entrants and overinvestment attracted by the 
initially improved conditions.
86
  Nor is a simple overall quota sufficient to solve the 
overcapitalisation problem, as individual operators would still have an incentive to 
invest in upgrading their vessels and equipment in order to catch a greater share of 
the quota – and the overcapacity leads to pressure to authorise unsustainable TACs, 
so as to avoid economic problems in the short term.
87
  Input control as practised by 
governments tends to shorten seasons – in Canada to the point where “fishermen had 
to fish continuously when allowed, regardless of weather and safety.”88  Only by 
making the quota specific to each individual or boat – an individual transferable 
                                                          
86
  OECD, supra n 53, at 73. 
87
  D. Butterworth, “Science and Fisheries Management Entering the New Millennium”, in 
M.H. Nordquist and J. Norton Moore (eds), Current Fisheries Issues and the Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (The Hague, Boston, London: Martinus Nijhoff, 
2000), 37 at 38. 
88
  S. Cunningham, “Outcome of the workshop on individual quota management”, in 
OECD, The Use of Individual Quotas in Fisheries Management (Paris: OECD, 1993), 7 at 12; 
according to the Canadian Department of Fisheries and Oceans, “Individual Quota Management: 
Canada’s Experience Featuring the Pacific Halibut Fishery”, ibid., 145 at 149, before ITQs, the 
Pacific halibut season shrank to 6 days in 1990 from 61 in 1982, causing supply gluts on the fresh 
fish market, so that most of the catch went to less the valuable frozen fish market instead.  
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quota (hereinafter ITQ) – could this incentive to “rush to fish” be negated.89  ITQs 
give fishermen an incentive to view the fishery resources as long-term assets whose 
conservation is in their own interests; will discount future returns at a rate far below 
that of returns when property rights are ill-defined.
90
 
ITQs can be placed within a much broader trend or phenomenon seen in the 
development of administrative law, in which regulation of some economic activity 
typically begins with a licence to engage in that activity issued by a governmental 
authority, backed by a prohibition on doing so without a licence, although, as 
formerly in the Commonwealth fisheries, such licences might be freely available.
91
  
Licences might be valid for only a short period, and possibly – subject to the 
requirements of natural justice
92
 – terminable on very little notice or perhaps even 
without notice.
93
  On expiry of the licence, the holder would have to reapply for it – 
                                                          
89
  IAC, supra n 70, at 18-19 and 25.  See also OECD, supra n 53, at 78, where other 
beneficial consequences of the elimination of the race to fish are listed.   Despite this, the spread 
of ITQs in domestic fisheries has not been rapid: the FAO Secretariat has noted (FAO Fisheries 
Circular No 853, supra Introduction n 15, at 1) that “many states are reluctant to take the 
necessary steps to assign and allocate exclusive use rights among their own fishermen.”  
90
  Bjørndal and Munro, supra n 76, at 178-179.  Accord Cunningham, supra n 88, at 13: 
ITQs give fishermen an interest in the health of the fishery as whole, not just in their own catch; 
moreover, with the realisation that cheating is now at the expense of fellow owners, not the 
public, there is increased preparedness to accept enforcement of the law. 
91
  See J. Waugh, Australian Fisheries Law (Melbourne: University of Melbourne Law 
School, 1988), at 87.  Subsection 13(1)(a)-(c) of the former Fisheries Act 1952 (Cth) prohibited 
fishing and related activities unless done by or on behalf of a person holding a valid licence. 
92
  See R v. City of Melbourne; ex parte Whyte [1949] VLR 257, a case about the 
cancellation of a taxi-driver’s licence. 
93
  Subsections 9(1) to (3) of the Fisheries Act 1952 authorised the granting of licences by 
the Minister or the Secretary of the administering Department, which by subsection 9(6) had a 
maximum duration of 12 months (or to the end of the following calendar year if issued in 
December).  Subsection 9(8) permitted but did not require fees to be payable for the grant.  
According to Waugh, supra n 91, at 41-42 it was “standard administrative practice” for the 
licence to be renewed on expiry even though this was discretionary by subsection 9(6B); 
amendments made in 1987 allowed extension of licences by regulation. 
 47 
and policies aimed at fairness such as ensuring a wide distribution of opportunities to 
engage in the activity may dictate that there be not only no presumption in favour of 
renewal, but perhaps even a deliberate bias against it.  Yet, since both law and 
economics favour certainty and predictability, both are served by the development 
over time of a practice whereby, provided the licence holder has a good record of 
compliance with the conditions, there should in fact be a presumption of renewal, so 
that economic activity is not unnecessarily interrupted.  This in due course may lend 
itself to the creation and recognition of a legitimate expectation as regards renewal of 
the licence,
94
 or further statutory measures to circumscribe the authorities’ discretion 
to cancel or suspend licences.
95
  From this point the logical next step is for the 
licences to become permanent.  As long as the licensing system remains, however, 
the government will want to retain control over entry and exit by each individual or 
firm (and of the possibility of cancellation of the licence for misdemeanours), for 
example with a view to ensuring that holders have the necessary qualifications and 
skills, and will not countenance trading, which would allow anyone to commence the 
activity licensed.  But if entry is limited, as is by definition the case for ITQs (as well 
                                                          
94
  See e.g. H.W.R. Wade and C.F. Forsyth, Administrative Law (9th edn; Oxford: Oxford 
University Press (hereinafter OUP), 2004), 536-538, citing inter alia FAI Insurances Ltd v. 
Winneke (1982) 41 ALR 1, a case concerning renewal of approval to provide worker’s 
compensation insurance. 
95
  Section 9A on cancellation and suspension of licences was added to the Fisheries Act 
1952 in 1973.  By section 16A, inserted in 1984, the Administrative Appeals Tribunal was able to 
review decisions on grant, renewal, cancellation and suspension of licences (but not for failure to 
comply with licence conditions, infringements of fisheries notices or false statements in 
applications).  The discussion of management plans in Waugh, supra n 91, at 43 indicates that 
their purpose was originally to provide guidance and predictability for the exercise of 
discretionary powers.  Subsection 7B(8), inserted in 1985, provided that “While a plan of 
management is in force for a fishery, the Minister and the Secretary shall perform their functions, 
and exercise their powers, under this Act in relation to the fishery in accordance with the plan of 
management, and not otherwise.”  See now the Fisheries Management Act 1991 (Cth), 
subsection 17(10), which replaces the reference to the Minister and Secretary with a reference to 
AFMA and omits the words “and not otherwise”. 
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as often with the taxi licences favoured as illustrations in the economic literature), 
scarcity gives the licences a value, and thus pressures grow to allow trading.  If the 
government concedes this,
96
 its role may come to be gradually reduced to registry 
functions, recording who has the rights at any given moment, and gatekeeper 
functions, perhaps insisting on certain qualifications in the purchaser, but provided 
those are met, it will not intervene to prevent the transaction.  This is the stage 
reached by the ITQ. 
As explained by the OECD, several practical questions need to be answered once the 
decision to move to an ITQ system is taken in principle: 
When individual quotas are first implemented, several issues confront managers: 
Whether to sell or give away quota rights.  If sold, by what means?  If given away, 
how to select recipients?  How to specify the basic characteristics of individual 
quotas, including the extent and duration of the right, divisibility, transferability.  
How to distribute quota shares among recipients…The initial allocation of individual 
quotas is…one of the most difficult, time consuming and costly aspects of 
implementing an [ITQ] regime.  The initial allocation of quota shares is often 
problematic and controversial because it determines who will receive many of the 
benefits from the programme, creating a valuable asset for some and excluding 
others.
97
 
                                                          
96
  Transfer of licences under the Fisheries Act 1952, subsection 9(7) could be done only by 
the Minister or Secretary on the joint application of the holder and the proposed transferee.  
Waugh, supra n 91, notes at 46 that in the mid-1980s fishing capacity units were made 
transferable subject to certain conditions under the Northern Prawn Fishery Management Plan, 
but his analysis of a possible constitutional challenge to a compulsory reduction plan as an 
acquisition of property other than on just terms (see Commonwealth of Australia Constitution 
Act 1900 (Imp), Schedule, s.51 (xxxi)) led him to conclude that the units’ resemblance to 
property rights was only superficial, since under the system based on licensing the holder’s right 
was enforceable only as against the grantor authorities, not against all the world: at 46-47.  
(Prepared to concede at 86 that “modern fisheries regulation, which tends increasingly to grant 
exclusive rights to fish, has many resemblances to an exercise of proprietary rights”, Waugh 
nevertheless maintains that the units bought and sold for value had a legal existence only as 
preconditions to the grant of a licence under a management plan: at 88.) 
97
  OECD, supra n 53, at 77. 
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Allocation commonly occurs on the basis of catch history, but this varies.  Once the 
TAC is allocated among individuals, most producers will initially possess less quota 
than desired for their fishing operation.  If quota is not transferable, some will be 
unable to cover their variable costs and thus be induced to leave the fishery.  If it is 
transferable, trading will take place and quota can be expected to end up in the hands 
of the lowest-cost producers.
98
 
Industry resistance can be expected as ITQs will displace the marginal and less 
profitable producers, many of whom receive significant non-monetary benefits from 
participating in the fishery – although ITQs also allow those leaving fishery to 
liquidate the value of their rights.
99
  There will also be wider concerns about the 
fairness of reserving a public resource for a privileged few with capital investment in 
the fishery and excluding all others, whereas under open access all can try their luck 
at making a living.  It should, however, be possible for the government to capture 
some of the resource rent generated and use it to compensate the public as previous 
owner of resource.
100
  Ownership restrictions such as limits on concentration of quota 
holdings can be imposed if desired to take account of these social considerations, 
though at some cost to the value of the right; there are trade-offs between economic 
efficiency and accommodation of restrictions.
101
 
The most often cited disadvantages of ITQs are the high monitoring and enforcement 
costs and the incentive to engage in highgrading (the practice of throwing small fish 
back into the sea in order to maximise the average weight – and value per kilogram – 
of retained fish).
102
  While the former is undeniable, and means that low-value 
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  Ibid., at 77. 
99
  Cunningham, supra n 88, at 12. 
100
  OECD, supra n 53, at 79. 
101
  I. Clark, “Individual transferable quotas: the New Zealand experience” (1993) 17 Marine 
Policy 340 at 341-342. 
102
  These were the reasons cited by Japan in 1996 for not intending to introduce ITQs in the 
near future when the Australian SBT industry presented to the CCSBT’s Third Meeting a paper 
advocating use of ITQs by all participants in the fishery, endorsed by Australia, which averred 
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fisheries will rarely be good candidates for placing on an ITQ basis, the latter 
criticism is not necessarily well founded.  The mid-1990s Japanese practice of 
discarding SBT under 25kg,
103
 which Australia has never followed despite having 
ITQs, indicates however that this is by no means an inevitable outcome.  By contrast, 
where there is a particular need to protect small fish, ITQs can provide a positive 
incentive in this respect, whereas a race to fish discourages having regard to the size 
of individual fish caught.
104
 
Under the ITQ system, one benefit of a market in quota, in theory at least, is that the 
prohibitive amount of detail about the economics of individual operators needed to 
optimise quota, which they are unlikely to yield willingly, is contained in the most 
                                                                                                                                                                    
that Japan would find ITQs of assistance in solving some of the problems in its SBT fishery: 
CCSBT, Report of the Third Annual Meeting (Revised), 24 - 28 September 1996, Canberra, 
Australia <www.ccsbt.org/docs/pdf/meeting_reports/ccsbt_3/report_of_ccsbt3_part1.pdf> 
(visited on 15 May 2008, hereinafter CCSBT3(1) Report), at 13 and “Australian Industry 
Presentation on ITQ System” (Attachment L).  Japan did ultimately announce in 2006 its 
willingness to adopt a system of individual quotas for its vessels, but this was only in response to 
the crisis of the revelation of persistent overcatch over two decades: see infra Ch V, text at n 
1109 and CCSBT, Report of the Extended Commission of the Thirteenth Annual Meeting of the 
Commission, 10-13 October 2006, Miyazaki, Japan (hereinafter CCSBT-EC5 Report; Appendix 
4 to CCSBT, Report of the Thirteenth Annual Meeting of the Commission, 10-13 October 2006, 
Miyazaki, Japan (hereinafter CCSBT13 Report; available online at <www.ccsbt.org/docs/pdf/ 
meeting_reports/ccsbt_13/report_of_CCSBT13.pdf> (visited on 11 June 2008))), at 5 (paragraph 
32).  The quotas are not transferable: J. Yamashita, “Opening Statement by Japan” (Attachment 
4-5 to CCSBT-EC5 Report), at 1; see also “Japanese New SBT Fishery Regulation” (Appendix 3 
to “Review of Japanese SBT Fisheries in the 2005 Fishing Season” (Attachment 12-5 to CCSBT-
EC5 Report)). 
103
  Infra Ch V, text at nn 1153-1156.  A change in the regulations applicable to Japanese 
vessels fishing for SBT in the Australian Fishing Zone in 1991 under a 1979 treaty (infra n 265 
and accompanying text), so that all hooked fish must be retained on board, was instituted into 
order to prevent the highgrading reported by observers on board: Polacheck, supra n 34, at 279. 
104
  OECD, supra n 53, at 73; see also reference at 19 to a study that found no discernible 
increase in discards under an ITQ system over the previous limited effort management scheme, 
and Cunningham, supra n 88, arguing at 12 that highgrading is not a problem of ITQs per se but 
is related to the limited hold capacity of vessels, and thus occurs under any management system. 
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recent sale price of quota, which is equivalent to the net present value of the future 
economic rent from the fishery.  For the management authority, it is sufficient to 
monitor and maximise that price:  
[T]he prevailing quota market price reflects all relevant information about the 
current and future conditions in the fishery available to the fishing firms, or, more 
generally, the participants in the quota market.  It follows that the quota authority has 
only to monitor the quota market to become privy to the same information.
105
 
4 Two further complexities 
The models presented in Figure 1 do not fully capture the economic factors at work 
in an open-access international fishery.  Two particular sources of complexity are 
now explained. 
(a) Discount rate 
States participating in international fisheries will often have different discount rates, 
which measure the relative value of a monetary unit in future compared with the 
present.  The concept of the discount rate is known to most legal systems from the 
necessity of calculating the present value of future losses in quantification of 
damages in tort or delict.
106
  A low discount rate means a future value is given nearly 
the same weight as the same value in the present, while a high discount rate places 
much lower weight on it.  Applying this to fisheries for depleted stocks, a zero 
discount rate (that is, participants are willing to exchange a dollar of sacrifice today 
for a dollar of gain in future) would result in fast rebuilding through greater sacrifices 
in the short term in exchange for future gains.  With a positive discount rate, the 
participants are not willing to sacrifice as much in the present for the sake of future 
                                                          
105
  R. Arnason, “Minimum information management in fisheries”, (1990) XXIII Canadian 
Journal of Economics 630 at 644. 
106
  See e.g. the discussion of the position in Australia in R.P Balkin and J.L.R. Davis, The 
Law of Torts, 3rd edn (Sydney: LexisNexis Butterworths, 2004), at 396-397. 
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gains, slowing the rebuilding of the stock and leaving its ultimate absolute size lower 
than with a zero discount rate.
107
 
The lower a fishing State’s discount rate, the greater its desire to invest in the 
resource and thus the more conservative the harvesting policy it can be expected to 
favour.
108
  Most fisheries commissions, however, behave as if they have high 
discount rates.  Uncertainty and imperfect information about the present and future 
states of the stock,
109
 markets and technology make managers and participants in the 
fishery reluctant to accept substantial present sacrifices for uncertain or distant
110
 
future gains.  Moreover, maximisation of economic performance is rarely the sole or 
even principal objective pursued by a commission.
111
  
An example of the trouble this causes is an unreported judgment of the New Zealand 
High Court
112
 in a case discussed by Burke where evidence had been led that
113
 in 
                                                          
107
  OECD, supra n 53, at 63.  C. Costa Duarte, A. Brasão and P. Pintassilgo, “Management 
of the Northern Atlantic Bluefin Tuna: An Application of C-Games” (2000) 15 Marine Resource 
Economics 21 at 24n apply a 4% per annum discount rate to the real data used in their model, 
based on International Monetary Fund reports.  Balkin and Davis, supra n 106, give at 396n-397n 
a range of discount rates in various jurisdictions, from 2.5% per annum (United Kingdom) to 7% 
(Tasmania).  G.R. Munro and A.D. Scott, “The Economics of Fisheries Management”, in A.V. 
Kneese and J.L. Sweeney (eds), Handbook of Natural Resource and Energy Economics, vol II 
(North-Holland: Amsterdam, 1985), 623 at 642 point out that once discount rates are taken into 
account, changing the bioeconomic model from a static to dynamic one (i.e. one that takes 
explicit account of the passage of time), the inequality B* > Bmsy (the biomass that produces 
MSY), a truism under the static model, no longer necessarily holds.  
108
  OECD, supra n 53, at 141. 
109
  Unreliability of supply is highlighted by G. Pontecorvo, “Insularity of scientific 
disciplines and uncertainty about supply: the two keys to the failure of fisheries management”, 
(2003) 27 Marine Policy 69 at 69 as reasons for attitudes reflecting implicit low discount rates. 
110
  For example, the Norwegian spring-spawning herring stock, fished almost to extinction 
before a moratorium on harvesting in the late 1960s, took over 20 years to recover: Bjørndal and 
Munro, supra n 76, at 161. 
111
  OECD, supra n 53, at 63. 
112
  New Zealand Fishing Industry Association and Ors v. Minister of Fisheries and Ors 
(High Court of New Zealand, reversed on other grounds in the Court of Appeal 1997). 
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the New Zealand snapper fishery a yield of 92 per cent of MSY was being produced 
by a biomass that was only 50 per cent of that generating MSY (Bmsy).  The Court 
held that, as a matter of construction of the Fisheries Act 1983 (NZ), which enacted 
in different words the relevant provisions of UNCLOS, the Minister of Fisheries had 
discretion as to the pace at which to rebuild to Bmsy, but not about whether to do so at 
all.  It upheld his decision to do so over 20 years, for which a 39 per cent cut of the 
TAC was required.  While Burke’s criticism that this will lead to greater risk of 
depletion is hard to understand, the case does illustrate the economic point that a 
fishery in this position would need a substantial drop from the current level of catch 
in order to rebuild the stock to Bmsy, but participants would not be rewarded by much 
more catch in future.  Even a low discount rate might not justify this in cost-benefit 
terms (though a reduction in unnecessary effort might). 
The CCSBT now provides its own quantified illustration of this phenomenon.  In 
2005 a cut in the TAC for 2006 of 5,000 tonnes, which was to have been the first 
step in a management procedure aimed at reaching a particular stock size by 2014, 
was delayed by a year.  Still wanting to meet that goal, the Members accepted the 
Scientific Committee’s advice that the delayed cut would instead have to be 7,160 
tonnes.
114
  In other words, 5,000 tonnes “borrowed” from the stock for a year and 
then repaid over eight years would result in a total repayment of 8 x (7160 – 5000) = 
                                                                                                                                                                    
113
  W.T. Burke, “Evolution in the Fishery Provisions of UNCLOS”, in N. Ando, E. 
McWhinney and R. Wolfrum (eds), Liber Amicorum Judge Shigeru Oda (The Hague, London: 
Kluwer Law International, 2002), 1355 at 1356-1359. 
114
  Report of the Extended Scientific Committee for the Tenth Meeting of the Scientific 
Committee, 5-8 September 2005, Taipei, Taiwan (hereinafter CCSBT-ESC4 Report; Appendix 2 
to CCSBT, Report of the Tenth Meeting of the Scientific Committee, 9 September 2005, Narita, 
Japan), <www.ccsbt.org/docs/pdf/meeting_reports/ccsbt_12/report_of_SC10.pdf> (visited on 16 
June 2008), at 9 (paragraph 42). 
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17,280 tonnes.  This implies a discount rate, assuming net returns of a fixed price per 
tonne of SBT in 2005 dollars, of no less than 40.3268 per cent per annum.
115
 
(b) Game theory  
Effective joint management of fish stocks by States is hampered by the differences 
among them in both management objectives and the willingness and ability to make 
short-term sacrifices in exchange for long-term gains.  Management conflicts can 
arise among States due to different discount rates, risk perceptions, production costs 
and consumer tastes, which all influence the optimal consumption rate and hence 
stock size.
116
 
As a consequence of the tragedy of the commons, each State in competing with 
others for high seas fish stocks tends to neglect the impact of its own harvesting on 
the capital (fish) stock and its future productivity.  In game theory,
117
 the tragedy of 
the commons falls within a wider class of game in which there is a 
strategy…that produces better results for each player no matter what strategy the 
other player follows.  When both players act in their own self-interest, both do worse 
than if each had shown restraint…[W]ithout co-operation players are driven to adopt 
strategies which both recognise as injurious.  Unless the countries reach a binding 
                                                          
115
  See <www.moneymadeclear.fsa.gov.uk/tools.aspx?Tool=loan_calculator> (visited on 13 
June 2008), the result obtained by filling in the first, second and fourth boxes with 5000, 8 and 1 
respectively and manipulating the figure in the third (interest rate) box in order for the result 
displayed in the fifth (annual repayment) box to be exactly 2160.00. 
116
  OECD, supra n 53, at 141. 
117
  Game theory is a branch of mathematics that models strategic behaviour, that is, actions 
influenced by expectations of the actions of others, and has applications in a variety of fields, 
including economics, evolutionary biology, political science and military strategy.   See generally 
J. von Neumann and O. Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, 3rd edn 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953).  When studied from an abstract mathematical 
viewpoint it is conventional to call the resulting interactions “games”.  Cooperative games are 
those “economic (or other) situations involving individuals whose interests are neither 
completely opposed nor completely coincident”: J. Nash, “Two-Person Cooperative Games”, 
(1953) 21 Econometrica 128 at 128. 
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agreement to conserve and manage the resource, both countries will inevitably 
decide to deplete the resource.
118
 
Resources exploited non-cooperatively thus yield lower economic returns than if 
managed cooperatively.  Non-member fishing imposes either loss of revenue on 
complying fleets by reducing the allowable catch if a given stock size is targeted, or 
reduction of the stock in any other case.
119
 
The economic analysis of the exploitation of straddling and highly migratory fish 
stocks has only recently developed beyond that of the simpler case of shared stocks 
(those occurring in two or more adjacent EEZs but not on the adjacent high seas).
120
  
The analysis of cooperation currently relies on the theory of coalitions, but the 
complexity of the issue forces the use of restrictive assumptions.
121
  Hannesson has 
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  OECD, supra n 53, at 140. 
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  Ibid., at 141-142. 
120
  See Bjørndal and Munro, supra n 76; T. Bjørndal and G. R. Munro, “The management 
of high seas fisheries resources and the implementation of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement of 
1995”, in T. Tietenberg and H. Folmer (eds), The International Yearbook of Environmental and 
Resource Economics 2003/2004: A Survey of Current Issues (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2004), 
1; C.W. Clark, “Restricted access to common-property fishery resources: a game theoretic 
analysis”, in P-T. Liu (ed), Dynamic Optimization and Mathematical Economics (New York: 
Plenum Press, 1980), 117; Costa Duarte et al, supra n 107; R. Hannesson, “Fishing as a 
Supergame”, (1997) 32 Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 309; V. Kaitala 
and M. Lindroos, “Sharing the Benefits of Cooperation in High Seas Fisheries: A Characteristic 
Function Game Approach”, (1998) 11 Natural Resource Modeling 275; V. Kaitala and G. R. 
Munro, “The Management of High Seas Fisheries”, (1993) 8 Marine Resource Economics 313; 
V. Kaitala and G. R. Munro, “The Conservation and Management of High Seas Fishery 
Resources Under the New Law of the Sea”, (1997) 10 Natural Resource Modeling 87; E. Li, 
“Cooperative High-Seas Straddling Stock Agreement as a Characteristic Function Game”, (1998) 
13 Marine Resource Economics 247; G. R. Munro, “The Management of Shared Fishery 
Resources Under Extended Jurisdiction”, (1987) 3 Marine Resource Economics 271; G. R. 
Munro, “The United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement of 1995: History and Problems of 
Interpretation”, (2000) 15 Marine Resource Economics 265; P. Pintassilgo and C. Costa Duarte, 
“The New-Member Problem in the Cooperative Management of High Seas Fisheries”, (2000) 15 
Marine Resource Economics 361. 
121
  OECD, supra n 53, at 142. 
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shown that, if the stock’s growth rate is higher than the discount rate (though the 
latter may itself be influenced by uncertainty about the former), any cooperative 
solution will have the property that no player can benefit by changing strategy while 
the other players keep their strategies unchanged, but the higher the number of 
players, the less likely the cooperative solution is to be sustainable, because of the 
high reward from cheating and low risk of punishment.
122
  More recently, Pintassilgo 
has demonstrated that under some conditions – where the benefits of cooperation are 
exceeded by the sum of the benefits each participant would derive if it alone were to 
cheat – no possible allocation can motivate all participants to abide by that 
allocation.  For this a legal framework is required that prevents fishing outside the 
cooperative regime.
123
  Such a framework exists, however, only in fragmentary form.  
Munro attributes non-cooperative management of straddling stocks such as the 
Grand Banks cod and Bering Sea pollock to the “vagueness and imprecision” of the 
UNCLOS high seas fisheries articles.
124
 
                                                          
122
  R. Hannesson, “Fishing on the High Seas: Cooperation or Competition?” (1995) 19 
Marine Policy 371 at 373.  Accord OECD, supra n 53, at 162: as the number of States increases, 
depletion becomes more likely because the relative attraction to each of being the “sole cheater” 
rises. 
123
  P. Pintassilgo, “A Coalition Approach to the Management of High Seas Fisheries in the 
Face of Externalities”, (2003) 16 Natural Resource Modeling 175 at 193-194; G. Munro, A. van 
Houtte and R. Willmann, The Conservation and Management of Shared Fish Stocks: Legal and 
Economic Aspects (FAO Fisheries Technical Paper No 465; Rome: FAO, 2004), at 45.  Kaitala 
and Munro (1993), supra n 120, at 325 concur that a binding agreement removes the threat of 
breakdown in cooperation from future shifts of relative bargaining power, which depends for 
each player on what it stands to lose if there is no cooperative solution – the more it stands to 
lose, the weaker its position: at 323.  
124
  Munro (2000), supra n 120, at 269.  More extensive accounts of the regulatory history of 
these fisheries are found respectively in R. Applebaum, “The Straddling Stocks Problem: The 
Northwest Atlantic Situation, International Law, and Options for Coastal State Action”, in 
A.H.A. Soons (ed), Implementation of the Law of the Sea Convention through International 
Organizations : Proceedings of the 23rd Annual Conference of the Law of the Sea Institute, June 
12-15, 1989, Noordwijk aan Zee, The Netherlands (Honolulu : Law of the Sea Institute, 
University of Hawaii, 1990), 282 and D.A. Balton, “The Bering Sea Doughnut Hole Convention: 
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For reasons of game theory, even in the context of general concern about an 
overfished stock, if any single participant voluntarily restrains its catch without 
reliable commitments of similar restraint by all other relevant players, it incurs a 
short-term loss while the entire benefit of its action accrues to those other players.  In 
other words, catch reductions can only be successfully undertaken in concert.  An 
example of this is seen in Australia’s 1989 proposal for a moratorium on SBT catch 
being conditional on it applying to all three States in the trilateral arrangement.
125
  In 
the late 1990s game theory similarly explains both why Australia, despite growing 
catches of third parties, merely opposed an increase in TAC rather than positively 
advocating a decrease, and why New Zealand, which did advocate a cut, did not, and 
could not have been expected to, accept Japan’s cynical invitation to act unilaterally 
on its view of the SBT stock as depleted and requiring immediate reductions in 
catch.
126
  This is a practical illustration of the “tragedy of the commons” affecting 
high seas fisheries; with open access, all players’ incentive is to maximise their own 
catch irrespective of the damage they thereby do to the stock (and of their knowledge 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Regional Solution, Global Implications”, in O.S. Stokke (ed), Governing High Seas Fisheries: 
The Interplay of Global and Regional Regimes (Oxford: OUP, 2001), 143. 
125
  In “Southern Bluefin Tuna Quotas Set” (Media Release PIE 89/328K, John Kerin MP, 
Minister for Primary Industries and Energy, 24 November 1989), the Minister not only stated that 
“A unilateral moratorium by Australia was never proposed and would not have made any sense 
either for conserving the stock of SBT or for promoting Australian industry’s interests.”, but 
lauded the reduced national allocations actually achieved that year as “a significant increase in 
the proportion taken from the surface [i.e. Australian] fishery.” 
126
  See Report of the Fourth Annual Meeting, First Part, 8-13 September 1997, Canberra, 
Australia (hereinafter CCSBT4(1) Report), in CCSBT, Reports of the Meetings for the Fourth 
Year of the Commission (including Financial Statements) (hereinafter CCSBT Blue Book 1999), 
at 10: “the decisions of both Australia and New Zealand on voluntary catch restrictions should 
reflect their respective views on stock status.”)  For all its superficial “put your money where 
your mouth is” appeal, for New Zealand to have accepted this challenge would have increased 
the other parties’ share with no guarantee that its own restraint would be rewarded in the medium 
term with a larger share if the stock recovered.  Indeed the stock might well not recover at all if 
Japan and non-members declined to follow suit or even took advantage of New Zealand’s 
reduction to increase their own catch in the light of their own scientific projections. 
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of that damage) because, as Gordon put it in his pioneering article on fisheries 
economics, “the fish in the sea are valueless to the fisherman, because there is no 
assurance that they will be there for him tomorrow if they are left behind today”.127 
With stocks occurring in the EEZs of two or more or States but not on the high seas, 
mutual access agreements increase the likelihood of a cooperative solution, because 
States are assured of access to the benefits of their conservation efforts despite the 
stock’s uncertain movement across the boundary.  For straddling and especially 
highly migratory stocks, however, such a solution is unlikely to emerge, since 
inviting any given number of distant-water fleets into the EEZ to fish the stock 
would still leave an indefinite number of participants able to fish it on the high 
seas.
128
  Making a range of arbitrary assumptions about discount rates and costs of 
fishing as a proportion of the price fetched, Hannesson finds the prospects of stocks 
shared between neighbouring EEZs “not too discouraging”,129 but is much more 
pessimistic about stocks outside 200 miles, for which he demonstrates that low-cost 
players may be tempted to fish down stocks to drive out high-cost ones,
130
 and that 
[t]he effect of cost heterogeneity is seen to be substantial: it does not take a great 
difference in costs to reduce [the maximum number of self-enforcing participants] to 
a number not much higher than two, irrespective of the discount rate, cost level or 
productivity of the fish stock.
131
 
As the next section shows, however, the SBT stock as a whole has never been 
managed to maximise the overall economic benefit from the fishery, despite a 1988 
recommendation from scientists of the States concerned to do so (which they thought 
                                                          
127
  Gordon, supra n 77, at 135; see also E.A. Keen, “Common property in fisheries – Is sole 
ownership an option?” (1983) 7 Marine Policy 197 at 203 who expresses it thus: “the harvest for 
any particular day must be maximized lest the resource be taken by someone else.” 
128
  Hannesson, supra n 122, at 375. 
129
  Hannesson, supra n 120, at 313. 
130
  Ibid., at 315-316. 
131
  Ibid., at 316.  Cooperation is much more likely, though, if the stock is assumed to 
migrate sequentially through the States’ EEZs rather than redistributing itself instantaneously: at 
318-319. 
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would be at a parental biomass of between 30 per cent and 50 per cent of its 
unexploited size).
132
  The reason for this may lie in the discount rate: one study found 
that a cooperative solution in the SBT fishery could bring about a rapid increase in 
parental biomass, resulting in significant reduction in harvesting costs – but would 
require that catches be cut by almost half for the first three years, approaching 15,000 
tonnes again only after 20 years.
133
  Since the reduction would only materialise in the 
form of lower effort through tackling the overcapitalisation, implying that many 
vessels would have to leave the fishery, implementation of such a solution is less 
politically palatable than risking the stock’s collapse by persevering with the overly 
large fleet.  The same study concluded that continuation of the 1997 harvesting effort 
would be “barely sustainable on either biological or producer rent grounds”, 
generating small profits for Australia and New Zealand, but losses for all others.
134
  
The levels of effort in the various national fleets are now considered seriatim. 
C Overview of the SBT fishery 
Seven of the tuna species are considered by the FAO as principal market tuna species 
because of their global economic importance and their international trade for canning 
and sashimi, raw fish being regarded as a delicacy in Japan and more recently also in 
other countries.
135
  As one of these principal market tunas, SBT, though of only 
                                                          
132
  Report of the Seventh Meeting of Australian, Japanese and New Zealand Scientists on 
Southern Bluefin Tuna, 15-19 August 1988, Fisheries Research Centre, Wellington, New Zealand 
(hereinafter 7th Trilateral Scientific Meeting Report), in Bureau of Rural Resources, Reports of 
the Trilateral Scientific Discussions among Australia, Japan and New Zealand on Southern 
Bluefin Tuna 1982-1991 (Working Paper No. WP/10/92; Canberra: Bureau of Rural Resources, 
1992) (hereinafter Trilateral Scientific Meeting Reports Compendium), 41 at 43.  Parental 
biomass is the weight of the sexually mature portion of a stock on which reproduction depends: 
Caton et al, supra n 36, at 41. 
133
  Kennedy, Davies and Cox, supra n 40, at 15. 
134
  Ibid., at 18. 
135
  Majkowski, supra n 23, at 118, adjusted for the split of northern bluefin tuna into two 
species.  The principal market tunas of the genus Thunnus are albacore (T. alalunga), bigeye tuna 
(T. obesus), northern bluefin tuna (T. thynnus and T. orientalis), SBT (T. maccoyii) and yellowfin 
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minor significance in terms of volume,
136
 realises high prices in the sashimi trade.  
The flesh is very red and firm in texture, with high fat and low moisture.  Large, 
good quality, fatty individuals sold for sashimi can sometimes fetch prices above 
US$200 per kilogram if they are properly handled after capture.
137
 
Until relatively recently there was little interaction between the States in whose 
waters SBT is found and those whose nationals or vessels fish for SBT, as their 
fisheries developed independently of each other.  In Australia, an early indication that 
commercial fishing of SBT might be possible occurred in June 1907 when large schools 
of it were observed off Port Jackson and Port Hacking in New South Wales.
138
  Though 
this was confirmed in 1936,
139
 significant commercial harvest of SBT did not begin 
until the early 1950s.  Catches of SBT since then are set out in Table 1 on the next 
page.  In 1961, the global SBT catch peaked at over 81,000 tonnes.  73 per cent of 
the catch has been taken in the Indian Ocean, 21 per cent in the Pacific and 6 per cent 
in the Atlantic, mostly off the southern tip of Africa.
140
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
tuna (T. albacares).  Skipjack tuna (Katsuwonus pelamis) is the seventh principal market tuna 
species.  Longtail tuna (T. tonggol) is another species of tuna that is becoming increasingly 
important for canning and is a subject of substantial international trade. 
136
   Ibid., at 124. 
137
   Ibid., at 118; Paul, supra n 25, at 127.  Market prices vary considerably with the fat 
content of the meat, high fat being considered high quality.  The average price for SBT in the 
Yaizu fish market in Japan in 1990 was seven times that of bigeye tuna, the next most valuable 
species fished in the Australian Fishing Zone: Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource 
Economics (hereinafter ABARE), Japanese Access to the Australian Fishing Zone: A Report to 
the Australian Fisheries Service (Canberra: ABARE, 1991), at 1. 
138
  Roughley, supra n 27, at 100. 
139
  Ibid., at 99. 
140
  Attachment 6 to CCSBT-ESC3 Report, supra n 34, at 205. 
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Table 1: Estimated catches of SBT by calendar year, in tonnes
141
 
 
Year Australia
a
 Japan
b
 New 
Zealand 
Taiwan Indonesia Korea 
(Republic of) 
Others TOTAL 
1949 320        
1950 122        
1951 25        
1952 264   565      829 
1953 509 3890      4399 
1954 424 2447      2871 
1955 322 1964      2286 
                                                          
141
 “Global Catch by Country” (Attachment 4 to CCSBT-ESC4 Report, supra n 114); P.I. 
Hobsbawn, J. Hender, S. Rowcliffe and R. Murphy, “Australia’s Annual Review of the Southern 
Bluefin Tuna Fishery” (Attachment 8-1 to Report of the Extended Commission of the Fourteenth 
Annual Meeting of the Commission, 16-19 October 2007, Canberra, Australia (hereinafter 
CCSBT-EC6 Report; Appendix 3 to CCSBT, Report of the Fourteenth Annual Meeting of the 
Commission, 16-19 October 2007, Canberra, Australia (hereinafter CCSBT14 Report, 
<www.ccsbt.org/docs/pdf/meeting_reports/ccsbt_14/report_of_CCSBT14.pdf> (visited on 11 
June 2008))), at 1; “Review of Japanese SBT Fisheries in the 2006 Fishing Season” (Attachment 
8-3 to CCSBT-EC6 Report), at 1; “Review of New Zealand SBT Fisheries” (Attachment 8-4 to 
CCSBT-EC6 Report), at 7 (Table 1); “Review of Taiwan’s SBT Fishery of 2004/2005” 
(Attachment 12-3 to CCSBT-EC5 Report, supra n 102), at 1 and 4 (Table 1); “Review of 
Taiwan’s SBT Fishery of 2005/2006” (Attachment 8-2 to CCSBT-EC6 Report), at 1-2 and 5 
(Table 1); Republic of Korea Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, “Review of Korean 
SBT Fishery” (Attachment 12-2 to CCSBT-EC5 Report, supra n 102), at 2; D-H. An, S-J. 
Hwang, D-Y. Moon and S-S. Kim, “Review of Korean SBT Fishery of 2005/2006” (Attachment 
8-5 to CCSBT-EC6 Report), at 2; Caton et al, supra n 36 at 9 (table); “Record of 
Australia/Japan/New Zealand Scientific Discussions on Southern Bluefin Tuna 13-15 December 
1982” (hereinafter 1st Trilateral Scientific Meeting Report), in Trilateral Scientific Meeting 
Reports Compendium, supra n 132, 1 at 5 (Table 1).  An updated catch table was prepared in 
2007, but at Japan’s request was excluded from the public version of the Scientific Committee 
report for that year because of controversy over the estimates of past misreporting: CCSBT-EC6 
Report, supra this n, at 24 (paragraphs 125-128) and 41 (paragraph 221) and “Global SBT Catch 
by Flag” (Attachment 5 to Report of the Extended Scientific Committee for the Twelfth Meeting 
of the Scientific Committee, 10 - 14 September 2007, Hobart, Australia (hereinafter CCSBT-
ESC6 Report; Appendix 2 to CCSBT, Report of the Twelfth Meeting of the Scientific Committee, 
10 - 14 September 2007, Hobart, Australia)), <www.ccsbt.org/docs/pdf/meeting_reports/ 
ccsbt_14/report_of_SC12_public_version.pdf> (visited on 11 June 2008). 
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Year Australia
a
 Japan
b
 New 
Zealand 
Taiwan Indonesia Korea 
(Republic of) 
Others TOTAL 
1956 964 9603      10567 
1957 1264 22908      24172 
1958 2322 12462      14784 
1959 2486 61892      64378 
1960 3545 75826      79371 
1961 3678 77927      81605 
1962 4636 40397      45033 
1963 6199 59724      65923 
1964 6832 42838      49670 
1965 6876 40689      47565 
1966 8008 39644      47652 
1967 6357 59281      65638 
1968 8737 49657      58394 
1969 8679 49769  80
c
    58528 
1970 7097 40929  130
c
    48156 
1971 6969 38149  30
c
  500
d
  45648 
1972 12397 39458  70
c
  100
 d
  52025 
1973 9890 31225  90
c
  100
 d
  41305 
1974 12672 34005  100
c
  182
 d
  46959 
1975 8833 24134  15
c
  99
 d
  33081 
1976 8383 34099  15
c
 12 28
 d
  42537 
1977 12569 29600  5
c
 4 7
 d
  42185 
1978 12190 23632  80
c
 6 94
 d
  36002 
1979 10783 27828  53 5 0 4 38673 
1980 11195 33653 130 64 5 0 7 45054 
1981 16843 27981 173 92 1 0 14 45104 
1982 21501 20789 305 182 2 6
 d
 9 42794 
1983 17695 24881 132 161 5 0 7 42881 
1984 13411 23328 93 244 11 1
 d
 3 37091 
1985 12589 20396 94 241 3 0 2 33325 
1986 12531 15182 82 514 7 0 3 28319 
1987 10821 13964 59 710 14 0 7 25575 
1988 10591 11422 94 856 180 0 2 23145 
1989 6118 9222 437 1395 568 0 103 17843 
1990 4586 7056 529 1177 517 0 4 13869
 e
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Year Australia
a
 Japan
b
 New 
Zealand 
Taiwan Indonesia Korea 
(Republic of) 
Others TOTAL 
1991 4489 6477 164 1460 759 246 97 13692
 e
 
1992 5248 6121 279 1222 1232 41 73 14216
 e
 
1993 5373 6318 217 958 1370 92 17 14345
 e
 
1994 4700 6063 277 1020 904 137 54 13155 
1995 4508 5867 436 1431 829 365 201 13637 
1996 5128 6392 139 1467 1614 1320 295 16355
 e
 
1997 5316 5588 334 872 2210 1424 333 16076
 e
 
1998 4897 7500 337 1446 1324 1796 476 17776 
1999 5552 7554 461 1513 2504 1462 483 19529 
2000 5257  6000 380 1448 1203 1135 48 15471
 e
  
2001 4853 6674 358 1580 1632 845 84 16030
 f
 
2002 4711 6192 450 1137 1691 746 285 15229
 f
 
2003 5827 5762 390 1128 564 254 116 14058
 e,f
 
2004 5062 5846 393 1298 677 131 83 13507
 f
 
2005
 g
 5244 7855
 g
 264 941 * 33
 g
 * * 
2006
 g
 5635 3693
 g
 238 963
 g
 * 130
 g
 * * 
 
a Possible minor discrepancies from the 1990s onwards due to method of accounting for 
farmed fish (see infra Ch V subsection E4). 
b Subject to significant doubt as underestimates from the late 1980s onwards based on 
Japanese market data (see infra Ch V, text at n 1109). 
c Probably estimates accurate only to the nearest 5 or 10 tonnes. 
d These figures (NB: those that are multiples of 100 are in all likelihood only very rough 
estimates) are taken from the table in Caton et al, supra n 36, at 9; in the Scientific 
Committee report table they are zero and the total for the year is correspondingly lower. 
e Total differs by 1 tonne from that given in the Scientific Committee report table, 
possibly due to rounding. 
f Total includes mortalities of 4 tonnes in 2001 and 17 tonnes in each of 2002, 2003 and 
2004 not attributable to country sources, e.g. taken under the CCSBT Scientific Research 
Program (see infra Appendix A, text at nn 1466, 1467 and 1470). 
g Figures taken from individual member reports to the CCSBT subsequent to the Scientific 
Committee report table; the figures for Japan in the relevant years are for the fishing year 
instead of the calendar year; the 2005 figure for Korea is processed weight rather than 
whole weight and it is not clear whether this also applies to the 2006 figure; Taiwan’s 
2006 figure is a preliminary estimate. 
* Not available/not calculable. 
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1 The Australian fishery 
Most tuna fishing activity in Australian waters has been directed at SBT.
142
  Catches 
were reported as early as the 1920s, but the fishery began in the 1940s off Eden in 
New South Wales and Port Lincoln in South Australia,
143
 taking advantage of the 
fact that at certain times of year, juvenile SBT form large surface schools off New 
South Wales and in South Australian coastal waters.
144
  From the 1950s, the surface 
fishery expanded rapidly, after the New South Wales fishery moved onto a 
commercial footing with the introduction of pole and live-bait techniques from the 
United States.  Operating between Sydney and Bass Strait from September to 
January, the New South Wales fishery caught about 2900 tonnes per annum on 
average during the 1960s, while the South Australian fishery, working from 
December to June, averaged around 3800 tonnes per annum in the same decade.
145
 
In the 1970s the New South Wales operators began to search farther offshore as a 
result of fewer fish being found in the hitherto fished areas, despite the use of long-
range spotter aircraft.
146
  The introduction of larger pole boats and large purse-seine 
vessels led to an increase in the size (and age) of fish caught, so that by the end of the 
decade the New South Wales fishery was taking over half the Australian catch.  A 
Western Australian fishery based in Albany and Esperance targeting 2- and 3-year-
old fish in the Great Australian Bight also came into being, with an average annual 
catch of 550 tonnes in the years 1969 to 1977.
147
  With the success of purse seining 
threatening to induce a further rapid increase in effort, in 1975 the number of such 
                                                          
142
 Caton et al, supra n 36, at 7. 
143
 “Update of the Australian Southern Bluefin Tuna Fishery for the 2002-03 Season” 
(Attachment 8-1 to CCSBT-EC3 Report), in CCSBT Blue Book 2005, supra n 34, 60 at 60; IAC, 
supra n 70, at 8. 
144
 Caton et al, supra n 36, at 7; Collette and Nauen, supra Introduction n 2, at 88. 
145
 Caton et al, supra n 36, at 7-8; Collette and Nauen, supra Introduction n 2, at 88. 
146
 Polacheck, supra n 34, at 272. 
147
 Caton et al, supra n 36, at 12. 
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vessels was frozen at six and at the State Government’s request the Commonwealth 
authorities prohibited purse-seining in the Western Australian SBT fishery.  In 1976 
a similar ban on entry of additional pole fishing vessels in the south-eastern fishery 
was instituted.  These measures were largely ineffective, however, because they did 
not restrict the type and size of vessels replacing those retired from service, and in 
1981 they were removed.
148
 
By the early 1980s, both the South Australian and Western Australian fisheries had 
expanded beyond the continental shelf, in the latter case leading to a substantial 
increase in the average size of the fish caught,
149
 though this trend reversed in the 
later years of the decade.
150
  In New South Wales, on the other hand, the catch fell in 
1983 to less than half of the 1978-1982 mean, while the average size of fish caught 
rose, the areas in which fishing took place contracted and the season itself was 
shortened.
151
  A quota was set for the first time in the 1983 season of 21,000 tonnes, 
slightly below the previous season’s record catch, with minimum size limits of 54 
centimetres in the Western Australian fishery and 70 centimetres elsewhere.
152
  
These were designated as temporary measures, pending the report of the IAC’s 
inquiry.
153
  Actual catch, however, fell almost 25 per cent short of the quota,
154
 and 
even at this early stage it was evident that a quota of this magnitude, added to the 
                                                          
148
 Ibid., at 31-32. 
149
   Ibid. 
150
   Ibid., at 22-23. 
151
   Ibid., at 12. 
152
  In conjunction with any fixed quota, minimum sizes increase the average size of fish 
caught, bringing about a concomitant decrease in the number of fish making up the quota, so that 
more fish can survive to maturity and reproduce: ibid., at 13. 
153
  Supra, text accompanying n 70.  The inquiry’s terms of reference included “whether 
changes to the management program would be necessary for adequate conservation of the 
resource and efficient development of the tuna industry and, if so, the nature and extent of such 
changes”: IAC, supra n 70, at 69. 
154
   Caton et al, supra n 36, at 32; Table 3 infra. 
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expected Japanese catch, would result in a total take above that required to reduce the 
risk of a stock collapse to tolerable levels.
155
 
After the inquiry reported in 1984, the Southern Bluefin Tuna Fishery Management 
Plan was introduced under the Fisheries Act 1952 (Cth)
156
 and over the following 
years the quotas were progressively reduced under the Plan to 6250 tonnes for the 
1989 season.  The size limits, however, were abandoned as impractical; instead a 
permanent closure was imposed off the Western Australian coast north of 34º South 
to protect smaller fish.
157
  The reduced quotas in turn gave operators an incentive to 
target larger fish for the Japanese sashimi market which yielded much higher prices 
than the low-value domestic canning market, at which the Australian SBT fisheries 
had hitherto been mainly directed (though some of the catch was exported, 
principally to Italy, for further processing).  In 1989 the South Australian fishery was 
reported to be “virtually dependent” on 3- and 4-year-old fish.158  By then over half 
the South Australian catch was exported to Japan as frozen or fresh sashimi, some 
transhipped to Japanese freezer vessels in the Great Australian Bight.
159
 
                                                          
155
   IAC, supra n 70, at 24. 
156
   The Plan survived the repeal of the 1952 Act by virtue of s. 6(1) of the Fisheries 
Legislation (Consequential Provisions) Act 1991 (Cth), until it was replaced by the Southern 
Bluefin Tuna Fishery Management Plan 1995, supra n 31. 
157
   Caton et al, supra n 36, at 33.  The surface fishery off Western Australia had ceased 
altogether by 1996: “Review of Australia’s SBT Fisheries–1996” (Attachment J to CCSBT3(1) 
Report, supra n 102). 
158
  Report of the Eighth Meeting of Australian, Japanese and New Zealand Scientists on 
Southern Bluefin Tuna, Shimizu, Japan, September 4-10, 1989 (hereinafter 8th Trilateral 
Scientific Meeting Report), in Trilateral Scientific Meeting Reports Compendium, supra n 132, 
47 at 47. 
159
   Caton et al, supra n 36, at 33; “Review of the Australian Southern Bluefin Tuna Fishery 
for the 1999/00 and Preliminary 2000/01 Seasons” (Attachment F-1 to Report of the Seventh 
Annual Meeting, 18-21 April 2001, Sydney, Australia (hereinafter CCSBT7 Report)), in CCSBT 
Blue Book 2002, supra n 30, 29 at 30. 
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Perhaps the most innovative element of the 1984 Management Plan was the 
introduction of ITQs.
160
  As proposed by the IAC
161
 and implemented in 1984, these 
were in effect a new form of property right entitling the owner to a given share in 
perpetuity of whatever quota might henceforth be legislated for a season. 
The SBT quota units were allocated as to 75 per cent on catch history (an 
individual’s best annual catch in the qualifying period expressed as a share of the 
sum of all individuals’ best catches) and as to 25 per cent on the current market value 
of vessels including fishing and navigation equipment.  The latter was a proxy for 
investment in the fishery, designed to make ineligible those who had recently ceased 
fishing for SBT.
162
  Although the alienability of the rights was at first subject to 
restrictions, these were soon lifted, so that they could be transferred to any person 
(including by way of lease or encumbrance) irrespective of whether the acquirer 
owned a fishing vessel or had any history of participation in the SBT fishery. 
The SBT fishery bears out the OECD’s conclusion that an ITQ system allows the 
same amount of fish to be harvested with less labour and capital, but is likely to 
create severe structural adjustment pressures.
163
  Despite the reduced quota, the 1985 
to 1987 seasons failed altogether in New South Wales as a consequence of the near-
disappearance of surface schools.  This led to a major restructuring of the SBT fleet, 
with a considerable reduction in the number of vessels, most now based in South 
Australia, and the sale by New South Wales quota holders of most of their ITQs to 
                                                          
160
  ITQs remain in existence to this day as statutory fishing rights under the Fisheries 
Management Act 1991 (Cth), s 21 and cl 8 of the Southern Bluefin Tuna Fishery Management 
Plan 1995, supra n 31.  See also the definition of ITQ at <www.afma.gov.au/information/ 
glossary.htm>, visited on 11 June 2008. 
161
  IAC, supra n 70, at 36-37 and 44-45. 
162
  G. Geen, W. Nielander and T.F. Meany, “Australian Experience with Individual 
Transferable Quota Systems” in OECD, supra n 88, 73 at 79 and 81. 
163
  OECD, supra n 53, at 20.  ITQs were soon extended to other species: Geen et al, supra n 
162, at 75.   
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South Australian operators.
164
  Since 1985 Australian catch has been close to the 
negotiated limit, demonstrating the effectiveness of the system in restraining catch.
165
 
Despite the stock’s poor condition, within two years of introduction of ITQs the 
number of vessels fell by 70 per cent and by 1989 the catching cost per tonne had 
fallen by 25 per cent.
166
  Resource rent was generated, the value of quota rising by 
“an order of magnitude” in a decade.167 
The introduction of ITQs also acted as an incentive to development of SBT 
mariculture.  The incentive lay in the fact that no quota was needed to cover the 
weight gained by fish in the farms, since the amount removed from the parental 
biomass (and thus debited against the quota) through catching fish for farming is 
their weight when caught.
168
   
From 1990 to 1994 approximately half of the Australian quota was taken by Japanese 
longliners using Australian quota under a joint venture.  A progressive increase in the 
proportion of SBT taken for the farms at Port Lincoln, whose intake of the species 
started in 1990-91 with 20 tonnes, began in 1992.  The last disturbance to the 
stability of the Australian fishery was the ending of the joint venture in 1995.  After 
this Australian catches again focused on the surface fishery in the Great Australian 
Bight from November to March, with poling operations supplying the sashimi 
market and purse seiners providing SBT to the Port Lincoln farms, which accounted 
by the 2001-02 season for over 99 per cent of the Australian quota.
169
  The number of 
                                                          
164
  Caton et al, supra n 36, at 13, 34; see also infra Ch V, text accompanying nn 1157-1159 
for the SBT bycatch problems in the late 1990s of longliners operating off New South Wales. 
165
   Caton et al, supra n 36, at 33. 
166
  Geen et al, supra n 162, at 87. 
167
  Ibid., at 91; OECD, supra n 53, at 152.  
168
  A fuller description of how catch is accounted for is given infra Ch V, text 
accompanying nn 1086-1184. 
169
  Attachment 8-1 to CCSBT-EC3 Report, supra n 143, at 62; “Update of Australian 
Southern Bluefin Tuna Fishery for the 2001-02 Season” (Attachment 8-1 to Report of the 
Extended Commission of the Tenth Annual Meeting of the Commission, 7-10 October 2003, 
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vessels involved is very small, having fluctuated between six and eight since the 
1996 season.
170
  Domestic longline vessels, commonly 20-30 in number, are 
generally not dedicated SBT catchers and usually fish SBT predominantly in winter 
along with other tuna species in the area between the east coast of Tasmania and 
northern New South Wales.
171
 
2 The Japanese fishery 
Offshore fishing operations began to receive official encouragement from the 
Japanese authorities in the 1880s, so that there would be adequate food supplies in 
years when the harvest of rice and other crops failed.
172
  Longline fishing developed 
in the late nineteenth century.
173
  Demand for tuna was low, however, and fishing for 
it was conducted close to Japan’s coast.174  Severe food shortages recurred in the 
1940s and into the 1950s because of the loss of manpower and of 60 per cent of the 
Japanese tuna fleet in the Second World War.  The Government therefore took 
measures to stimulate food production, including bringing the tuna fisheries under 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Christchurch, New Zealand (hereinafter CCSBT-EC2 Report; Appendix 3 to Report of the Tenth 
Annual Meeting of the Commission, 7-10 October 2003, Christchurch, New Zealand (hereinafter 
CCSBT10 Report)), in CCSBT Blue Book 2004, supra n 32, 64 at 65.  In 1996 around 20 purse 
seine and pole and line vessels operated from South Australia: “Overview of 1996/1997 
Australian SBT Season” (Attachment L to CCSBT4(1) Report), in CCSBT Blue Book 1999, 
supra n 126, 37 at 37. 
170
  Attachment 8-1 to CCSBT-EC6 Report, supra n 141, at 8 (Table 4). 
171
  From 1992 to 1998 longliners operating off Tasmania and New South Wales took 5-10% 
of the catch: Attachment 8-1 to CCSBT-EC3 Report, supra n 143, at 61.  By 2006 there was no 
fishing for SBT off Tasmania: Attachment 8-1 to CCSBT-EC6 Report, supra n 141, at 11. 
172
 N. Fujinami, “Development of Japan’s Tuna Fisheries”, in D.J. Doulman (ed), Tuna 
Issues and Perspectives in the Pacific Islands Region (Honolulu: Pacific Islands Development 
Program, 1987), 57 at 57. 
173
 Ibid., at 58. 
174
 According to a chronicler of life in old Edo, tuna was formerly held in such low esteem 
that not even the poor would eat it, possibly because its warm flesh (see supra text at n 43) spoils 
quickly: S. Williams, “Understanding Japanese Seafood Markets” (1992) 51(2) Australian 
Fisheries 32 at 35n. 
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military control in 1942,
175
 and after 1945 fisheries production recovered rapidly as 
the Government promoted expansion of fishing grounds and subsidised vessel 
construction.
176
 
Starting from a complete prohibition on movement of Japanese fishing vessels in the 
aftermath of Japan’s surrender, the occupation authorities progressively extended the 
high seas areas in which Japanese vessels were permitted to fish.
177
  By 1950 the fish 
resources of the area within the outermost of these “MacArthur lines” were fully 
exploited.  After this last spatial restriction ended in 1952 with the entry into force of 
the peace treaty with the Allied Powers,
178
 Japanese policy moved to encourage the 
development of distant-water fishing, including transfer of licences from the fully 
exploited offshore fisheries and encouraging construction of larger vessels.  Catches 
of tuna rose quickly.  By 1964 Japan’s distant-water tuna fleet was operating 
throughout the world, licensed vessel numbers reaching 3000 in 1965, of which 
about 1300 pole-and-line and longline vessels had no restrictions on their area of 
operation.
179
  The enlargement of the fleet and improvements in efficiency were 
driven by technological advances in boatbuilding, fish detection, vessel positioning, 
                                                          
175
 Y. Matsuda, “Postwar Development and Expansion of Japan’s Tuna Fishery”, in 
Doulman (ed), supra n 172, 71 at 71. 
176
  Fujinami, supra n 172, at 58. 
177
  Matsuda, supra n 175, at 72.  H.N. Scheiber, “Origins of the Abstention Doctrine in 
Ocean Law: Japanese-U.S. Relations and the Pacific Fisheries, 1937-1958”, (1989) 16 Ecology 
Law Quarterly 23 at 40ff describes how, as part of the general program of economic revival, the 
resumption of fisheries was actively encouraged by occupation authorities, not only to promote 
self-sufficiency in food which was one of its priorities, but later also, with the onset of the Cold 
War, for geopolitical reasons. 
178
  Treaty of Peace with Japan (done at San Francisco, 8 September 1951) 136 UNTS 45; 
ATS 1952 No 1. 
179
 Fujinami, supra n 172, at 58-59.  Licensing requirements applied to longliners and pole-
and-line vessels of more than 20 gross registered tons (GRT) and purse seiners above 40 GRT.  
Other than longliners and pole-and-line vessels of more than 120 GRT, the Government 
restricted tuna vessels’ area of operation in order to ensure their safety, avoid concentration of 
fishing effort and assist orderly marketing of the catch: ibid., at 65. 
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navigation, ship-to-shore communication and post-harvest handling.
180
  In the late 
1960s improvements in freezing technology enabled the fleet to shift from supplying 
canneries to production of sashimi-grade tuna.
181
  Soon afterwards, however, the 
longline fleet became uneconomic at its then size owing to a number of factors: 
rising fuel and (because of Japan’s rapid post-war economic growth) crewing costs, 
declining catch rates and changing food consumption patterns.  A specifically legal 
factor exacerbating this trend was the extension of coastal State jurisdiction under the 
new concept of the EEZ,
182
 resulting in closure of many areas to fishing and 
payments for access to those areas that remained open.  Distant-water vessel numbers 
were reduced by 20 per cent in 1980, accounting for much of the fall between 1970 
and 1984 from 997 to 762, though proportionately an even greater fall was recorded 
in offshore longliners.
183
 
The first Japanese vessels to fish for SBT began doing so in 1952, south of Java on 
the SBT spawning grounds, as soon as the last MacArthur line was lifted.
184
  The 
Japanese longline fishery spread gradually into most areas of the southern Indian, 
Pacific and Atlantic Oceans, extending at its peak from 10ºE to 170ºW with 
concentrations off Western Australia, South Africa, Tasmania, New Zealand where 
SBT could be found.
185
  The main longline fishing grounds shifted seasonally in line 
with changes in ocean conditions.  After monthly sea surface temperature charts were 
introduced as an aid in locating fish, the efficiency of fishing operations rose.
186
  In 
                                                          
180
 Ibid., at 59. 
181
 Ibid., at 60-61.  In the case of SBT the shift to sashimi grade took place in 1972; until 
then SBT was used for teriyaki and fish sausages: IAC, supra n 70, at 87 (evidence of the 
Executive Director of the Federation of Japan Tuna Fisheries Co-operative Associations). 
182
   According to Matsuda, supra n 175, at 86, in 1977 48% of Japan’s catch of tunas other 
than skipjack was taken within 200 nautical miles of other States’ coasts. 
183
   Ibid., at 77; Fujinami, supra n 172, at 61-63. 
184
   Matsuda, supra n 175, at 84. 
185
   Ibid., at 78; Caton et al, supra n 36, at 13; Collette and Nauen, supra Introduction n 2, at 
88. 
186
  Collette and Nauen, supra Introduction n 2, at 88. 
 72 
both 1960 and 1961 catches in excess of 75,000 tonnes were recorded, after which 
the catch fluctuated for the next decade around 40,000 tonnes with occasional spikes 
to 50,000 or 60,000 tonnes.
187
  By 1970 the fleet was 1200 vessels strong, including 
over 300 specialist SBT boats that shifted between the Indian and South Atlantic 
Oceans depending on where fishing conditions were better,
188
 but the decade that 
followed saw further decline in annual catch to around 30,000 tonnes and falling 
economic returns, together leading to a reduction in vessel numbers by 20 per cent. 
The decline in the catch rate of SBT (catch per unit of effort, hereinafter CPUE) was 
even greater.  From 1961 to 1987 Japanese effort rose from 30 million to 110 million 
hooks, meaning that the catch rate declined by around 95 per cent over that period.
189
  
The fall in abundance may have been greater still once the fleet’s growing efficiency 
is taken into account.
190
  After Japanese scientists reported that the mean density of 
spawning adults had been decreasing since the early 1960s and by 1967-68 had fallen 
by nine tenths on the spawning ground itself, in 1971 the Japanese fleet voluntarily 
                                                          
187
   See Table 1 supra. 
188
   Caton et al, supra n 36, at 13; Reports of the Standing Committee on Research and 
Statistics (SCRS), Puerto de la Cruz, Tenerife, November 5-10, 1981 (Annex 8 to Proceedings of 
the Seventh Regular Meeting of the Commission), in International Commission for the 
Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (hereinafter ICCAT), Report for biennial period, 1980-81 (Part 
II 1981), 108 at 138.  A significant part of Japan’s catch continues to be taken in the south-east 
Atlantic in some years, e.g. 1,205 tonnes in 2000: “National Report of Japan”, in ICCAT, Report 
for biennial period, 2002-03 Part II (2003) - Vol.3 (hereinafter ICCAT Green Book 2004/3), 53 
at 61 (Table 3).  The table shows that 2,506 tonnes of SBT were caught in the Atlantic in 1981, 
and over 1,000 tonnes in ten of the next twenty years, the highest figure being 1,688 tonnes in 
1993, and the lowest 301 tonnes in 1997. 
189
  According to Caton et al, supra n 36, at 17, CPUE is frequently used as a surrogate 
measure of fish abundance, although it is not necessarily directly proportional to it.  The Japanese 
longline fishery expresses its CPUE as the number of SBT caught per 1,000 hooks set. 
190
   Ibid.; on the increase in efficiency over time see also the oral submissions to ITLOS of 
Professor Crawford, Counsel for Australia, on 18 August 1999: ITLOS doc ITLOS/PV.99/21/ 
Rev.2, available online at <www.itlos.org/case_documents/2001/document_en_140.pdf> 
(hereinafter Transcript for afternoon of 18 August), at 15. 
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adopted a seasonal closure south of the spawning area in order to protect migrating 
spawning fish.
191
  In line with the scientists’ views that the exploitation of younger 
fish was too high, similar closures were observed in areas off southern New South 
Wales, South Australia and South Africa where immature fish were predominant.
192
  
Of greater concern to Japanese scientists, on the feeding grounds effort continued to 
grow during the 1970s, though there too catch rates declined.
193
  Japanese regulation 
was less effective than expected, with recruitment maintained to the surface fisheries 
but declining to the longline fishery harvesting fish four years and older.
194
 
In response, the Japanese vessels began to concentrate their effort spatially, fishing 
only the historically more productive locations, an additional factor tending to make 
raw CPUE figures overestimate actual abundance.  The Japanese industry was unable 
to fill its quota despite the marked downward trend in the quota allocations to Japan 
when they commenced in 1985.  Data from the Japanese and joint venture longline 
                                                          
191
 Caton et al, supra n 36, at 19, 31.  The spawning stock “may have been reduced to 10-
20% of the earlier levels.”  See Report of the Standing Committee on Research and Statistics 
(SCRS), Madrid, November 9-15, 1977 (Annex 9 to Proceedings of the Fifth Regular Meeting of 
the Commission, Madrid, Spain, November 16-22, 1977) (hereinafter ICCAT5 Report), in 
ICCAT, Report for biennial period, 1976-77 Part II (1977) (hereinafter ICCAT Green Book 
1978), 98 at 150; repeated in Report of the Standing Committee on Research and Statistics 
(SCRS), Madrid, November 8-14, 1978 (Annex 6 to Proceedings of the First Special Meeting of 
the Commission, Madrid, Spain, November 15-21, 1978), in ICCAT, Report for biennial period 
1978-79 Part I (1978), 93 at 157.  The aim of the measures was described by Japan to ICCAT as 
avoiding catching fish younger than 7, though longlines caught fish aged as young as 4: Annex 9 
to ICCAT5 Report, at 150. 
192
  Caton et al, supra n 36, at 31; Collette and Nauen, supra Introduction n 2, at 88. 
193
   Caton et al, supra n 36, at 19, 31. 
194
  Annex 9 to ICCAT5 Report, supra n 191, at 150.  Recruitment is defined as the amount 
of fish added to the fishery each year by becoming vulnerable to the fishing gear through growth 
or migration into the fishing area “Definition of Technical Terms” (Appendix 12 to Report of the 
Standing Committee on Research and Statistics (SCRS) (Madrid, October 9-13, 1995)), in 
ICCAT, Report for biennial period, 1994-95 Part II (1995) - Vol.2 (hereinafter ICCAT Green 
Book 1996/2), 158 at 162. 
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fishery
195
 within the Australian Fishing Zone (AFZ) also showed hook rates down in 
the late 1980s to only half their level of a decade earlier.  Although a 50 per cent 
increase was reported in the AFZ in the later years of the decade, possibly a result of 
the fall in fishing mortality from the Australian surface fishery as a consequence of 
the sharply reduced Australian quotas,
196
 the evidence was inconclusive.  This was 
because no similar improvement in the numbers of small fish occurred in the New 
Zealand fishery,
197
 and oceanographic conditions of the time or behavioural changes 
owing to the reduced abundance cannot be ruled out as causes.
198
 
The catch composition of the longline fishery substantially changed in the 1990s; 
fish larger than 120cm made up the bulk of the catch (by number) in previous 
decades (74 to 88 per cent), but in the early 1990s fish of that size accounted for only 
48 per cent of the catch.
199
  The number of Japanese vessels fishing for SBT has 
continued to fall since the 1990s.  In successive fishing seasons from 1998 it was 
257, 227, 199, 227, 224, 221, then 222 in 2004 and fell sharply to 168 in 2005.
200
  In 
2003 Japan reported a severe decline in the price of tuna, caused by a fall in demand 
as a consequence of Japan’s long economic recession and the continued high level of 
tuna imports.
201
  From 1 April 2006, in response to the revelations of persistent past 
overcatches, Japan instituted a system of individual vessel quotas, allocating them to 
                                                          
195
  See text following n 165 supra. 
196
   Caton et al, supra n 36, at 20. 
197
   Ibid., at 22. 
198
   Ibid.; see also the oral submissions of Professor Crawford, Counsel for Australia, to 
ITLOS on 18 August 1999 (supra n 190, at 21). 
199
  13th Trilateral Scientific Meeting Report, supra n 46, at 9 (Appendix 1, “Status of the 
stock and fishery indicators”, paragraph 6). 
200
  “Review of Japanese SBT Fisheries in the 2005 Fishing Season” (Attachment 12-5 to 
CCSBT-EC5 Report, supra n 102), at 2. 
201
  “Review of Southern Bluefin Tuna Fisheries of Japan in the 2003 Fishing Season” 
(Attachment 8-3 to CCSBT-EC2 Report), in CCSBT Blue Book 2004, supra n 32, 74 at 74. 
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142 vessels for that year, of which 133 actually fished, with landing of SBT 
restricted to eight designated ports.
202
 
3 The New Zealand fishery 
SBT is seasonally present in New Zealand waters from March or April until July.
203
  
The New Zealand domestic SBT fishery began much later than those of Australia 
and Japan: not until 1980 was a small specialised winter fishery developed off the 
South Island’s west coast for sashimi-grade fish chilled and air-freighted to Japan.204  
SBT were caught by trolling and handlines from small vessels in inshore waters.
205
  
Catch was limited at first by a quota of 5,000 fish up to 1982 and then of 10,000 fish 
in 1983 to 1985.  Although a development quota of 1,000 tonnes was reserved for 
New Zealand in the 1985 trilateral negotiations
206
 and came into effect for 1986, 
actual take peaked at 305 tonnes in 1982 and fell below 100 tonnes every year from 
1984 to 1988.
207
  The substantial increase to 437 tonnes in 1989 is attributed to the 
start of a longlining joint venture with Japanese interests that yielded 290 tonnes, and 
the introduction of monofilament longlining from small vessels.
208
 
Surface longlining accounted for 96 per cent of fishing in the 1990s.  At first much of 
it was carried out by Japanese longliners using Japanese quota, but declining catch 
rates, shortened seasons of availability and increased operating costs resulted in the 
                                                          
202
  Appendix 3 to Attachment 12-5 to CCSBT-EC5 Report, supra n 102; Attachment 8-3 to 
CCSBT-EC6 Report, supra n 141, at 1. 
203
  “Review of New Zealand SBT Fisheries” (Attachment 8-4 to CCSBT-EC3 Report), in 
CCSBT Blue Book 2005, supra n 34, 75 at 75. 
204
   Paul, supra n 25, at 127; 900 fish were taken in 1980 and 2300 in 1981: Report of the 
Standing Committee on Research and Statistics (SCRS), Funchal, Madeira (Portugal), November 
5-9, 1982 (Annex 10 to Proceedings of the Third Special Meeting of the Commission, Funchal, 
Madeira, Portugal, November 10-16, 1982 (hereinafter ICCATSM3 Report)), in ICCAT, Report 
for biennial period, 1982-83 (Part I 1982) (hereinafter ICCAT Green Book 1983), 100 at 133. 
205
   Caton et al, supra n 36, at 16. 
206
  See infra Ch II n 335 and accompanying text. 
207
   See Table 1 supra and Caton et al, supra n 36, at 21 (table) and 32. 
208
   Caton et al, supra n 36, at 9 (table) and 16. 
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cessation of such operations in the middle of the decade.  Since then, the domestic 
fishery has comprised a wide range of vessel types from small owner-operated boats 
to a number of longliners chartered by a New Zealand company that are otherwise 
part of the Japanese distant-water fleet.  All fish of suitable quality are exported to 
the Japanese sashimi market, domestic consumption of SBT being negligible.
209
 
In the 1996 season around 60 operators were active, mostly small owner-operated 
vessels which caught less than three tonnes.  These did not venture far from their 
home ports and supplied the fresh SBT markets in Japan.  In addition, several 
medium-to-large domestic longliners, some with freezer capacity, entered the 
fishery.  This led to an expansion in both areas and seasons fished, although in 1997 
over 90 per cent of domestic landings were still made from June to August.  Only 30 
domestic vessels were active in 1997 despite the reactivation of charter arrangements 
between New Zealand and Japanese companies.  From the early 1990s nearly all 
fishing was conducted either off the west coast of the South Island or off East Cape 
on the North Island, though SBT is also taken as bycatch in the bigeye tuna fishery in 
the Bay of Plenty.
210
  By 2002 the number of vessels targeting tunas had increased to 
over 150, mostly small, though in 2003 it fell to 132.
211
 
In 2003 New Zealand announced that SBT would come under its Quota Management 
System – a form of ITQ – on 1 October 2004.212  Its 420-tonne allocation from the 
CCSBT was split among commercial catch of 413 tonnes, recreational take (4 
                                                          
209
  “Review of New Zealand SBT Fisheries for CCSBT-7” (Attachment F-3 to CCSBT7 
Report), in CCSBT Blue Book 2002, supra n 30, 40 at 42. 
210
  “Review of SBT Fisheries – New Zealand” (Attachment I to CCSBT3(1) Report, supra 
n 102), at 1; “Annual Review of New Zealand SBT Fisheries” (Attachment N to CCSBT4(1) 
Report), in CCSBT Blue Book 1999, supra n 126, 41 at 41; Attachment F-3 to CCSBT7 Report, 
supra n 209, at 41. 
211
  CCSBT-ESC2 Report, supra n 32, at 114 (paragraph 13); “Review of New Zealand SBT 
Fisheries for the 10
th
 Annual CCSBT Meeting” (Attachment 8-4 to CCSBT-EC2 Report), ibid., 
78 at 79; Attachment 8-4 to CCSBT-EC3 Report, supra n 203, at 77. 
212
  Attachment 8-4 to CCSBT-EC2 Report, supra n 211, at 78. 
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tonnes), customary take by Maori (1 tonne, despite no estimates being available of 
past catches of this nature) and other fisheries-related mortality (2 tonnes).
213
  As a 
result a rationalisation of fishing effort took place, with the number of fishing vessels 
catching SBT falling to 58 in the 2005 fishing year and 57 in that of 2006 (with only 
two chartered vessels), and the fishing season shifting to slightly later in the year to 
target SBT when they were in the best condition, particularly off East Cape.
214
 
4 Catches by others 
The CCSBT Scientific Committee estimated in 1997 that catch in 1996 by States not 
party to the 1993 Convention was between 4136 and 4937 tonnes.
215
  Limiting the 
catches by these new entrants to the SBT fishery became a notable preoccupation of 
Australia, Japan and New Zealand.  Their prolonged inability to do so was a 
significant factor contributing directly to their disagreement over the TAC in the 
second half of the decade and indirectly to the dispute of 1998-2001, in which it also 
became an issue.
216
 
In the middle and late 1970s, Korean and Taiwanese distant-water longline operators 
entered the sashimi fishery targeting bigeye and yellowfin tuna, often purchasing 
Japanese vessels second hand or with support from Japanese trading companies.
217
  
Incidental catches of SBT by vessels from Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, South 
Africa and Taiwan were recorded up to the 1980s
218
 but in the 1990s the catches of 
                                                          
213
  Attachment 8-4 to CCSBT-EC3 Report, supra n 203, at 76 and 79. 
214
  “Review of New Zealand SBT Fisheries” (Attachment 12-4 to CCSBT-EC5 Report, 
supra n 102), at 2-3 and 6 (Table 2); Attachment 8-4 to CCSBT-EC6 Report, supra n 141, at 7 
(Table 2). 
215
  Report of the Third Scientific Committee Meeting, 28 July – 8 August 1997, Canberra, 
Australia (Attachment Q to CCSBT4(1) Report), in CCSBT Blue Book 1999, supra n 126, 121 at 
124. 
216
   Discussed in Appendix A infra. 
217
   M.J. Riepen, “Distant-Water Tuna Longline Fishery”, in Doulman (ed), supra n 172, 
161 at 164. 
218
   IAC, supra n 70, at 7.  
 78 
all but South Africa increased considerably.
219
  Although SBT’s range extends far 
enough for it perhaps to be vulnerable to fisheries based on the east coast of South 
America, such catches in this region are poorly documented and are likely to have 
been insignificant, although the mean catch of 38 tonnes of undifferentiated bluefin 
reported by Brazil between 20° S and 35° S in 1956-71
220
 could well have been SBT. 
Korea began exploratory distant-water longlining for tuna in the Indian Ocean in 
1957 and its fleet reached 200 vessels in 1975.
221
  Its catches of SBT were significant 
in the early and mid-1970s but were almost nil in the 1980s.
222
  The Korean sashimi 
fleet reached a maximum size of 219 vessels in 1980 before the Japanese 
Government introduced restrictions on the export of second-hand vessels.  In 1985 
60 of the 156 vessels still operating worked in the Indian Ocean.
223
  Korean 
longliners shifted southwards from tropical tuna fisheries and began to target SBT in 
the southern Indian Ocean from 1991; their numbers fluctuated between one and 
three until 1995, grew to eight in 1996 and 19 in 1998 before declining to 16 in 1999, 
13 in 2000 and ten in both 2001 and 2002, while catches reached a maximum of 
1,562 tonnes in 1998.
224
  The decline after 1998 was attributed to voluntary 
regulation of fleet size to respect the CCSBT catch limits, but also to the shift of 
Korean longliners from the Indian to the Pacific Ocean where fishing for other 
                                                          
219
   See Table 1 supra. 
220
  M.P. Paiva, “Recent Data on the Investigation and Fishery of Tunas and Tuna-like 
Species in Brazil”, in ICCAT, Report for biennial period, 1974-75 Part I (1974) (hereinafter 
ICCAT Green Book 1975), 159 at 161-162.  SBT catches were also reported off Brazil by 
Japanese vessels: Caton, supra Introduction n 16, at 364.  
221
   Riepen, supra n 217, at 167.  
222
  See Table 1 supra.  Caton, supra Introduction n 16, at 362 doubts the low 1980s catches 
because other fleets caught SBT in the areas and months where the Korean fishing took place. 
223
   Riepen, supra n 217, at 168. 
224
  “Korean SBT Longline Fishery” (Attachment 8-5 to CCSBT-EC3 Report), in CCSBT 
Blue Book 2005, supra n 34, 83 at 85 (Table 1); “Annual Review of SBT Fisheries by Republic 
of Korea” (Attachment K-3 to CCSBT8 Report), in CCSBT Blue Book 2002, supra n 30, 115 at 
115. 
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species was more profitable.
225
  By 2003 the number of vessels had declined to four 
and catch to 254 tonnes.
226
  There were six vessels in 2004, seven in 2005 and nine in 
2006, but the catch fell further to 33 tonnes (processed weight) in 2005, most of their 
catch being of other species, before recovering somewhat to 130 tonnes in 2006.
227
  
SBT had represented 95.2 per cent of the catch of the vessels targeting it in 1999 and 
90 per cent of those doing so in 2002.
228
 
Until 1993 most fishing was in the south-eastern Indian Ocean, but from 1994 some 
longliners extended their operations to waters off the southern tip of Africa and 
further west into the south-eastern Atlantic.  Fishing was broadly concentrated in 
three areas: one in November and December off Western Australia between the 
latitudes of 35ºS and 45ºS and longitudes 90ºE and 110ºE, a second off South Africa 
between the same latitudes and longitudes 25ºE and 50ºE from March to July or 
August, and a third occasionally also between the latitudes of 40ºS and 45ºS and 
                                                          
225
  “Annual Review of Korea’s SBT Fisheries for the Annual Commission Meeting” 
(Attachment 8-5 to CCSBT-EC2 Report), in CCSBT Blue Book 2004, supra n 32, 84 at 84; 
Attachment 8-5 to CCSBT-EC3 Report, supra n 224, at 83. 
226
  Attachment 4 to CCSBT-ESC4 Report, supra n 141.   
227
  Attachment 12-2 to CCSBT-EC5 Report, supra n 141, at 1-2; Attachment 8-5 to 
CCSBT-EC6 Report, supra n 141, at 1-2. 
228
  “Review of the Korean SBT Fishery” (Attachment F-4 to CCSBT7 Report) in CCSBT 
Blue Book 2002, supra n 30, 45 at 45; Attachment 8-5 to CCSBT-EC3 Report, supra n 224, at 
83.  The number of vessels fishing for SBT depends on the Japanese market price and conditions 
on the fishing grounds: ibid., at 84.  Korea had small bycatches of SBT in the Atlantic (10 
tonnes) in 1997, 28 tonnes in 1999 and 62 tonnes in 2000: “National Report of Korea” in ICCAT, 
Report for biennial period 2000-01 Part II (2001) - Vol.1 (hereinafter ICCAT Green Book 
2002/1), 505 at 506 (Table 1). But as the tropical tuna fleet withdrew from that ocean, most of 
Korea’s tuna catch in 2001 was SBT (158 tonnes), by now a targeted species: “National Report 
of Korea” in ICCAT, Report for biennial period, 2002-03 Part I (2002) - Vol.3 (hereinafter 
ICCAT Green Book 2003/3), 57 at 57.  (In 2002, however, Korea caught no SBT at all in the 
Atlantic: ICCAT Green Book 2004/3, supra n 188, 66 at 66.) 
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longitudes 5ºE and 10ºE, catches in the last two areas being taken as late as October 
in 2004 and 2005.
229
 
Taiwanese vessels did not move to the Indian Ocean until the mid-1970s, but 
concentrated their fishing effort for sashimi-grade tuna there from the late 1970s.
230
  
Numbering 130-140, they caught SBT mostly in the Indian Ocean between the 
latitudes of 20ºS and 40ºS, that is, on grounds somewhat to the north of those 
favoured by the Japanese fleet, where both SBT and less valuable tropical tuna 
species are to be found.  Their catches reached 1000 tonnes in 1989 and averaged 
1387 tonnes per annum in the years 1996 to 2000.
231
  In 1994 41 vessels caught more 
than 10 tonnes and in 1995 49 vessels did so.  After 1993, Taiwan’s SBT landings 
were estimated based on sales records and certified weight reports from the Japanese 
surveyors’ association.  Catches of SBT were reported as “bluefin tuna” before 1994 
and Taiwanese logbooks began to use the term SBT only at the end of that year.
232
  
Fishing on the spawning ground is prohibited.
233
  Vessels targeting SBT tended to do 
so around latitude 35ºS in two distinct seasons annually.
234
  In 2002 71 per cent of 
the annual quota was allocated to the seasonal directed fishery vessels, and the 
remainder to bycatch vessels; the 2002 catch was taken by 60 vessels although 152 
were registered for 2003, of which 101 took the catch for that year, with 134 
                                                          
229
  Ibid., at 2; Attachment 8-5 to CCSBT-EC2 Report, supra n 225, at 85. 
230
   Riepen, supra n 217, at 169-170. 
231
  “Review of Taiwan SBT Fishery of 2000/01” (Attachment K-5 to CCSBT8 Report) in 
CCSBT Blue Book 2002, supra n 30, 138 at 138-139.  Around a quarter of the catch from 1989 
to 1992 was taken by driftnets, which were prohibited in 1993: “Review of Taiwan SBT Fishery 
of 2002/2003” (Attachment 8-2 to CCSBT-EC2 Report), in CCSBT Blue Book 2004, supra n 32, 
70 at 71. 
232
  “Review of SBT Fisheries – Taiwan” (Attachment K to CCSBT3(1) Report, supra n 
102), at 1-2. 
233
  “Review of Taiwan’s SBT Fishery of 2003/2004” (Attachment 8-2 to CCSBT-EC3 
Report), in CCSBT Blue Book 2005, supra n 34, 67 at 67. 
234
  “Review of Taiwan SBT Fishery of 1999/2000” (Attachment F-5 to CCSBT7 Report), in 
CCSBT Blue Book 2002, supra n 30, 47 at 47. 
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registered for 2004.
235
  Some of the fish reported by Taiwan as SBT were caught off 
the South American coast, which the CCSBT’s Scientific Committee considered 
were likely to be ABT, a matter it asked Taiwan to investigate further.
236
  In 2006 
only 36 vessels caught SBT, the preliminary estimate of their catch being 963 tonnes, 
up from 941 tonnes in 2005.  93 per cent of this was from the southern and central 
Indian Ocean and the remainder from its south-western extremities.
237
 
In the case of Indonesia, its take of SBT, though largely on the spawning ground, has 
been as bycatch in its bigeye tuna fishery, described as a “minor longline fishery” 
tending to catch “very large” SBT.238  In recent years, however, some targeting of 
SBT by vessels owned by Taiwanese interests has taken place.
239
  Catches by 
Indonesia are monitored through port sampling, including exports to Japan, which 
                                                          
235
  Attachment 8-2 to CCSBT-EC3 Report, supra n 233, at 68; Attachment 8-2 to CCSBT-
EC2 Report, supra n 231, at 70-71.   
236
  CCSBT-ESC3 Report, in CCSBT Blue Book 2005, supra n 34, 164 at 166 (paragraph 
11).  Catch data submitted to ICCAT in 2002 indicated that a portion of Taiwan’s catch of SBT 
was taken in the Atlantic: the highest was 472 tonnes in 1993, but in six out of the following 
eight years was in the range 150-250 tonnes: “National Report of Chinese Taipei”, in ICCAT 
Green Book 2003/3, supra n 228, 112 at 114 (Table 1).  In 2004 the figures underwent 
substantial revision, to show 1995 as the peak year for SBT catch in the Atlantic of 584 tonnes, 
one of only four years since 1991 in which it was over 100 tonnes, the most recent being 2001 
(223 tonnes): Fisheries Agency, Council of Agriculture, “Annual Report of Chinese Taipei”, in 
ICCAT, Report for Biennial period 2004-05 Part I (2004) - Vol.3, 135 at 142 (Table 1).  A fifth 
such year, 2003 (170 tonnes) appears in the equivalent table in Fisheries Agency, Council of 
Agriculture, “Annual Report of Chinese Taipei”, in ICCAT, Report for Biennial period 2006-07 
Part II (2007) - Vol.3, <www.iccat.int/Documents/BienRep/REP_TRI%20LINGUAL_06-
07_II_3.pdf> (visited on 26 October 2008), 195 at 204 (Table 1).   
237
 “Review of Taiwan’s SBT Fishery of 2005/2006” (Attachment 8-2 to CCSBT-EC6 
Report, supra n 141), at 1-2. 
238
 Summary report of the second FAO Expert Consultation on Interactions of Pacific Tuna 
Fisheries, Shimizu, Japan, 23-31 January 1995 (FAO Fisheries Report No 520; Rome: FAO, 
1995) at 11. 
239
  In Attachment F-5 to CCSBT7 Report, supra n 234, at 47, Taiwan attributed 274 tonnes 
of its catch in 1999 and 241 tonnes in 2000 to SBT “in fresh form probably from those small 
longliners that have entered into fisheries cooperation with Indonesia”. 
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are cross-matched against Japanese import statistics.  There are frequently 
discrepancies,
240
 and the size of Indonesia’s catch became one of the major 
disagreements among the parties after the end of the 1998-2001 dispute.  In recent 
years there have been indications that some Indonesian vessels have moved to the 
high seas, and that since 2004 as a first step towards controlling its catches Indonesia 
has begun monitoring them in collaboration with a number of Australian 
Government and international bodies.
241
 
In South Africa, commercial longlining for tunas started in the early 1960s, with 
combined catches of up to 1,800 tonnes of albacore, SBT and bigeye tunas, but this 
fishery ceased within the decade because tunas at that time fetched poor prices and 
development of other fisheries was more lucrative.
242
  Catches of SBT in coastal 
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  For example, in 1995 catches as monitored were estimated at 724 tonnes, of which 361 
tonnes were exported to Japan, but only 221 tonnes were recorded by Japan as imports of SBT 
from Indonesia: Report of the Second Meeting of the CCSBT Scientific Committee, Hobart, 
Australia (26 August – 5 September 1996), Report to the Commission, 23 September 1996 
(Attachment N to CCSBT3(1) Report, supra n 102, hereinafter CCSBT-SC2 Report), at 3. 
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  CCSBT-EC6 Report, supra n 141, at 35 (paragraph 186). 
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  R.W. Leslie, “National Report of South Africa” in ICCAT, Report for Biennial period, 
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Caton, supra Introduction n 16, states at 362 that South Africa’s SBT catch peaked at around 400 
tonnes in 1963, South Africa in 2002 claimed a catch in the 1960s of around 4,000 tonnes per 
annum, but did not furnish any evidence of this beyond offering to make available for inspection 
records of catches of Japanese and Taiwanese vessels in its waters from the late 1970s: “Opening 
Statement by South Africa to the Ninth Annual Meeting of the Commission” (Attachment 6 to 
Report of the Extended Commission of the Ninth Annual Meeting of the Commission, 15-18 
October 2002, Canberra, Australia (hereinafter CCSBT-EC1 Report; Appendix 3 to Report of 
the Ninth Annual Meeting of the Commission, 15-18 October 2002, Canberra, Australia) 
(hereinafter CCSBT9 Report)), in CCSBT Blue Book 2003, supra n 46, 53 at 54.  Previously it 
claimed not to be “a Tuna Fishing country as such, but other countries are fishing for tuna in 
South African waters”: “Remarks by Eugene Grobler, Counsellor, South African High 
Commission” (Attachment G to Report of the Sixth Annual Meeting, First Part, 29, 30 November 
1999, Canberra, Australia (hereinafter CCSBT6(1) Report)), in CCSBT, Reports of the Meetings 
for the Sixth Year of the Commission (including Financial Statements) (hereinafter CCSBT Blue 
Book 2001), 26.  
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waters totalled over 1,500 tonnes from 1960 to 1968.
243
  South Africa submitted very 
brief annual reports on its tuna fisheries to the International Commission for the 
Conservation of Atlantic Tuna Commission (hereinafter ICCAT) in the 1970s and 
1980s, which mostly laconically recorded the catch of all species combined as “well 
below 1000 tonnes”; the proportion of “bluefin” (which may be assumed to be SBT) 
was specified only in one year, as 1 per cent; more often the preponderance of other 
species was noted.
244
  Even when the catch grew markedly in 1979, no SBT were 
recorded.  In 1991 ICCAT was advised by its Standing Committee on Research and 
Statistics that South Africa’s catch of SBT was 13 tonnes in 1980, 6 tonnes in 1981, 
less than half a tonne in 1982, then nothing until 1 tonne in 1989; there were again no 
SBT caught in 1990-96.
245
  In the early 1990s the local fleet began to express interest 
in developing a South African fishery for sashimi-grade tunas and swordfish.  A 
single experimental longline permit was issued to a South African and Japanese joint 
venture; in 1997 30 such permits were allocated, 23 in both 1998 and 1999, 27 in 
2000, 25 in 2001, with 22 vessels active in South African waters, rising to 23 in 
                                                          
243
  “Opening Statement by the Republic of South Africa” (Attachment 5-2 to CCSBT-EC6 
Report, supra n 141), at 1. 
244
  Only 1% of the tuna catch in the austral summer of 1974-75 of “well below 1,000 metric 
tons”, was SBT: “Review of National Fisheries and Research Activities – South Africa” in 
ICCAT, Report for Biennial period 1974-75 Part II (1975) (hereinafter ICCAT Green Book 
1976), 216; if the 1% figure is taken as rounded to the nearest whole number, then the SBT catch 
must have been “well below” 15 tonnes. 
245
  See “SBF-Table 1: Atlantic and world southern bluefin catches (MT) by gear, area and 
country.” in Report of the Standing Committee on Research and Statistics (SCRS) (Madrid, 
November 4-8, 1991 (Annex 16 to Proceedings of the Twelfth Regular Meeting of the 
Commission, Madrid, November 11-15, 1991 (hereinafter ICCAT12 Report)), in ICCAT, Report 
for biennial period, 1990-91 Part II (1991) (hereinafter ICCAT Green Book 1992), 97 at 170; 
A.J. Penney and C.L. Moloney, “National Report of South Africa”, in ICCAT, Report for 
biennial period, 1996-97 Part II (1997) - Vol.2 (hereinafter ICCAT Green Book 1998/2), 229 at 
231 (Table 1). 
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2002-04, since when the fishery has been operating commercially.
246
  From 1997 to 
2001 total SBT catch was only 6.7 tonnes (of which more than half occurred in 
2000), rising to 17.8 tonnes, 14.7 tonnes and 19.0 tonnes successively in 2002-04.
247
 
The Philippines fishing industry first took SBT as bycatch in 1997, and in 2002 45 
tonnes were recorded as imports into Japan, while in the first half of 2005, of the 25 
vessels licensed to catch SBT, only three did so, resulting in export to Japan of about 
24.5 tonnes.
248
  Its take of SBT (43 tonnes in 2006
249
) is all bycatch, a side-effect of 
incentives provided by the Philippines Government since 1998 to domestic operators 
to fish in the outer reaches of the Philippines EEZ, which also encouraged them to 
venture into the Atlantic and Indian Oceans.
250
  Since it became a cooperating non-
member of the CCSBT in 2004, the Philippines’ catch has been subject to a quota.251 
In 2004 there was an unconfirmed report of a small catch (5 tonnes) by European 
vessels.
252
  This was revised to between 1 and 3.4 tonnes (all bycatch) when the 
                                                          
246
  Both reports in the previous footnote, together with “National Report of South Africa”, 
in ICCAT Green Book 2002/1, supra n 228, 525 at 525; “National Report of South Africa” in 
ICCAT Green Book 2003/3, supra n 228, 72 at 72; “National Report of South Africa” in ICCAT 
Green Book 2004/3, supra n 188, 84 at 84; Attachment 5-2 to CCSBT-EC6 Report, supra n 243, 
at 1. 
247
  CCSBT-EC6 Report, supra n 141, at 10 (paragraph 56). 
248
  “Opening Statement by the Philippines” (Attachment 5-2 to CCSBT-EC2 Report), in 
CCSBT Blue Book 2004, supra n 32, 54 at 54; “2005 Philippine Report to CCSBT” (Attachment 
8-5 to Report of the Extended Commission of the Twelfth Annual Meeting of the Commission, 11-
14 October 2005, Taipei, Taiwan (hereinafter CCSBT-EC4 Report; Appendix 3 to CCSBT, 
Report of the Twelfth Annual Meeting of the Commission, 15 October 2005, Narita, Japan 
(hereinafter CCSBT12 Report; <www.ccsbt.org/docs/pdf/meeting_reports/ccsbt_12/report_of_ 
ccsbt12.pdf> (visited on 11 June 2008))).  The successive catches from 1998 to 2003 were 5, 80, 
17, 43, 82 and 68 tonnes: Attachment 4 to CCSBT-ESC4 Report, supra n 141. 
249
  CCSBT-EC6 Report, supra n 141, at 9 (paragraph 55). 
250
  “Report of the Philippines” (Attachment 8-6 to CCSBT-EC3 Report), in CCSBT Blue 
Book 2005, supra n 34, 88 at 88. 
251
  See infra Ch IV, text at n 789. 
252
  CCSBT-ESC3 Report, supra n 236, at 174 (paragraph 51). 
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European Community attended its first CCSBT meeting in 2006, at which it sought 
cooperating status and, noting that it did not target SBT, asked for “cooperation 
quota” sufficient to allow it to continue its southern ocean shark and swordfish 
fisheries in which the “unavoidable” bycatch occurred.  It was granted that status and 
accepted a quota of 10 tonnes.
253
 
Vessels of other nationalities that have taken SBT in quantities sufficient to cause 
concern in the past to the major participants in the fishery are Belize, Cambodia, 
Equatorial Guinea and Honduras.
254
 
D First interactions 
In the late 1960s Japanese scientists began to express concern in the Indo-Pacific 
Fisheries Council
255
 (as the Asia-Pacific Fishery Commission then was) and later the 
Indian Ocean Fishery Commission
256
 (IOFC) and both bodies’ tuna management 
committees that the Australian SBT fishery developing on juveniles was an obstacle 
                                                          
253
  CCSBT-EC5 Report, supra n 102, at 15-17 (paragraphs 82 and 91-94); see also 
Attachment 6-1 (“Opening Statement by the European Community”). 
254
  See “Decision regarding Belize pursuant to the 2000 Action Plan” and “Decision 
regarding Cambodia, Honduras and Equatorial Guinea pursuant to the 2000 Action Plan” 
(Attachments G and H respectively to CCSBT8 Report), in CCSBT Blue Book 2002, supra n 30, 
98 and 99 respectively; the Action Plan is discussed in Ch IV infra, subsection B4. 
255
  Established by the Agreement for the Establishment of the Indo-Pacific Fisheries 
Council, done at Baguio (Philippines) on 26 February 1948; 120 UNTS 59; ATS 1949 No 4. 
256
  Established by Resolution 2/48 of the FAO Council, adopted at its Forty-eighth Session 
(reprinted at paragraph 42 of FAO, Report of the Council of FAO Forty-Eighth Session, Rome, 
12-23 June 1967,  <www.fao.org/docrep/meeting/007/68977E/68977E00.HTM> (visited on 30 
September 2008)), under Article VI(1) of the Constitution of the Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations (done at Québec, 16 October 1945; United Kingdom Treaty 
Series 1946 No. 47 (Cmd. 6955), ATS 1945 No 9 (electronic)).  This was on the recommendation 
of the Committee on Fisheries, which viewed the increasing fishing pressure as “an urgent 
problem common to the whole Indian Ocean” that made a new fisheries body necessary: Report 
of the Second Session of the Committee on Fisheries, Rome, 24-29 April 1967 (FAO Fisheries 
Report No 46; Rome: FAO, 1967), at 13.  By Article 1, IOFC’s area of competence was defined 
as “the Indian Ocean and adjacent seas but excluding the Antarctic area”.  Article 3 opened 
 86 
to their own proposals to increase the size of fish caught in the Japanese longline 
fishery.
257
  Initially this did not lead to action by any State, but a “special southern 
bluefin tuna working party” of Australian and Japanese scientists was convened at 
Japan’s Far Seas Fisheries Research Laboratory in June 1975,258 which led the 
following year to a cooperative study of Australian and Japanese scientists.
259
  A 
special Working Group on Stock Assessment of the two commissions concluded that 
longline fishing intensity was high and the stock was being heavily exploited.
260
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
membership of IOFC to all Member Nations and Associate Members of FAO.  With the IOTC’s 
establishment, the IOFC lost much of its raison d’être and in June 1999 was abolished by 
Resolution 1/116 of the FAO Council (reprinted at paragraph 124 of the Report of the Hundred 
and Sixteenth Session of the Council, Rome, 14-19 June 1999 (FAO doc CL 116/REP), 
<www.fao.org/docrep/X2372E/X2372e02.htm#a> (visited on 11 June 2008). 
257
 Caton et al, supra n 36, at 18, 31.  Institutional arrangements for the management of tuna 
fisheries in the Indian Ocean were first discussed in 1970 and sporadically thereafter, though it 
was not until the mid-1980s that serious consideration of the issue began in the Committee on 
Management of Indian Ocean Tunas (CMIOT) of the now defunct IOFC, prompted by the rising 
catches and increased fishing by vessels from distant-water fishing States and the growing 
availability of scientific information on which to base management measures.  IOFC did not have 
regulatory powers, but was merely a forum for the exchange of scientific information and making 
non-binding recommendations to member governments.  Its meetings were relatively rare and 
discussion of SBT haphazard, though at the Eighth and Ninth Sessions Australia reported on 
some of the developments mentioned in this chapter: Report of the eighth session of the Indian 
Ocean Fishery Commission, Bangkok, 2-6 July 1985 (FAO Fisheries Report No 341; Rome: 
FAO, 1985), at 7 (paragraph 47); Report of the ninth session of the Indian Ocean Fishery 
Commission, Mahé, Seychelles, 2-6 October 1989 (FAO Fisheries Report No 436; Rome: FAO, 
1990), at 16 (paragraph 105).  CMIOT’s subsequent meetings were more notable for the fact that 
it was largely here that the IOTC Agreement had its genesis.  See generally J.J. Kambona and 
S.H. Marashi, Process for the Establishment of the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (FAO 
Fisheries Circular No 913; FAO: Rome, 1996), at 6-8 (paragraphs 17-22). 
258
  S. Kume, “Japanese Fisheries and Research Activities on Tunas and Tuna-Like Fisheries 
in the Atlantic Ocean, 1973-1975”, in ICCAT Green Book 1976, supra n 244, 187 at 190. 
259
  Report of the Standing Committee on Research and Statistics (Annex 8 to Proceedings of 
the Fourth Regular Meeting of the Council (hereinafter ICCATC4 Report)), in ICCAT, Report 
for biennial period 1976-77 Part I (1976) (hereinafter ICCAT Green Book 1977), 69 at 103. 
260
  Ibid., at 102.  
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The interactions of the Australian and Japanese fisheries were complex.  Composed 
of immature fish, Australia’s large surface fishery catches did not immediately affect 
the parental biomass, as it took several years for the removal of young fish to be 
reflected as reduced survival to maturity.  Conversely, the benefit of a surface fishery 
catch restriction would not have been observed as an improvement in parental 
biomass for several years.  In contrast, because the longline fishery catch, which 
comprised predominantly adult SBT, had an immediate impact on parental biomass, 
reducing longline catches would have reduced in severity or prevented the further 
decline in parental biomass.  The mid-1980s trilateral scientific reports showed that 
each tonne of surface fishery catch was then having roughly the same impact on 
parental biomass as 2.25 tonnes of longline catch because of the far greater number 
of fish per tonne of surface catch.  Australian scientists denied, however, that the low 
level of parental biomass was solely attributable to surface fishery catches, arguing 
that since the fishery commenced, the longline fishery had cumulatively caused 
almost twice the decline attributable to the surface fishery.
261
 
The decisive factor in internationalising the management of the fishery was the 
expansion in the 1970s of coastal State jurisdiction during the Third UN Conference 
                                                          
 
261
  Caton et al, supra n 36, at 28.  The ratio of 2.25: 1 is consistent with the slope of the 
dotted line in Figure 1 in Report of the 5th Meeting of Australian, Japanese and New Zealand 
Scientists on Southern bluefin tuna (SBT), Shimizu, Japan, June 10-14, 1986, in Trilateral 
Scientific Meeting Reports Compendium, supra n 132, 25 at 30.  The scientists’ equation in the 
two previous years of the effect on the parental biomass of surface catch of 11,000 tonnes and 
26,000 tonnes of longline catch given the 1981 age composition of the stock, with 14,500 tonnes 
each of surface and longline catch (Report of the Third Tripartite Scientific Meeting on Southern 
Bluefin Tuna, Canberra, 28 May 1984 (hereinafter 3rd Trilateral Scientific Meeting Report), in 
Trilateral Scientific Meeting Reports Compendium, supra n 132, 11 at 15) implies a ratio of 
roughly 3.3:1 at the margin, and subsequently of 13,500 tonnes of surface catch and 27,000 
tonnes of longline catch with 18,000 tonnes each of surface and longline catch (Report of the 
Fourth Tripartite Scientific Meeting on Southern Bluefin Tuna, Wellington, 15-18 July 1985, 
ibid., 19 at 20) of 2:1. 
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on the Law of the Sea, ultimately finding its expression in Part V of UNCLOS on the 
EEZ.  The declaration of the New Zealand EEZ in 1977,
262
 followed in 1979 by 
Australia’s proclamation of the AFZ,263 meant that the Japanese SBT fleet could 
henceforth operate in those zones only by agreement of the coastal States.  In 1978 
New Zealand and Japan negotiated a fisheries treaty providing for access of Japanese 
longliners to the New Zealand EEZ; originally of four years’ duration, it was 
extended by a series of exchanges of notes until 1997.
264
  A similar Agreement on 
Fisheries followed in 1979 between Australia and Japan, along with the first of a 
long series of annual Subsidiary Agreements setting out the terms on which Japanese 
longline fishing vessels could fish for tuna in the AFZ.
265
 
                                                          
262
   Territorial Sea and Exclusive Economic Zone Act 1977 (NZ), s 9. 
263
   Commonwealth of Australia, Gazette S189 (26 September 1979), Schedule, taking effect 
on 1 November 1979.  The legislative authority for this proclamation was created a year earlier 
by ss 3 and 6 of the Fisheries Amendment Act 1978 (Cth). 
264
  Agreement on Fisheries between the Government of New Zealand and the Government 
of Japan (Wellington, 1 September 1978; 1167 UNTS 441, New Zealand Treaty Series 
(hereinafter NZTS) 1978 No 12; extended by exchanges of Notes of 26 May 1982 (for two years 
– 1324 UNTS 410; NZTS 1982 No 6), 21 September 1984 (for two years – 1676 UNTS 553; 
NZTS 1984 No 18), 23 September 1986 (for four years – 1937 UNTS 403; NZTS 1987 No 4), 26 
September 1990 (for two years – 1937 UNTS 403; NZTS 1990 No 10), 30 September 1992 (for 
two years – 1937 UNTS 403; NZTS 1992 No 13), 30 September 1994 (for two years – 1937 
UNTS 403; NZTS 1994 No 25) and 23 September 1996 (for one year – 1950 UNTS 402; NZTS 
1996 No 17). 
265
  Agreement on Fisheries between the Government of Australia and the Government of 
Japan and Subsidiary Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of 
Japan concerning Japanese Tuna Long-Line Fishing (Canberra, 17 October 1979; 1217 UNTS 3 
(Head Agreement), 19 (Subsidiary Agreement); together published as ATS 1979 No 12).  They 
entered into force on 1 November 1979, the day on which the AFZ came into effect (supra n 
263).  A further 17 subsidiary agreements covering individual fishing seasons were negotiated in 
most of the succeeding years up to 1997, all entitled Subsidiary Agreement concerning Japanese 
Tuna Long-Line Fishing and all done at Canberra except where otherwise noted:  
(i)   30 October 1980 (1217 UNTS 40; ATS 1980 No 21) 
(ii)   29 October 1981 (1342 UNTS 3; ATS 1981 No 22) 
(iii)   28 October 1982 (1342 UNTS 41; ATS 1982 No 18)  
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Under these new arrangements, small SBT were targeted in the Great Australian 
Bight south of 35ºS in April and May, fish of varying sizes off the south coast of 
New South Wales and off New Zealand from June to September and large fish off 
Tasmania from November to January.  With complete closure of some areas and 
seasonal closures or limits on vessel numbers in others under the new arrangements, 
less than 20 per cent of Japan’s total catch was taken in the AFZ, while catches 
through the 1970s in or near what became New Zealand’s EEZ averaged about 5,500 
tonnes or 100,000 fish.  Over the course of the 1980s these area closures were 
gradually tightened, the Tasmanian component being least affected.
266
 
After preliminary scientific discussions that Australia held separately in the early 
1980s with Japan and New Zealand, the three States began trilateral scientific and 
management discussions in 1982.
267
  Illustrating the point that the game theoretical 
conditions influencing the domestic fishery apply equally at the international level, in 
1984 the IAC was prepared to endorse the Government’s belief that a unilateral catch 
                                                                                                                                                                    
(iv)   31 October 1983 (1424 UNTS 85; ATS 1983 No 11) 
(v) 30 October 1984 (1426 UNTS 29; ATS 1984 No 29) 
(vi) 31 October 1985 (1430 UNTS 9 (title page) and 22 (text); ATS 1985 No 26)  
(vii) 30 October 1986 (1459 UNTS 197; ATS 1986 No 28)  
(viii) 29 October 1987 (1487 UNTS 115; ATS 1987 No 20)  
(ix)  27 October 1988 (1536 UNTS 331; ATS 1988 No 31)  
(x) 15 December 1989 (1573 UNTS 3; ATS 1989 No 33)  
(xi) 30 November 1990 (1598 UNTS 341; ATS 1990 No 40) 
(xii) 10 December 1991 (1680 UNTS 407; ATS 1991 No 47)  
(xiii) (done at Melbourne) 21 December 1992 (1736 UNTS 115; ATS 1992 No 42)  
(xiv) (done at Hobart) 24 December 1993 (1770 UNTS 457; ATS 1993 No 41)  
(xv) (done at Melbourne) 21 December 1994 (1889 UNTS 191; ATS 1994 No 38)  
(xvi) 4 June 1996 (1945 UNTS 275; ATS 1996 No 11)  
(xvii) 4 June 1997 (2007 UNTS 43; ATS 1997 No 17). 
266
   Caton et al, supra n 36, at 16; Collette and Nauen, supra Introduction n 2, at 88; Paul, 
supra n 25, at 127.  Japan’s catch of SBT in New Zealand’s EEZ was over 7,000 tonnes when the 
EEZ was first established, but less than 100 tonnes by the start of the 1990s: Caton, supra 
Introduction n 16, at 355. 
267
   Caton et al, supra n 36, at 26, 31. 
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reduction by Australia was in its own interest, recommending a quota of 14,000 
tonnes.  It warned, though, that Australia might capture only a small part of the 
economic benefits from doing so, and that “international agreements reached with 
the Japanese to date are not sufficient to ensure that Australia would benefit 
significantly from further unilateral reduction in the Australian catch.” 268  The 
conclusion it drew was that: 
If no agreement could be reached with the Japanese and the Japanese catch increases, 
while the Australian quota may need to decline to protect the parental biomass, 
strategically it may be in Australia’s interest to increase the Australian quota.269 
Subsequently, in 1985, Australia, Japan and New Zealand entered into a voluntary 
trilateral arrangement which established a TAC for SBT, divided into national 
allocations.  This mechanism is the subject of Chapter II.  The industries also began 
to interact, one of the factors that brought about the large quota reductions being the 
lease of 770 tonnes of quota by its Australian owners to twenty Japan longliners 
participating in a joint venture between them and the Japanese industry.
270
 
In July 1989, the Australian Prime Minister, Mr Hawke, proposed a moratorium on 
the taking of SBT, but this was rejected by Japan.
271
  Instead, a TAC of 11,750 
                                                          
268
  IAC, supra n 70, at 35. 
269
  Ibid., at 38. 
270
   Caton et al, supra n 36, at 26, 31. 
271
   The Hon R.J.L. Hawke AC, Our Country, Our Future: Statement on the Environment, 
(Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1989) at 25; see also infra Ch II, text at 
nn 363-370.  While there was scientific justification for a moratorium, the language used (“Some 
of Australia’s scientists are already arguing that we need to stop fishing for SBT altogether to 
avoid wiping out the species”) appears to misrepresent the scientists – see infra text 
accompanying n 288 – by confusing commercial extinction with total extinction.  Although 
commercial extinction occurs at a more severe level of depletion than previously thought – see 
supra text accompanying nn 78 and 79 – total extinction of a fish species by overfishing is very 
rare: see the oral submissions of Professor Crawford, Counsel for Australia, to ITLOS on 18 
August 1999 (supra n 190, at 13), also M.S. McDougal and W.T Burke, The Public Order of the 
Oceans: A Contemporary International Law of the Sea (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1962), at 467-468 and sources there cited; commercial extinction of a species is said to have 
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tonnes was agreed in that year, with national allocations of 6,065 tonnes, 5,265 
tonnes and 420 tonnes to Japan, Australia and New Zealand respectively.
272
  From 
1989 to 1993 the three States negotiated the Convention for the Conservation of 
Southern Bluefin Tuna and in 1994 the Commission established under that treaty 
confirmed the 1989 TAC and national allocations.
273
  Although from 1998 to 2002 
no TAC and national allocations were set because of disagreement between Australia 
and New Zealand on one hand and Japan on the other over Japan’s demand for 
additional catch, in 2001 the Republic of Korea acceded to the Convention, having 
negotiated with the existing parties a national allocation per annum of 1,140 
tonnes,
274
 and the Fishing Entity of Taiwan joined a specially created subsidiary 
body of the Commission in 2002, also with a national allocation of 1,140 tonnes.
275
 
The impasse was broken in 2003 when, principally as a result of a glut of tuna on its 
market, Japan abandoned its demand and a TAC of 14,030 tonnes was set, divided 
into the following national allocations expressed in tonnes:
276
  
 
Australia     5265  
Japan      6065  
Korea (Republic of)     1140  
New Zealand       420  
Taiwan (Fishing Entity of)   1140  
TOTAL   14030 
                                                                                                                                                                    
occurred when its numbers have become so low as to make targeting it uneconomic (though it 
might still occasionally be taken as bycatch).  This, together with its appearance in a document 
dealing with the environment, appears to have persuaded Japan that the moratorium was being 
proposed for political rather than resource management reasons. 
272
  See infra Ch II, text following n 338. 
273
  CCSBT, First Meeting of the Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin 
Tuna, Wellington, May 1994, Conclusion (unpublished; hereinafter CCSBT1 Report), at 2. 
274
  CCSBT8 Report, supra n 30, at 63 (paragraph 11). 
275
  See infra Ch IV, text following n 857. 
276
  A further 900 tonnes was reserved for non-members: infra Appendix A, text at n 1482. 
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That is, the national allocations of the original parties to the 1993 Convention were 
exactly the same as when the TAC was last set in 1997. 
The current position as to TAC and national allocations dates from the 2006 meeting, 
when the same nominal figures were retained for three years but Japan’s “allocated 
catch” was cut to 3,000 tonnes per annum up to 2011 as a result of its past overcatch 
that had come to light that year.
277
  Adjusting for this and adding a total of 845 
tonnes for Indonesia, the Philippines, South Africa and the European Community as 
cooperating non-members, the TAC for 2007-09 is 11,810 tonnes.
278
 
E The state of the stock 
The effect the fishery was having on the stock is shown by the fall in the average size 
of SBT caught from 55 kg in 1961 to 29 kg in 1971 and further to 23 kg in 1981.
279
 
As early as 1979 Australian scientists had reported that the global SBT fishery was 
fully exploited, so that any further increase in effort would bring little if any extra 
catch, in that any further increase in exploitation by Australian fishermen would 
reduce the Japanese catch, while any significant rise in Japan’s catch might reduce 
that of Australia.
280
  A first meeting of scientists from the three States took place in 
1982 and thereafter such trilateral meetings were held annually.  The 1982 meeting 
confirmed earlier estimates by the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research 
Organisation (CSIRO) of the decline in the parental biomass and concluded that the 
stock had been fished down to half, a third or even less of the original level.  The 
1983 meeting predicted unavoidable further short term decline as the year classes 
affected by the large surface catches of 1981-83 came to maturity.  The participants 
                                                          
277
   Supra n 102. 
278
  CCSBT-EC5 Report, supra n 102, at 13-14 (paragraphs 60, 64 and 65). 
279
  H. Campbell, S.F. Herrick Jr and D. Squires, “The Role of Research in Fisheries 
Management: The Conservation of Dolphins in the Eastern Tropical Pacific and the Exploitation 
of Southern Bluefin Tuna in the Southern Ocean”, (2000) 31 Ocean Development & 
International Law (hereinafter ODIL) 347 at 350. 
280
 Caton et al, supra n 36, at 18; IAC, supra n 70, at 10. 
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concluded that urgent steps needed to be taken to avert parental biomass falling 
significantly below the 1980 level, beyond which they believed there was significant 
risk that satisfactory numbers of recruits could not be produced.
281
  The next year 
they warned that the longer remedial action was deferred, the more severe the 
eventual catch reductions would need to be to keep the spawning stock at a 
satisfactory level.
282
 
In 1985 the scientists expressed the view that managers should in the short term 
adopt a conservative approach to the SBT fishery and by 1987 they regarded this as 
imperative, warning that there was risk associated with maintaining the then catch 
limits.
283
  For the fishery as a whole CPUE fell by half from 1983 to 1986 and by a 
further 5 per cent in 1987.
284
  This, coupled with various refinements to the analytical 
models that had taken place over the years, resulted in 1988 in a significant 
proportion of the analyses suggesting that recruitment had been in decline since the 
mid-1970s (though the first results pointing to this possibility were produced in 
1986).  Participants at the 1988 meeting concluded that even by 1979 the parental 
biomass may have been reduced to too low a level, so it was vital to prevent any 
further decline.  To achieve this and safeguard the long-term viability of the fishery, 
there would need to be substantial further reductions in catches until the parental 
biomass and the recruitment from it had demonstrably recovered to much higher 
levels.  The only safe catch was zero, but even with zero catch biological 
mechanisms preventing a recovery could not be ruled out.
285
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 Caton et al, supra n 36, at 26. 
282
 3rd Trilateral Scientific Meeting Report, supra n 261, at 16. 
283
 Caton et al, supra n 36, at 27. 
284
 Ibid., at 19. 
285
 7th Trilateral Scientific Meeting Report, supra n 132, at 42-44.  This recommendation 
was criticised by Mr Greig, counsel for Japan, before ITLOS on 19 August 1999 (“How much 
unnecessary socio-economic damage would have been caused had this plea been heeded?”: 
ITLOS doc ITLOS/PV.99/22/Rev.1 (hereinafter “Transcript for morning of 19 August”, available 
online at <www.itlos.org/case_documents/2001/document_en_141.pdf>, at 25), though he did 
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The scientific disagreement which was to mark the next decade became apparent in 
1989 when Australian and Japanese scientists presented projections of future parental 
biomass assuming the indefinite continuation of the 1988 quotas (Australia 6,250 
tonnes, Japan 8,800 tonnes, New Zealand 450 tonnes).  All Japanese projections 
depicted rising trends while the Australian projections were mixed, depending on 
whether recruitment after 1981 was assumed to return to the average level for the 
assumed stock-recruitment relationship or remain at more recent low estimates.  As a 
consequence, there was no agreement on future parental biomass and recruitment 
trends from the projections.  Australian and New Zealand scientists took the view 
that, once other indicators from the fishery were taken into account, recovery of the 
SBT stock was less probable than its continued decline.  Japanese scientists alleged 
that the Australian projections were deliberately pessimistic and unreasonable.  The 
Australian scientists rejoined that the projected recovery depended on optimistic 
assumptions about recruitment,
286
 but did not deny the scope for much larger catch 
from the SBT stock if the parental biomass could be rebuilt to a sufficiently high 
level.
287
  By 1990 Australian scientists were warning that, assuming the then current 
                                                                                                                                                                    
not mention that the Japanese scientists too supported this recommendation.  While the effects of 
overfishing are usually reversible if catch is sufficiently reduced, instances have been recorded 
where a stock has failed to recover because the depletion of its numbers has allowed an offsetting 
increase in the population of another species with which it competes for the same prey, creating a 
new equilibrium between the two, e.g. the non-recovery of the sardine population off California: 
A.W. Koers, International Regulation of Marine Fisheries: A Study of Regional Fisheries 
Organizations (West Byfleet and London: Fishing News (Books) Ltd, 1973), at 49, or where the 
stock is itself preyed upon by some other species – e.g. predation by the grey seal has been 
advanced as an explanation for the non-recovery of Canadian cod stocks despite the closure of 
the fishery since 1993, and even though overfishing was the prime cause of the collapse: C. Fu, 
R. Mohn and L.P. Fanning, “Why the Atlantic cod (Gadus morhua) stock off eastern Nova Scotia 
has not recovered”, (2001) 58 Canadian Journal of Fisheries and Aquatic Sciences 1613 at 1622. 
286
 Caton et al, supra n 36, at 27; see also the more detailed defence of Australian 
assumptions and critique of Japanese ones at 29. 
287
  The necessary implication of this is that the parental biomass was – and presumably still 
is – well below the level that would produce the maximum sustainable yield: see the diagram in 
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trends continued, SBT could be described as commercially threatened and might be 
facing commercial extinction.
288
 
Over the 1990s this divergence of scientific views between Australia and New 
Zealand on one hand and Japan on the other became entrenched.  It related much less 
to the present state of the stock than to its prospects for recovery in the short to 
medium term – which became crucial once the CCSBT, soon after it was set up, 
adopted a management goal of rebuilding the parental biomass to its 1980 level by 
2020.
289
  This state of affairs was the main reason why no consensus to alter the 
quotas fixed in 1989 could be reached among the three States, a pattern developing 
of Japanese proposals for increases which Australia and New Zealand did not accept.  
                                                                                                                                                                    
Appendix B infra.  Although Australia said at the CCSBT’s 1996 annual meeting (CCSBT3(1) 
Report, supra n 102, at 17) that the 1980 level “corresponds to commonly used thresholds for 
biologically safe parental biomass”, it is described in T. Polacheck, N.L. Klaer, C. Millar and 
A.L. Preece, “An initial variation of management strategies for the southern bluefin tuna fishery”, 
(1999) 56 ICES Journal of Marine Science 811 at 824 as “a minimum level for rebuilding and 
not the target level around which the stock is to be maintained”.  It can hence be concluded that 
the MSY is some way below the 1981 catch of 45,000 tonnes, though if the proportion of young 
fish in the catch were reduced, the total could move closer to that figure.  This is corroborated by 
two studies cited by Campbell et al, supra n 279, at 360, one of which found that global catch of 
32,000 tonnes could be sustained by a population in equilibrium at its 1980 level, while the other 
describes notional Australian and Japanese catches of 11,000 tonnes and 28,000 tonnes 
respectively as having equal impact on the parental biomass and consistent with maintaining it at 
an “assumed safe level”. 
288
 Caton et al, supra n 36, at 19. 
289
 Report of the Second Special Meeting, Canberra, 29 April - 3 May 1996 (hereinafter 
CCSBTSM2 Report, available on the CCSBT website at <www.ccsbt.org/docs/pdf/meeting_ 
reports/ccsbt_2/report_of_special_meeting2.pdf>)), at 1.  At the 1993 management meeting New 
Zealand had argued that no increase in catch should be permitted until the 1980 parental biomass 
was again reached; there was a need for shorter term goals to be developed to provide a means to 
assess progress in meeting the overall goal.  Australia agreed that there ought to be no increase in 
catch levels, for scientific purposes or not, until that goal was achieved: Southern Bluefin Tuna 
Trilateral Management Discussions – Second Session – Draft Summary Record, Canberra, 22-26 
November 1993 (unpublished, copy held by author extracted from DPIE files; hereinafter 
November 1993 Draft Summary Record), at 4. 
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The concomitant frustrations on both sides caused by this impasse culminated in the 
Japanese experimental fishing programs of 1998 and 1999 and the related dispute 
which lasted until 2001.
290
  
At its Sixth Meeting in 2001, the CCSBT’s Scientific Committee reported that at current 
catch levels, the probability of the parental biomass being larger in 2020 than in 2001 
was about the same as of its being smaller, adding that “there is little chance that the 
SBT spawning stock will be rebuilt to the 1980 levels by 2020, and substantial quota 
reductions would be required to achieve that goal.”
291
  The Scientific Committee 
concluded that the risk of further recruitment declines, while not possible to determine 
quantitatively, was not particularly high, so that an immediate reduction in total 
removals was “not recommended as a necessary action to prevent stock collapse…a 
policy of maintaining current removals would most likely enable the CCSBT to react 
in a timely fashion to future stock trends.”  Nonetheless there was  
a risk of further stock declines if current removals are maintained, and depending 
upon members [sic] aversion to this risk, differing levels of catch reductions would 
be appropriate forms of insurance for the sustainability of the current fishing 
industries.”292 
A year later the Scientific Committee saw no need to update its advice, with the 2000 
catch level of approximately 15,500 tonnes being close to the replacement yield.
293
  
Though there was again no dramatic change in the status in 2002 and 2003 
warranting a change in the advice, there were worrying signs in 2002 from the 
                                                          
290
 See Ch II infra. 
291
  Report of the Sixth Meeting of the CCSBT Scientific Committee, 28-31 August 2001, 
Tokyo, Japan (hereinafter CCSBT-SC6 Report), in CCSBT Blue Book 2002, supra n 30, 227 at 
239 (paragraph 29). 
292
  Ibid., at 239-240 (paragraph 30). 
293
  Report of the Extended Scientific Committee for the Seventh Meeting of the Scientific 
Committee, 9-11 September 2002, Canberra, Australia (hereinafter CCSBT-ESC1 Report; 
Appendix 2 to Report of the Seventh Meeting of the Scientific Committee, 9-11 September 2002, 
Canberra, Australia)), in CCSBT Blue Book 2003, supra n 46, 124 at 126 (paragraph 12); see 
also CCSBT-EC1 Report, supra n 242, ibid., 15 at 21 (paragraphs 47 and 48). 
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increased search effort required in the Australian surface fishery and marked decline 
of smaller fish in 2003 in the Japanese longline fishery.
294
  The 2003 meeting of the 
Stock Assessment Group reported that “...it was clear that under current catches there 
is a low probability of realising the existing management objective of recovery [of 
the parental biomass] to the 1980 level by 2020.”295  Indeed, with current catches 
close to replacement yield, any rebuilding was unlikely, regardless of relative stock 
productivity assumptions.
296
 
In 2004 the same body found that the parental biomass was between 3 per cent and 
14 per cent of its average before fishing began and between 14 per cent and 59 per 
cent of the 1980 level, with the models suggesting a marked decline in recruitment 
for the 2000 and 2001 cohorts, confirming earlier indications of this at the previous 
year’s meeting297 and being a source of serious concern.298  The projection results 
suggested that the probability of a fall in the spawning stock biomass by 2020 if 
catches continued at their current level was around 72 per cent.
299
  Although the most 
recent estimates of recruitment were low and models showed stability of parental 
biomass and recruitment since the early 1990s, the change in stock status since the 
2001 assessment was not large.
300
  A paper submitted by Australia concluded that, 
given the low spawning stock, even a few years of low recruitment would have 
                                                          
294
  CCSBT-ESC2 Report, supra n 32, at 113 (paragraphs 8 and 9 (Australia) and 11 
(Japan)). 
295
  Report of the Fourth Meeting of the Stock Assessment Group, 25-29 August 2003, 
Christchurch, New Zealand (hereinafter CCSBT-SAG4 Report), in CCSBT Blue Book 2004, 
supra n 32, 169 at 173 (paragraph 20). 
296
  Ibid., at 175 (paragraph 25). 
297
  See e.g., ibid., at 172 (paragraph 11). 
298
  Report of the Fifth Meeting of the Stock Assessment Group, 6-11 September 2004, 
Seogwipo City, Jeju, Republic of Korea (hereinafter CCSBT-SAG5 Report), in CCSBT Blue 
Book 2005, supra n 34, 227 at 236 (paragraph 48). 
299
  Ibid., at 231-232 (paragraph 21). 
300
  Ibid., at 232 (paragraph 23). 
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important implications for the sustainability of current catches.
301
  The sharp fall in 
Indonesian catch on the spawning ground to less than a third of the previous six 
years’ mean, accompanied by a lower average age of SBT caught, pointed to a 
possible decline in abundance.
302
  Since the stock was well below the level that 
produces MSY, rebuilding it would “almost certainly increase” sustainable yield and 
provide security against unforeseen environmental events.
303
  Agreeing, the Extended 
Scientific Committee advised that “[i]f reduced recruitment continues into the future, 
then under current catch levels the stock would certainly decline”, but if it were to 
return to the level of the mid-1990s, then a management procedure could be adopted 
that allow for a “reasonable probability of stock rebuilding”.304  If indicators in 2005 
suggested an ongoing marked reduction in recruitment, the CCSBT would need to 
consider TAC reductions “as soon as possible” which “would likely be substantial 
and the size of the reduction would be designed to arrest stock decline and lead to 
rebuilding.”305  Given the uncertainty in recruitment trends, the Committee said it 
was unable to “advise on what level of TAC reduction would provide for specified 
probabilities of rebuilding”, but added that “any TAC reduction would increase the 
probability of stock recovery under all possible recruitment scenarios.”306 
Despite this, the CCSBT at its 2004 annual meeting declined to make the reduction 
in catches for which the scientists were calling, claiming that it lacked the “clear 
scientific advice” to decide on the appropriate level for reduction, which it defined as 
                                                          
301
  Ibid., at 233 (paragraph 31). 
302
  Ibid., at 236-237 (paragraphs 49 and 50). 
303
  Ibid., at 240 (paragraph 62). 
304
  CCSBT-ESC3 Report, supra n 236, at 169 (paragraphs 24 and 25). 
305
  Ibid. (paragraph 27). 
306
  Ibid., at 170 (paragraph 28).  Scientific advice to a mid-year management workshop was 
that a new reference case model predicted with near-certainty that spawning stock and CPUE 
would both decline under current catches, contrary to the advice provided during 2001-2003: 
Report of the Third Meeting of the Management Procedure Workshop, 19-24 April 2004, Busan, 
Republic of Korea, (hereinafter CCSBT-MPW3 Report) in CCSBT Blue Book 2005, supra n 34, 
291 at 303 (paragraph 52). 
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“evaluations of the likely effect of various alternate levels of reduction, and estimates 
of uncertainty around these predictions.”307  Although the Extended Commission 
recognised that the next year would be “critical to the state of the fishery” and 
asserted its “prepared[ness] to make the necessary decision(s)” for a large reduction 
in TAC, it was worried about the possible “serious impacts on industry and related 
communities”, Members wanting an increased level of certainty about the scientific 
advice before making such a decision.
308
  It thus left TAC and national allocations 
unchanged from the previous season.
309
  The risk of even graver impact from 
possible collapse of the stock through failure to heed the advice was not mentioned. 
Given what has been said above about discount rates as well as other consequences 
of the tragedy of the commons, it is far from a foregone conclusion that any 
reduction, let alone one sufficient to begin rebuilding the SBT parental biomass, will 
be adopted in the years to come.  Although interest rates have been very low in Japan 
for well over a decade, its effective discount rate is high because the immobile 
capital of Japan’s fishing industry, coupled with its poor profitability, provides an 
incentive to forgo distant gains in favour of current revenues.
310
  Japan’s indication at 
the 2005 annual meeting that it was not yet ready to implement the management 
                                                          
307
  CCSBT-EC3 Report, supra n 78, at 20 (paragraph 27).  This was despite the Extended 
Scientific Committee’s advice that any TAC reduction would improve the stock’s prospects: 
CCSBT-ESC3 Report, supra n 236, at 170 (paragraph 28). 
308
  CCSBT-EC3 Report, supra n 78, at 20-21 (paragraph 28).  See also ibid., at 21-22 
(paragraph 35): “Any decision to reduce the TAC…could not…be taken lightly and must be 
taken on the best scientific advice.”   
309
  Ibid., at 22 (paragraph 36).  Australia, however, recalled (paragraph 37) that at the 
previous annual meeting 12 months was considered a suitable lead time for implementing TAC 
changes, and that reductions made at the Twelfth Meeting should be made immediately if the 
recruitment continued to be low.  New Zealand took a similar stance (paragraph 38). 
310
  A. Cox, M. Stubbs and L. Davies, Economic issues in the international management of 
southern bluefin tuna (ABARE Conference Paper 99.18) 
<http://abareonlineshop.com/product.asp?prodid=11362> (visited on 11 June 2008), at 13.   
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procedure was always on the cards,
311
 and it is only the revelation of its persistent 
overcatch in 2006 that left it without any pretext to resist a steep cut at the next 
annual meeting.
312
  It thus remains no less true today than it was in 1988 that “the 
current catches of SBT, in both weight and value, are only a small fraction of what 
could be taken if the stock returns to an optimal level.”313  The next chapter returns to 
the beginning of the cooperative phase of the SBT fishery to look more closely at 
how the new entrants issue influenced the participating States’ attitudes and 
prompted them to negotiate the 1993 Convention.  
                                                          
311
  Although in the discussion on TAC at paragraphs 47 to 66 of CCSBT-EC4 Report, supra 
n 248, only New Zealand (paragraphs 55 and 60) and Korea (paragraph 58) expressed an 
unambiguous preference for making the 5,000-tonne cut in 2006 over a 7,160-tonne cut in 2007, 
Japan was alone in not making a commitment even to the latter; it would merely “seriously 
consider” it (paragraph 59). 
312
  Supra, text at n 277.   
313
  7th Trilateral Scientific Meeting Report, supra n 132, at 43.  This remains true even after 
adjusting for the substantial overcatches revealed in 2006, with the Chair of the CCSBT’s 
Scientific Committee reporting that the spawning stock is still thought likely to be at no more 
than 10-13% of its original level: CCSBT-EC5 Report; supra n 102, at 8 (paragraph 46). 
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CHAPTER II 
New entrant issues under the trilateral (Australia/ 
Japan/New Zealand) management mechanism that 
governed the SBT fishery from 1983 to 1994 
A Introduction 
Although Articles 63 and 64 of UNCLOS expressly permit States interested in 
transboundary stocks to cooperate directly as well through an international 
organisation, examples of direct cooperation are rare.  The two best known are the 
joint management by Australia and New Zealand of orange roughy on the high seas 
part of the South Tasman Rise,
314
 and the informal arrangements since 1997 among 
the European Community, the Faroes, Iceland, Norway and the Russian Federation 
on North-East Atlantic herring.
315
  A hybrid example is the management of Bering 
Sea pollock, where there is a binding treaty among the States concerned, which 
                                                          
314
  The principal instruments governing this fishery are the 1998 and 2000 memoranda of 
understanding between Australia and New Zealand, both entitled Arrangement between the 
Government of Australia and the Government of New Zealand for the Conservation and 
Management of Orange Roughy on the South Tasman Rise.  The former is available online at 
<www.dfat.gov.au/geo/new_zealand/roughy.pdf > (visited on 12 June 2008) and the latter is 
reprinted in E.J. Molenaar, “The South Tasman Rise Arrangement of 2000 and other Initiatives 
on Management and Conservation of Orange Roughy”, (2001) 16 International Journal of 
Marine and Coastal Law (hereinafter IJMCL) 77 at 119.  Molenaar also gives at 80-82 a legal 
history of this fishery to that point, updated to 2003 by A. Serdy, “Schrödinger’s TAC – 
Superposition of Alternative Catch Limits from 2003 to 2006 under the South Tasman Rise 
Orange Roughy Arrangement between Australia and New Zealand”, in R. Shotton (ed), Deep Sea 
2003: Conference on the Governance and Management of Deep-sea Fisheries, Part 1, 
Conference reports, Queenstown, 1-5 December 2003 (FAO Fisheries Proceedings 3/1, Rome: 
FAO, 2005) 494, where lengthy extracts are given at 507-510 from an exchange of letters 
between the Australian and New Zealand Fisheries Ministers putting in place under the 2000 
Arrangement an innovative way of setting catch limits for the years 2003 to 2006. 
315
  This is described by P. Ørebech, K. Sigurjonsson and T.L. McDorman, “The 1995 
United Nations Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks Agreement: Management, 
Enforcement and Dispute Settlement”, (1998) 13 IJMCL 119 at 124. 
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nevertheless relies on direct cooperation among its parties for its efficacy since it 
does not create an international organisation.
316
  Although other instances of ad hoc 
cooperation may have gone unrecorded, until the CCSBT was formed in 1994, the 
trilateral direct cooperation among Australia, Japan and New Zealand was the only 
systematised form of direct cooperation in managing a highly migratory species. 
This chapter briefly introduces the trilateral arrangements before proceeding to 
consider how the gradually increasing take of SBT by other participants in the 
fishery was perceived by the three States in relation to their own interests in the 
stock, legal and otherwise.  It covers the introduction and progressive reduction of 
quotas and analyses whether the catch limits accepted by the three States in this 
period were binding at international law.  Attention is drawn to the unusual formula 
by which New Zealand indicated its limited commitment to its own quota, and to 
whether or not it resulted in any legally meaningful distinction from the position of 
Australia and Japan.  Through reference to the unpublished reports of trilateral 
management meetings,
317
 it shows the extent to which the outsiders’ presence 
contributed to their decision to negotiate a treaty to formalise their management of 
the SBT stock – the 1993 Convention.  Finally, the negotiation of the 1993 
Convention is traced and its main innovation, decision-making by consensus in lieu 
of the hitherto usual majority voting coupled with an objection procedure, is assessed 
for its efficacy in leading to binding catch limits. 
B Background: the first quotas and their subsequent 
reduction 
Following the CSIRO’s 1981 warning of the extent of decline in the SBT parental 
biomass and the consequent high risk to recruitment,
318
 Australia approached Japan 
                                                          
316
  Convention on the Conservation and Management of Pollock Resources in the Central 
Bering Sea, done at Washington DC on 16 June 1994, (1995) 34 ILM 67. 
317
  It should be noted that few of the meeting reports in the trilateral period were formally 
adopted; most were left as rapporteurs’ drafts and should thus be treated with a degree of caution.  
318
  For the definition of this term see supra Ch I n 194. 
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and New Zealand to suggest a tripartite scientific review of the state of the SBT stock 
and exploring the need for the fishery to be managed globally.
319
  In October 1982 
Australian officials met Japanese Embassy and New Zealand High Commission 
officials in Canberra.  They decided that there would first be a scientific meeting to 
consider the status of the stock, then managers would meet to discuss the sustainable 
yield, the objective for and degree of urgency of SBT management, the framework 
for the negotiations and the form the agreement would take.  In this regard Japan 
thought a treaty would be “ideal”, but more difficult to achieve; the FAO had written 
to Australia and New Zealand seeking involvement in the negotiations, but this was 
not pursued after Japan said that it knew of no third-party interest in the fishery.
320
 
With papers from Australia and New Zealand both showing that parental biomass 
would continue to decline under the then prevailing level of fishing pressure,
321
 the 
scientists agreed that “it would be wise to take steps now to stabilise the stock at 
approximately present levels and to have in place mechanisms to further reduce the 
catches should recruitment begin to falter.”322  At the first management meeting, held 
in Wellington in 1982, the three States indicated their concern at the decline of the 
stock but did not set catch limits.  New Zealand voiced a preference for a treaty and 
all three States agreed the eventual management framework should be binding, but 
Japan wanted a better understanding of all aspects of the resource, especially the 
stock/recruitment ratio, as well as a standardised database, before committing itself.  
                                                          
319
  Caton et al, supra Ch I n 36, at 32. 
320
  Cable No 3027 of 22 October 1982 from the New Zealand High Commission in 
Canberra to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Wellington, New Zealand Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs file 40/12/10 “New Zealand Affairs: Economic Relations – Japan – Fishing” (hereinafter 
“NZMFA file 40/12/10”), Part 22. 
321
  1st Trilateral Scientific Meeting Report, supra Ch I n 141, at 3. 
322
  Ibid., at 2. 
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Australia said it would have to contemplate unilateral action if the trilateral gathering 
failed to produce a management strategy.
323
 
If the overall catch were to be reduced to avoid endangering the fishery, the question 
of allocating the catch among the three States would almost inevitably arise.
324
  New 
Zealand expressed a preference for a system of zonal quotas (that is, one quota for 
the AFZ, another for the New Zealand EEZ and a third for the high seas). Australia 
preferred country quotas, while Japan was silent on the question.
325
  Consideration 
was given within the New Zealand Government to arguing that the reduction in the 
overall catch should come from the high seas component, given that management in 
the AFZ and New Zealand EEZ was a matter for the two coastal States, and that the 
different treatment of stocks inside and outside the zones accords with the fact that 
New Zealand and Australia have sovereign rights over the SBT in their zones with 
the Japanese being given access to the surplus catch, whereas outside the zones the 
Japanese are simply exercising a high seas freedom to fish. 
The anonymous author of the document concerned recommended against adopting 
this line of argument, however, since an equitable reduction was more likely to 
achieve agreement.  Japan would resist restraint being applied on the high seas only 
and the suggestion could prompt it to seek instead to maximise its short-term returns 
                                                          
323
  Cable No 4569 of 23 December 1982 from the New Zealand High Commission in 
Canberra to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Wellington, in NZMFA file 40/12/10, supra n 320, 
Part 22.  It is not clear whether this was intended as a threat by Australia, since it would have 
been open to Australia to limit its own catch unilaterally at any time, and in 1983 it proceeded to 
do so: supra Ch I, text at nn 152 and 153.  The only other measure it could have taken 
unilaterally that would affect other States would be to end the access of Japanese vessels to the 
AFZ which had been accorded to them under the 1979 Agreement and its annual subsidiary 
agreements: see supra Ch I n 265 and accompanying text. 
324
  Division of a total allowable catch into national allocations is not inevitable, but has 
certain advantages: see infra, text at nn 418-420. 
325
  Cable No 1038 of 25 March 1983 from the New Zealand High Commission in Canberra 
to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Wellington, in NZMFA file 40/12/10, supra n 320, Part 22. 
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from the fishery, whereas, in that author’s opinion, Japan needed to be persuaded of 
its own long-term interest in the fishery.
326
 
Visiting Wellington in April 1983, a Counsellor of the Japan Fisheries Agency, Mr 
Noda, tried to persuade New Zealand officials that Australia must be “convinced” or 
“forced” to reduce its catch, but Japan itself could not agree to further restrictions on 
its own activity in view of its own sacrifices in avoiding the spawning ground since 
1971
327
 and a 20 per cent cut in vessel numbers in 1981-82.  New Zealand, repeating 
its preference for a trilateral arrangement, pointed out that Australia could not be 
forced into any action in its EEZ, where it had sovereign rights.  When Mr Noda 
pressed the point, saying that by contrast there was no need for New Zealand to 
introduce equivalent restrictions in its own EEZ, Mr Mackay of the Foreign Ministry 
confirmed New Zealand’s willingness to apply trilateral decisions in its own EEZ.328  
Thereafter the pattern of scientific meetings preceding management meetings 
continued on a roughly annual cycle, the venue rotating among the three States.
329
  
At the next meeting later in 1983, Australia and Japan expressed willingness to 
restrain growth in their fisheries pending final agreement on an overall management 
arrangement.  In 1984 all three States reaffirmed the desire to work towards 
                                                          
326
  Ibid.  Oddly, Article 63(1) rather than 64 of UNCLOS was cited as the basis for this 
view.  Though this provision opens with the words “Where the same stock or stocks of associated 
species occur within the exclusive economic zones of two or more coastal States…”, and is 
usually thought of as referring to stocks distributed over neighbouring EEZs, note that it does not 
actually require the zones to be adjacent to each other.  Even so, this is clearly the circumstance 
in which its application is contemplated, since it is very unlikely that a stock would occur in two 
EEZs separated by an area of high seas without the stock also being present in the latter area, 
making it a straddling stock to which Article 63(2) would instead apply – and if not, the two 
stocks would be separate and no cooperation between the coastal States would be necessary.  
327
  Supra Ch I, text following n 188 and at n 191. 
328
  The exchanges at the meeting are reported in Cable No 659 of 14 April 1983 from the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Wellington to the New Zealand Embassy in Tokyo, in NZMFA 
file 40/12/10, supra n 320, Part 22. 
329
  Trilateral Scientific Meeting Reports Compendium, supra Ch I n 132, at iii. 
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management measures for the fishery that would sustain the spawning (parental) 
stock at a satisfactory level.  Australia proposed to limit its own and Japan’s catch, 
but Japan, not yet ready to accept a quota as the basis of restraint of its catch, 
undertook only to keep its fishing effort at such a level that the impact of Australia’s 
management measures was not dissipated, while maintaining its own recent 20 per 
cent reduction in vessel numbers.
330
  Australia nevertheless reduced its own quota 
and established a long-term catch-limiting mechanism through the institution of 
ITQs, a new form of property right entitling the owner to a given share in perpetuity 
of whatever quota might henceforth be legislated for a season.
331
 
The Australian policy of linking Japanese access to the AFZ to global quotas
332
 was 
also first given effect in 1984.  Under the 1984 Subsidiary Agreement
333
 Japanese 
vessels were excluded from most waters south of 34º South, partly in order to reduce 
their total catch and partly because it was felt that, at a time when the Australian 
industry was subject to stringent management measures, Japanese fishing activity in 
the AFZ ought not to continue unrestricted.
334
  This bore fruit in 1985, when Japan 
accepted a limit on its global SBT catch of 23,150 tonnes and in return was permitted 
under the next Subsidiary Agreement to resume fishing for SBT around Tasmania, 
though waters between 34º and 40º South remained closed to its vessels.  Australia’s 
quota was 14,500 tonnes and New Zealand’s quota of 1,000 tonnes was expressed to 
be for development purposes, given that its actual catch was far below this figure.
335
 
From 1985 quotas were negotiated each year based broadly on advice from the 
trilateral scientific meetings.  In 1986 and 1987 Australia and Japan nominally 
                                                          
330
   Ibid.; Caton et al, supra Ch I n 36, at 32.  
331
   Caton et al, supra Ch I n 36, at 32; IAC, supra Ch I n 70, at 20 and 44-45. 
332
   See infra n 433. 
333
  Supra Ch I n 265, item (v) listed, Article II.  Some smaller areas south of 34º South had 
previously been closed to Japanese fishing; see the 1983 Subsidiary Agreement, ibid., item (iv) 
listed, Article II and Appendices I and II. 
334
   Caton et al, supra Ch I n 36, at 32-33. 
335
   Ibid., at 21 and 33. 
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maintained their 1985 quotas but agreed that their national catches would not exceed 
11,500 tonnes and 19,500 tonnes respectively.  This was made possible by the 
Japanese industry providing funds in 1986 to the Tuna Boat Owners’ Association of 
Australia, at the latter’s initiative, in lieu of 3,000 tonnes of catch, assisting the 
Australian industry to reduce pressure on the small fish.
336
 
These cuts proved insufficient to halt the stock’s decline; the report of the 1988 
scientific meeting advised that the only safe catch would be zero, but if agreement on 
a moratorium on catch could not be reached, then quotas should be reduced by at 
least half.  The management meeting accepted this advice, reducing quotas to 6,250 
tonnes (Australia), 8,800 tonnes (Japan) and 450 tonnes (New Zealand), a cut of 52 
per cent overall from their 1987 total.  In part this was facilitated by a joint venture 
between the Australian and Japanese industries, under which Japanese vessels fished 
Australian quota for some years; this served in the short term palliative of the 
perennial problem of allocation.  To accommodate two new joint ventures, one 
between Australia and Japan and the other between New Zealand and Japan, 
Australia’s and New Zealand’s national allocations were divided into domestic and 
joint venture quotas as follows: Australia 5,480 tonnes domestic, 770 tonnes joint 
venture; New Zealand 150 tonnes domestic, 300 tonnes joint venture.
337
 
                                                          
336
   Ibid. 
337
   Caton et al, supra Ch I n 36, at 21 and 34.  The following year, 
[t]he three parties agreed that there is a place within the management framework for joint 
venture operations.  The Australian Government has agreed not to impede the joint venture 
between Australian and Japanese industries of SBT quota in the 1989/90 SBT quota 
management year, for a number of reasons including the encouragement of the Australian SBT 
fishery to move towards longlining in the longer term.  While details were primarily for 
respective industries consideration it was noted that continued Australia – Japan joint venture 
operations were subject to the provision of data and tangible benefits from the relevant joint 
venture.  Australia noted that the joint venture would also be subject to domestic considerations.  
All parties agreed that, if appropriate, their respective Governments should make very 
endeavour to facilitate joint venture operations consistent with their impact on the SBT stock. 
See untitled document (ca 1989, unpublished, copy held by author extracted from DPIE files), at 
2.  Since documents from this source generally have no clear indication that they were ever 
provided to Japan and New Zealand for comment – or, in the case of statements, that they were 
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When Japanese longlining vessels resumed operations off New South Wales in 1989 
as part of the joint venture, however, their catch rates were only a third of those 
recorded in 1980 and 1981.
338
  Further cuts were made that year, the three States 
agreeing on a total allowable catch of 11,750 tonnes, 24 per cent down on the 15,500 
tonnes of 1988, but while Australia and Japan took respective “national allocations” 
of 5,265 tonnes and 6,065 tonnes, what New Zealand accepted was a “voluntary 
catch limit”, which it saw as less binding than a national allocation, of 420 tonnes.  
There was some confusion about the circumstances in which New Zealand’s national 
allocation would become binding.  New Zealand believed that it would not occur 
until such time as the stock had recovered sufficiently for its quota to reach 1,000 
tonnes, while Australia and Japan saw the threshold as being much lower: 
As I heard it, New Zealand insisted that the New Zealand agreed catch limit of 420 
tonnes for the 1989/90 quota year was on the understanding that no formal quota, in 
the sense that it applied to Australia and Japan, will be applied to New Zealand until 
New Zealand’s southern bluefin tuna catch exceeds 1000 tonnes. 
While I know that this is a position New Zealand has stated before, I feel it must be 
underlined that we do not see this as a position that has been agreed. 
The resolution of 1989/90 agrees that when there is an increase in global quota, the 
New Zealand catch limit of 450 tonnes would be reinstated before any other 
allocations are made, but goes on to say that any additional tonnages would be 
allocated between the three parties through the process of trilateral discussion.
339 
It is not clear whether any legal significance can attach to this differentiation of 
wording.  A threshold requirement for significance would be that national allocations 
themselves must be binding – not an obvious conclusion at a time when the 1993 
Convention had yet to be concluded and UNCLOS, though soon afterwards accepted 
by the three States as reflecting custom, was not yet in force and contained in any 
                                                                                                                                                                    
delivered in the form written – they should be treated as no more than Australia’s written record 
of the proceedings with only commensurately qualified confidence to be placed in their accuracy. 
338
   Caton et al, supra Ch I n 36, at 23. 
339
  “25 September 1990 Opening Statement – Australia” (unpublished, copy held by author 
extracted from DPIE files), at 12. 
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event no positive obligation beyond that to cooperate.  The implication of binding 
effect in Australia’s opening statement is contradicted by one of the previous year on 
“the need for management decisions to be binding on all parties in international law”, 
when it seemed to suggest that a treaty was required to bring this about.
340
  Thus at 
their 1990 management meeting the three States passed a resolution in which: 
The three parties confirmed their intentions to set a global quota of 11750 metric 
tonnes for 1990/91 with the following national allocations: 
Australia 5265 tonnes 
Japan 6065 tonnes 
New Zealand confirmed its intention to limit its own catch to 420 tonnes, noting that 
Australia and Japan had expressed the view that in the circumstances where the 
global quota was increased, New Zealand would lift its own catch to 450 tonnes.
341
 
The tension resurfaced in 1990 when Australia sought to move its share of the quota 
towards parity with Japan, a stance greeted with hostility by Japan, which observed 
that in circumstances where the Australian industry was not capable of catching its 
nominal quota, it should not profit from use of a quota as an asset while other 
participants were having to accept severe restrictions: 
The Australian side asks for increased quota [share] to catch fish under charter…We 
feel that beneath this is an intention by Australian industry to sell quota at very high 
prices. 
In allocation of quota one must consider socio-economic factors and the fishing 
situation.  National allocation of quota not based on the size of the fishing industry is 
not rational utilisation of the resources.  
Japan believes it is irrational to insist on equal quota allocation while the Australian 
catch is declining. 
… Japan doubts the Australian attitude and believes it is acting against the 
international principles of good faith.   
                                                          
340
  “Draft Opening Statement – Australia” (unpublished, 1989, copy held by author 
extracted from DPIE files), at 9. 
341
  “SBT Trilateral Management Discussions – Resolution” (ca 1990, unpublished, copy 
held by author extracted from DPIE files), at 1. 
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Australia insists that 3500 tonnes of Australian quota would not be taken by 
Australian fishermen, it would be chartered, leased or not taken at all.  Japan 
demands that Australia drop the idea, which does not utilise catch effectively, and 
allow other nations to utilise it more effectively.
342 
Japan was worried that extremely small quotas would be disruptive, and not 
conducive to recovery of the Japanese SBT industry, and asked that in setting the 
quota, the meeting consider socio-economic factors.
343
  In its opening statement 
Japan had said that 
[t]here is no single way to promote recovery of SBT stock; we should adopt the 
method which causes least socio-economic friction.  The reality is that extreme 
measures may look good and be welcomed by the average person but can cause 
tremendous economic loss to fishery operators.
344
  
In the end agreement was reached on having the 1989 catch limits do duty again for 
1990, despite them having been expressed to be only for one year.
345
  As no 
agreement to vary these figures has ever subsequently been reached, there is much 
irony in hindsight in the qualification attending the decision to set them as default 
limits for 1991 also: 
Unless there is clear scientific evidence of recovery in the parental biomass, or 
scientific evidence that required further reductions to be made in quota levels, the 
global quota and national allocations will remain unaltered for the following year.  
All parties shared the view that there was a need to avoid being locked into an 
inappropriate global catch limit.
346
 
                                                          
342
  P. Enright (Australian Fisheries Service), Draft Summary Record Trilateral Management 
Meeting for SBT, Canberra 25 September – 26 October 1990 (unpublished, copy held by author 
extracted from DPIE files; hereinafter Draft 1990 Summary Record), at 28-29.  Japan did 
however say that it wished “to actively support the plan to convert Australian industry to 
longlining” and would support increasing Australia’s share of the quota if this occurred: at 29. 
343
  Ibid., at 25. 
344
  “Draft transcript of Japanese opening statement, 25 September 1990” (unpublished, copy 
held by author extracted from DPIE files, hereinafter Draft 1990 Japanese Opening Statement), at 
1. 
345
  Kerin, Media Release PIE 89/328K, supra Ch I n 125, at 2. 
346
  “SBT Trilateral Management Discussions – Resolution”, supra n 341, at 1. 
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C The 1990 catch share adjustment formula and its 
frustration 
Possibly believing the need for quota reductions was past and that the next change 
would be upwards, in their 1990 Resolution the three parties settled on a formula for 
adjusting the shares in the global quota, as it was increased, of the national 
allocations to Australia and Japan, and New Zealand’s voluntary catch limit.  The 
formula was set out in detail in an annex: 
1. As soon as the global quota is increased, New Zealand will raise its present 
voluntary catch limit of 420 tonnes to 450 tonnes. 
2.  As the global quota is increased, Australia will move to equality of national 
allocations with Japan.  At the same time, New Zealand will raise its catch limit 
to either 1,000 tonnes or 6% of the global quota, whichever is greater. 
These adjustments will take place in four steps, upon the condition that at least 
90% of the quota allocated to Australia and New Zealand in the year prior to 
each adjustment being made (excluding any frozen portion) is caught.  Should 
any of the trilateral partners fail to qualify for movement to a subsequent step in 
any one year, this will not prejudice that country’s aspirations [sic] to complete 
the four steps.  Catches of Australian or New Zealand quota by vessels operated 
by nations outside the trilateral group will not count as part of the 90%.  If 
catches by such nations exceed 10% in any one year the implications of these 
developments will be reviewed.  
3.  The four steps will be taken as follows: 
Step 1: New Zealand will raise its catch limit to the equivalent of 4.161 per 
cent of the global quota.  After calculating the Japanese and Australian 
allocations according to the ratio between the two allocations for the previous 
year, the difference between the Australian and Japanese allocations will be 
reduced by 1/4; namely an amount of 1/8 of the difference will be moved from 
the Japanese allocation to the Australian allocation. 
Step 2: New Zealand will raise its catch limit to the equivalent of 4.861 per 
cent of the global quota.  After calculating the Japanese and Australian 
allocation according to the ratio between the two allocations for the previous 
year, the difference between the Australian and Japanese allocations will be 
reduced by 1/3; namely an amount of 1/6 of the difference will be moved from 
the Japanese allocation to the Australian allocation. 
 112 
Step 3: New Zealand will raise its catch limit to the equivalent of 5.469 per 
cent of the global quota.  After calculating the Japanese and Australian 
allocations according to the ratio between the two allocations for the previous 
year, the difference between the Australian and Japanese allocations will be 
reduced by 1/2; namely an amount of one quarter of the difference will be 
moved from the Japanese allocation to the Australian allocation.  
Step 4: New Zealand will raise its catch limit to the equivalent of six per cent 
of the global quota, or 1,000 tonnes, whichever is greater.  When the New 
Zealand catch exceeds 1,000 tonnes, then New Zealand will subject itself to a 
quota in the same way as Australia and Japan.  This will in no way diminish 
New Zealand’s determination to adhere to the agreed voluntary catch limits.  
After calculating the Japanese and Australian allocations according to the ratio 
between the two allocations for the previous year, the difference between the 
two will be eliminated; namely an amount of 1/2 of the difference will be 
moved to the Australian allocation. 
4. The first adjustment will occur when the global quota [has] reached or exceeded 
12,750 tonnes and subsequent adjustment steps will only occur when the 
increase in global quota since the last adjustment is at least 1,000 tonnes.  If the 
increase since the last adjustment is greater than 5,000 tonnes, then a two step 
adjustment will be made at one time.
347
 
Despite encouraging early signs that the catch reductions of the 1980s were having a 
positive effect on the stock’s prospects of recovery, new information in 1992 on the 
growth rates of SBT showed that previous evidence of recovery was misleading:  
Under all interpretations of growth, the analyses show that the parental biomass is 
expected to remain below the 1980 level for many more years, so that the risk of 
                                                          
347
  Ibid., at 3-4 (Annex 1, “Future Adjustments to Quota Allocation”).  At the 1992 and 
1993 management meetings the mutual understanding of the three States was reaffirmed: 
Southern Bluefin Tuna Trilateral Management Discussions, Tokyo, October 1992, Conclusion 
(unpublished, copy held by author extracted from DPIE files; hereinafter 1992 Conclusion) at 1; 
Southern Bluefin Tuna Trilateral Management Discussions, Canberra, October-November 1993, 
Conclusion (unpublished, copy held by author extracted from DPIE files; hereinafter 1993 
Conclusion), at 1.  Annex 1 to 1992 Conclusion and Attachment B to 1993 Conclusion (at 11-12) 
are identical to the equivalent 1990 document apart from some trivial editorial changes, except 
that “agreed” is omitted in step 4, presumably in order to underline the non-binding nature of 
New Zealand’s commitment. 
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abrupt recruitment decline remains high.  Similar to last year, from a biological 
viewpoint a decrease in catch level is highly desirable.
348
 
Failing that,  
catch levels should not be increased from the present level until such time as the 
parental biomass returns to at least the 1980 level, unless this is part of an agreed 
stock rebuilding strategy that can be shown to have a high probability of returning 
the stock to biologically safe levels.
349
 
Commenting on catches by other participants in the fishery, the scientists said they 
remained high, and increases in them would “worsen the prospects for recovery.”  
Since the trilateral scientific group analyses were based on total global catch, with 
non-trilateral catches taken into account in the projections, the future level of the 
latter, which was attended by considerable uncertainty, “could substantially affect the 
results”.  They recommended improved monitoring of non-trilateral catches.350 
The catch limits thus were left at the level agreed in 1989 for the rest of the trilateral 
period.  Table 2 below sets out the catch limits in the trilateral years and actual 
catches in the years to 1988. 
 
 
Table 2: SBT catch limits from 1984 to 1994 negotiated among Australia, Japan 
                                                          
348
  Report of the Twelfth Meeting of Australian, Japanese and New Zealand Scientists on 
Southern Bluefin Tuna, Hobart, Australia, 13-19 October 1993: Report to Management 
(Attachment C to 1993 Conclusion; hereinafter 12th Trilateral Scientific Meeting Report), in 
1993 Conclusion, supra n 347, 13 at 16 (paragraph 16); see also Report of the Eleventh Meeting 
of Australian, Japanese and New Zealand Scientists on Southern Bluefin Tuna. Shimizu-shi, 
Japan, 5-10 October 1992 (Annex 2 to 1992 Conclusion; hereinafter 11th Trilateral Scientific 
Meeting Report), at 5 (paragraph 17). 
349
  12th Trilateral Scientific Meeting Report, supra n 348, at 17-18 (paragraph 22). 
350
  13th Trilateral Scientific Meeting Report, supra Ch I n 46, at 4 (paragraph 21) and 6 
(paragraph 36).  Less than realistically, in the preceding two years they had recommended 
reducing catches by those outside the trilateral framework: 11th Trilateral Scientific Meeting 
Report, n 348, at 5 (paragraph 18); and that Australia, Japan and New Zealand “endeavour to 
ensure that global SBT catches do not exceed the catch level agreed to by [them]”: 12th Trilateral 
Scientific Meeting Report, supra n 348, at 18 (paragraph 24). 
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and New Zealand or unilaterally adopted, in tonnes except where indicated 
(with amounts caught in subsequent quota years to 1989 in parentheses)
351
 
Year Australia Japan New Zealand TOTAL 
1984 21000 (15843) - (23323)  10000 fish (93) (39169) 
1985 14500 (13486) - (20393) 10000 fish (94) (33973) 
1986 14500 (13237) 23150 (15522) 1000 (82) 38650 (28841) 
1987 11500 (11308) 19500 (13955) 1000 (59) 32000 (24904) 
1988 11500 (10976) 19500 (10821*) 1000 (93) 32000 (21890*) 
1989 6250 (5985) 8800 (**) 450 (424) 15500 (**) 
1990-1994 5265 6065 420  11750  
* estimated in source or dependent on figure so estimated 
** not available in source or not calculable  
The issue has never gone away.  In 2003, when after a six-year gap the CCSBT again 
adopted a TAC and national allocations, at the urging of New Zealand, which feared 
that relative catch levels might become “cemented in” through a management 
procedure,
352
 the Extended Commission acknowledged that there was an outstanding 
issue with respect to allocations as set out in the 1994 mutual understanding which it 
needed to resolve no later than the next meeting in the context of future consideration 
                                                          
351
  After Caton et al, supra Ch I n 36, at 21, with unilaterally adopted limits in italics.  Note 
that the catches of Australia and Japan differ from those in Table 2 because their quota years do 
not coincide with the calendar year.  The three States would negotiate in one year the quotas for 
the following quota year.  In the years treated singly in the Table, Australia’s quota year ran from 
1 October of the year of negotiation to 30 September of the following year: “Update of the 
Australian Southern Bluefin Tuna Fishery for the 1999/00 and Preliminary 2000/01 Seasons” 
(Attachment K-l to CCSBT8 Report)), in CCSBT Blue Book 2002, supra Ch I n 30, 108 at 110 
(Attachment A, “Domestic southern bluefin tuna catch by Australian state, gear and quota year, 
1988/89 to 2000/01”).  New Zealand’s fishing year extends from 1 October to 30 September of 
the following year, while Japan’s quota year runs from 1 March of the following year to the last 
day of February in the year after that: see infra Ch V n 1168. 
352
  “Opening Statement by New Zealand” (Attachment 4-4 to CCSBT-EC2 Report), in 
CCSBT Blue Book 2004, supra Ch I n 32, 48 at 50. 
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of TAC, national allocations and management procedure decision rules “taking full 
account of the [1993] Convention and the relevant principles in international law.”  
The Commission invited New Zealand to prepare a paper in advance of the 2004 
Meeting exploring how the principles reflected in the 1994 understanding might be 
accommodated given the current CCSBT environment, including the admission of 
Korea and Taiwan and the moves towards a management procedure.
353
   
At the next meeting, New Zealand put its case in the following terms:  
[I]t has been the ongoing concern about the status of the SBT stock and the need to 
ensure that all fishing for SBT occurs within the ambit of the CCSBT that has 
stopped New Zealand at previous meetings from pressing for the entitlement to an 
increase in our national allocation that was acknowledged by the Commission as far 
back as the Mutual Understanding reached at CCSBT1 in 1994. 
New Zealand has adhered to a 420 tonne allocation since national allocations were 
first agreed in 1994, even though in doing so we have severely constrained the 
ability of the New Zealand industry to develop the fishery in the New Zealand EEZ, 
or utilise the resources of that industry to build its catch more widely – at a time 
when others were engaged in just such expansion of their catch.  New Zealand has 
been a responsible member of this Commission.  The price of such restraint on our 
part has been a continuing inequity in New Zealand’s allocation. 
… 
[T]his Commission must address…the outstanding claim that New Zealand has over 
the level of its allocation.  This allocation does not reflect our status as a coastal 
state, our past conservation efforts, and the available catch within our EEZ – all 
important allocation principles reflected in the [1993] Convention itself and in 
international law.
354
 
New Zealand proposed that national allocations for members and cooperating non-
members of less than 500 tonnes not be reduced if the TAC is between 10,000 and 
15,000 tonnes.  If the TAC were to go below 10,000 tonnes, they would be reduced 
                                                          
353
  CCSBT-EC2 Report, ibid., 14 at 24-25 (paragraphs 52-54). 
354
  “Opening Statement by New Zealand” (Attachment 4-4 to CCSBT-EC3 Report), in 
CCSBT Blue Book 2005, supra Ch I n 34, 47 at 47-48. 
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in the same proportion as other members’ for the difference between the reduced 
TAC and 10,000 tonnes “or according to any other decision the Commission takes”, 
with the CCSBT1 Understanding to be applied only if the TAC is set above 15,000 
tonnes.  These rules would apply even if no management procedure were adopted at 
the 2005 meeting.
355
  The decision was, however, again deferred for a year, although 
it was recognised that rules for dividing the TAC derived from the management 
procedure would need to be in place by the time that procedure was adopted.
356
 
It is submitted that New Zealand has a legitimate grievance.  Since the essence of its 
2004 proposal is that New Zealand now accepts 4.2 per cent of a small TAC, while 
not entirely abandoning its hope of 6 per cent of a large one, it certainly cannot be 
accused of failing to cooperate or compromise with the other CCSBT Members.  So 
far, however, these others have continued to find reasons not to redress the situation. 
D New entrants’ influence on institutional arrangements 
for SBT management 
After only a few years of their trilateral arrangement, the three States realised that the 
need to deal collectively with other actual and potential participants in the fishery 
made the formalisation of their relationship in a treaty desirable.  This was impelled 
by the first moves in the Indian Ocean Fishery Commission’s Committee on the 
Management of Indian Ocean Tunas towards the possible establishment of a 
management body for Indian Ocean tunas.
357
  At Australia’s suggestion a working 
group on formalising the institutional arrangements was set up in 1987.
358
  Formation 
of a wider Indian Ocean body for all tunas under FAO auspices, Australia said in its 
opening statement at the 1988 trilateral meeting, “places on us a considerable 
international obligation to ensure that the trilateral group develops responsible 
                                                          
355
  “New Zealand Proposal for Decision Rules concerning Allocation of TAC” (Attachment 
11 to CCSBT-EC3 Report), in CCSBT Blue Book 2005, supra Ch I n 34, 95. 
356
  CCSBT-EC3 Report, supra Ch I n 78, at 23 (paragraphs 44 and 45). 
357
  See Kambona and Marashi, supra Ch I n 257, at 8 (paragraphs 22 and 23). 
358
  “Draft Opening Statement – Australia”, supra n 340, at 9.   
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management arrangements for both short-term and long-term conservation of the 
SBT stock.”359  New Zealand stated: 
                                                          
359
  “Opening Statements by Delegations” (Attachment C to Southern Bluefin Tuna 
Trilateral Management Discussions Seventh Round (hereinafter 7th Trilateral Management 
Meeting Report), unpublished, copy held by author extracted from DPIE files), Australian 
statement at 5.  Similar pressures were felt in succeeding years: see e.g. in 1989 “Draft Opening 
Statement – Australia”, supra n 340, at 2 (“those countries presently harvesting SBT, but not 
party to this management group, were also watching our actions closely”) and 10: 
Mr. Gorrie reminded the meeting that discussions on the possible establishment of a body 
responsible for the management of Indian Ocean Tuna fisheries are scheduled to commence 
in two weeks, and this meeting needed to maintain our present standing with the Indian 
Ocean forum.  
Mr. Gorrie felt it was important that all participants continue to…stress that the trilateral 
group is the appropriate body to provide management advice to whatever arrangement is put 
in place on SBT.  
Mr. Gorrie was sure that the Indian Ocean meeting would be reviewing the outcome of these 
trilateral management discussions very closely.   
 
In “Opening Statement by New Zealand Delegation” (1989, unpublished, copy held by author 
extracted from DPIE files), at 2, New Zealand spoke in similar terms: 
Work towards finalising an agreement has been lent some urgency because of the 
involvement of other nations with SBT.  Some other countries are catching increasing 
amounts of SBT and threaten to add significantly to the overexploitation of the stock, and 
there are other initiatives concerned with management of tuna in the Southern Hemisphere.  
… [I]t will be in our best interests to conclude an international instrument that recognises our 
commitment to the fishery and provides responsible conservation and management of the 
resource.  However, for other countries to accept this role, the trilateral partners need to 
demonstrate that we are capable of ensuring the long term sustainability of the stock by 
making the necessary management decisions.  
New Zealand’s position had evolved subtly by 1990: whereas in 1989 the instrument was to be 
one that “provides responsible conservation and management”, it was now described as one that 
“maintains our control over” the SBT resource  – see “Southern Bluefin Tuna Management 
Discussions Ninth Round, Canberra, 25-28 September 1990 – Opening Statement by New 
Zealand Delegation” (unpublished, copy held by author extracted from DPIE files; hereinafter 
New Zealand September 1990 Opening Statement), at 3, where New Zealand added that it was: 
…concerned to achieve some substantial progress towards agreement to a final arrangement 
for the conservation and management of SBT.  Work towards finalising an agreement is 
urgent because of the erosion of our respective positions by the uncontrolled catches of other 
countries which threaten to undermine our sacrifices to conserve the stock. 
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[T]he trilateral partners can ill afford to be seen to be incapable of conserving and 
managing the SBT resource.  Other non-SBT catching nations are interested in the 
future management of SBT. 
There is an obvious self-interest for catching nations to maintain control over the 
conservation and management of the stocks but to do so requires demonstrable 
responsiveness to the state of the resource and pressing management issues. 
…While the current ad hoc management arrangement has its merits…the high 
ground in negotiating with others who also wish to be involved in conservation and 
management of the SBT resource will inevitably be held by those that can get their 
act together first.
360
 
Later in the meeting Australia pointed to the need to take into account catches of 
those outside the trilateral group, and indicated that it understood the Taiwanese 
catch to be at least 280 tonnes.  Japan observed that, since SBT migrate through the 
EEZs of Indonesia and South Africa, their future participation as coastal States 
would need to be contemplated.  The meeting also “recognised the need to take into 
account the activities of distant water fishing nations such as Taiwan and Korea.”361 
In 1989 the three States continued to voice their concerns in familiar terms:  
                                                                                                                                                                    
 
360
  Ibid., New Zealand statement at 2.  Accord “Opening Statement – Australia, Reconvened 
SBT Trilateral Management Session 23 October 1990” (unpublished, copy held by author 
extracted from DPIE files), at 1: 
[In] discussions held earlier, we agreed on the need to control catches by other nations 
outside of the agreed arrangements we have for management of SBT.  Yet there appears to be 
little point in trying to impose any restrictions on other nations if we are unable to agree on 
control of our own industries.  
 
Accord also the opening statement at the 1993 meeting (“Opening Statement – New Zealand 
(October 1993)” (Attachment C to Southern Bluefin Tuna Trilateral Management Discussions – 
First Session – Draft Summary Record, Canberra, 21-23 October 1993 (unpublished, copy held 
by author extracted from DPIE files; hereinafter October 1993 Draft Summary Record)), at 2: 
“…catches [by parties] outside the trilateral arrangement continue to be of grave concern.  We 
cannot reasonably seek their cooperation in reducing fishing on the stock if we do not ourselves 
demonstrate reasonable management.” 
361
  7th Trilateral Management Meeting Report, supra n 359, at 9. 
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All parties expressed their concern at catches by fishers not subject to any 
conservation and management measures.  They further agreed to encourage fishers 
outside the trilateral group to subject their operations to management controls and 
provide information on their catches.  The trilateral parties undertook to continue to 
use their best endeavours to determine the extent of catches by others using the 
fishery and to exchange any data obtained.
362
 
For Australia, the moratorium on take of SBT it proposed that year
363
 drove home the 
need for a treaty.  It was convinced that the “long term benefits to be derived from a 
short term moratorium were very large, both from biological and economic points of 
view.”364  Further, “it was necessary to consider formulation of arrangements that 
could include those outside of the trilateral management body who are fishing for 
SBT.”365  In their absence, Australia merely “hoped that other fishing nations outside 
of this forum would respect and adhere to such a moratorium on SBT catches.”366 
By contrast, among Japan’s reasons for rejecting a moratorium were that it would do 
nothing to encourage other catchers of SBT to accede to the future treaty.
367
  Indeed 
Japan saw the catch of third parties as an additional reason not to cut the trilateral 
partners’ own catch at all.  With SBT prices already rising markedly, it argued, there 
was a real risk that, by cutting catch levels further, the trilateral group would only 
fuel the rise, encouraging others to “fill the void” by increasing their catches or 
entering the fishery.  Japan also claimed that it could not retain the confidence of its 
industry in the trilateral arrangements if it followed a policy of increasing cuts on its 
fleet only to the advantage of Taiwan or Korea.  Accordingly, Japan was in favour of 
                                                          
362
  Untitled document, supra n 337, at 2. 
363
  Supra Ch I n 271 and accompanying text. 
364
  “Draft Opening Statement – Australia”, supra n 340, at 5. 
365
  Ibid., at 9. 
366
  Ibid., at 5. 
367
  Report of the Working Group on a Possible Institutional Framework for the 
Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (ca 1989, unpublished, copy held by author extracted 
from DPIE files), at 2. 
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retaining the status quo.
368
  New Zealand responded that the need to encourage other 
countries to participate in the management arrangements through formation of an 
international convention was the best way to remove the threat of market and fishing 
“voids” mentioned by Japan.369 
New Zealand supported Australia’s call for a moratorium in the 1989 management 
meeting as its preferred position, but added a significant caveat should agreement on 
a moratorium not be achieved: 
[I]t is our position that the current stressed state of the SBT stock is a result of the 
large catches by Australia and Japan in earlier years and consequently the relatively 
small New Zealand industry should not be further restricted.  Substantial catches of 
SBT are taken within the New Zealand [EEZ] and when the stock recovers we 
expect our current small scale domestic fishery will expand to take a greater share of 
the resource harvested within our waters.
370
 
In 1990 the scientists reported to the managers that  
catches by nations other than Australia, Japan and New Zealand pose an additional 
risk to the stocks that increased with magnitude of those catches. … It is essential 
                                                          
368
  Southern Bluefin Tuna Trilateral Management Discussions Eighth Meeting 18-21 
September 1989 Summary Record (unpublished, copy held by author extracted from DPIE files; 
hereinafter September 1989 Summary Record), at 25-26.  Australia joined New Zealand in 
expressing interest in whatever data Japan could provide on Taiwan’s catch and marketing of 
SBT: at 26. 
369
  Draft Summary Record Reconvened Trilateral Management Meeting for SBT Canberra 
8 – 18 October 1989 (unpublished, copy held by author extracted from DPIE files; hereinafter 
October 1989 Draft Summary Record), at 2.  Japan rejoined that it was worried about Taiwanese 
and Korean fishermen negating any benefit further reductions by Australia, Japan and New 
Zealand may have – particularly with a number of Japanese skippers proposing to operate on 
Taiwanese and Korean boats: at 3.  The Japanese industry feared that the lack of agreement on 
quotas even after two rounds of meetings “could mean other countries like Taiwan and Korea 
would move into the fishing grounds, which would be chaotic in terms of the stock.”: ibid., at 14. 
370
  “Opening Statement by New Zealand Delegation”, supra n 359, at 2.  In the equivalent 
statement in 1990 (New Zealand September 1990 Opening Statement, supra n 359, at 2) New 
Zealand rather than speaking of an expected expansion of its fishery said that it was “confident it 
can expand”. 
 121 
that reliable data on past and future catches and catch length composition of SBT 
taken by all countries be collected and made available for inclusion in the VPAs.
371
  
Australia noted in the management meeting that, for as long as Japan’s national 
allocation had been set too high to require closure of the Japanese season in order 
that it not be exceeded, third-party catch had effectively been ignored because it did 
not take the global catch above the TAC.  Now this slack was no longer available: 
It is extremely important to note that, until 1989, catches by other nations had been 
contained within the global quotas set – but, when quotas first restricted Japanese 
longline operations in 1989, we were faced with all catches by other nations being 
outside the level of global quotas. 
It is essential this issue is addressed immediately – agreed quotas leave no scope for 
quota limitations being exceeded, particularly when the stock is in such a grave 
situation.
372
  
New Zealand, however, now wanted to postpone the admission of new States to the 
completion of a treaty: 
New Zealand is concerned by recent indications of substantial increases in catch by 
vessels from outside the trilateral arrangements.  New Zealand believes that it is 
important that other nations that fish the stock be drawn into arrangements for the 
conservation and management of the stock.  But equally we are of the firm view that 
institutional arrangements should first be thoroughly discussed and if possible set in 
place between the trilateral parties, before involving further parties.
373
 
                                                          
371
  Report of the Ninth Meeting of Australian, Japanese and New Zealand Scientists on 
Southern Bluefin Tuna, Hobart, Australia, 17-22 September 1990 (unpublished, copy held by 
author extracted from DPIE files), at iii.  VPA stands for virtual population analysis, a fish stock 
assessment technique described infra in Appendix 2, text at nn 1515-1520. 
372
  “25 September 1990 Opening Statement – Australia”, supra n 339, at 9. 
373
  New Zealand September 1990 Opening Statement, supra n 301, at 2.  It appears to have 
had its way for the next year at least, as there was no discussion of third parties recorded in the 
report of the 1991 trilateral management meeting.  Although in the treaty text ultimately adopted, 
the criteria for eligibility to accede were not at all stringent (see Article 18 of the 1993 
Convention, reproduced at Appendix C, Part I infra), the three States appeared to believe, for 
reasons that are unclear, that they could impose conditions on prospective new entrants: 
Concern was expressed by all three countries that the trilateral framework established for the 
conservation and management of SBT could be adversely affected by nations not party to 
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The general resolution adopted by the three States embodying the outcome of their 
management meeting that year included the following passage:  
The three parties noted the serious concern at the current level and possible increase 
of SBT catches by other parties outside of the trilateral framework, and have recorded 
their views on the issue of catches by other parties in Annex 3 to this resolution.  It 
was recommended that the scientific group extend invitations to scientists from other 
parties to participate as observers at the next trilateral scientific meeting. 
…It was recognised that a formal agreement was most important in addressing the 
activities of other parties.
374
 
A resolution-within-a-resolution dealt specifically with new entrants: 
Noting that Australia, Japan and New Zealand, the three traditional southern bluefin 
tuna (SBT) fishing nations, have been taking voluntary regulatory measures of self 
restraint for the purpose of conserving the SBT resource since 1982 under the 
trilateral co-operative management framework; 
Also taking note of the particular importance of maintaining and developing the co-
operative management framework which is serving to help bring about the recovery 
of the SBT resource; 
Taking into account the advice of the three nation’s [sic] scientists that given the 
status of the parental biomass currently at historically low levels, cautious 
management measures for the three nation’s [sic] fisheries should be continued; 
Being conscious of their shared responsibilities to ensure continuing efforts to 
achieve recovery of the SBT resource; 
Australia, Japan and New Zealand, 
Reaffirmed at the 1990 trilateral SBT management meeting their readiness to take 
voluntary regulatory measures during the next fishing season; 
Expressed their increasing concern over catches by third parties, which unless 
properly regulated, could possibly jeopardise the extensive effort so far exerted by 
the three nations; and 
                                                                                                                                                                    
those arrangements.  All three countries agreed that other nations with significant catches of 
SBT should be invited to accede to the Convention as soon as it is ratified, but that the terms 
and conditions of such access remained to be considered. 
 
See November 1993 Draft Summary Record, supra Ch I n 289, at 3. 
374
  “SBT Trilateral Management Discussions – Resolution”, supra n 346, at 2. 
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Reconfirmed their intention to use their best endeavours to encourage such third 
parties to be cognisant of the efforts of the three nations and pay due respect to the 
conservational aspect of the SBT fisheries.
375
   
Though the self-serving description of themselves as “traditional” participants 
suggests that the three States were laying an inchoate claim to historic rights to the 
SBT fishery, it was rather half-hearted in that no attempt appears to have been made 
to bring this text to other States’ attention – concerted engagement with them was in 
1990 still some years off.  
Third States became involved in the negotiations in an additional and unusual way.  
Pursuing its standard insistence on conditioning access of Japanese fishing vessels to 
the AFZ on prior agreement on the TAC and national allocations against which their 
catch would be counted,
376
 Australia warned that Japan was not the only State to 
which it was prepared to give access to the AFZ:  
If the trilateral negotiations are broken off, I must make it absolutely clear that there 
will be no bilateral access whatsoever for Japanese vessels to the Australian Fishing 
Zone in 1990/91.  This includes port visits, with the only possible exceptions being 
for surveillance and agreed research vessels. 
[I]f Japan walks away from agreement on global quotas this year…that would leave 
the Australian industry no choice but to pursue negotiations with other countries.
377
  
One of the arguments used by Japan in opposing leasing and charter arrangements 
was that they “will increase catches by other nations, against our common goal of 
                                                          
375
  Ibid., at 6 (Annex 3, “Resolution on Catches by Other Parties”). 
376
  Supra, text at nn 332-334. 
377
  “Southern Bluefin Tuna Trilateral negotiations – Australian Statement to plenary session 
on 10 October 1990” (unpublished, copy held by author extracted from DPIE files, hereinafter 
Australian 1990 trilateral statement), at 2-3, corroborated by Draft 1990 Japanese Opening 
Statement, supra n 344, at 2: “[S]ome Australian fishing operators propose to sell/lease some 
3000 tonnes of quota to Japan, ROK or Taiwan.” 
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restricting catch by other nations in the interests of stock management”.  Japan asked 
that Australia “voluntarily restrict” such arrangements.378  New Zealand went further: 
New Zealand believes arrangements to catch SBT should be limited to the trilateral 
partners at least until such time as formal institutional arrangements have been 
established.  We have placed restrictions on our own industry to limit joint venture 
arrangements to other trilateral partners.  New Zealand is of the view that 
arrangements with parties outside the trilateral framework would be in breach of the 
agreement to discourage catches of SBT by those parties.
379
  
Implicit in these stances, however, is a failure to appreciate that, on proper legal 
analysis, quota carries with it a measure of international responsibility.  A catch limit 
is an obligation to ensure that catches by persons and vessels subject to the control of 
the State accepting the limit – in this case Australia – do not exceed a certain 
quantified level.  It is submitted that there is no warrant for implying into this a 
further restriction that Australia’s 5,265 tonnes must be caught by Australian vessels.  
Had Australia permitted or encouraged the use of foreign vessels to catch SBT 
against quota covered by statutory fishing rights under the Fisheries Act 1952, that 
fishing, whether or not it took place within Australia’s EEZ, would be governed by 
Australian law and produce catch that would be counted against Australia’s national 
allocation just as if it had been caught by Australian-flagged vessels.  That is, it is 
enough that the fishing by the foreign vessels would have taken place under the same 
conditions as that of Australian vessels and been catch for which Australia accepted 
                                                          
378
  Draft 1990 Summary Record, supra n 342, at 29.  See also Draft 1990 Japanese Opening 
Statement, supra n 344, at 3: 
If Australia is not able to use its quota itself it should give it up.  Allowing Taiwan and ROK 
to use Australian quota will severely exacerbate the problem of other countries catching 
outside the Trilateral Management arrangements.  
379
  “New Zealand Statement for Plenary Session of Ninth Southern Bluefin Tuna 
Management Talks, Canberra 9 October 1990” (unpublished, copy held by author extracted from 
DPIE files, hereinafter New Zealand 1990 trilateral statement), at 1. 
 125 
international responsibility, including for any failure to prevent the combined total 
exceeding 5,265 tonnes.
380
 
The lack of imagination on the part of Japan and New Zealand may have stemmed 
from a continuing belief in flag State primacy, giving no weight to the fact that the 
vessels were voluntarily subjecting themselves to management regulation under 
Australian law.  Their understanding of the nature of quota may also have been 
blurred because the catch of Japanese vessels fishing under the joint venture was 
double-counted against both Australian and Japanese quota; this was the way in 
which the total catch was kept down.
381
 
The 1990 resolution ultimately appeared to contemplate that outsiders might be able 
to fish a party’s quota, though in words that were less than encouraging of such a 
development: 
The three parties reiterated their common view that there was a place within the 
trilateral framework for various charter and leasing arrangements, and that it would 
be desirable for such arrangements to be between the trilateral partners.
382
 
E The beginnings of a more systematic approach 
Other participants in the SBT fishery were also a consideration for the three States 
when at their 1992 management meeting they decided they needed to specify more 
clearly their objectives for the fishery, and in consequence adopted the outlines of a 
mid-term management strategy for the next three years, “directed at annual increases 
in parental biomass and reduction of the risk of abrupt recruitment decline”.  The 
further refinement of the strategy planned for early 1993 would include in it: 
                                                          
380
  This is supported by the 1988 reference to the obligation to ensure compliance with 
management measures, in the context of the desire to control fishing for SBT by non-parties in 
the EEZ, not prohibit it: supra, text at n 401.  
381
  Supra, text at n 336. 
382
  “SBT Trilateral Management Discussions – Resolution”, supra n 346, at 2.  Note too the 
possibility that the implementation of the decision on reallocation of catch shares under Annex 1 
to the 1990 Resolution might not proceed if third-State vessels took more than 10% of Australia’s 
or New Zealand’s quota; see paragraph 2 of the Annex reproduced supra, text at n 347. 
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(g) actions, consistent with international law, to deter catches of SBT outside the 
SBT trilateral conservation and management framework including consideration of a 
mechanism for tracking SBT products such as certificate of origin regime, and 
coordinated contacts to relevant fishing authorities 
(h) scientific cooperation between the trilateral parties and other countries fishing for 
SBT or having SBT in waters under their jurisdiction.
383
  
Once more the three States expressed “significant concerns at the current level and 
apparent increase of SBT catches by parties outside the trilateral framework, 
particularly Taiwan,” and reaffirmed their 1990 views on catches by others.  They 
agreed to “explore, as a matter of urgency, possible measures for addressing the 
problem of non-trilateral catch.”  Concurring that every effort should be made to 
discourage SBT fishing by vessels reflagged for convenience, they requested Japan 
to take effective measures to deter such reflagging of exported Japanese longliners.  
The three States also undertook to cooperate in investigating the potential of a 
certificate of origin scheme for SBT and scheme as a means for more clearly 
identifying the origin of SBT catches.  Meanwhile, they recommended that the 
scientists extend invitations to counterparts from other countries to participate as 
observers at the next trilateral scientific meeting.  They also saw merit in seeking 
Indonesia’s involvement in co-operative stock enhancement projects.384 
The refrain continued at the 1993 meeting, where concern was expressed by all three 
States over the significant increase of non-trilateral catch, especially that of Taiwan 
and Indonesia.  Australia in its opening statement listed a much broader range of 
information that was required on catch taken outside the trilateral framework: 
Catches of SBT taken outside the trilateral quota system threaten to undermine our 
collective efforts to manage the fishery.  Other countries involved in the SBT fishery 
                                                          
383
  1992 Conclusion, supra n 350, at 1-2. 
384
  Ibid., at 4.  Annex 3, “Resolution on Catches by Other Parties” was, apart from some 
minor additions, placing the mention of cautious management in the context of the outline mid-
term management strategy, and contemplating early, coordinated contacts with the fisheries 
authorities of other participants, essentially the same as the equivalent document of 1990 (see 
supra n 375).  
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must be encouraged to participate in the work of the new Commission.  It is also 
vital that we obtain, as soon as possible, much better information about the nature 
and origin of these catches.  We need to know what vessels are fishing, where and 
when they are doing so, and by what means their catches are being brought to 
market.  We need to work together on obtaining detailed information on non-quota 
catches, and to cooperate in devising effective means of influencing the activities of 
the vessels concerned.
385
  
Australia focused on catch and effort data to underpin management of the fishery: 
Any calls for catch constraint outside the trilateral quota regime will be both 
pointless and unjustified if we are unable to show that we have effective 
management measures in place for our own fisheries.  These must necessarily 
include programs to ensure the collection and exchange of timely and verified catch 
and effort data from within fishing zones and on the high seas.
386
  
New Zealand saw a certification scheme as the answer:  
The grave stock situation continues to be aggravated by uncontrolled and increasing 
catch outside the trilateral arrangement.  In the medium term we need to seriously 
consider how to bring new parties into the Convention.  In the shorter term the most 
immediate step is to implement a certification scheme as soon as possible.  The New 
Zealand Government and industry are ready to cooperate in a system which will 
have documentation for all SBT caught by New Zealand vessels.
387
 
Briefed by Japan on the ICCAT statistical document program’s origins, Australia and 
New Zealand were interested in collaborating in the introduction of such a scheme as 
an important component of a strategy for obtaining information on non-party catch, 
but in Japan’s view the merits of doing so for SBT had yet to be assessed.  All three 
                                                          
385
  “SBT Trilateral Management Discussions 21-23 October 1993 Australian Opening 
Statement”, in Attachment C to 1993 Conclusion, supra n 348, at 2. 
386
  “SBT Trilateral Management Discussions 22 November 1993 – Second Session: 
Australian Opening Statement” (Attachment E to November 1993 Draft Summary Record, supra 
Ch I n 289). 
387
  “Opening Statement – New Zealand” (Attachment C to November 1993 Draft Summary 
Record, supra Ch I n 289), at 2. 
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States recognised the need to seek cooperation from flag States of vessels that catch 
SBT before implementation of such a scheme which might affect them.
388
 
Australia reported joint research with Indonesia that “reliably estimated” the latter’s 
annual catch at 650 tonnes, of which 67 per cent was exported to Japan.  Japan in 
turn provided statistics on significant SBT imports from countries (Taiwan, Korea, 
Indonesia, Singapore, Panama) other than Australia and New Zealand, noting that the 
separation of statistics for southern and northern bluefin tunas would allow the closer 
monitoring of such imports in future.  Information was shared on SBT catches by 
Indonesia’s tuna longline fisheries collected through CSIRO’s co-operative research 
program with Indonesian scientists, which Australia was encouraged to continue.  
Australia and New Zealand urged Japan to discourage transactions in SBT caught 
outside the trilateral conservation framework.  Japan undertook to obtain detailed 
information on the landings of Taiwanese-caught SBT on a vessel-by-vessel basis.
389 
The three States undertook to set up a system for the collection, timely sharing and 
reviewing of all trade, scientific and other relevant data available from non-parties in 
relation to SBT with a view to determining the magnitude of non-party catches and 
to prepare an assessment of those data at the time of the trilateral management 
meeting in May 1994.  Australia and New Zealand encouraged Japan to monitor 
imports of non-party catch closely and to alert them to developments in this regard.  
All were to consider the merits of introducing a statistical document program similar 
to that of ICCAT for the May 1994 meeting.
390
  In the meantime,  
Each Party will make every effort to discourage its nationals from being involved in 
non-Party fishing, transactions involving SBT caught by a non-Party or engaging in 
other activities involving non-Parties in relation to SBT, where such fishing, 
                                                          
388
  1993 Conclusion, supra n 348, at 3. 
389
  Ibid., at 2-3; October 1993 Draft Summary Record, supra n 360, at 2. 
390
   “Draft Action Plan on Non-Party Catch” (Annex II to “Mid-term Management Strategy 
for the SBT Fishery” (Attachment D to 1993 Conclusion)), in 1993 Conclusion, supra n 348, 31 
at 31. 
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transactions or activities are likely to undermine the effectiveness of the SBT 
conservation effort.
391
 
When the meeting resumed a month later, the three States agreed on a draft Action 
Plan on Non-Party Catch based on a draft prepared by Japan, which contemplated 
that they would organise and send a joint mission to Indonesia and Taiwan in mid- or 
late 1994 to urge them to join the SBT conservation and management effort, as well 
as collect information on their fishing activities.  It was agreed that each of them 
would take any opportunity available to discuss the conservation and management of 
SBT with Taiwan, Indonesia, Korea and Panama, the plan’s main targets, and they 
prepared a draft joint demarche which would form the basis of such approaches.
392 
The draft demarche refers to UNCLOS and the 1993 Convention, and the obligation 
in Article 117 of UNCLOS to take, or cooperate with other States in taking, 
measures for nationals necessary for the conservation of the living resources of the 
sea, though not identified as such, is described as being among the “generally 
accepted principles of international law”.  The draft rehearses the history of the 
trilateral catch limits in the context of the “voluntary cooperation among the three 
nations to manage sustainably the SBT fishery resource”.  Drawing attention to the 
1,148 tonnes of non-trilateral SBT exports to Japan in 1992, and to the addressee’s 
share of it (165 tonnes from Indonesia in the example used), the text continues:  
Given the severe restraints already exercised by the parties to the Convention, this 
information causes concern to the three nations over not only the lack of catch data 
for proper scientific analysis but also the possible adverse impact of such catches on 
the effectiveness of the conservation effort under the Convention.  Australia, Japan 
and New Zealand, as contracting parties to the Convention, wish to work closely and 
cooperatively with Indonesia.  The Parties therefore encourage Indonesian 
                                                          
391
  Ibid., at 32. 
392
  November 1993 Draft Summary Record, supra Ch I n 289, at 4.  For the draft plan and 
text of the demarche see Annex II to Attachment D to 1993 Conclusion, supra n 390, at 31-33.  
At 31-32 catch by non-parties was also mentioned, in line with the focus on control of catch 
under the mid-term management strategy (Attachment D to 1993 Conclusion, in 1993 
Conclusion, supra n 348, 27 at 28). 
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participation under the Convention framework either though joining the Convention 
or as observers to scientific, plenary and other meetings relevant to the conservation 
of stock, including the trilateral management meeting in May 1994.   
The demarche ends with a call for the addressee to provide as soon as possible all 
relevant catch and effort data, including location and method of capture, necessary 
for effective scientific assessment of SBT, in time for it to be included in scientific 
evaluations of the status of SBT to take place in April 1994.
393
  
F The 1993 Convention and its negotiation 
The 1993 Convention was negotiated by Australia, Japan and New Zealand from 
1988 to 1992 at six meetings of the working group established by the trilateral 
meeting of 1987 for this purpose.  As seen above,
394
 the three original Parties 
decided to formalise their cooperation in this way for two main reasons.  One was the 
early signs of significant catch of SBT by other States and entities, which they 
thought would be easier to control through a formal mechanism, while the second 
was the FAO’s decision to set up what became the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission 
(IOTC), with a twofold attendant risk: not only might decisions on SBT adverse to 
the Parties’ interests be made by a body with a considerable number of members that 
had no stake in the fishery, but sooner or later those other members would take the 
IOTC’s nominal competence to regulate the SBT fishery as an inducement or 
encouragement to enter the fishery themselves.  Either way this amounts to a desire 
on the part of the three original parties to retain control of the fishery – including 
their overwhelming collective share of the SBT catch – as far as possible. 
The Working Group had before it a consolidated working text prepared by Australia 
but concentrated on its substance, not specific wording.
395
  It identified two basic 
                                                          
393
  “Draft Text for Joint Diplomatic Demarche to Indonesia”, attached to Annex II to 
Attachment D to 1993 Conclusion, supra n 390, at 33. 
394
  Supra, nn 358-359 and accompanying text. 
395
  Report of the Trilateral Working Group on Possible Institutional Arrangements for 
International Management of Southern Bluefin Tuna Second Meeting, Canberra 8 – 10 
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approaches for a treaty: creation of a commission, or regular meetings of parties but 
without establishing a formal body.  There was substantial agreement that the treaty 
should cover the entire range of SBT, and include a clause encouraging participation 
by other countries whose nationals fished for SBT or in whose EEZ or exclusive 
fishery zone SBT occurred.
396
  Among outstanding issues were whether to have a 
secretariat (Japan favoured this, but Australia and New Zealand were reluctant);
397
 
criteria for the allocation of catch shares;
398
 how to specify the sovereign rights of 
coastal States and rights of distant-water fishing States;
399
 and decision-making 
procedures, including whether to have an objection clause.
400
  
                                                                                                                                                                    
September 1988 (Attachment F to 7th Trilateral Management Meeting Report, supra n 359), 
Summary Record, at 1-2. 
396
  Ibid., at 4.  Participants concurred that the agreement should not be seen as exclusive.  
Japan was of the view that the establishment of a commission would be welcomed internationally 
as it would be seen as being open for other countries to join.  All agreed on the need for there to 
be incentives for countries with an interest in SBT to become party to the treaty: at 8.  
397
  Ibid., at 4.  While Australia and New Zealand were wary of the costs of a commission, 
Japan said it was not necessarily expensive and pointed to precedents of commissions without a 
secretariat.  
398
  New Zealand supported allocation criteria so as to safeguard the interests of coastal 
States, i.e. the priority right of a coastal State to develop the resources in its EEZ; Japan 
considered that this would reopen debate on the relative rights of distant-water fishing States and 
coastal States over highly migratory species, and preferred to let the commission decide its own 
criteria: ibid., at 6. 
399
  Agreement was at this stage confined to the abstract need for balance: ibid., at 3.  
Australia and New Zealand favoured inclusion of a reference to the sovereign rights of coastal 
States, the principal requirement being a clause restating the right of a coastal State to determine 
fishing access to its EEZ or exclusive fishery zone.  Bearing in mind that SBT was a highly 
migratory species, Japan preferred a more general disclaimer concerning the parties’ rights, 
claims and views in regard to international law.  New Zealand had said in plenary (7th Trilateral 
Management Meeting Report, supra n 359, at 3) that it “maintains the right to control SBT 
fishing in its zone by any party in addition to trilateral management control measures.”  For some 
years after UNCLOS was adopted in 1982 the issue of whether highly migratory species were by 
virtue of Article 64 uniquely not subject to the coastal State’s sole control in its EEZ remained 
controversial, but was eventually resolved in the negative.  A US proposal that would have led to 
a strong international management element for tuna in the EEZ (UN doc A/CONF.62/C.2/L.47 (8 
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Australia and New Zealand were particularly concerned that adequate provision be 
made to control fishing for SBT in EEZs by non-parties.  While New Zealand 
thought such activity should be discouraged, participants concurred on the value of 
including a general provision stating the obligations of parties to ensure compliance 
with all relevant management measures adopted under the treaty.
401
 
There was general agreement that parties should not encourage SBT fishing by non- 
parties outside the terms of the treaty.  Though all concurred that there should be 
provisions to discourage activities by non-parties adversely affecting the 
conservation and management measures adopted under the treaty, these should be 
consistent with other international laws and agreements including the GATT.
402
 
The meeting concurred that invitations for new parties to accede to the treaty should 
be unanimous, as Australia’s draft text provided.403 
                                                                                                                                                                    
August 1974), Article 19(A), reprinted in UN, United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea 
(3rd), Official Records, Vol III (New York: UN, 1975) 222 at 223-224) was not accepted.  The 
precursor provision of Article 64 in the Informal Single Negotiating Text (UN doc A/CONF.62/ 
WP.8/Part II (7 May 1975), Article 53, reprinted in UN, United Nations Conference on the Law 
of the Sea (3rd), Official Records Vol IV (New York: UN, 1975), 152 at 161) avoided the issue 
of whether regulations would be developed by coastal States, or by international organisations, 
for coastal States to implement.  This ambiguity was the basis of the US view until 1990 that tuna 
in the EEZ were not subject to coastal State jurisdiction.  See C.J. Carr, “Transformations in the 
Law Governing Highly Migratory Species: 1970 to the Present” in D.D. Caron & H.N. Scheiber 
(eds), Bringing New Law to Ocean Waters (Berkeley: Law of the Sea Institute, University of 
California; Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 2004) 55 at 57, 60-61 and 63-65. 
400
  Attachment F to 7th Trilateral Management Meeting Report, supra n 395, Executive 
Summary, at 1-3. 
401
  Ibid., Summary Record, at 7.  There is no necessary contradiction here with New 
Zealand’s statement in plenary (7th Trilateral Management Meeting Report, supra n 359, at 3) 
that a figure approaching 2,000 tonnes of SBT annually was caught by foreign vessels in its EEZ, 
as Japanese vessels continued to enjoy access to its EEZ to fish SBT under the 1978 treaty (supra 
Ch I n 264). 
402
  Ibid., at 8.   
403
  Ibid., at 10.  See Attachment B, “Consolidated Working Text on the International 
Management of Southern Bluefin Tuna, 26 August 1988”, whose Article XV(2) stated: 
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Although the working group went into abeyance for a number of years, at its fifth 
meeting in early 1992 the instrument that became the 1993 Convention acquired a 
form fairly close to the final one, when the meeting established a working party to 
review draft texts and proposals.
404
  This smaller group then prepared a consolidated 
working text which reflected the deliberations of the meeting.
405
 
Fishing by others remained throughout the drafting of the 1993 Convention a main 
incentive to finalise it, the delegations at the sixth and final working group meeting 
recording their “shared concern at the expansion in fishing activity for southern 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Any State or country whose nationals harvest Southern Bluefin Tuna or in whose exclusive 
economic or fisheries zone, however described, Southern Bluefin Tuna is or may be 
harvested, may accede to this Agreement at the invitation of the Parties. … Until an allocation 
limit is decided for that State the provisions of Article VII [on catch limits] shall not apply to 
it but it shall ensure that its nationals harvest no more Southern Bluefin Tuna in a management 
year than the actual harvest by its nationals in the preceding management year. 
404
  “Southern Bluefin Tuna Working Group on Institutional Arrangements, Wellington, 10-
13 February 1992 Executive Summary Record” (unpublished, copy held by author extracted from 
DPIE files), at 1. 
405
  The text is headed “Consolidated Working Text February 1992” and forms Annex C to 
the report of the Working Group’s meeting cited in the previous footnote.  The differences from 
the 1993 Convention are mostly editorial, except that: (a) the definitions (Article I) were still 
blank; (b) decision-making was subject to an objection procedure (Article IX) by which a Party 
unable to accept a measure adopted could, by notifying the Commission, avoid becoming bound 
by it; this would lead to a Special Meeting at which any other party could follow suit, followed 
by consultations with other parties “to facilitate the expeditions adoption of the measure, 
amended as necessary”; (c) there was no equivalent of the 1993 Convention’s Article 14, on third 
party-observers at meetings; (d) the annex for the arbitral tribunal had yet to be written, though 
there was already a reference to it in the dispute settlement clause (Article XV); (e) nor was the 
anti-reservation clause (Article 19 of the 1993 Convention) yet present.  By the next draft (Annex 
B to “Southern Bluefin Tuna Sixth Working Group on Institutional Arrangements, Canberra, 12-
14 August 1992, Executive Summary Record” (unpublished, copy held by author extracted from 
DPIE files)), the text is virtually in its final form, except that the articles have headings which are 
omitted from the final, and there was still no provision on reservations.  
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bluefin tuna by vessels operating without proper flag State control outside the current 
trilateral framework.”406 
One curious passage of the report shows that delegations clearly had the European 
Community in mind as a potential participant, but deliberately chose not to provide 
for its participation ab initio: 
The delegations also noted their readiness to work on revision of the terms of the 
Convention should a regional economic integration organisation express an interest 
in becoming a member of the Commission and be qualified to do so.
407
  
It may be surmised that this reluctance was prompted by fear that specific provision 
would have been interpreted by the European Community as an encouragement to 
enter the SBT fishery, to the three States’ detriment. 
After making the final changes, the three States signed the 1993 Convention on 10 
May 1993 at a ceremony in Canberra.  In 1994 for Japan, New Zealand and Australia 
deposited instruments of ratification on 8 April, 9 May and 20 May respectively; by 
Article 17, paragraph 2 it entered into force on the last of these dates. 
1 Assessment of the 1993 Convention: continuity and change 
The original Parties chose an initial structure
408
 for the CCSBT that is typical of the 
three-element norm (plenary, subsidiary bodies and staff) identified by Koers in 
1973.
409
  The Scientific Committee is entrenched in the 1993 Convention (Article 9), 
while Article 10 merely permits, but does not oblige, the Commission to establish a 
                                                          
406
  “Southern Bluefin Tuna Sixth Working Group on Institutional Arrangements, Canberra, 
12-14 August 1992, Executive Summary Record”, supra n 405, at 2 (paragraph 7). 
407
  Ibid. (paragraph 9). 
408
  By a 2001 resolution the Commission created an Extended Commission and Extended 
Scientific Committee in order to accommodate Taiwan: Resolution to Establish an Extended 
Commission and an Extended Scientific Committee (Attachment I to CCSBT7 Report), in 
CCSBT Blue Book 2002, supra Ch I n 30, 54, reproduced infra at Appendix D.  This is analysed 
more fully in Chapter IV. 
409
  Koers, supra Ch I n 285, at 130.  Other more elaborate structures are possible: examples 
are ICCAT’s four panels, and NAFO’s dual structure under which a Commission sets 
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Secretariat.
410
  For the first two years of its life the CCSBT had no independent 
Secretariat, the secretariat functions rotating among the parties along with the Chair 
of the Commission – essentially a continuation of the pre-1994 practice.411 
A Finance and Administration Committee was established at the CCSBT’s Third 
Meeting to begin operations from 1997, with Japan to chair it for the first two 
years.
412
  There exist also a Compliance Committee
413
 and a Working Group on 
Ecologically Related Species.
414
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
conservation and management measures while a General Council administers the organisation’s 
internal affairs (for which most commissions make do with a finance and administration 
committee).  Nothing, however, appears to turn on this. 
410
  This it did in 1996, once Australia had made regulations for the Commission under the 
International Organisations (Privileges and Immunities) Act 1963 (Cth) – the Commission for 
the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (Privileges and Immunities) Regulations, Statutory 
Rules 1996 No 40.  Australia made office space available within the DPIE’s building for an 
interim Executive Secretary supplied by that Department, Mr McGregor, to begin the task of 
setting up the permanent Secretariat in separate premises, which were subsequently opened in 
September 1996 by the Australian Minister for Resources and Energy, Senator Parer.  The 1993 
management meeting had recognised as factors in favour of the establishment of a permanent 
secretariat the need to increase international awareness of the trilateral conservation effort for 
SBT and to establish relations with other relevant international bodies: 1993 Conclusion, supra n 
348, at 5.  For the text of Articles 9 and 10, see Appendix C, Part I infra. 
411
  Nevertheless, the Parties’ intent appears to have been to establish a secretariat 
reasonably promptly; at the First Meeting of the CCSBT Japan and New Zealand accepted 
Australia’s offer to host the secretariat once established: CCSBT1 Report, supra Ch I n 273, at 5. 
412
  CCSBT3(1) Report, supra Ch I n 102, at 8. 
413
  At the CCSBT’s First Meeting, Japan proposed the establishment of an infractions “sub-
committee”: CCSBT1 Report, supra Ch I n 273, at 3.  The term “sub-committee” appears to be a 
misnomer, as the Scientific Committee provided for in Article 9 of the 1993 Convention had not 
yet been formed, and the CCSBT did not at this meeting establish any other committee to which 
it would have reported.  Reference is subsequently made to a future “Enforcement and Infractions 
Committee” in the record of the informal meeting of April 1995: Japan-Australia-New Zealand 
Southern Bluefin Tuna Informal Consultations, Canberra 26-28 April 1995, Draft Summary 
Record (unpublished; hereinafter April 1995 Draft Summary Record), at 9.  The records of this 
informal consultation and of those of October 1994 (infra Ch IV n 685) and September 1995 
were subsequently incorporated in that of the closing session of the CCSBT’s first meeting: 
 136 
In other respects, however, the 1993 Convention was innovative.  
2 Decision-making in the CCSBT   
Though it was not always so,
415
 the prime purpose of modern fisheries commissions 
is to set catch and/or effort limits, or, in the case of stocks for which they have 
                                                                                                                                                                    
CCSBT, Reconvened First Commission Meeting, 11 September 1995, Tokyo, Conclusion (Part 
II) (unpublished).  The delay was caused by debate between New Zealand, supported by 
Australia, and Japan on the Committee’s terms of reference, principally on the UN Fish Stocks 
Agreement’s provisions on collaborative compliance action, including high seas vessel 
inspections: see CCSBT, Report of the Resumed Third Annual Meeting (Revised), 18 – 22 
February 1997, Canberra, Australia <www.ccsbt.org/docs/pdf/meeting_reports/ccsbt_3/report_ 
of_ccsbt3_part2.pdf> (visited on 15 May 2008, hereinafter CCSBT3(2) Report), at 12-13.  
Ultimately it was decided at the Fifth Meeting to convene a Compliance Committee: Report of 
the Fifth Annual Meeting, First Part, 22-26 February 1999, Tokyo, Japan (hereinafter 
CCSBT5(1) Report)), in CCSBT, Reports of the Meetings for the Fifth Year of the Commission 
(including Financial Statements) (hereinafter CCSBT Blue Book 2000), 1 at 4. 
414
  The CCSBT adopted terms of reference for the Working Group at its Second Meeting; 
see CCSBT, Report of the Second Annual Meeting, Tokyo, 12 – 15 September 1995 (hereinafter 
CCSBT2 Report), <www.ccsbt.org/docs/pdf/meeting_reports/ccsbt_2/report_of_ccsbt2.pdf> 
(visited on 30 September 2008), at 6.  The Terms of Reference are at ibid., Annex 5.  The 
Working Group reports to the CCSBT through the Scientific Committee, which can provide 
comment to the Commission on its reports.  Japan declined to raise the Working Group to the 
status of a standing Committee as favoured by Australia and New Zealand: CCSBT3(1) Report, 
supra Ch I n 102, at 25.  The discussion continued inconclusively at the resumed meeting.  
Japan’s opinion was that it was not appropriate to upgrade the Working Group as its work was 
not essential to the functioning of the CCSBT in the same way as finance, administration and 
compliance: CCSBT3(2) Report, supra n 413, at 7. 
415
  Koers, supra Ch I n 285, at 171 identifies seven functions of international fisheries 
commissions: full utilisation of the living resources of the sea, conservation of those resources, 
economic efficiency of marine fisheries, allocation of catch, research, enforcement of fisheries 
regulations and conflicts between fisheries and either other fisheries or other uses of the ocean.  
Few of the older commissions he surveys, however (ibid. at 171-228), particularly those created 
by the FAO with the first of his functions primarily in mind, reflecting the post-war 
preoccupation with protein shortages in the developing world, have any power to institute 
measures binding on their member States – they are consultative rather than normative fora.  
Accord Burke, supra Ch I n 80, at 19 and 23-24. 
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competence but no such limits are required, to monitor the state of those stocks and 
introduce limits when they become necessary.  The 1993 Convention by Article 8, 
paragraph 3 directs the CCSBT, “[f]or the conservation, management and optimum 
utilisation” of SBT, to “decide upon a total allowable catch and its allocation among 
the Parties” unless it decides upon “other appropriate measures” on the basis of the 
report and recommendations of the Scientific Committee established under Article 9; 
it may also “if necessary, decide upon other additional measures”.  The original 
Parties thus took a common position, and wrote it into the Convention, on two 
debates about management rules in the international community: the relative merits 
of catch limits as opposed to effort limits, and of “Olympic” fisheries as opposed to 
national allocations. 
(a) Catch limits vs effort limits 
Limitations of catch (i.e. of the output of a fishery) have the disadvantage that they 
tend to magnify the natural fluctuations of the biomass (in that a given tonnage 
caught represents a greater proportion of a stock when it is scarce than when it is 
abundant), but they are easy to define and administer.  Restrictions of effort (i.e. of 
the inputs to a fishery) are not only more difficult to police, but require prior 
agreement among participants on the way in which effort is to be measured – number 
of vessels, number of fishing days, number of hooks deployed are some of the 
common ones – and are vulnerable to circumvention by channelling of investment 
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into still unrestricted inputs.
416
  Their offsetting advantage is that a given amount of 
effort, however defined, will ceteris paribus yield a higher catch when the stock is 
abundant and a lower one when it is not.
417
 
(b) Allocated vs unallocated shares 
At first, international fisheries management relied on “Olympic” or unallocated catch 
limits, open to all comers, not subdivided into national shares.  Allocated limits, 
though increasingly the norm, are of relatively recent origin, first introduced by the 
International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries in 1972.
418
 
Unallocated catch limits have two main problems.  The first is that they do nothing 
about the incentive to overinvest, as all compete to maximise their share of available 
                                                          
416
  P. Gooday, Economic Aspects of Fisheries Policy (ABARE eReport 04.18 (2004), 
<www.abareconomics.com/publications_html/fisheries/fisheries_04/er04_fish_policy.pdf>, 
accessed on 30 October 2008), at 6-7.  Australia’s experience with SBT in the 1970s, where a 
simple limit on vessel numbers was ineffective to prevent older smaller vessels from being 
replaced by larger new ones with greater fishing capacity – see supra Ch I, text at n 148 – is a 
prime example of this drawback of effort limits.  See also J.L. Kask, Tuna: A World Resource 
(Occasional Paper No 2; Kingston: Law of the Sea Institute, University of Rhode Island, 1969), 
at 18: where the tonnage of vessels was restricted, owners substituted new vessels that were 
capable of greater speed (allowing more fishing trips to be made) or had greater hold capacity 
(allowing more fish to be taken with vessels of the same tonnage). 
417
  Of course, other things are not always equal: the scientific literature is replete with 
examples of “depensatory” as well as compensatory biological mechanisms.  Clark, supra Ch I n 
83, at 17, defines as compensatory any model in which the growth rate is a decreasing function of 
the population size, at any size, whereas depensation occurs when at certain population sizes the 
growth rate is an increasing function of that size.  The point here is that, while catch limits are in 
themselves depensatory in effect, effort limits (leaving aside their ease of circumvention) are 
neutral in this regard.  
418
  E.D. Anderson, “The History of Fisheries Management and Scientific Advice – the 
ICNAF/NAFO History from the End of World War II to the Present”, (1998) 23 Journal of 
Northwest Atlantic Fishery Science 75 at 82. 
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quota;
419
 secondly, on the international plane they require a cumbersome institutional 
mechanism to support them which is at significant risk of breakdown through error 
or bureaucratic inefficiency.  Vessels must first report their catch to their individual 
flag States, who in turn report them to a central body, which then closes the fishery 
when the catch limit is approached or reached, involving further delays before 
member State authorities convey news of the closure to their own fleets.
420
 
National allocations avoid the second of these evils (States’ fisheries close at 
different times as their limits are reached, with a single-level communication process, 
for subsequent reporting to the Commission), but can only attenuate the first unless 
each participant in the fishery has an individual share of the TAC.  Australia’s ITQ 
system has achieved this within the confines of its national allocation, and New 
Zealand and more recently Japan have followed suit,
421
 but these are actions 
undertaken and enforced only at the domestic level; they are neither prohibited nor 
encouraged by the 1993 Convention or other international fisheries instruments.  No 
international fisheries commission distributes quota directly to individual participants 
                                                          
419
  See supra Ch I n 88 and accompanying text; also Johnston, supra Introduction n 1, at 
382-383 for a specific instance of this in the otherwise successful regulation from the 1930s 
onwards of the Pacific halibut fishery. 
420
  For example, Japan told the 1988 trilateral management meeting that for the 1988 fishing 
year, the Japan Fisheries Agency would make an annual catch projection on a monthly basis from 
November 1988 to January 1989; from the date when catch is expected to exceed the catch limit, 
some vessels would be ordered to leave the fishing ground, and the submission of monthly 
reports would be ordered; administrative guidance would be given after the catch limit was 
reached to release incidental catch of SBT by vessels which target other tunas outside restricted 
areas: 7th Trilateral Management Meeting Report, supra n 359, at 3.  The main force of these 
measures, however, came only once the limit was reached, and Japan in effect conceded the 
possibility of the quota being exceeded by providing additionally for closed areas to be set if this 
occurred: ibid.  This in fact happened in 1989 when catch rates higher than those on which the 
Japanese authorities had based their expected date of reaching the national allocation left them 
unprepared to close the fishery in time to avoid overcatch: see infra Ch V, text at n 1096. 
421
  See the discussion supra Ch I, text at nn 89 (Australia), 202 (Japan) and 212 (New 
Zealand). 
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sponsored by its member States,
422
 but trade in quota between States, which in 
principle would go part-way to achieving the same capacity-limiting end, may in 
future come to be an accepted part of the international fisheries landscape, with the 
CCSBT in the forefront: see Chapter VI. 
3 Consensus decisions: beyond the objection procedure, or a half-
measure? 
Until the 1980s fisheries commissions’ decision-making procedures reflected the 
general reluctance of States to hand over to an international body what they regard as 
sovereign decisions on the amount of fish that they may take from the high seas.  In 
this ICCAT, under Article VIII of its 1966 Convention,
423
 is typical.  Its decisions are 
styled “recommendations” and do not come into force immediately on their making.  
Rather, after adoption by a two-thirds majority, recommendations are transmitted by 
the ICCAT Secretariat to the Contracting Parties and become binding six months 
from the date of notification, unless within that period any Contracting Party presents 
an objection.  In that event a number of other rules come into play, entailing at 
minimum a delay in the recommendation’s entry into force.  The salient point of 
these rules is that even a lone objector can escape being bound, and on receipt of its 
objection every other Contracting Party has a choice between becoming bound by the 
recommendation as against all parties but the objector, or itself escaping the 
obligation through a consequential objection of its own.
424
 
                                                          
422
  This was proposed by R. Shotton and M. Haward, “Requirements for Managing Deep-
Seas Fisheries”, in FAO Fisheries Proceedings 3/1, supra n 314, 686 at 707.  On the analysis 
above, however, States are the “middlemen” in the quota allocation transaction and there is no 
reason to expect that they would be keen to relinquish this role.  This is to be contrasted with the 
position for deep seabed mining established by Part XI of UNCLOS. 
423
  Article VIII of the 1966 Convention is reproduced in Appendix C, infra, in Part II. 
424
  This a State might well wish to do in order to safeguard its share of the catch if the 
objector is a major participant in the fishery concerned, given that the history of ICCAT’s 
allocation decisions is that there is little or no discount for catches taken above an allocation 
which did not enter into force because of one or more objections. 
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The reason for the three original Parties to the 1993 Convention not adopting this 
procedure is that the Convention’s negotiation was itself prompted by the growth of 
catches by vessels flagged to the Republic of Korea, Indonesia and Taiwan.
425
  
Though objections were rarely presented in ICCAT, the recent history of that body is 
that they have tended to be presented not by Members of long standing, but rather by 
newly acceding coastal States.  These would otherwise have found themselves 
without quota for species they had hitherto fished in their own EEZs, and – at least 
until the 2002 adoption of criteria of allocation
426
 – little prospect of obtaining any 
because ICCAT’s entrenched practice, reflecting the dominance of its developed 
country members, was to rely predominantly on historic catch to allocate quota.
427
 
                                                          
425
  Supra, text at nn 359 ff.  
426
  “ICCAT Criteria for the Allocation of Fishing Possibilities” (Annex 8 to Proceedings of 
the 17
th
 Regular Meeting of the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas 
(Murcia, Spain - November 12 to 19, 2001) (hereinafter ICCAT17 Report)), in ICCAT Green 
Book 2002/1, supra Ch I n 228, 211. 
427
  Japan impliedly criticised South Africa’s objections for not being motivated, as Japan 
considered they ought to be, only by the most serious of reasons: see “Opening Statement by 
Japan” in “1
st
 Meeting of the ICCAT Working Group on Allocation Criteria, Madrid, Spain, May 
31 to June 2, 1999 – Opening Statements” (Appendix 3 to Report of the 1
st
 Meeting of the ICCAT 
Working Group on Allocation Criteria, Madrid, Spain, May 31 to June 2, 1999 (Annex 6 to 16
th
 
Regular Meeting of the Commission, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil – November 15 to 22, 1999 
(hereinafter ICCAT16 Report))), in ICCAT Green Book 2000/1, supra Ch I n 242, 104 at 105.  
Japan urged that objections be made only if a recommendation was contrary to the 1966 
Convention or totally lacked scientific justification, not simply because it was not in the national 
interest of the State contemplating objecting; its Government’s view was that it should not act as 
“puppet of our industry”.  See also the joint proposal by Canada, the EC, Japan and the United 
States, “Draft Resolution by ICCAT Regarding the Presentation of Objections in the Context of 
Promoting Effective Conservation and Management Measures Adopted by ICCAT” (Annex 9.4 
to Proceedings of the 13
th
 Special Meeting of the International Commission for the Conservation 
of Atlantic Tunas (Bilbao, Spain – October 28 to November 4, 2002) (hereinafter ICCATSM13 
Report)), in ICCAT, Report for Biennial period 2002-03 Part I (2002) - Vol.1 (hereinafter 
ICCAT Green Book 2003/1), 207.  While Brazil opposed this proposal on the basis that what it 
purported to do could only be done by amending the 1966 Convention, South Africa withdrew at 
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Against this background, it can be seen that in the 1993 Convention the objection 
procedure was eschewed less because Australia or New Zealand feared objection by 
Japan, than because all three original Parties feared objections by new entrants.  
Instead of an objection procedure, Article 7 of the 1993 Convention simply provides 
that “Each Party shall have one vote in the Commission.  Decisions…shall be taken 
by a unanimous vote of the Parties present at the Commission meeting.”  In other 
words, each Member has a veto on catch decisions, conditional only on its attendance 
at the meeting where it is decided – a qualification that has the useful benefit of 
discouraging boycotts of CCSBT proceedings by dissatisfied Members.  
Article 8, paragraph 3 of the 1993 Convention directs the CCSBT to “decide upon a 
total allowable catch and its allocation among the Parties” and/or “other appropriate 
measures”;428 in doing so it must “take full account” of the Scientific Committee’s 
report and recommendations: Article 8, paragraph 6.  Crucially, paragraph 7 then 
provides that “All measures decided upon under paragraph 3 shall be binding on the 
Parties.”  In addition, by Article 5, paragraph 1, each Party must “take all action 
necessary to ensure the enforcement of this Convention and compliance with 
measures which become binding under paragraph 7 of Article 8.”  That is, each Party 
is obliged to enact into its domestic law catch limits for its SBT fleet that are no 
higher than its national allocation from the CCSBT, and then to enforce these limits, 
or at least make every reasonable effort to do so.
429
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
this meeting its objection to the recommendation on South Atlantic Swordfish: ICCATSM13 
Report, ibid., 34 at 42-43.  On allocation to new entrants see generally infra Chapter III. 
428
  Supra, text following n 415. 
429
  The establishment by the CCSBT of its Compliance Committee as a subsidiary body 
under Article 8(10) of the 1993 Convention (supra n 413) indicates that full compliance was not 
peremptorily assumed, nor even thought to be realistic.  Breach of a national catch limit by a 
vessel could place its flag State in breach of the Convention, as occurred in December 1996 when 
an Australian aerial surveillance operation, conducted to investigate Japan’s claims that non-
member vessels were moving into high seas SBT fishing grounds as soon as fishing by Japanese 
vessels had ceased, instead revealed at least 40 Japanese vessels operating after closure of the 
Japanese season in contravention of Japanese law.  Japan subsequently reported that the incident 
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While it is assumed that the TAC and national allocations are decided in advance of 
each season, there is no requirement that this be so.  Thus it is at least theoretically 
possible – by contrast with the 1966 Convention’s contingent “recommendations” – 
that the binding effect of such decisions will operate immediately.
430
  That the 
CCSBT then “promptly” notifies all Parties of such measures (Article 8, paragraph 8) 
is thus a requirement included essentially for form’s sake.  The only conceivable way 
a CCSBT Member could for any length of time be unaware of the CCSBT’s adoption 
                                                                                                                                                                    
had led to overcatch of its national allocation by 308 tonnes: CCSBT3(2) Report, supra n 413; at 
2-4 passim.  The purpose of the Compliance Committee was thus to provide a vehicle for Parties 
to exert peer pressure on each other to return to compliance as soon as possible. 
430
  Or even retrospectively: in the CCSBT’s early years disagreements over these matters 
frequently led to these limits being decided after one or more of the Parties had begun fishing 
under a self-imposed provisional quota.  Thus no TAC was set at what was to have been the only 
session of the CCSBT’s Third Meeting: CCSBT3(1) Report, supra Ch I n 102, at 20.  The matter 
was adjourned to a resumed session of the meeting and in the interim Australia and New Zealand 
undertook that, if no decision on a TAC and national allocations were made by the start of their 
next fishing seasons, they would abide by their previous national allocations as though they were 
still in force: ibid., at 21.  Japan gave no comparable commitment and when the meeting resumed 
in February 1997 it described the fact that Australia and New Zealand had started fishing without 
a TAC as an “abnormal situation”: CCSBT3(2) Report, supra n 413, at 2.  Note that Japan was 
not alleging breach of any obligation, as the proposition that absent a TAC no fishing at all was 
permissible would have allowed Australia to impose by default the moratorium it unsuccessfully 
proposed in 1989: supra Ch I, text at n 271.  Since no party in fact opposed continued fishing at 
the previous year’s level, the better view is that there can be no real objection to the course of 
action adopted by Australia and New Zealand.  Retrospectivity is not a practical problem early in 
a season, if catches are spread roughly evenly throughout the year, as illustrated by the following 
hypothetical example: the effect of deciding on a national allocation of 1,000 tonnes for State X 
three months into a fishing season in which it has already caught 250 tonnes is that in effect it has 
a limit of 750 tonnes for the remainder of the season.  In reality, however, SBT’s migratory cycle 
means that most of the Australian catch occurs in just a few weeks when the fish are within range 
of the fleet based at Port Lincoln.  Thus Australia’s self-imposed quota was 100% of its previous 
year’s national allocation, and was soon almost exhausted.  This effectively meant that Australia 
would hardly subsequently accept a national allocation less than that previous quota, and 
certainly not a quota less than its catch to date, of which it would immediately be in breach. 
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of a decision on TAC and national allocations is if its delegation has acted contrary 
to its home government’s instructions in agreeing to the adoption of such a decision. 
4 The veto under consensus: another form of the same problem 
Although consensus does away with the objection procedure in form, the veto rule 
merely reproduces its deleterious effects in another guise.  For the weakness of the 
objection procedure is that it undermines the bargain on which decision-making in 
respect of high seas stocks relies, in which each party’s restraint is purchased by the 
others’ promise of like restraint.431  The system may survive an occasional objection 
by new entrants whose fishing capacity, and thus ability to damage a given stock, 
remains limited in the short term, but an objection by a large player, or even the 
prospect of one, will inevitably lead to the non-adoption of management measures 
acceptable to a required supermajority but not to that player.  This has two systemic 
consequences: first, whatever the decision-making article may prescribe, the larger 
the fishing capacity of any member, the closer it comes in practice to having an 
outright veto on any decision the commission might contemplate making; secondly, 
such a rule tilts the balance of advantage against States concerned about the viability 
of a fish stock, and in favour of any State (rightly or wrongly) not so concerned.
432
  
This runs counter to the underlying precautionary slant implicit in the UNCLOS 
fisheries management principles, and to the precautionary approach to fisheries 
explicitly affirmed in Article 6 and Annex II to the UN Fish Stocks Agreement. 
The 1993 Convention’s veto rule thus simply makes direct and generalises to all 
Members the indirect consequence of the objection procedure.  With no provision for 
resolving deadlocks, the locus of disagreement and obstruction is merely shifted to 
                                                          
431
  See infra Ch V, text at n 952. 
432
  It should be noted that this bias is not replicated in favour of a lone objector who regards 
the majority decision as insufficiently precautionary.  An objector in this position has nothing to 
gain by opting out of being bound; rather it can become bound and still have the choice of taking 
its full national allocation or – if it does not find the game theoretical considerations canvassed in 
this and the previous chapters compelling – unilaterally exercising restraint. 
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the making of the decision itself.  Had the CCSBT been established with ICCAT’s 
decision-making mechanism, say, Australia and New Zealand would have been able 
to secure adoption of an unchanged or reduced TAC and national allocations, by 
which Japan, through presenting an objection, could have ensured it was not bound.  
Instead, thanks to each party’s veto, Japan was able to prevent the adoption of any 
TAC that did not meet its demand for an increase, and Australia and New Zealand 
were able to prevent the adoption of an increased TAC.  In 1996 and 1997, for the 
sake of continued access to the AFZ, Japan relented,
433
 but from 1998 no TAC was 
set until 2003.  Whether this was a superior fisheries or legal policy outcome to 
having a TAC in force from which one party had opted out must be doubted.  Indeed, 
in some ways, at least from the perspective of Australia and New Zealand, it may 
well have been inferior, in that the exercise by Japan of its veto was obscured from 
view, substantially alleviating the degree of political discomfort that Japan would 
have felt as a consequence of its open use.
434
 
                                                          
433
  Australia’s longstanding policy of allowing Japanese fishing vessels access to its ports 
only while their catch of southern bluefin tuna was subject to a negotiated limit – see supra text 
at n 332 – was credited by Japan before the UNCLOS Annex VII arbitral tribunal both in its 
memorial for the preliminary objections phase of the dispute (Memorial on Jurisdiction of Japan, 
at paragraph 53) and in the oral submissions of its counsel, Professor Ando (First Round 
Presentation of Japan, May 7, 2000 (hereinafter Transcript of 7 May 2000), at 34-35), with 
securing Japan’s reluctant agreement in the years leading up to the dispute to leave the total 
allowable catch and national allocations unchanged.  All written and oral pleadings in the case 
cited above are archived under the item of 7 May 2000 at <www.icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/ 
ICSID/ViewNewsReleases.jsp> (visited on 23 June 2008).   
434
  See the remark by the Agent of Japan, Mr Togo, in the provisional measures phase of the 
dispute (Transcript for morning of 19 August, supra Ch I n 285, at 9), that use of the “veto”, 
impliedly by Australia and New Zealand, was damaging the CCSBT, and the response by the 
Agent for Australia, Mr Campbell (ITLOS doc ITLOS/PV.99/24/Rev.1 (hereinafter “Transcript 
for 20 August”), available online at <www.itlos.org/case_documents/2001/document_en_ 
143.pdf>, at 7-8).  
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A preferable decision-making procedure, it is suggested, is that of the Honolulu 
Convention,
435
 which encourages the search for consensus but, except on budgetary 
and, it must be admitted, catch limit questions, allows decisions to be taken by a 
three-quarters majority in each of two chambers.  Instead of an objection procedure, 
an aggrieved party in the minority has recourse to review of the decision on limited 
grounds.  These seem to have been inspired by principles of administrative law: in 
order to be overturned, the decision must be found to be either contrary to UNCLOS, 
the UN Fish Stocks Agreement or the Honolulu Convention itself, or unjustifiably 
discriminatory in form or in fact against the complainant.
436
  This removes the 
systemic bias against policy stances based on concern for the status of the stock. 
It would probably, however, have been impossible to incorporate a precisely 
equivalent rule into the 1993 Convention at the time of its negotiation, particularly in 
relation to the first limb.  Reference to the UN Fish Stocks Agreement, which had not 
yet been concluded, would have been anachronistic.  Nor would Japan be likely to 
have admitted a reference to UNCLOS, which was not yet in force.
437
 
                                                          
435
  Supra Introduction n 8. 
436
  Article 20 of the Honolulu Convention is reproduced in Appendix C, infra, in Part III. 
437
  In Attachment F to 7th Trilateral Management Meeting Report, supra n 395, Summary 
Record, at 3, Japan opposed use of the term “EEZ” on the ground that UNCLOS was not yet in 
force.  New Zealand countered that the meaning of EEZ was well understood and did not require 
definition.  This ultra-conservative approach to new treaty texts is regrettable, as it cannot but 
retard the progressive development of international law if a treaty cannot even be mentioned in a 
new instrument until is it in force for all prospective parties to the latter.  It was repeated, though, 
in Japan’s subsequent attitude in the CCSBT to the UN Fish Stocks Agreement, offering a prime 
example of what Edeson has described as a “currently popular game in negotiating instruments: 
What is cited and what is not cited”, with Australia and New Zealand keen to adopt some of the 
principles enunciated in the Agreement for managing the SBT fishery and Japan reluctant to 
allow this: W. Edeson, “Soft and Hard Law Aspects of Fisheries Issues: Some Recent Global and 
Regional Approaches”, in M.H. Nordquist, J.N. Moore and S. Mahmoudi (eds), The Stockholm 
Declaration and Law of the Marine Environment (The Hague/London/New York: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 2003), 165 at 168.  Even if the treaty’s entry into force is felt to be a long way off, it can 
nonetheless acquire the status of custom relatively quickly, as did the high seas fisheries 
 147 
This would have left as the first limb the single ground of the decision being ultra 
vires the 1993 Convention alone.  Under such an hypothetical rule, Japan would have 
been compelled to argue that the TAC, by being set at too conservative (low) a level, 
was incapable of achieving the 1993 Convention’s objective of “ensur[ing], through 
appropriate management, the conservation and optimum utilisation” of SBT.  This in 
turn would have depended on the meaning, and relationship with each other, of the 
terms “conservation” and “optimum utilisation”, considered in Appendix A on the 
1998-2001 dispute.  For present purposes it suffices to observe that this would in 
effect have reversed the onus of proof that would have been borne by the applicants 
in that dispute had it in fact reached the merits – and, even without foreknowledge of 
that dispute, Japan would probably have perceived, and resisted, such a consequence.  
As for the second limb, Japan would have had to show that the national allocation 
hypothetically imposed on it by the majority States discriminated unjustifiably 
against it.  On the assumption that the national allocations making up the TAC would 
                                                                                                                                                                    
provisions (Part VII, Section 2) of UNCLOS, indeed the Informal Composite Negotiating Text is 
referred to by its UN document number in Article 7(6) of the Treaty between Australia and the 
Independent State of Papua New Guinea concerning Sovereignty and Maritime Boundaries in the 
Area between the Two Countries, including the Area known as the Torres Strait, and Related 
Matters (1429 UNTS 207, ATS 1985 No 4), which provides, in part, that: 
[A] regime of passage over routes used for international navigation in the area between 
[Australia and Papua New Guinea], including the area known as Torres Strait, shall apply in 
respect of vessels that is no more restrictive of passage than the regime of transit passage 
through straits used for international navigation described in Articles 34 to 44 inclusive of 
Document A/Conf.62/WP.10 of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the 
Sea...If the provisions of those Articles are revised, are not included in any Law of the Sea 
Convention or fail to become generally accepted principles of international law, the Parties 
shall consult with a view to agreeing upon another regime of passage that is in accordance 
with international practice to replace the regime of passage applying under this paragraph. 
 
On the other hand, to judge from the practical consequence of Article 7 of the 1993 Convention 
that only a Member in attendance at a meeting can veto its decisions, a CCSBT version of the 
Honolulu Convention rule would probably omit absence from the meeting as a qualifying 
condition for invoking the review procedure; the latter is probably a recognition of the financial 
difficulties that small Pacific Island States are likely to have from time to time in attending 
meetings of the new Commission. 
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have been reduced pari passu, the arguments Japan would have employed can only 
be guessed at, but they could hardly have avoided being centred on the CCSBT 
failing to have sufficient regard to Japan’s historical interests in fishing for SBT and 
its contribution to scientific research of the stock.
438
  Such arguments, however, 
would have had to overcome Japan’s acceptance in 1990 that in the long run its share 
of the catch as among the three original Parties should fall to 47 per cent.
439
 
The net effect would thus have been that the fisheries management policy 
disagreement which gradually soured the atmosphere in the CCSBT from the mid-
                                                          
438
  Article 8(4) of the 1993 Convention lists among the factors to be considered by the 
CCSBT in deciding Parties’ national allocations: 
(d) the interests of Parties whose vessels engage in fishing for southern bluefin tuna including 
those which have historically engaged in such fishing and those which have southern bluefin 
tuna fisheries under development; 
(e) the contribution of each Party to conservation and enhancement of, and scientific research 
on, southern bluefin tuna[.] 
439
  At its First Meeting in 1994, the CCSBT readopted as its own the 1990 trilateral formula 
for future increases in national allocations: CCSBT1 Report, supra Ch I n 273, at 2 and Annex 2.  
This would preclude any argument by Japan that it had borne a disproportionate share of the 
burden of conservation.  If it wanted to rely on its contribution to the “enhancement” of the stock 
in Article 8(4)(e) – presumably a reference to the initial fishdown along the lines of the old 
rationale for the abstention doctrine (see infra Ch III, text following n 536) the answer would 
have lain in the observation that, while this does provides benefit for others, the overwhelming 
economic benefits are reaped by the pioneer fishing State itself through high catch rates: accord 
C.W. Armstrong, “Co-operative Solutions in a Transboundary Fishery: The Russian-Norwegian 
Co-Management of the Arcto-Norwegian Cod Stock” (1994) 9 Marine Resource Economics 329 
at 337.  Note that the factors do not include capacity as such (except possibly under (f) “any other 
factors which the Commission deems appropriate”), which would have been a profoundly anti-
precautionary step.  In 1997 Japan argued (CCSBT4(1) Report, supra Ch I n 126, at 11) that the 
current allocation was inappropriate because it gave no weight to Members’ historical catch 
records and fishing capacities and the social and economic dependence of their fishing industry 
on the SBT fisheries.  It is submitted, however, that if the factors mentioned by Japan were given 
priority or even equal weighting with the others, it would act as a disincentive to reduce 
overcapacity.  This would run counter to the inescapable imperative in a fishery for a depleted 
stock that capacity must be adjusted to the safe level of catch, not vice versa. 
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1990s before erupting in an open dispute in 1998 may well have been brought to the 
surface, and solved, much earlier.  While there is a risk that a finding against Japan 
under a review procedure would have put unbearable strain on its commitment to the 
CCSBT framework, Japan does not have a history of leaving bodies whose policy 
stance it finds uncongenial to its interests. 
G Conclusion  
It can be seen from the foregoing that, as the CCSBT began its institutional life, its 
members had for some years been thinking about non-member catch and how they 
might approach the States concerned with a view to minimising it.  The leisurely 
pace at which they were proceeding suggests, however, that for all their repetitive 
rhetoric they still saw it as a second-order issue.  The only concrete action called for 
in the 1993 text of the joint demarche was the provision of catch and effort data, and 
the text gave not even a hint of any intention or threat to take steps to exclude others 
from the fishery, something that there seemed to be no legal power for them to do. 
To succeed in enticing new entrants into the CCSBT would be a mixed blessing.  
The consensus rule gives any new Member veto power, but in the context of the 
1993 Convention is not in itself unreasonable, given that the CCSBT began life with 
only three Members.  Without it, there is a strong risk that one Member would find 
itself continually outvoted by the other two.  In principle, this might be either New 
Zealand or Japan.  New Zealand has interests as a latecomer to the fishery not 
responsible for its initial depletion; with only a small share of the catch, Australia 
and Japan might frequently resort to informal bilateral deals without its knowledge.  
On the other hand, Australia and New Zealand have common interests as coastal 
States on the SBT migratory path, and their respective tolerances of risk of collapse 
of the stock in terms of preferred fisheries management policies are much closer to 
each other than either is to Japan’s, and much lower than Japan’s.   
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Though there are instances of the former,
440
 in practice, the latter has been the 
dominant dynamic within the CCSBT.
441
  In replacing the objection procedure with a 
veto, however, the 1993 Convention’s decision-making procedure does not solve the 
basic problem that a policy of limiting catch of, or fishing effort for, a highly 
migratory stock to which there is practically unrestricted access on the high seas can 
be effective only if all significant participants in the fishery, and preferably all of 
them, are bound.  It treats the symptom rather than the cause.  A procedure akin to 
that in the Honolulu Convention, ensuring that TAC and national allocations are 
fixed and that minority objectors can avoid being bound by them only by persuading 
a review panel that the decision is somehow legally defective would seem better 
suited, at the price of some loss of sovereignty, to prevent deadlocks that prevent a 
                                                          
440
  An example is the less than transparent settlement of the 1998-2001 dispute, in which 
New Zealand yielded in advance of Australia on port access, but resisted Japan’s claim to 
additional catch to compensate it for the 711 tonnes forgone in part-implementation of the ITLOS 
provisional measures orders, whereas Australia and Japan together set the opposite agenda – see 
infra Appendix A, text at nn 1472 and 1473.  The only attempt by Japan to make common cause 
with New Zealand against Australia – with a proposal for reallocation of catch shares – was 
rebuffed by New Zealand.  At the CCSBT’s Third Meeting Japan tabled a proposal for a future 
quota allocation mechanism that assigned certain weights to the criteria in Article 8(4) of the 
1993 Convention for consideration in deciding allocations: “Proposal[:] A Future Quota 
Allocation Mechanism for the Parties in Accordance with the Provisions of the Convention” 
(Attachment P to CCSBT3(1) Report, supra Ch I n 102).  The net effect would have been to 
transfer quota from Australia to both Japan and New Zealand.  New Zealand declined the 
inducement and the CCSBT agreed to revert to the matter in future, but to set it aside in the 
meantime in order to focus on other significant priorities: CCSBT4(1) Report, supra Ch I n 126, 
at 11.  Japan did not thereafter pursue the proposal with any vigour and no discussion of it is 
recorded in any subsequent meeting reports. 
441
  J.-J. Maguire, “Southern Bluefin Tuna Dispute”, in Nordquist and Norton Moore (eds), 
supra Ch I n 87, 201 at 211-212 points to the smallness of the CCSBT, leading to polarisation, 
worsened by the shared mindset of Australia and New Zealand leaving Japan feeling isolated in a 
permanent minority.  Presciently, New Zealand officials in cable No 3027 of 22 October 1982, 
supra n 320, had worried about New Zealand co-ordinating its position too closely with Australia 
despite the two States’ similarity of outlook on this issue, lest Japan see this as collusion. 
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fisheries commission from fulfilling its basic task.  Not even this, however, would 
ensure that a non-member of the CCSBT that catches significant quantities of SBT 
does not undermine the CCSBT’s conservation measures if it is under no obligation 
to join the Commission or comply with its measures.  The next chapter will examine 
the problem of new entrants into the fishery and the adjustment of their interests and 
those of CCSBT members through a number of instruments, some external to the 
CCSBT and others being measures taken by the Commission itself. 
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CHAPTER III 
New entrants, old problem – allocation principles in 
the UN Fish Stocks Agreement and earlier treaties 
A Introduction 
The problem of how to accommodate new entrants to existing fisheries has been 
recognised for over 50 years.  That even such an eminent jurist as Judge Oda could 
confess himself unable to resolve it
442
 is not surprising because, in terms of the 
classical principles of international law, notably the high seas freedom of fishing, it 
does indeed appear to be insuperable.  Restated in economic terms, the problem 
stems from the open-access nature of high seas fisheries, which the residual character 
that the legal freedom has since acquired does nothing to alter.  The expansion of 
EEZs in the 1970s and 1980s and the continued depletion of stocks within them 
means that the share of the world fish catch taken on the high seas is likely to grow 
beyond the 8-10 per cent estimated by the FAO in 1994 for the UN Conference on 
Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks,
443
 a figure that itself had 
risen from less than 1 per cent on 1972 catch data.
444
 
This affects the SBT fishery more than most.  Assuming that the catches of Australia, 
New Zealand and Indonesia in Table 2 in Chapter I were all taken within their 
respective EEZs and the catches of all others on the high seas, only in one year 
                                                          
442
  S. Oda, “Distribution of Fish Resources of the High Seas: Free Competition or Artificial 
Quota?”, in L.M Alexander (ed), The Law of the Sea: The Future of the Sea’s Resources: 
Proceedings of the Second Annual Conference of the Law of the Sea Institute, June 26-29, 1967, 
the University of Rhode Island (Kingston: University of Rhode Island, 1968), 29 at 29. 
443
  UN doc A/CONF.164/INF/4 (15 June 1993), “Some High Seas Fisheries Aspects 
relating to Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks”, reprinted in J.-P. Lévy and 
G. Schram, United Nations Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish 
Stocks: Selected Documents (1996), 377 at 378 (paragraph 4). 
444
  J. Gulland, “Letter to the editor: How much of the world’s fisheries lies within EEZs?” 
(1984) 8 Marine Policy 359. 
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(1982) was less than half of the catch taken by distant-water fishing States, and in 
1989, 1991 and 1998 the high seas share was over 60 per cent. 
Another way of looking at the problem is to say that limiting entry to fisheries at the 
domestic level will not be wholly successful in the case of transboundary stocks if a 
significant proportion of the catch occurs on the high seas, if only because the same 
considerations that prompted the introduction of limited entry also operate on the 
international plane, whither the solution cannot be so easily transposed.  Contracts 
between participants to limit their catches will not prevent entry to the fishery of 
outsiders – for that legislation is necessary, and the Australian and now New Zealand 
and Japanese Parliaments have supplied it.
445
  Similarly, in international law the 
privity of contract is replicated in the pacta tertiis rule, as codified in Article 34 (“A 
treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a third State without its 
consent.”) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.446 
Some international equivalent of legislation to limit entry to fisheries would therefore 
now be needed, but the search for anything answering this description is not easy.  
Either one is forced to look beyond treaties to custom (with all the attendant 
difficulties of its formation) or, if a multilateral convention is instead relied on, then 
it must be one that either codifies custom or attracts so many parties that it exerts 
what Mendelson has called a “gravitational pull” on the formation of custom.447  
While the high seas fisheries provisions of UNCLOS may well fall into this category, 
the same may not yet be true of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement.  Although Articles 8 
and 17 of the latter come close to a limited-entry rule, the Agreement as a whole, or 
                                                          
445
  Supra Ch I nn 160, 202 and 212. 
446
  Supra Introduction n 18.  See also Article 35 of the Convention:  
An obligation arises for a third State from a provision of a treaty if the parties to the treaty 
intend the provision to be the means of establishing the obligation and the third State 
expressly accepts that obligation in writing. 
447
  M.H. Mendelson, “Fragmentation of the Law of the Sea”, (1988) 12 Marine Policy 192 
at 199. 
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at least these provisions of it, would need to become customary international law in 
order to bind non-parties.
448
 
Viewed as a whole, one of the main aims of the Agreement is to encourage States 
whose nationals fish in certain parts of the high seas or for certain species to join the 
relevant fishery commission or at least abide by the measures it adopts.  Some of the 
substantive provisions directed to this end (for example, Article 8’s conditioning of 
freedom of fishing on the high seas for a given species by reference to membership 
of, or cooperation with, the relevant regional or subregional fisheries management 
organisation such as the CCSBT)
449
 are more susceptible of transformation into 
custom than others (such as the boarding and inspection provisions of Articles 21 and 
                                                          
448
  It is entirely possible that some provisions of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement will in due 
course be received into customary international law, so binding all States engaged in the SBT 
fishery, whether or not they are parties to it.  The Chile/EC swordfish dispute, which may yet 
proceed to a hearing before a Special Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law of the 
Sea – see infra Ch IV n 901 – would be likely to elicit arguments from all sides (including third 
parties) that particular provisions of the Agreement have in fact achieved the status of custom: 
see generally A. Serdy, “See You in Port: Australia and New Zealand as Third Parties in the 
Dispute between Chile and the European Community over Chile’s Denial of Port Access to 
Spanish Vessels Fishing for Swordfish on the High Seas”, (2002) 3 Melbourne Journal of 
International Law 79 at 105-107 and 115. 
449
  As to whether the CCSBT is actually a “regional or subregional fisheries management 
organization” within the meaning of that Agreement (passim, e.g. in Article 8; by contrast 
UNCLOS Article 64 refers only to “appropriate international organizations”), given that it 
applies to SBT wherever in the world they are found, note that Japan’s citation of the Agreement 
precludes any argument by it to the contrary: CCSBT7 Report, in CCSBT Blue Book 2002, supra 
Ch I n 30, 1 at 9 (paragraph 60).  An earlier Japanese statement (“Japan’s Opening Statement” 
(Attachment A to CCSBT4(2) Report), in CCSBT Blue Book 1999, supra Ch I n 126, 68)) also 
assumes the CCSBT is included within this phrase.  A curiosity here is that Australia’s delegated 
legislation implementing domestically its national allocation from the CCSBT applies to not to 
the whole world but only to the part of the southern hemisphere north of 60ºS and between 50ºW 
in the west and 140ºW in the east: Southern Bluefin Tuna Fishery Management Plan 1995, supra 
Ch I n 31, cl 3.1, definitions of “high seas fishing zone” and “SBT Fishery Zone”. 
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22, which allow the authorities of one State that is party to the Agreement to enforce 
on the high seas the measures of such an organisation of which it is a member against 
vessels of another State party, whether or not the second State is also a member).  In 
the light of the sparseness of State practice to date, however, the better view is that 
this has not yet occurred.
450
 
This chapter considers the efforts of Australia, Japan and New Zealand to limit the 
entry of third parties to the SBT fishery.  Although in a strict sense New Zealand was 
the first new entrant in the 1980s under the emergent EEZ regime, it is convenient to 
assimilate it to a historic participant in the fishery, not merely because it was an 
original party to the 1993 Convention, but also because its right to participate in the 
SBT fishery was never seriously questioned – a circumstance assisted by the modest 
capacity of the New Zealand fishing industry to catch SBT.  The chapter considers 
the third-party provisions of the conventions negotiated at three UN conferences – 
the 1958 (First) UN Conference on the Law of the Sea, the 1973-82 Third UN 
Conference on the Law of the Sea and the 1993-95 UN Conference on Straddling 
Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks.  It assesses the likely impact over 
time of the entry into force of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement, including, by way of 
the hypothetical example of South Africa, the possibility of catch limits being set by 
recourse to the dispute settlement mechanism, but also the inherent limitations of its 
rules.  It then examines a cul-de-sac in the history of international fisheries law, the 
                                                          
450
  R. Rayfuse, “The United Nations Agreement on Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish 
Stocks as an Objective Regime: A Case of Wishful Thinking?” (1999) 20 Australian Yearbook of 
International Law 253 at 278.  Nonetheless, with some qualification, it is possible to agree with 
Birnie (P. Birnie, “Impact on the Development of International Law on Cooperation: the United 
Nations Law of the Sea, Straddling Stocks and Biodiversity Conventions”, in Nordquist, Norton 
Moore and Mahmoudi (eds), supra Ch II n 437, 85 at 94) that “it seems likely that once the [UN 
Fish Stocks Agreement] is widely in force, its provisions could become established as part of 
customary law governing access and persistent objectors could lose the right to fish on the high 
seas.”  This would be so if the persistent objections were not to the provisions of the Agreement 
itself, but to given management measures adopted by a fisheries commission, and the loss of the 
right to fish on the high seas was not general, but limited to the stock(s) concerned. 
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doctrine of abstention, which in modern times has enjoyed something of an unspoken 
revival in fishery commissions struggling to cope with or forestall the quota demands 
of growing memberships.  The conclusion drawn is that, while the UN Fish Stocks 
Agreement does not itself incorporate abstention in another guise, the practice of its 
parties in applying it comes very close to doing so.  This may be necessary to solve 
the new entrants problem, but it is not sufficient. 
B The UN Law of the Sea Conferences Treaties 
1 The 1958 Conventions 
Of the four treaties produced by the first (1958) UN Conference on the Law of the 
Sea, only one is directly germane to the entry of new participants into an existing 
international fishery (that is, one in which at least two States already take part) – and 
it is not the Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the 
High Seas (hereinafter the Fishing Convention),
451
 the last of the four to come into 
force and which never achieved wide adherence.
452
  Even so, according to Koers the 
Convention did become “a moral code which fishing nations prefer not to violate.”453 
The Fishing Convention mentions neither any particular species of fish nor any 
category of fish by reference to the extent of its migratory path.  It is more concerned 
                                                          
451
  Supra Introduction n 21. 
452
  All four Conventions were expressed to enter into force on the thirtieth day after deposit 
of the twenty-second instrument of ratification or accession: Fishing Convention Article 18(1) 
(entered into force 20 March 1966); Convention on the High Seas, supra Introduction n 20, 
Article 34(1) (entered into force 30 September 1962); Convention on the Continental Shelf (done 
at Geneva, 29 April 1958; 499 UNTS 311, ATS 1963 No 12), Article 11(1) (entered into force 10 
June 1964); Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone (done at Geneva, 29 
April 1958; 516 UNTS 205, ATS 1963 No 12), Article 29(1) (entered into force 10 September 
1964).  The combined catch in 1965 of the 23 States that had become party to the Fishing 
Convention by mid-1967 amounted to only 14% of the world’s fish catch: W.C. Herrington, “The 
Future of the Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the Sea”, in 
Alexander (ed), supra n 442, 62 at 62.  
453
  Koers, supra Ch I n 285, at 118. 
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with how a fishery becomes international – that is, the entry of a second State to a 
fishery on the high seas hitherto pursued in isolation by a single State. 
The 1958 Conference was notable instead for the qualification in Article 2 of the 
Convention on the High Seas
454
 of the hitherto unalloyed principle of freedom of 
fishing on the high seas.  This reads, so far as material: 
[…]Freedom of the high seas is exercised under the conditions laid down by these 
articles and by the other rules of international law.  It comprises, inter alia, for both 
coastal and non-coastal States: 
… 
(2) Freedom of fishing; 
… 
These freedoms…shall be exercised by all States with reasonable regard to the 
interests of other States in their exercise of the freedom of the high seas. 
The second paragraph of the preamble to the High Seas Convention referred to the 
adoption of the provisions of that Convention “as generally declaratory of established 
principles of international law.”  That this applies to the qualification at the end of 
Article 2 can be seen from the Commentary of the ILC on Article 27 of its Draft 
Articles on the Law of the Sea prepared in 1956:
 455
 
Any freedom that is to be exercised in the interests of all entitled to enjoy it, must be 
regulated.  Hence, the law of the high seas contains certain rules, most of them 
already recognized in positive international law, which are designed, not to limit or 
restrict the freedom of the high seas, but to safeguard its exercise in the interests of 
the entire international community.  These rules concern particularly  
… 
(iii) The rights of States relative to the conservation of the living resources of the 
high seas[.]
456
 
                                                          
454
  Supra n 452. 
455
  The ILC Draft Articles and Commentary are in Report of the International Law 
Commission covering the work of its eighth session, 23 April–4 July 1956 (UN doc A/3159), 
reprinted in UN, Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1956, Vol II (New York: UN, 
1957) 253 at 256-301. 
456
  Ibid., at 278. 
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Article 2 of the High Seas Convention was also in effect the source of the locus 
classicus of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Fisheries Jurisdiction 
cases
457
 that: 
[i]t is one of the advances in maritime international law, resulting from the 
intensification of fishing, that the former laissez-faire treatment of the living 
resources of the sea in the high seas has been replaced by a recognition of a duty to 
have due regard to the rights of other States and the needs of conservation for the 
benefit of all.
458
   
As Iceland, the respondent in those cases, though a signatory to both the High Seas 
Convention and the Fishing Convention, had never ratified either of them,
459
 the 
dictum of the Court indicated conclusively that the underlying principle had indeed 
been received into customary international law.  While the precise time this occurred 
cannot be ascertained with certainty, it serves nonetheless as a strong indication that 
the same principle would have been applicable for some time previously as between 
Australia and Japan concerning the latter’s mid-Indian Ocean fishing for SBT.  The 
Fishing Convention is nonetheless indirectly relevant in two ways, even though, of 
the States principally involved in the SBT fishery, only Australia in fact ratified it.
460
  
                                                          
457
  ICJ Reports 1974, p.3 (United Kingdom v. Iceland) and p.175 (Federal Republic of 
Germany v. Iceland).  
458
  Ibid., at 31 (paragraph 72) and 202 (paragraph 64) respectively.  
459
  See the Status Lists of the 1958 Conventions, maintained by the Treaty Section of the 
UN Secretariat, at <treaties.un.org/Pages/Treaties.aspx?id=21&subid=0&lang=en> and linked 
pages, visited on 26 September 2008, in particular <treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx? 
src=TREATY&id=454&chapter=21&lang=en> (Convention on the High Seas) and 
<treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&id=455&chapter=21&lang=en> 
(Fishing Convention). 
460
  It did so on 14 May 1963; Indonesia and New Zealand signed the Convention on 8 May 
and 29 October 1958 respectively but never ratified it; Japan and the Republic of Korea did not 
sign it.  South Africa acceded to the Convention on 9 April 1963.  Taiwan, whose authorities at 
the time held the Chinese seat at the UN as the Republic of China, also signed the Convention on 
29 April 1958: see the Status List for the Fishing Convention, supra n 459.  Japan abstained in 
the vote on its adoption at the 1958 Conference: see UN, United Nations Conference on the Law 
of the Sea, Official Records, Volume II: Plenary Meetings (New York: UN, 1958) at 59.  The 
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First, although the concept of highly migratory species was a novel element of 
international fisheries law introduced in the Third UN Conference on the Law of the 
Sea,
461
 with the benefit of hindsight, a harbinger of the future regime governing such 
species may be faintly discerned in Article 8.  Paragraph 1 reads:  
Any State which, even if its nationals are not engaged in fishing in an area of the 
high seas not adjacent to its coast, has a special interest in the conservation of the 
living resources of the high seas in that area, may request the State or States whose 
nationals are engaged in fishing there to take the necessary measures of conservation 
under articles 3 and 4 respectively, at the same time mentioning the scientific 
reasons which in its opinion make such measures necessary, and indicating its 
special interest.   
This Article was based on Article 56 of the Draft Articles prepared by the ILC,
462
 
itself influenced by the outcome of the International Technical Conference on the 
Living Resources of the Sea that had taken place in Rome the previous year.
463
  At 
the 1958 Conference there was very little discussion of this provision.
464
  In its 
commentary on the 1956 draft, the ILC had stated:  
This case may arise, for example, if the exhaustion of the resources of the sea in the 
area would affect the results of fishing in another area where the nationals of the 
State concerned do engage in fishing.
465
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Convention was adopted by a vote of 45 in favour, 1 against with 18 abstentions.  As no 
delegation demanded a roll-call ballot, the Official Records do not reveal how the States present 
voted, but it is clear from the text that the sole vote against the Convention was cast by the 
Federal Republic of Germany.  In an earlier vote on the substantive provisions of the Convention 
(Articles 1 to 14) the result was 44 in favour (including Australia and New Zealand), 16 against 
(including Japan) and 8 abstentions: ibid. at 46. 
461
  Burke, supra Ch I n 80, states at 199: “Prior to this negotiation, this categorization of 
species was unknown.” 
462
  Supra n 455. 
463
  Supra Ch I n 56 and accompanying text (Article 56 of the Draft Articles, supra n 455, 
appears here as Article 28); Oda, supra Ch I n 56, at 86.   
464
  Oda, supra Ch I n 56, at 118. 
465
  Report of the International Law Commission covering the work of its eighth session, 23 
April–4 July 1956, supra n 455, at 291 (paragraph (1) of Commentary to Article 56).  
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While Oda interprets this as being aimed at ecologically related stocks, it is also 
susceptible of application to a single highly migratory stock such as SBT which 
migrates between an area on the high seas (the Indian Ocean) where it is fished by 
one State (Japan) and the territorial sea of a second State (Australia) whose nationals 
may exploit that stock off the coast, including perhaps in the adjacent part of the high 
seas (in the 1950s, off New South Wales and South Australia, as outlined in Chapter 
I), but not in that part of the high seas remote from its coast where the first State is 
exploiting the stock.
466
 
Secondly, several of the Fishing Convention’s provisions are the basis for related 
articles in UNCLOS, albeit often in a changed context.  Most prominently, Article 1, 
paragraph 1:  
All States have the right for their nationals to engage in fishing on the high seas, 
subject (a) to their treaty obligations, (b) to the interests and rights of coastal States 
as provided for in this Convention, and (c) to the provisions contained in the 
following Articles concerning conservation of the living resources of the high seas. 
constitutes a second qualification of the formerly unfettered freedom of high seas 
fishing and is clearly the template on which Article 116 of UNCLOS
467
 was drafted. 
Unlike Article 6, paragraph 1, which recognises the coastal State’s “special interest 
in the maintenance of the productivity of the living resources in any area of the high 
seas adjacent to its territorial sea”,468 Article 8 does not mention coastal States as 
such.  Hence the rights of the coastal State in a highly migratory species of fish in the 
situation mentioned by Verzijl were arguably not contemplated by the drafters as 
falling within the “interests and rights of coastal States as provided for in this 
Convention”, to which the rights of the fishing State are made subject.  Nonetheless, 
this phrase appears redundant as the whole of the substantive provisions of the 
                                                          
466
  J.H.W. Verzijl, “The United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Geneva, 1958”, 
Part II (1959) 6 Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Internationaal Recht 115 at 126. 
467
  See text infra following n 495. 
468
  Supra n 463. 
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Convention, including Article 8, are embraced by “the provisions contained in the 
following Articles concerning conservation of the living resources of the high seas” 
to which they are anyway subject.
469
  In fact, however, in the 1960s there was not yet 
any concern on Australia’s part at the scale of Japanese catches of SBT; rather it was 
Japan – or more precisely Japanese scientists – that expressed concern in that decade 
about Australian fishing for SBT, not vice versa.
470
 
2 UNCLOS 
The modern law of international fisheries, and the place within it of SBT as a highly 
migratory species, is a result largely of the Third United Conference on the Law of 
the Sea, which met in sixteen sessions from 1973 to 1982
471
 and of whose labours 
UNCLOS was the fruit.
472
  The Conference was established by General Assembly 
Resolution 3029 A (XXVII) of 18 December 1972 and by Resolution 3067 (XXVIII) 
of 16 November 1973 its mandate was extended to encompass the whole of the law 
of the sea.  Prior to its convening, general law of the sea issues including fisheries 
had also been taken up by Sub-Committee II of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses 
                                                          
469
  Oda, supra Ch I n 56, at 112, see also the converse point made by F.V. García Amador, 
The Exploitation and Conservation of the Resources of the Sea: A Study of Contemporary 
International Law (2nd edn) (Leiden: A.W. Sijthoff, 1959), at 194-195. 
470
  Supra Ch I, text at nn 255-257. 
471
  Formally there were eleven sessions, but the last five of them were all adjourned and 
later resumed after an interval of several months: see the Chronology of Significant Law of the 
Sea Events in M.H. Nordquist (Editor-in-Chief), United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea, 1982: A Commentary, (Dordrecht, Boston and Lancaster: Martinus Nijhoff, 1985) 
(hereinafter Virginia Commentary), Vol I, at xxx-xxxiii. 
472
  The history of the Conference is told at T.T.B. Koh and S. Jayakumar, “The Negotiating 
Process of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, in Virginia Commentary, 
supra n 471, Vol I, at 29-134; R.R. Churchill and A.V. Lowe, The Law of the Sea (3rd edn) 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999), at 15-18; J.A. de Yturriaga, The International 
Regime of Fisheries: From UNCLOS 1982 to the Presential Sea (The Hague; Boston: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1997), at 20-91; L. Juda, International Law and Ocean Use Management: The Evolution 
of Ocean Governance (New York: Routledge, 1996), at 209-254. 
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of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction
473
 
(hereinafter the Sea-Bed Committee), the Sub-Committee having been formed in 
1971 once the in-principle decision to convene the Conference had been taken.
474
  As 
will be seen below, it was to this earlier body that the first precursors of Article 64 
and Annex I of UNCLOS were submitted. 
(a) Article 64 
The text of Article 64 of UNCLOS: 
Article 64 
Highly migratory species 
1. The coastal States and other States whose nationals fish in the region for the 
highly migratory species listed in Annex I shall co-operate directly or through 
appropriate international organizations with a view to ensuring conservation and 
promoting the objective of optimum utilisation of such species throughout the 
region, both within and beyond the exclusive economic zone.  In regions for which 
no appropriate international organization exists, the coastal States and other States 
whose nationals harvest these species in the region shall co-operate to establish such 
an organization and participate in its work. 
2. The provisions of paragraph 1 apply in addition to the other provisions of this 
Part. 
was finalised relatively early in the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea, 
appearing in a form very similar to that above as Article 53 of the Revised Single 
Negotiating Text at the Fourth Session in 1976.
475
  It is the result of a compromise 
between fishing States keen to establish a special regime for species of fish moving 
                                                          
473
  The Committee was established by UN General Assembly Resolution 2467 A (XXIII) of 
21 December 1968, and its mandate was amended so as to extend to a wide range of law of the 
sea issues by Resolution 2750 C (XXV) of 17 December 1970. 
474
  S.N. Nandan and S. Rosenne (volume editors), Virginia Commentary, supra n 471, Vol 
II (Dordrecht, Boston and London: Martinus Nijhoff, 1993), at 3-4. 
475
  UN doc A/CONF.62/WP.8/Rev.1/Part II (6 May 1976), reprinted in UN, United Nations 
Conference on the Law of the Sea (3rd), Official Records Vol V (New York: UN, 1976), 151 at 
162. 
 163 
through extensive areas of ocean space,
476
 and coastal States taking the view that 
such species ought to be treated no differently from others found in their EEZs.
477
  
Article 64, along with the remainder of Part V of UNCLOS, was found “consonant 
with general international law” by a chamber of the ICJ in the Gulf of Maine Case.478 
(b) Annex I to UNCLOS 
The idea of enumerating in an annex the species to which what became Article 64 
applies stems from a proposal put to the Sea-Bed Committee in 1971 by the United 
States that “In the case of a highly migratory oceanic stock identified in Appendix 
A*, such stocks shall be regulated pursuant to agreement or consultation among the 
States concerned with the conservation and harvesting of the stock.”  The footnote to 
                                                          
476
  According to Burke, supra Ch I n 80, at 199, a principal motivating factor was the 
interest of Japan and the United States in tuna fisheries in particular. 
477
  Virginia Commentary, Vol II, supra n 474, at 649-650.  Because the requirement to co-
operate extends to the EEZ, it does impinge to a degree on the largely unfettered discretion that 
the coastal State enjoys in the EEZ concerning the fixing of the allowable catch of other species 
that occur in the EEZ, though it falls short of mandating access by other States to any surplus that 
the coastal State is unable to harvest itself in its EEZ – see Articles 61 and 62 and the discussion 
in Burke, supra Ch I n 80, at 213-217 and F. Orrego Vicuña, The Changing International Law of 
High Seas Fisheries (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999); at 26-28.  Thus 
under UNCLOS fishing States would have seen their position as stronger in respect of highly 
migratory species than of straddling stocks, given that the requirement in Article 63(2) that 
affected States must “seek…to agree upon the measures necessary for the conservation of these 
stocks” applies only “in the adjacent area” (i.e. the high seas area adjacent to the EEZ), and not 
within the EEZ itself.  In practice, however, coastal States have tended consistently to take more 
conservative stances than fishing States on permissible levels of exploitation intensity, with the 
result that disputes are far more likely to be about the high seas exploitation of a highly migratory 
species than the coastal State’s exploitation of it in the EEZ – as indeed occurred in the SBT 
dispute considered in Appendix A infra. 
478
  Case concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area 
(Canada/United States of America), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1984, p.246 at 294 (paragraph 94).  
Churchill and Lowe, supra n 472, take the view that coastal State EEZ rights have become 
custom but not the Article 61 and 62 obligations: at 161-162.  
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which the asterisk referred indicated that no appendix was actually attached.
479
  
When these draft articles were revised in 1972 the phrase re-emerged as “the highly 
migratory species listed in Annex A” and “[t]he highly migratory oceanic resources 
listed in Annex A”,480 but again no annex was provided – and as the predicate of the 
sentence in which it appeared shows (“shall be regulated by appropriate international 
fishery organizations”), the drafters’ focus was on the principles for management of 
such species, not on their enumeration.  When the Conference proper began, the 
same phrase, still without any annex, was used in tentative draft articles produced at 
the Second Session in 1974 by an Informal Group of Juridical Experts.
481
  At the 
same session a draft article on such species proposed by Australia and New Zealand 
continued the pattern of referring to but not including an annex listing them, though 
it added a novel element in the suggestion that, because of the technical nature of 
such an annex, a flexible procedure for amending it would be desirable.
482
   
The first proposal to which an annex was attached was made by the United States at 
the Second Session of the Conference in 1974.
483
  The Annex ran to twelve items, of 
which the first five are identical with the English text of their respective counterparts 
in the final Annex I.  Tunas as a genus were mentioned by name for the first time at 
                                                          
479
  UN doc A/AC.138/SC.II/L.4 (undated), Art III(3)(A), reprinted in Report of the 
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor Beyond National 
Jurisdiction: General Assembly Official Records, Twenty-Sixth Session, Supplement No 21 
(A/8421) (New York: UN, 1971; hereinafter Sea-bed Committee Report 1971), 241 at 243. 
480
  UN doc A/AC.138/SC.II/L.9 (undated), sections II(A) and III respectively, reprinted in 
Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor Beyond 
National Jurisdiction: General Assembly Official Records, Twenty-Seventh Session, Supplement 
No 21 (A/8721) (New York: UN, 1972), 175 at 175 (section II(A)) and 176 (section III). 
481
  Tentative Draft Articles (5 August 1974), Art 22, Alternative B, reprinted in R. Platzöder 
(ed), Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: Documents, Vol XI (Dobbs Ferry: 
Oceana Publications, 1987), 393 at 405. 
482
  UN doc A/CONF.62/C.2/L.57/Rev.1 (22 August 1974), footnote 26, reprinted in UN, 
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (3rd), Official Records Vol III (New York: 
UN, 1975), 231.  The suggestion was not accepted. 
483
  UN doc A/CONF.62/C.2/L.47 (8 August 1974), Annex, reprinted ibid., 222 at 225. 
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the same session, when eight Western European States (Belgium, Denmark, France, 
Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands) 
proposed unsuccessfully that regional or sectoral organisations be created to manage 
conservation and utilisation of “certain species such as tuna and whales.”484  After 
the scientific names were added in the Revised Single Negotiating Text at the Fourth 
Session in 1976,
485
 a further unsuccessful proposal made informally by Japan in 1977 
at the Sixth Session would have partially defined highly migratory species to include 
[t]una, cetaceans and such other species as may be designated by the relevant 
regional or global organization on the basis of their ocean-wide range of migration 
and the need for their regional or global management by reason of multinational 
participation in the fishery of such species.
486
 
The addition of SBT was in fact the last substantive change made to the Annex, and 
took place at the Ninth Session in 1980 on the informal proposal of Japan and the 
Republic of Korea,
487
 with the Chairman of the Second Committee reporting that it 
had received widespread support.
488
  Originally included as item 17 in the Informal 
Composite Negotiating Text,
489
 in the next revision but one at the Resumed Tenth 
Session in 1981 it was moved up the order to join the other tunas, becoming item 
                                                          
484
  UN doc A/CONF.62/C.2/L.40 and Add.1 (5 and 28 August 1974), Art 13, reprinted 
ibid., 217 at 218.  
485
  UN doc A/CONF.62/WP.8/Rev.1/Part II, supra n 475, at 173.   
486
  Reprinted in Platzöder, supra n 481, Vol IV (1983), at 440. 
487
  Reprinted ibid., Vol V (1984), at 63. 
488
  UN doc A/CONF.62/L.51 (29 March 1980), paragraphs 12, 13 and 15 and Annex I, 
reprinted in UN, United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (3rd), Official Records Vol 
XIII (New York: UN, 1981), 82 at 83-85. 
489
  UN doc A/CONF.62/WP.10/Rev.2 (11 April 1980), Annex I, reprinted in Platzöder, 
supra n 481, Vol II (1982), 3 at 126.  The Japanese and Korean proposal had been for SBT to 
become the first item. 
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8.
490
  The intention appears to have been to include all known tunas in Annex I,
491
 
but was imperfectly executed. 
(c) Articles 116-119 
Section 2 of Part VII of UNCLOS bears the heading “Conservation and Management 
of the Living Resources of the High Seas”.   Although SBT is not mentioned by 
name, fishing for this and all other highly migratory species of fish on the high seas 
is governed by Articles 116 to 119, which constitute the bulk of section 2.
492
  These 
articles must also be read with Article 87, which reads, so far as material:  
1.   The high seas are open to all States, whether coastal or land-locked.  Freedom of 
the high seas is exercised under the conditions laid down by the Convention and by 
other rules of international law.  It comprises, inter alia, for both coastal and land-
locked States:  
… 
(e) freedom of fishing, subject to the conditions laid down in section 2.  
2.   These freedoms shall be exercised by all States with reasonable regard to the 
interests of other States in their exercise of the freedoms of the high seas, ...  
                                                          
490
  UN doc A/CONF.62/L.78 (28 August 1981), Annex I, reprinted in UN, United Nations 
Conference on the Law of the Sea (3rd), Official Records, Vol XV (New York: UN, 1983), 172 at 
224. 
491
  A monograph by the deputy head of the Spanish delegation to the Conference states that 
the highly migratory species include “all the varieties of tuna”: de Yturriaga, supra n 472, at 128.  
Though eventually included, one reason for the long persistence of SBT’s initial omission may 
have been that it was wrongly assumed to be encompassed under Item 2, “Bluefin tuna”: see A. 
Serdy, “One Fin, Two Fins, Red Fins, Bluefins: Some Problems of Taxonomy and Nomenclature 
Affecting Legal Instruments Governing Tunas and Other Highly Migratory Species” (2004) 28 
Marine Policy 235, at 236n (an assumption that appears in some quarters to have persisted well 
into the 1990s: at 242). 
492
  The remaining article in this section, Article 120, deals only with marine mammals and 
is thus not germane to SBT. 
 167 
While the extracted part of paragraph 2 reproduces almost verbatim the last sentence 
of Article 2 of the High Seas Convention quoted above,
493
 in the Sea-Bed Committee 
there had been moves to end the freedom of fishing.  Malta had put forward a 
proposal in which fishing was omitted from the list of high seas freedoms,
494
 while 
Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela were the joint authors of another proposal by 
which fishing on the high seas “shall be neither unrestricted nor indiscriminate”.495  
Article 116, headed “Right to fish on the high seas”, provides that:  
All States have the right for their nationals to engage in fishing on the high seas 
subject to: 
(a) their treaty obligations; 
(b) the rights and duties as well as the interests of coastal States provided for, inter 
alia, in article 63, paragraph 2 and articles 64 to 67; and 
(c) the provisions of this section. 
That is, the interests of distant-water fishing States exploiting SBT are now 
subordinated to some extent to those of coastal States,
496
 which can be expected to  
                                                          
493
  Supra, text following n 454.  B. Kwiatkowska, “The High Seas Fisheries Regime: at a 
Point of No Return?”, (1993) 8 IJMCL 327 notes at 329 that freedom of fishing was second in the 
1958 Convention’s list of high seas freedoms but was demoted to fifth (out of six) in UNCLOS 
Article 87. 
494
  UN doc A/AC.138/53 (undated), reprinted in Sea-bed Committee Report 1971, supra n 
479, 105 at 117 (article 5). 
495
   UN doc A/AC.138/SC.II/L.21 (undated), reprinted in Report of the Committee on the 
Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor Beyond National Jurisdiction: General 
Assembly Official Records, Twenty-Eighth Session, Supplement No 21 (A/9021), Vol III (New 
York: UN, 1973), 19 at 21 (article 16). 
496
  Contra D. Nelson, “The Development of the Legal Regime of High Seas Fisheries”, in 
A. Boyle and D. Freestone (eds), International Law and Sustainable Development: Past 
Achievements and Future Challenges (Oxford and New York: OUP, 1999), 113 who says at 123 
that “subject to” should be taken to mean “with due regard to”, but his reasons for reading the 
provision down in this way essentially rely on the drafting history of Article 116 as opposed to its 
ordinary contextual meaning as required by Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, supra Introduction n 18, so are not particularly convincing.  The preferable 
interpretation is that of Burke, supra Ch I n 80, at 214 (“Article 116 appears to introduce a drastic 
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include in particular the maintenance of the long-term sustainability of the stock.  As 
the coastal States harvest the stock in their EEZs, they have a duty as well as an 
interest in ensuring that it does not fall below the level which produces the maximum 
sustainable yield as qualified by Article 61.
497
  In addition, coastal States have an 
interest in decisions on determination of the allowable catch of the species – and 
although Article 119, paragraph 1 does not specifically require that such decisions be 
made jointly by all interested States, it has that effect when read in conjunction with 
Article 118:
498
 
States shall cooperate with each other in the conservation and management of living 
resources in the areas of the high seas. States whose nationals exploit identical living 
resources, or different living resources in the same area, shall enter into negotiations 
                                                                                                                                                                    
change in high seas fishing rights by providing for a priority in coastal state rights and interests 
affecting high seas fishing states.”), elaborated at 220-224. 
497
  Though this in fact has happened for SBT – see supra Ch I, text between nn 296 and 
303.  From the coastal State’s point of view Article 61 is expressed in mandatory terms, the 
auxiliary verb “shall” denoting an imperative duty or obligation (see “Note on the use of the 
word ‘shall’”, Virginia Commentary Vol II, supra n 474, at xlv-xlvi):  
2.  The coastal State, taking into account the best scientific evidence available to it, shall 
ensure through proper conservation and management measures that the maintenance of the 
living resources in the exclusive economic zone is not endangered by over-exploitation…. 
3.  Such measures shall also be designed to maintain or restore populations of harvest species 
at levels which can produce the maximum sustainable yield, as qualified by relevant 
environmental factors, including the economic needs of coastal fishing communities and the 
special requirements of developing States, and taking into account fishing patterns, the 
interdependence of stocks and any generally recommended international minimum 
standards, whether subregional, regional or global.  
498
  As urged by S.N. Nandan and S. Rosenne (volume editors), Virginia Commentary, supra 
n 471, Vol III (Dordrecht/Boston/London: Martinus Nijhoff, 1995), at 309-310.  The degree of 
that subordination is canvassed in Burke, supra Ch I n 80, at 214 and 219-224, Orrego Vicuña, 
supra n 477, passim but esp at 62-72 and in the SBT dispute would no doubt have been the 
subject of detailed argument before the Annex VII Tribunal had it permitted the arbitration to 
proceed to the merits.  S.B. Kaye, International Fisheries Management (The Hague and London: 
Kluwer Law International, 2001) at 160-161 prefers a construction denying that Article 63(2) 
gives coastal States preferential rights in relation to straddling stocks, in terms that appear to 
apply equally to Article 64 and highly migratory species. 
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with a view to taking the measures necessary for the conservation of the living 
resources concerned.  They shall, as appropriate, cooperate to establish subregional 
or regional fisheries organizations to this end. 
Article 117: 
All States have the duty to take, or to cooperate with other States in taking, such 
measures for their respective nationals as may be necessary for the conservation of 
the living resources of the high seas.  
also reinforces the obligation of cooperation set out in Article 64, as does Article 
119, paragraph 2: 
Available scientific information, catch and fishing effort statistics, and other data 
relevant to the conservation of fish stocks shall be contributed and exchanged on a 
regular basis through competent international organizations, whether subregional, 
regional or global, where appropriate and with participation by all States concerned. 
In particular, there is no suggestion here that, by way of compensation for coastal 
States’ ability to exclude them from fishing for straddling or highly migratory stocks 
in their EEZs, distant-water fishing States have some sort of preferential claim to the 
same species on the high seas.  By Article 87, paragraph 2, the high seas freedoms 
are exercised “on the basis of equality of States.”499 
Australia and New Zealand alleged breach of all four of these Articles by Japan in 
embarking on its unilateral program of experimental fishing in 1998 and 1999.
500
   
                                                          
499
  Virginia Commentary, Vol III, supra n 498, at 86. 
500
  Statements of Claim under Article 1 of Annex VII to UNCLOS by which Australia and 
New Zealand commenced their litigation against Japan, <http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/ 
FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=OpenPage&PageType=AnnouncementsFrame
&FromPage=%3ca%20href=javascript:goHome()%3ePublications%3c/a%3e%3e%20%3ca%2
0href=/ICSID/ICSID/ViewNewsReleases.jsp%3eNews%20Releases%3c/a%3e&pageName=Arch
ive_%20Announcement7> (visited on 23 June 2008; hereinafter Statement of Claim), paragraphs 
45 and 69(1), with fuller reasoning at paragraphs 59-62 (Article 116), 55 (Article 117), 56 
(Article 118), 57 and 58 (Article 119).  See also Appendix A infra on third-party aspects of the 
dispute generally, and in particular section 8 of that Appendix on specific issues within Articles 
64 and 116-119 that a hearing on the merits might have resolved. 
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3 The United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement 
Despite the undoubted advance over the previous international law of fisheries 
represented by Articles 64 and 116 to 119 of UNCLOS, relatively little attention was 
paid at the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea to questions related to the 
straddling and highly migratory fish stocks, and the above provisions of UNCLOS 
did not elaborate any mechanism by which relevant States’ duty to cooperate should 
be implemented.
501
 
The inadequacies of these rules soon became apparent.  In the context of the feared 
depletion of the pollock stock in the high seas “doughnut hole” in the middle of the 
Bering Sea, the United States Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and Fisheries, 
Mr Wolfe, observed that States had no right to expand high seas fishing activities at 
the expense of rights and interests of coastal States; moreover failure to cooperate 
with coastal States in establishing and implementing conservation measures for high 
seas fisheries would constitute an abuse of high seas rights.
502
  The arguments made 
by the United States during the negotiation of the subsequent treaty included not just 
the “profound and unpredictable consequences for the ecosystem at large” that stock 
                                                          
501
  J-P. Lévy and G.G. Schram (eds), United Nations Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks 
and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks: Selected Documents (The Hague, Boston and London: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1996), at 9.  Addressing the General Assembly the day after the opening for 
signature of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement, the Canadian Minister for Fisheries, Mr Tobin, went 
so far as to say that the high seas fisheries provisions of UNCLOS were “stated in such general 
terms that they are not a practical guide for States in the conduct of their international relations”: 
UN doc A/50/PV.80 (5 December 1995), at 6. 
502
  United States Senate, Hearing before the National Ocean Policy Study of the Committee 
on Commerce, Science and Transportation, “Fishery Management and Enforcement in the Bering 
Sea,” 100th Congress, second session (16 March 1988) at 22 and 46.  The argument based on 
abuse of rights advanced by the United States in relation to the pollock stock in the high seas area 
of the central Bering Sea may yet find an echo in the CCSBT as regards fishing for SBT on the 
high seas by newcomers.  It is of no assistance, however, to any State fishing for SBT erga 
Indonesia and South Africa, whose entire catch is in their EEZ.  As will be seen below in section 
E, for many years ICCAT’s approach to tackling this difficulty was to ignore the rights of coastal 
States in their EEZs, and to some extent in effect this remains so. 
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collapse would bring – an argument more attuned to all States’ UNCLOS Article 192 
obligation to protect and preserve the marine environment, but also (echoed by the 
Russian Federation) Article 116(b), given that the fishing communities of Alaska and 
the Russian Far East were more vulnerable to economic harm from overfishing than 
distant-water fleets, which could move elsewhere.
503
  In response, the distant-water 
States maintained that the coastal States were in part responsible for any collapse of 
the stock, and thus should bear some of the conservation burden for its recovery.  
They declined to restrict or terminate their own high seas pollock fisheries simply so 
that the coastal States could continue theirs in their EEZs.  Against the background of 
the large-scale transfer of fishery resources to coastal States through the institution of 
the EEZ, their argument ran, no theory of justice could support any further coastal 
State control over the few remaining desirable fishing grounds still open.
504
 
By the time a treaty was concluded in 1994,
505
 however, the stock it was intended to 
protect had been depleted.  Kaye has argued that the fact that the predicted depletion 
occurred highlights the ultimate inadequacy of the UNCLOS provisions, for there 
was no clear failure of cooperation on the part of any of the distant-water fishing 
States in bringing matters to this juncture, and hence no possibility of sheeting home 
to any of them a breach of these provisions.
506
  The most that can be said, based on 
the reliance on them and behaviour of the protagonists, is that there was a general 
acceptance by all that these provisions, even though UNCLOS was not yet in force, 
had by then solidified into customary obligations binding them anyway.
507
 
                                                          
503
  Balton, supra Ch I n 124, at 153. 
504
  Ibid., at 153-154.  In support of the last proposition they even cited Article 2(1) of the 
Charter of the United Nations (done at San Francisco, 26 June 1945; 1 UNTS xvi, ATS 1945 No 
1 (electronic)), on sovereign equality of States. 
505
  Supra Ch II n 316. 
506
  Kaye, supra n 498, at 325-326. 
507
  Ibid., at 322-323. 
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Even before this, States had begun to consider how the UNCLOS provisions might 
be strengthened.  At the Third Session of the Preparatory Committee for the UN 
Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), a group of 15 coastal 
States including New Zealand submitted a proposal on the conservation and 
management of the living resources of the high seas.
508
  Of the four principles and 
nine measures it advocated, the material ones are reproduced below: 
(principle) (c) On the high seas, States fishing a stock which straddles the 200-
mile limit of a coastal State, or highly migratory species which are found within that 
limit, must take all measures necessary to give effect to the special interest and 
responsibility of the coastal States concerning the portion of the stock outside the 
200-mile limit and in the highly migratory species while outside that limit. 
(principle) (d) High seas fishing must not have an adverse impact on the 
resources under the jurisdiction of coastal States. 
(measure) 8. With respect to a stock occurring both within the exclusive 
economic zone of a coastal State and in an area of the high seas adjacent to it, the 
management regime applied to the stock must provide for consistency of the 
measures applied on the high seas with those applied by the coastal State within its 
exclusive economic zone. 
(measure) 9. With respect to a highly migratory species, the management 
regime on the high seas must fully recognize the sovereign rights of the coastal State 
in its exclusive economic zone and, taking into account the special interest of the 
coastal State in the species while outside its zone, avoid an adverse impact on the 
resources within that zone. 
When revised in March 1992, with only inconsequential changes to the above text, 
the proposal was co-sponsored by 40 States, including Australia and New Zealand.
509
  
                                                          
508
  UN doc A/CONF.151/PC/WG.II/L.16 (15 August 1991), reprinted in UN, (1991) 19 
Law of the Sea Bulletin 42-44.  See also the background to UNCED and the Conference on 
Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in D. Freestone, “International Fisheries Law since 
Rio: The Continued Rise of the Precautionary Principle”, in Boyle and Freestone (eds), supra n 
496, 135 at 141-145; Kwiatkowska, supra n 493, at 349-352. 
509
  UN doc A/CONF.151/PC/WG.II/L.16/Rev.1 (16 March 1992), reprinted in 
Kwiatkowska, supra n 493, at 356-358. 
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But when UNCED took place the following June the proposal was not adopted, no 
doubt in part because inclusion of the reference to the special interest of the coastal 
State in fisheries outside its EEZ was needlessly controversial, given that UNCLOS 
does not reproduce mutatis mutandis for the EEZ Article 6, paragraph 1 of the 1958 
Fishing Convention: “A coastal State has a special interest in the maintenance of the 
productivity of the living resources in any area of the high seas adjacent to its 
territorial sea.”510  This apart, however, the principles and measures reflect soundly 
enough the consequences of the rights, duties and interests of coastal States to which 
fishing on the high seas for the stock concerned is subjected by Article 116(b) of 
UNCLOS,
511
 even if the coastal State has no superior or preferential right to fish 
such stocks on the high seas merely because they also occur in its EEZ.  The 
argument of Treves in this regard, although confined to straddling stocks, is equally 
applicable to highly migratory species: 
Il est difficile, d’une part, de nier que l’Etat côtier a un intérêt digne de protection à 
ce que l’exploitation du straddling stock en haute mer ne se répercute pas 
négativement sur la conservation du même stock dans sa zone économique 
exclusive.  Il est, d’autre part, également difficile de trouver un appui sérieux dans la 
Convention ou dans la pratique à la thèse que l’Etat côtier a une position 
«supérieure»ou «dominante» pour ce qui est des straddling stocks en haute mer.” 512  
Instead, UNCED called in paragraph of 17.49(e) of Agenda 21
513
 for a further 
conference to be convened to pursue the effective implementation of the provisions 
                                                          
510
  The next paragraph of Article 6 of the Fishing Convention, supra Introduction n 21, 
reinforces the coastal State’s position:  
2.  A coastal State is entitled to take part on an equal footing in any system of research and 
regulation for purposes of conservation of the living resources of the high seas in that area, 
even though its nationals do not carry on fishing there. 
511
  See supra text following n 495. 
512
  T. Treves, “La pêche en haute mer et l’avenir de la Convention des Nations Unies sur le 
Droit de la Mer”, (1992) XXXVIII Annuaire Français de Droit International 885 at 895.  
513
  Agenda 21 is the title of Annex II to UN doc A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. I), Report of 
the United Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, 3-14 June 1992 (New 
York: UN, 1993). 
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of UNCLOS concerning straddling and highly migratory fish stocks.  A few months 
later, the UN General Assembly by Resolution 47/192
514
 formally convened the 
Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks with such a 
mandate.  The Conference did not at any stage in its work distinguish systematically 
between straddling stocks on the one hand and highly migratory stocks on the 
other,
515
 let alone focus on individual species, as is reflected in the treaty which it 
adopted, the UN Fish Stocks Agreement.
516
 
The substantive provisions of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement have generated a 
considerable body of literature.
517
  For present purposes, it suffices to remark that  
                                                          
514
  UN doc A/RES/47/192 (22 December 1992), paragraphs 1 and 2. 
515
  According to Applebaum, supra Ch I n 124, at 283, straddling stocks are those “for 
which there would be no special category or legal status if fishing zones followed continental 
shelf contours instead of being limited to 200 miles.” 
516
  Supra Introduction n 4. 
517
  The following is an incomplete list: D.H. Anderson, “The Fish Stocks Agreement of 
1995 - An Initial Assessment”, (1996) 45 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 463; 
D.A. Balton, “Strengthening the Law of the Sea: The New Agreement on Straddling Fish Stocks 
and Highly Migratory Species”, (1996) 27 ODIL 125; R. Barston, “United Nations Conference 
on straddling and highly migratory fish stocks”, (1995) 19 Marine Policy 159; Birnie, supra n 
450; W.T. Burke, “Compatibility and Precaution in the 1995 Straddling Stock Agreement”, in 
H.N. Scheiber (ed), Law of the Sea: The Common Heritage and Emerging Challenges (The 
Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2000), 105; M. Christopherson, “Toward a Rational Harvest: 
The United Nations Agreement on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Species”, (1996) 
5 Minnesota Journal of Global Trade 357; P.G.G. Davies and C. Redgwell, “The International 
Legal Regulation of Straddling Fish Stocks”, (1996) LXVII British Yearbook of International 
Law 199; E. deLone, “Improving the Management of Atlantic Tuna: The Duty to Strengthen 
ICCAT in Light of the 1995 Straddling Stocks Agreement”, (1998) 6 New York University 
Environmental Law Journal 656; J. Ellis, “The Straddling Stocks Agreement and the 
Precautionary Principle as Interpretive Device and Rule of Law”, (2001) 32 ODIL 289; E. 
Franckx, “Pacta Tertiis and the Agreement for the Implementation of the Straddling and Highly 
Migratory Fish Stocks Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea”, 
(2000) 8 Tulane Journal of International and Comparative Law 49; D. Freestone, “Implementing 
Precaution Cautiously: The Precautionary Approach in the Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish 
Stocks Agreement” in E. Hey (ed), Developments in International Fisheries Law (The Hague: 
 175 
Articles 8 to 13 make a considerable advance in the problem of new entrants by 
putting regional fisheries commissions firmly at the core of management of 
straddling and highly migratory stocks.  Article 13 directs States to “cooperate to 
strengthen existing subregional and regional fisheries management organizations and 
arrangements in order to improve their effectiveness in establishing and 
implementing conservation and management measures” for the stocks concerned.  
More notably, Article 8, paragraph 3 provides that States with a real interest in a 
fishery must join the relevant commission or cooperate with its management 
measures, and the commission must be open to their participation: 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Kluwer Law International, 1999), 287; D. Freestone, “The Effective Conservation and 
Management of High Seas Living Resources: Towards a New Regime?”, (1995) 5 Canterbury 
Law Review 341; M. Hayashi, “The 1995 Agreement on the Conservation and Management of 
Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks: Significance for the Law of the Sea Convention”, 
(1995) 29 Ocean and Coastal Management 51; M. Hayashi, “Straddling and Highly Migratory 
Fish Stocks Agreement” in Hey (ed), supra this n, 55; M. Hayashi, “The 1995 UN Fish Stocks 
Agreement and the Law of the Sea”, in D. Vidas and W. Østreng (eds), Order for the Oceans at 
the Turn of the Century (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999), 37; E. Hey, “Global 
Fisheries Regulations in the First Half of the 1990s”, (1996) 11 IJMCL 459, esp at 472-482; L. 
Juda, “The 1995 United Nations Agreement on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory 
Fish Stocks: A Critique”, (1997) 28 ODIL 147; Kaye, supra n 498, Chapters 5-7; J.R. Mack, 
“International Fisheries Management: How the U.N. Conference on Straddling and Highly 
Migratory Fish Stocks Changes the Law of Fishing on the High Seas”, (1996) 26 California 
Western International Law Journal 313; E.J. Molenaar, “The Concept of "Real Interest" and 
Other Aspects of Co-operation through Regional Fisheries Management Mechanisms”, (2000) 15 
IJMCL 475; Nelson, supra n 496; Ørebech et al, supra Ch II n 315; Orrego Vicuña, supra n 477; 
A.G. Oude Elferink, “The Determination of Compatible Conservation and Management 
Measures for Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks”, (2001) 5 Max Planck Yearbook of 
United Nations Law 551; Rayfuse, supra n 450; Stokke (ed), supra Ch I n 124; O.S. Stokke, 
“Governance of High Seas Fisheries: The Role of Regime Linkages” in Vidas and Østreng (eds), 
supra this n, 157; A. Tahindro, “Conservation and Management of Transboundary Fish Stocks: 
Comments in Light of the Adoption of the 1995 Agreement for the Conservation and 
Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks”, (1997) 28 ODIL 1; 
J.M. Van Dyke, “Modifying the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention: New Initiatives on 
Governance of High Seas Fisheries Resources: the Straddling Stocks Negotiations”, (1995) 10 
IJMCL 219; de Yturriaga, supra n 472, esp Part 4. 
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Where a subregional or regional fisheries management organization or arrangement 
has the competence to establish conservation and management measures for 
particular straddling fish stocks or highly migratory fish stocks, States fishing for the 
stocks on the high seas and relevant coastal States shall give effect to their duty to 
cooperate by becoming members of such organization or participants in such 
arrangement, or by agreeing to apply the conservation and management measures 
established by such organization or arrangement.  States having a real interest in the 
fisheries concerned may become members of such organization or participants in 
such arrangement.  The terms of participation in such organization or arrangement 
shall not preclude such States from membership or participation; nor shall they be 
applied in a manner which discriminates against any State or group of States having 
a real interest in the fisheries concerned. 
The corollary of this is in the next paragraph of the same Article: 
Only those States which are members of such an organization or participants in such 
an arrangement, or which agree to apply the conservation and management measures 
established by such organization or arrangement, shall have access to the fishery 
resources to which those measures apply. 
By Article 17, paragraphs 1 and 2, moreover, a State which neither joins nor agrees 
to apply the conservation and management measures established by a relevant 
fisheries commission is not discharged from the obligation to cooperate in the 
conservation and management of the relevant fish stocks.  Such a State may not 
authorise vessels flying its flag to engage in fishing for the stocks subject to the 
conservation and management measures established by that commission. 
This is the basic bargain – for States Parties to the UN Fish Stocks Agreement, open 
access to high seas fisheries as a consequence of freedom of fishing on the high seas 
is replaced by a duty to join or cooperate with the competent fisheries commission, if 
any, as a condition of access to the fishery.  (Where there is no such body extant for a 
stock or region, Article 8, paragraph 5 requires relevant coastal States and States 
fishing on the high seas to cooperate to establish one or enter into other appropriate 
arrangements to ensure conservation and management of such stock and participate 
in the work of the commission or arrangement.  By Article 9, paragraph 2, States 
cooperating in the formation of a commission or arrangement must “inform other 
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States which they are aware have a real interest in the work” of the proposed 
commission or arrangement.) 
What, though, if the fisheries commission imposes restrictive conditions on entry of 
new participants or is closed altogether to their participation?  At minimum, it is 
submitted, the freedom of high seas fishing of a State with a real interest in a 
particular high seas stock is abdicated only to a commission that is in fact prepared to 
admit it as a member.  If its constitutive instrument does not allow that, the freedom 
is not lost.
518
  If it allows it conditionally, the commission in essence has a choice 
between admitting the new entrant and rejecting it but not depriving it of its high seas 
freedom of fishing.  The difficulty lies in that Article 8, paragraph 3 contains no 
definition of “real interest”;519 if the ground of refusal to admit the applicant is that it 
                                                          
518
  Accord Molenaar, supra n 517, at 498-499, where he warns that yielding in this way to 
their members’ “resentment” at “having to accept diminishing shares as a consequence of new 
entrants” may be self-defeating.  This is because the obligations under Article 17(1) and (2) of 
the Agreement to refrain from fishing the stock concerned would not be opposable to any State 
barred from participation for lack of an overly narrowly defined real interest, and any dissuasive 
measures taken by those members pursuant to Article 17(4), or boarding and inspection of new 
entrants’ fishing vessels under Articles 21 and 22, would be unjustified. 
519
  A subsequent attempt to define “real interest” in what became the Convention on the 
Conservation and Management of Fishery Resources in the South East Atlantic Ocean, done at 
Windhoek, 20 April 2001 (hereinafter SEAFO Convention), 2221 UNTS 189, (2002) 41 ILM 
257, was unsuccessful and ultimately abandoned: A. Jackson, “Developments in the Southeast 
Atlantic, 1997-1999: Meetings of Coastal States and Other Interested Parties on a Fisheries 
Management Organization for the South East Atlantic (the SEAFO Process)”, in Nordquist and 
Norton Moore (eds), supra Ch I n 87, 55 at 58; Molenaar, supra n 517, at 508 (part of a 
discussion of the “real interest” concept more generally at 493-501 and of State practice in this 
regard in various fisheries commissions and negotiations at 507-523).  Nor could any common 
understanding be found in “Working Group on Allocation of Fishing Rights to Contracting 
Parties of NAFO and Chartering of Vessels Between Contracting Parties, 13-15 April 1999, 
Halifax, N.S., Canada”, in Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization, Annual Report 1999 
(hereinafter NAFO Annual Report 1999), available online at <archive.nafo.int/open/ar/ar99.pdf> 
(visited on 12 June 2008), 31 at 31 – though it was noted that the context in which the phrase 
occurred was solely that of membership in a fisheries commission, not necessarily extending to 
the allocation of quota.  
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has no such interest, the rejected applicant cannot take action against the commission 
because the latter is not party to the UN Fish Stocks Agreement, but must pursue its 
remedies against all its members. 
Questions of entry aside, it is no longer enough for States simply to become members 
of the relevant fisheries commission.  Their conduct within the commission is now 
governed by Article 10 of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement, which provides that, in 
order to fulfil the obligation to cooperate through subregional or regional fisheries 
management organisations or arrangements, it is necessary, inter alia, to: 
(a) agree on and comply with conservation and management measures to ensure the 
long-term sustainability of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks; 
(b) agree, as appropriate, on participatory rights such as allocations of allowable 
catch or levels of fishing effort; 
(c) adopt and apply any generally recommended international minimum standards 
for the responsible conduct of fishing operations; 
… 
(i) agree on means by which the fishing interests of new members of the 
organization or new participants in the arrangement will be accommodated; 
(j) agree on decision-making procedures which facilitate the adoption of 
conservation and management measures in a timely and effective manner; 
(k) promote the peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with Part VIII; 
(l) ensure the full cooperation of their relevant national agencies and industries in 
implementing the recommendations and decisions of the organization or 
arrangement; and 
(m) give due publicity to the conservation and management measures established by 
the organization or arrangement. 
Expanding on paragraph (i), Article 11, headed “New members or participants”, 
states that: 
In determining the nature and extent of participatory rights for new members of a 
subregional or regional fisheries management organization, or for new participants 
in a subregional or regional fisheries management arrangement, States shall take into 
account, inter alia:  
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(a) the status of the straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks and the 
existing level of fishing effort in the fishery; 
(b) the respective interests, fishing patterns and fishing practices of new and existing 
members or participants; 
(c) the respective contributions of new and existing members or participants to 
conservation and management of the stocks, to the collection and provision of 
accurate data and to the conduct of scientific research on the stocks; 
(d) the needs of coastal fishing communities which are dependent mainly on fishing 
for the stocks; 
(e) the needs of coastal States whose economies are overwhelmingly dependent on 
the exploitation of living marine resources; and 
(f) the interests of developing States from the subregion or region in whose areas of 
national jurisdiction the stocks also occur. 
There has been only one major attempt to elaborate on this, in ICCAT.  As Judge 
Oda might have predicted, this produced no concrete results in terms of allocation, as 
the question was pushed further down the organisational hierarchy to the individual 
panels which set catch limits for each stock.  First, however, there is another 
secondary set of provisions that can be applied to the question of allocation at the 
instance of an interested State: those on dispute settlement. 
C Allocation by litigation: the hypothetical example of 
South Africa 
Another element of the 1958 Fishing Convention revived by the UN Fish Stocks 
Agreement is the possibility of invocation of the dispute settlement provisions for the 
fixing of short- as well as long-term conservation measures such as catch limits.  
Normally the processes of litigation are too slow by comparison with the typically 
yearly migratory cycle of a fishery, and thus of quota-setting, to offer a meaningful 
remedy to an aggrieved State.  Going further than the tentative recommendation of 
the 1955 Rome Conference,
520
 the 1958 Convention provided for binding decisions 
on such measures by a special commission to be created by the parties to the dispute, 
                                                          
520
  Infra, text at n 541. 
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but only after a year had elapsed in which such measures could not be adopted by 
negotiation,
521
 and its provisions were never used. 
By Article 5, paragraph 1, new entrants had to apply to their nationals the measures 
binding existing participants (provided they were non-discriminatory in form or fact) 
within seven months of their notification to the Director-General of the FAO.  
Paragraph 2 then continued: 
2.  If these other [new entrant] States do not accept the measures so adopted and if 
no agreement can be reached within twelve months, any of the interested parties may 
initiate the procedure contemplated by Article 9.  Subject to paragraph 2 of Article 
10, the measures adopted shall remain obligatory pending the decision of the special 
commission.
522
  
Article 7 of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement provides a similar procedure based on, 
but adding to, the dispute settlement mechanism in Part XV of UNCLOS.  Although 
South Africa appears to have accepted in 2006 a quota of 45 tonnes as a cooperating 
non-member, at one stage it was seeking, and Members were resisting, an allocation 
of 250 tonnes.
523
  As a party to that Agreement, South Africa could have invoked 
Article 7, paragraph 5 to have a provisional catch limit prescribed for it via the 
                                                          
521
  See Articles 9-11 of the Fishing Convention, supra Introduction n 21. 
522
  Also pertinent to new entrants are Article 6, dealing with negotiations between a coastal 
State and other States (not necessarily new entrants) fishing the high seas adjacent to its territorial 
sea, which by paragraph 5 become subject to unilateral invocation of the dispute settlement 
provision if no agreement on conservation measures is reached within twelve months, and the 
possibility in Article 7(2) of unilateral measures imposed by the coastal State after six months of 
fruitless negotiations being valid erga other States on condition:  
(a) That there is a need for urgent application of conservation measures in the light of the 
existing knowledge of the fishery;  
(b) That the measures adopted are based on appropriate scientific findings;  
(c) That such measures do not discriminate in form or in fact against foreign fishermen. 
 
Article 7(3) and (4) then provides that these measures are to remain in force “pending the 
settlement, in accordance with the relevant provisions of this Convention, of any disagreement as 
to their validity.”  
523
  See infra Ch IV, text at nn 771-784; including the curious fact that despite this in 2006 it 
was allocated only 40 tonnes. 
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dispute settlement process; to the extent that it wished to take the 250 tonnes in its 
EEZ, the test under paragraphs 2 to 6 of that Article would have been whether this 
was “compatible” with the measures applying on the high seas through the CCSBT’s 
TAC.
524
  Since 250 tonnes represented an addition of only around 1.6 per cent to the 
                                                          
524
  The South African vessels would have been free, however, to catch SBT on the high seas 
too: see “Opening Statement by the Republic of South Africa” (Attachment 6 to CCSBT-EC3 
Report), in CCSBT Blue Book 2005, supra Ch I n 34, 52 at 53.  Article 7(2)-(6), so far as 
relevant, is in the following terms: 
2.  Conservation and management measures established for the high seas and those adopted 
for areas under national jurisdiction shall be compatible in order to ensure conservation and 
management of the straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks in their entirety. 
To this end, coastal States and States fishing on the high seas have a duty to cooperate for the 
purpose of achieving compatible measures in respect of such stocks.  In determining 
compatible conservation and management measures, States shall: 
    (a) …; 
    (b) take into account previously agreed measures established and applied for the high seas 
in accordance with the Convention in respect of the same stocks by relevant coastal States 
and States fishing on the high seas; 
    (c) take into account previously agreed measures established and applied in accordance 
with the Convention in respect of the same stocks by a subregional or regional fisheries 
management organization or arrangement; 
    (d) take into account the biological unity and other biological characteristics of the stocks 
and the relationships between the distribution of the stocks, the fisheries and the geographical 
particularities of the region concerned, including the extent to which the stocks occur and are 
fished in areas under national jurisdiction; 
    (e) take into account the respective dependence of the coastal States and the States fishing 
on the high seas on the stocks concerned; and 
    (f) ensure that such measures do not result in harmful impact on the living marine 
resources as a whole. 
3.  In giving effect to their duty to cooperate, States shall make every effort to agree on 
compatible conservation and management measures within a reasonable period of time. 
4.  If no agreement can be reached within a reasonable period of time, any of the States 
concerned may invoke the procedures for the settlement of disputes provided for in Part VIII. 
5.  Pending agreement on compatible conservation and management measures, the States 
concerned, in a spirit of understanding and cooperation, shall make every effort to enter into 
provisional arrangements of a practical nature.  In the event that they are unable to agree on 
such arrangements, any of the States concerned may, for the purpose of obtaining provisional 
measures, submit the dispute to a court or tribunal in accordance with the procedures for the 
settlement of disputes provided for in Part VIII. 
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global SBT catch in 2003 (including the 14 tonnes caught by South Africa), even as 
an ambit claim, it may be thought, it was not certain to fail. 
Invocation of the Agreement, however, illustrates the difficulty pointed out by 
Rayfuse
525
 that fishery commissions face caused by the differences in their members’ 
obligations.  Whether or not it acceded to the 1993 Convention, South Africa could 
under those provisions proceed for the CCSBT’s failure to offer it a reasonable quota 
not against the CCSBT or its membership as a whole, but only against those 
Members that at the time were also parties to the UN Fish Stocks Agreement, namely 
Australia and New Zealand.  Had it done so, the absence from such litigation of 
Japan and the Republic of Korea as necessary third parties could have been fatal to 
the admissibility of its claim.  The absent third party rule
526
 states that a claim is 
inadmissible when a legal finding on the acts or omissions of a third party not before 
the court or tribunal is a necessary condition of determining the claim.  The rule is 
hence not directly applicable, since a finding in favour of South Africa would merely 
carry a concurrent implication that all CCSBT Members, not only Australia and New 
                                                                                                                                                                    
6.  Provisional arrangements or measures entered into or prescribed pursuant to paragraph 5 
shall take into account the provisions of this Part, shall have due regard to the rights and 
obligations of all States concerned, shall not jeopardize or hamper the reaching of final 
agreement on compatible conservation and management measures and shall be without 
prejudice to the final outcome of any dispute settlement procedure. 
525
  R. Rayfuse, “The Interrelationship Between The Global Instruments of International 
Fisheries Law”, in Hey (ed), supra n 517, 107 at 113-114.  The problem has also been noticed by 
Hey, supra n 517, at 482 and 489, who treats the UN Fish Stocks Agreement as lex specialis to 
the lex generalis of the Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and 
Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas, adopted by the Conference of the 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations at its Twenty-seventh Session, Rome, 
24 November 1993; 2221 UNTS 93; [2004] ATS 26; (1994) 33 ILM 968 (hereinafter FAO 
Compliance Agreement). 
526
  See Case of the Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943 (Preliminary Question) 
(Italy v. France, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of 
America), ICJ Reports 1954, p.19 at 32-33, applied in the Case concerning East Timor (Portugal 
v. Australia), ICJ Reports 1995, p.90. 
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Zealand, were in breach of their duties to South Africa.  The implicit finding against 
Japan and Korea would thus be a consequence of, not a necessary prerequisite for, 
that against Australia and New Zealand.  Yet if the latter two States were to be 
unsuccessful in raising as a substantive defence the impossibility of carrying out their 
duties because of the CCSBT’s decision-making procedure, the consequence would 
be that, by joining a fisheries commission, States render themselves jointly and 
severally liable for the acts and omissions of the commission as whole, or in practice 
the acts and omissions of the delinquent majority of members.  This would hardly be 
conducive to encouraging wider membership of those commissions.  Australia and 
New Zealand could also point to the futility of ordering relief against them which 
they could not carry out within the CCSBT. 
The only feasible relief for South Africa in such circumstances might be to award it a 
share of the catch out of those of the respondent States.  That too, however, would 
not only be a disincentive to remaining party to the UN Fish Stocks Agreement, but 
also run counter to UNCLOS Article 116, paragraph (b), whose effect at minimum 
must be that existing coastal State members should not bear a disproportionate share 
of the burden of quota reallocation to other States, and arguably would sustain a 
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conclusion that it shields coastal States from that burden altogether.
527
  Alternatively, 
South Africa could have sued all CCSBT Members under UNCLOS, but the 
applicable law under Article 293, paragraph 1
528
 would have differed as among the 
respondents, the UN Fish Stocks Agreement being opposable only to Australia and 
New Zealand, unless South Africa (or Australia and New Zealand, as it would be in 
their interests to do so) persuaded the arbitral tribunal that its relevant provisions had 
become custom. 
Strong opposition to South Africa’s claimed allocation was shown by Japan.  
Possibly its attitude was driven by fears that, while a net addition to catch remained 
scientifically inadvisable, South Africa’s allocation as a coastal State with a greater 
legal interest in the fishery than Japan, Korea and Taiwan would come at the expense 
of the distant-water fleets.  At any rate, while the CCSBT and its Members can 
require South Africa’s cooperation under both UNCLOS and especially the UN Fish 
Stocks Agreement once it is in force for all of them, they cannot insist that the only 
way for South Africa to fulfil that obligation is by taking zero catch.  Though South 
                                                          
527
  The problem would disappear if the CCSBT could itself become party to the UN Fish 
Stocks Agreement, which is expressed by Article 1(3) to apply mutatis mutandis to “other fishing 
entities”.  Article 6(9) of the 1993 Convention provides that the CCSBT “shall have legal 
personality and shall enjoy in its relations with other international organisations and in the 
territories of the parties such legal capacity as may be necessary to perform its functions and 
achieve its ends.”  This includes international legal personality, as evidenced by its headquarters 
agreement with Australia, which is of treaty status: Headquarters Agreement between the 
Government of Australia and the Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna 
(Canberra, 20 January 1998); 2076 UNTS 527; ATS 1999 No 6.  Although the commonly 
accepted view is that Article 1(3) was inserted as a sub rosa reference to Taiwan: see infra Ch IV 
n 828, it is conceivable, if unlikely, that in future a fisheries commission wishing to underline its 
collective commitment to the Agreement could by resolution declare itself bound by it under this 
provision.  To be truly effective, however, the declaration would need to include acceptance of 
the application to the commission mutatis mutandis of the dispute settlement provisions. 
528
  Article 293(1) states that “A court or tribunal having jurisdiction under this section shall 
apply this Convention and other rules of international law not incompatible with this 
Convention.” 
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Africa’s cooperating status is a useful step forward, the long-term interests of the 
existing Members might have been better served by making South Africa a quota 
offer closer to 250 tonnes so as to entice it to accede to the 1993 Convention.  
Recourse could have been had to the precedents in both CCSBT and ICCAT for 
“development quota”.  This was how the 1,000-tonne limit for New Zealand under 
the trilateral mechanism of the 1980s, which it did not come close to catching, was 
described,
529
 and in ICCAT’s 2002 Recommendation on the South Atlantic 
swordfish stock,
530
 the TAC was set higher than advised by the Standing Committee 
on Research and Statistics, on the basis that it would not all be caught, as it included 
development quota for new entrants.
531
  While the danger appears to have passed of 
the CCSBT, having learnt nothing from the mistake it made with its insufficient 
quota offers to Korea and Taiwan, impelling South Africa to build up its catch 
outside the CCSBT to a point where only a significantly higher allocation would 
induce it to accede to the 1993 Convention, the like issue with respect to Indonesia 
remains, now that it is party to that Convention.
532
  The other Members would be in a 
vulnerable position were Indonesia to ratify the UN Fish Stocks Agreement. 
D  The abstention doctrine – a false start for conservation  
If the debates on fisheries at and preceding the Third UN Conference on the Law of 
the Sea resembled a “class war” between coastal and distant-water fishing States, the 
history as outlined above of allocation negotiations within fishery commissions since 
the adoption of UNCLOS is notable chiefly for the extent to which the dominant 
                                                          
529
  See Table 2, supra Ch II at n 351. 
530
  “Recommendation by ICCAT on South Atlantic Swordfish Catch Limits” (Annex 8.3 to 
ICCATSM13 Report), in ICCAT Green Book 2003/1, supra Ch II n 427, 159. 
531
  Reports of the Meetings of Panels 1 - 4 (Annex 13 to ICCATSM13 Report), ibid., 303 at 
319.  Note however that a frequent drawback of the unreality of development quota is that it 
generally stores up trouble for later by failing to make explicit the assumption that existing 
participants would reduce their catch as the new entrants’ fisheries develop.  Thus it would be 
realistic to expect resistance to this notion on the part of the former when the time comes. 
532
  Infra Ch IV, text accompanying n 761. 
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thread has ceased to be a continuation of that struggle on the basis of Article 116, 
paragraph (b) of UNCLOS.
533
  Instead there is now an uneasy accommodation 
between the two camps, which may vary in composition among commissions, 
sustained by a joint vigilance to discourage or even prevent altogether new entrants 
to the fishery from either camp.  When the stock is being exploited at an intensity of 
effort at or above the level of maximum sustainable yield, so that to make room for 
admission of new entrants would require some restriction of their own fishing effort, 
the predominant attitude is best summed up as “first come first served”.  The 
justifications advanced in modern fishery commissions for urging restraint on non-
members tend to be that the stock is “fully subscribed” or “fully allocated”.534 
1 Abstention and the UN Fish Stocks Agreement 
This line of argument is not new.  In its essential elements it is little different from 
the doctrine of “abstention” propounded by the United States in the early 1950s with 
the aim of forestalling Japan from dominating the salmon fisheries in the North-East 
Pacific, after the political reaction in the late 1930s to the appearance of large 
Japanese vessels targeting salmon in Bristol Bay off Alaska.
535
  The abstention 
principle was accepted by Canada because its interests were parallel in this instance 
to those of the United States, but only reluctantly by a Japan emerging from 
occupation, in the 1952 International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the 
                                                          
533
   Article 116(b), it will be recalled, subjects the right of all States for their nationals to fish 
on the high seas to “the rights and duties as well as the interests of coastal States provided for, 
inter alia, in article 63 paragraph 2, and articles 64 to 67.”  For the full text of Article 116 see 
supra, text following n 495. 
534
  Report of the Fourth Meeting of the Permanent Working Group for the Improvement of 
ICCAT Statistics and Conservation Measures (PWG) (hereinafter ICCAT-PWG4 Report; Annex 
6-5 to Fourteenth Regular Meeting of the Commission, Madrid, November 10-17, 1995 
(hereinafter ICCAT14 Report)), in ICCAT, Report for biennial period, 1994-95 Part II (1995), 
Vol. 1 (hereinafter ICCAT Green Book 1996/1), 185 at 196.  The latter term is used in the NAFO 
and NEAFC documents to guide expectations of new members, quoted infra nn 624 and 626 
respectively. 
535
  Scheiber, supra Ch I n 177, at 29-31; Burke, supra Ch I n 80, at 156-157. 
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North Pacific Ocean.
536
  The conditions for a Party abstaining from fishing are set 
out in Article IV(1)(b) of the 1952 Convention: 
(i) Evidence based upon scientific research indicates that more intensive exploitation 
of the stock will not provide a substantial increase in yield which can be sustained 
year after year. 
(ii) The exploitation of the stock is limited or otherwise regulated through legal 
measures by each Party which is substantially engaged in its exploitation, for the 
purpose of maintaining or increasing its maximum sustained productivity; such 
limitations and regulations being in accordance with conservation programs based on 
scientific research, and 
(iii) The stock is the subject of extensive scientific study designed to discover 
whether the stock is being fully utilized and the conditions necessary for maintaining 
its maximum sustained productivity. 
By Article III(1)(b), if the Commission decides that a particular stock fulfils the 
above conditions, it  
shall recommend, (1) that such stock be added to the Annex, (2) that the appropriate 
Party or Parties abstain from fishing such stock and (3) that the Party or Parties 
participating in the fishing of such stock continue to carry out necessary 
conservation measures. 
                                                          
536
  Done at Tokyo on 9 May 1952, 205 UNTS 65.  For a general history of the abstention 
doctrine see McDougal and Burke, supra Ch I n 271, at 957-960; Scheiber, supra Ch I n 177, at 
36-90; Oda, supra Ch I n 56, at 67-71, 85-90 and 124-127, García Amador, supra n 469, at 68-
69; S. Yamamoto, “The Abstention Principle and its Relation to the Evolving International Law 
of the Sea”, (1967) 43 Washington Law Review 45 at 49n; W.C. Herrington, “In the Realm of 
Diplomacy and Fish: Some Reflections on the International Convention on High Seas Fisheries 
in the North Pacific Ocean and the Law of the Sea Negotiations”, (1989) 16 Ecology Law 
Quarterly 101.  Y. Tsuru, “Rethinking the Principle of Abstention: the North Pacific and 
Beyond” (2004) 28 Marine Policy 541, is the only writer to have discerned a revival in recent 
years of the abstention doctrine, but sees it as inherent in the UN Fish Stocks Agreement itself 
rather than, as argued here, in the attitudes displayed by both coastal and distant-water fishing 
States in the Agreement’s implementation. 
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One significant exception, which underlines the vulnerability to new entrants of any 
regime based on an agreement only among existing participants in a fishery, covers 
stocks harvested in greater part by a non-party to the Convention: Article IV(1)(b). 
Originally the principle was conceived as an ad hoc solution to the problem of 
reconciling the various United States fisheries’ conflicting interests.  On one hand the 
salmon industry was pressing for a strong coastal State stance against Japanese 
interest in the Bristol Bay salmon fishery; on the other the Californian tuna and New 
England groundfish fleets wished to preserve their access to the fishing grounds of 
the west coast of Central and South America and the Grand Banks of Newfoundland 
respectively.  Later, from 1955 to 1958 the United States attempted to incorporate the 
principle into international fisheries law, first at the Rome Conference, then through 
the ILC
537
 and finally in the Fishing Convention at the first UN Conference on the 
Law of the Sea.
538
  It met little success.  The Rome Conference clearly saw the 
nature of the problem posed by new entrants,
539
 but the closest its report came to 
endorsing abstention was a passage stating that “where…development or restoration 
by the harvesting State or States is necessary to maintain the productivity of the 
resources, conditions should be made favourable for such action.”540  The general 
conclusions on new entrants state simply that, where they posed a serious problem, 
the States involved should submit the question to “suitably qualified and impartial 
                                                          
537
  See the US comment on the ILC’s 1955 provisional articles on the high seas, supra Ch I 
n 60, in ILC Yearbook 1956/II, supra n 455, 91 at 93. 
538
  See generally W.M. Chapman, “The United States Fish Industry and the 1958 and 1960 
United Nations Conferences on the Law of the Sea”, in L.M. Alexander (ed), The Law of the Sea: 
International Rules and Organization for the Sea: Proceedings of the Third Annual Conference 
of the Law of the Sea Institute June 24 – June 27, 1968, University of Rhode Island (Kingston: 
University of Rhode Island, 1969), 35. 
539
  See the discussion in UN doc A/CONF.10/6, Report of the International Technical 
Conference on the Conservation of the Living Resources of the Sea, Rome, 18 April-10 May 1955 
(New York: UN, 1955), at 7-8 (paragraphs 60-66). 
540
  Ibid., at 7 (paragraph 61). 
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experts chosen for the special case by the parties concerned, with the subsequent 
transmittal of the findings, if necessary, for the approval of the parties concerned”.541 
There might have been a narrow majority for abstention in 1956 in the ILC, but for a 
too frank remark in its favour by the Mexican member Padilla Nervo, who called it 
the “principle of justified exclusion of third parties”.542  In the end the ILC saw the 
question more as a technical one: 
[T]his proposal, the purpose of which was to encourage the building up or 
restoration of the productivity of the resources…reflect[s] problems and interests 
which deserve recognition in international law.  However, lacking the necessary 
competence in the scientific and economic domains to study these exceptional 
situations adequately, the Commission, while drawing attention to the problem, 
refrained from making concrete proposals.
543
 
A resolution to “commend the abstention procedure to States for utilization where 
appropriate as an incentive to the development and restoration of the productivity of 
the living resources of the sea” found majority support in the Third Committee of the 
1958 conference, but lacked the two-thirds support needed for the plenary to adopt 
it.
544
  Japan in particular opposed it despite being party to the 1952 Convention, as 
did France, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and 
others, who criticised it as a distribution scheme rather than a conservation measure, 
discriminating in favour of developed countries, in conflict with the principle of 
                                                          
541
  Ibid., at 9 (paragraph 79). 
542
  See the summary record of the ILC’s 356th meeting, 30 May 1956, in UN, Yearbook of 
the International Law Commission 1956, Vol I (hereinafter ILC Yearbook 1956/I; New York: 
UN, 1956), 119 at 123 (paragraph 47); Chapman, supra n 538, at 48; Herrington, supra n 536, at 
116. 
543
  See the ILC’s commentary on Article 53 of its Draft Articles in UN doc A/3159, supra n 
455, at 290. 
544
  The resolution forms the annex to UN doc A/CONF.13/L.21, reprinted in UN, United 
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Official Records, Volume V: Plenary Meetings (New 
York: UN, 1958) at 162.  On the fate of the abstention principle see also Scheiber, supra Ch I n 
177, at 90-94; Herrington, supra n 536, at 108-111 (implementation under the 1952 Convention) 
and 112-117 (Rome Conference, ILC and the 1958 Conference).  
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freedom of the high seas and open to abuse through false claims as to the existence 
of the conditions sufficient to qualify a stock for abstention.
545
 
The United States decided not to reintroduce the abstention text at the Second UN 
Conference on the Law of the Sea in 1960.
546
  At two meetings in 1963 of the parties 
to the 1952 Convention Japan stated that “the abstention formula has in it intrinsic 
irrationality since it is…actually designed for the protection of fishery industries of 
certain countries rather than for conservation of resources” and called for the 
replacement of the 1952 Convention with a new one.  The head of the Japanese 
delegation said that the principle  
mixes the problems of resource conversation and that of resource distribution, 
establishes exclusive fishery rights in the disguise of resource conservation, and 
eventually leads to the monopolization of fishery resources.  I do not think that any 
nation today can ever be persuaded of the argument that fishery resources will be 
depleted but for their monopolization.
547
 
Thereafter attempts to propagate it ceased, and the abstention provisions were 
removed from the Convention by a 1978 Protocol.
548
  It is not without irony that in 
1987 the United States itself undertook to abstain from fishing for SBT in most of the 
western half of the Pacific Ocean: by paragraph 5 of Annex I to the Treaty on 
                                                          
545
  R. Johnson, “The Japan-United States Salmon Conflict”, (1967) 43 Washington Law 
Review 1 at 29.  For a persuasive criticism of the principle see Oda, supra Ch I n 56, at 89-90 
(“very similar to acquisitive prescription…completely contrary to the concept of freedom of the 
high seas”), which succeeded in discrediting it.  Knight, supra Ch I n 52 at 43 confirms that 
abstention has never been a rule of international law.  It was  
suggested as a means of handling the problem of new entrants, but, in fact, this is a non-
solution because there is no benefit to the new entrant simply from abstention.  If a quid pro 
quo were found for such a situation, the result would be properly described as a bilateral (or 
multilateral) agreement in which one state gives up the right of access in return for another 
payoff… . 
546
  Chapman, supra n 538, at 55. 
547
  S. Oda and H. Owada (eds), The Practice of Japan in International Law 1961-1970 
(Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1982), at 131. 
548
  Protocol amending the International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North 
Pacific Ocean, done at Tokyo on 25 April 1978; 1207 UNTS 325. 
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Fisheries between the Governments of Certain Pacific Island States and the 
Government of the United States of America,
549
 its vessels “shall not be used for 
directed fishing for Southern Bluefin Tuna, or for fishing for any kinds of fish other 
than tunas, except that other kinds of fish may be caught as an incidental by-catch.” 
2 Abstentio rediviva?  
Yet, while it is one thing to object to locking-up of a high seas fishery by its first 
exploiters, it is another to find an alternative mechanism by which the tragedy of the 
commons can be averted.  If new entrants cannot be excluded from a fisheries 
commission, the situation is  
uncomfortably close to that of a fishery wholly confined to coastal state waters in 
which the coastal state authorities establish and enforce a TAC, but exert no control 
over fleet size.
550
  
Although “abstention” is a word for which one searches in vain in modern fisheries 
commission meeting reports and papers from the Straddling and Highly Migratory 
Fish Stocks Conference, objectively it differs little from the requirement in Article 8, 
paragraph 3 of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement for new entrants to have a “real 
interest” as their entrée card to the relevant commission.551  The true character of the 
“fully subscribed” argument becomes apparent when such non-members join the 
fisheries commissions or avail themselves of the increasingly formalised procedures 
for cooperation with them that Article 8 has inspired.
552
  For, as Butterworth and 
                                                          
549
  Supra Introduction n 9. 
550
  Kaitala and Munro (1993), supra Ch I n 120, at 320. 
551
  Supra, text following n 517.  Nevertheless, it is submitted that to equate the cumulative 
effect of the pertinent provisions of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement itself with abstention, as 
Tsuru does (supra n 536 at 542 and 548), is an oversimplification.  They do not close the door to 
new entrants, but subject their entry to the requirement of cooperation with existing participants 
through the relevant commission.  As will be argued below, abstaining from entering a fishery 
altogether is not the only way to cooperate with the existing participants.  As to the definition of 
“real interest”, see supra n 519 and accompanying text. 
552
  In the case of the CCSBT, this is the resolution cited at Ch IV n 803 infra and discussed 
in the text following. 
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Penney write,
553
 this simply transforms what was hitherto a “non-member problem” 
into a “new member problem”, namely how “old” members can retain their existing 
shares of the catch if its absolute level cannot rise to accommodate newcomers 
because there is no surplus.  Coastal States are grudgingly admitted by virtue of their 
geographical location to have a real interest, and in ICCAT at least the visible result 
of this to date is the 2001 Criteria for Allocation of Fishing Opportunities and the 
allocation Recommendations based on it,
554
 but other new members without a catch 
history from the relevant stock are told that they lack a real interest and therefore 
have no business fishing it in future.  In this way limited entry to the fishery is 
achieved on the international plane, but only by depriving some potential new 
entrants of the possibility of even acquiring a “real interest”.  This problem will now 
be explored in greater detail. 
E Allocation precedents in other international fisheries 
The new entrants problem is one aspect of the wider unresolved question of the legal 
principles governing allocation of shares in international fisheries.  As a legal issue, 
for stocks within 200 miles of coastal States’ territorial sea baselines it may be 
regarded as solved by UNCLOS through the new institution of the EEZ. 
After the adoption of UNCLOS in 1982, legal interest centred on the debates on 
allocation of surplus within EEZs under Article 62, but that too had largely petered 
out by the late 1980s.
555
  For stocks beyond 200 miles, however, the problem 
                                                          
553
  D.S. Butterworth and A.J. Penney, “Allocation in High Seas Fisheries: Avoiding 
Meltdown”, in A.I.L. Payne, C.M. O’Brien and S.I. Rogers (eds), Management of Shared Fish 
Stocks (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2003), 165 at 170.   
554
  Infra n 608. 
555
  The debate may be seen as one between lawyers of classical bent on one hand who saw 
the EEZ regime provisions on foreign access as intended to signal a move away from Western 
concepts of ownership (e.g. A.V. Lowe, “Reflections on the Waters, Changing Conceptions of 
Property Rights in the Law of the Sea”, (1986) 1 International Journal of Estuarine and Coastal 
Law 1, and on the other hand economists and policy-oriented lawyers who saw more clearly their 
transitory applicability and its consequences.  Thus W.T. Burke, “Extended fisheries jurisdiction 
 193 
remained acute, and at bottom is the reason why the subject of fisheries has not lost 
the attention of writers on international law. 
The tension first came to the fore in the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization 
(NAFO)
556
 when the 1986 entry of Spain and Portugal into the European Community 
prompted the latter to advocate a less conservative management policy for cod than it 
                                                                                                                                                                    
and the new Law of the Sea”, in B.J. Rothschild (ed), Global Fisheries: Perspectives for the 
1980s (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1983), 7 at 46 concludes with some regret that “the coastal 
state is given substantially complete discretion to manage the fisheries for its own exclusive 
interests, however narrowly and selfishly conceived they might be”; agreeing, G.R. Munro, 
“Coastal states, distant-water fleets and EFJ [extended fisheries jurisdiction]: Some long-run 
considerations” (1985) 9 Marine Policy 2 at 3-4, argued that the coastal State’s obligation to 
enter into cooperative fisheries arrangements under UNCLOS Article 62(2) was “more apparent 
than real, at least over the long term.”  Under the preceding Article 61, (at 3) 
the coastal State is given a virtual free hand in establishing the total allowable catches 
(TACs) for fisheries within its zone.  In theory, the coastal state could set the TACs at such 
levels as to ensure zero surpluses throughout its EEZ. 
The sole constraint is that, if the coastal State were to set “unconscionably low” TACs, that 
would invite poaching by distant-water fleets, counterable only through “prohibitively expensive 
surveillance and enforcement procedures.”  According to Munro (at 4), Burke’s concession that 
Article 300 prevents coastal States from imposing terms and conditions clearly designed to bar 
distant-water fleets from the surpluses (W.T. Burke, “1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea 
Provisions on Conditions of Access to Fisheries Subject to National Jurisdiction” (Annex 1 to 
FAO, Report of the Expert Consultation on the Conditions of Access to the Fish Resources of the 
Exclusive Economic Zones, Rome, 11-15 April 1983 (FAO Fisheries Report No 293; Rome: 
FAO, 1983)), 23 at 31) means only that “the coastal state should not be unduly blatant in its 
attempt to discourage distant-water nation interest in its zone…the coastal state’s obligation…is 
basically that [it] should be prepared to endure a phase-out period”, leaving it with “virtually full 
property rights to the fishery resources within its zone” thereafter.  Kaitala and Munro (1993), 
supra Ch I n 120, say that the coastal State’s sovereign rights in the EEZ under Article 56 are 
“essentially full property rights to the fishery resources”: at 314.  Knight, supra Ch I n 52, at 42 
agrees that there is no international legal doctrine of historic fishing rights – rather, UNCLOS 
Article 62 in his view reflects the “fact of political and economic life that it would be generative 
of conflict to eliminate suddenly and unilaterally...the distant-water state….from an area in which 
it had traditionally derived resources and revenues.” 
556
  Created by the Convention on Future Multilateral Cooperation in the Northwest Atlantic 
Fisheries, done at Ottawa, 24 October 1978, 1135 UNTS 369, Canada Treaty Series 1979, No 11. 
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had hitherto accepted.  The coastal State, Canada, saw no reason to depart from the 
old policy.  Some years later a Canadian fisheries official argued that the preferential 
position of coastal States in management of straddling stocks meant that the high 
seas right was subordinate.
557
  Further, the UNCLOS Article 61 duty of the coastal 
State to conserve and manage the stocks in its EEZ by reference to MSY as qualified 
by economic and environmental factors creates a duty of other States to make it 
possible for it to fulfil the former.
558
  As for new entrants, he maintained that, since 
NAFO quotas were based on “customary proportionate shares”, it would not be 
discriminatory and thus in breach of UNCLOS Article 119 to insist that new entrants 
have a zero share – a novel, but equally unconvincing way of justifying the 
abstention doctrine.
559
 
At the Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, 
Canada was joined by four other coastal States in putting forward, as part of a draft 
convention, a provision on new entrants in the following terms: 
 
Article 18 
New participants 
Parties which participate in a regional fisheries conservation organization or 
arrangement shall, where appropriate, encourage States with an interest in a high 
seas fishery which it regulates to participate in such organization or arrangement.  
Such Parties may:  
(a)  As part of a new participant’s contribution to the conservation measures of such 
organization or arrangement:  
(i) Make allocations of any stock they regulate to new participants subject to a 
waiting period;  
(ii)  In cases where stocks are depressed, make allocations of any stock they 
regulate to new participants only when the total allowable catch exceeds a 
                                                          
557
  Applebaum, supra Ch I n 124, at 290. 
558
  Ibid., at 288. 
559
  Ibid., at 291-292. 
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threshold level determined for that purpose by the organization or under the 
arrangement;  
(iii) In cases where stocks are at appropriate levels and fully allocated, make 
allocations of any stock they regulate to new participants subject to quotas 
being relinquished by existing participants;  
(b)  In cases where quotas are relinquished by existing participants, decide to 
reallocate those quotas to new participants, provided that special consideration shall 
be given to a coastal State with regard to straddling fish stocks or highly migratory 
fish stocks occurring within both its exclusive economic zone and the regulatory area 
and, secondarily, to developing States.
560
  
The same idea of allocations to new entrants being entirely within existing 
participants’ gift occurs also in abbreviated form in Article 14, paragraph (i) of an 
alternative draft convention submitted by Ecuador.
561
 
Kaitala and Munro conclude that neither of these texts is incompatible with the 
Agreement as adopted.
562
  They dismiss the waiting period as a solution, viewing it 
as simply a postponed surrender to economic irrationality,
563
 but are much more 
enthusiastic about transferable membership,
564
 pointing out that if existing members 
                                                          
560
  UN doc A/CONF.164/L.11 (14 July 1993), Draft Convention on the Conservation and 
Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks on the High Seas 
(submitted by the delegations of Argentina, Canada, Chile, Iceland and New Zealand), reprinted 
in Lévy and Schram, supra n 443, 147-161; Article 18 is at 155. 
561
  UN doc A/CONF.164/L.44 (23 June 1994), Presentation of the Working Paper for a 
Draft Convention on the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly 
Migratory Fish Stocks on the High Seas (submitted by the delegation of Ecuador), reprinted ibid., 
503-549; Article 14(i) is at 523. 
562
  Kaitala and Munro (1997), supra Ch I n 120, at 99. 
563
  Ibid., at 99-100.  The ultimate omission of this concept from the UN Fish Stocks 
Agreement is, however, less likely to have been for this reason than for the opposite one: the very 
idea of waiting is incompatible with States’ political need for instant gratification, exemplified by 
their high implied discount rates (on which see supra Ch I, text at nn 106-115). 
564
  Ibid., at 100-106.  Note that the transfer is of membership rather than of quota and 
appears to contemplate that membership of a commission is itself a property asset (possibly 
owing its value to the assumption that a fixed quota share is attached to it).  For transfer of quota 
separate from (though still related to) membership, see Ch V infra. 
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cannot veto a transfer, then will lose from replacement of a less efficient distant-
water fishing State by a more efficient one if the maximum economic yield is being 
extracted from the fishery, though they can minimise the loss if they are permitted to 
make counteroffers.
565
  The strongest argument against a declared policy of closing a 
fishery to new entrants is, however, perhaps a practical one: the economic benefits 
will be achieved only if the closure comes as a surprise; if it seen for some time 
beforehand to be impending, as must inevitably be the case given the slow pace of 
international diplomacy, then it has the same perverse effect as before the 
introduction of ITQs, namely a rush to stake claims, attracting the entry of 
newcomers anxious to be inside the fishery when the door closes.
566
 
The remainder of this section discusses three issues of allocation that have troubled 
ICCAT in the last dozen years. 
1 New entrants bound by old decisions – is there an acquis 
commissionnaire? 
This issue poses two questions, one general and one specific.  The general question is 
whether, if a treaty such as the 1993 Convention gives a commission it creates power 
to bind by its decisions the parties to the treaty, a new party to the treaty is bound by 
past decisions as well as subsequent ones.  Without a general rule of international 
law on this matter, guidance must be sought in the terms of the treaty itself.  Though 
it is not clear whether the question was specifically adverted to by any of the three 
original Parties during the negotiation of the text, Article 8, paragraph 7 of the 1993 
Convention states that “All measures decided upon under paragraph 3 above shall be 
binding on the Parties.”  Neither this provision nor any other in the Convention states 
                                                          
565
  Ibid., at 104-105. 
566
  R. Falloon (with the assistance of T.M. Berthold), “Individual Transferable Quotas: the 
New Zealand Case”, in OECD, supra Ch I n 88, 43 at 57.  The prospect of avoiding this self-
defeating anticipatory reaction is an important reason why quota trading (see infra Ch V), in 
effect a way of achieving closure by stealth, may succeed in aligning fishing capacity with the 
size of the stock where a more transparent approach would fail. 
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who the Parties are.  By Article 17, paragraph 1, it is expressed to be open for 
signature by Australia, Japan and New Zealand, but it is clear from the context of the 
treaty as a whole that what is meant must be not only the three original parties but 
also any States that accede to the 1993 Convention under Article 18.  In other words, 
a new entrant to the fishery contemplating accession to the 1993 Convention must 
look further than the text of the treaty itself to see what its rights and obligations will 
be; it must obtain from the Secretariat the text of decisions taken by the CCSBT 
under Article 8, paragraph 3.
567
 
The specific question is whether, if a commission has adopted a TAC and national 
allocations in which a new entrant is not mentioned, this is equivalent to a national 
allocation of zero to the new entrant should it accede to the relevant treaty.
568
  If so, it 
can hardly be doubted that this would be a serious disincentive to accession to the 
                                                          
567
  Contrast in this regard the CCSBT’s resolution to establish its Extended Commission, 
supra Ch II n 408, paragraph 6 of which merely requires the applicant for membership of the 
Extended Commission to “give the Commission its firm commitment to…comply with such 
decisions of the Extended Commission as become decisions of the Commission pursuant to 
paragraph 4” with the position in ICCAT, where Taiwan was given a list of decisions with which 
it was expected to comply: “ICCAT Chairman’s Letter to Taiwan Regarding its Fishing 
Activities in the Atlantic Ocean & Mediterranean Sea” (Appendix 3 to ICCAT-PWG4 Report), in 
ICCAT Green Book 1996/1, supra n 534, 205. 
568
  A related question is whether a new member acquires a right to object to any measures 
constituting the acquis even when the time to do so may for existing members long since have 
expired.  In 2007 the Chair of ICCAT’s Compliance Committee appears to have taken the view 
that time begins running for a new member from the date it joins: Report of the Meeting of the 
Conservation and Management Measures Compliance Committee (Annex 10 to Proceedings of 
the 20
th
 Regular Meeting of the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas 
(Antalya, Turkey – November 9 to 18, 2007) (hereinafter ICCAT20 Report)), in ICCAT, Report 
for biennial period 2006-07 Part II (2007) - Vol.1 (hereinafter ICCAT Green Book 2008/1), 212 
at 214, rejecting as out of time Belize’s objection in 2007 to a recommendation adopted in 1997.  
Belize had become party to the 1966 Convention in 2005: see the status list maintained by the 
FAO as depositary at <www.fao.org/Legal/treaties/014s-e.htm> (visited on 1 August 2008). 
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treaty even if, as in Article 18 of the 1993 Convention, fishing the stock was in itself 
sufficient qualification to accede.
569
  This problem has not yet affected the CCSBT, 
but ICCAT has had to face it squarely, and the way it did so may serve as a precedent 
for when the CCSBT comes to grapple with it. 
The new entrants problem in fact can arise even before binding catch limits are 
imposed, as for example occurred in ICCAT in 1974 in the context of a proposal to 
freeze ABT catch for a year at recent levels.  Although supporting the need for 
restraint, Brazil voiced opposition in principle to a freeze on the ground that it would 
prevent it establishing a fishery for the species at all, but was prepared to abstain 
from vote on the proposal on the basis that it interpreted the freeze as applying only 
                                                          
569
  Note that this cannot explain Korea’s reticence.  While there might have been a problem 
in theory of zero allocation in the remainder of the year of joining that a veto for Korea over 
future TACs (under the consensus decision-making rule in Article 8(2) of the 1993 Convention) 
would not have remedied, from 1998, thanks to the dispute, there had been no existing TAC in 
fact.  The real explanation may be Korea’s bruising experience as a new entrant at the hands of 
NAFO, which offered it an allocation of 69 tonnes of redfish from area 3M, despite Korea having 
fished 9,000 tonnes before of redfish its accession to NAFO’s constitutive treaty, supra n 556.  
The allocation was never used because it was too small to be commercially profitable: see 
Korea’s expressions of dissatisfaction in NAFO doc NAFO/GC Doc. 98/2, Report of the Working 
Group on Allocation of Fishing Rights to Contracting Parties of NAFO and Chartering of 
Vessels Between Contracting Parties, 4-6 March 1998, Brussels, Belgium (unpublished, copy 
supplied by NAFO Secretariat on file with author), at 13 (Annex 5, “Opening Statement by the 
Representative of Korea”) and NAFO doc NAFO/GC Doc. 99/9, Report of the General Council 
21
st
 Annual Meeting, 13-17 September 1999, Dartmouth, N.S., Canada (unpublished, copy 
supplied by NAFO Secretariat on file with author), at 14 (see too at 43 (Annex 12, “Statement by 
the Representative of the Republic of Korea on Quota Allocating Practices (Mr. G. Lee))”); also 
Molenaar, supra n 517 at 515n).  The inutility of very small quotas has also affected St Pierre and 
Miquelon, which has asked ICCAT for enough quota to keep occupied a single “polyvalent” boat 
targeting multiple species, or at least for full flexibility to transfer unused quota to future years: 
“Statement by France (St. Pierre and Miquelon) to Panel 2” (Appendix 3 to Annex 9 to ICCAT20 
Report), in ICCAT Green Book 2008/1, supra n 568, 205 at 205-206 and “Statement by France 
(St. Pierre and Miquelon) to Panel 4” (Appendix 8 to Annex 9 to ICCAT20 Report), ibid., 209. 
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to those members already fishing, with all others remaining free to begin doing so.
570
  
Similarly, in relation to swordfish 25 years later, South Africa observed that, if 
ICCAT were to follow the recommendation of the Standing Committee on Research 
and Statistics that catch and effort be capped at their 1998 levels, any development in 
southern Atlantic coastal States fisheries would 
necessarily have to be accompanied by a reduction in the TAC allocation to distant 
water fleets.  South Africa proposes that this transfer…be achieved by applying an 
annual attrition rate to the allocation of the high-seas fleets, to release part of the 
TAC for distribution among the developing coastal states.
571
 
The case of Iceland and ABT is equally instructive.  In the mid-1990s Iceland 
suspected the presence of this species in its EEZ, and was considering developing the 
fishery and joining ICCAT, but apprehended that if it did so, the relevant ICCAT 
Recommendations in force might prohibit new Contracting Parties from targeting 
relevant species, even in their own EEZ and irrespective of the distribution of the 
stock.  This was perceived by Iceland as a serious disincentive to its accession to the 
1966 Convention unless a reservation or other solution were possible.
572
  At the 1996 
Meeting Iceland reminded ICCAT that: 
                                                          
570
  Proceedings of the Third Regular Meeting of the Council, Madrid, Spain, November 20-
26, 1974 (hereinafter ICCATC3 Report), in ICCAT Green Book 1975, supra Ch I n 220, at 33 
(paragraph 14.3); Morocco agreed: ibid. (paragraph 14.10). 
571
  “Statement by South Africa to Panel 4 on South Atlantic Swordfish Allocations” 
(Appendix 10 to Reports of the Meetings of Panels 1 to 4 (Annex 9 to ICCAT16 Report)), in 
ICCAT Green Book 2000/1, supra Ch I n 242, 185.  The next year South Africa proposed that 
“Countries with existing quota should not expect to hold these quotas in perpetuity, and…the 
principle of quota attrition [should] be incorporated in future sharing arrangements to provide 
potential for re-allocation.”  See Report of the 2
nd
 ICCAT Working Group on Allocation Criteria 
(Madrid, Spain - April 6 to 8, 2000) (Annex 6 to Proceedings of the 12
th
 Special Meeting of the 
International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (Marrakech, Morocco – 
November 13 to 20, 2000) (hereinafter ICCATSM12 Report)), in ICCAT, Report for biennial 
period, 2000-01 Part I (2000) - Vol.1 (hereinafter ICCAT Green Book 2001/1), 80 at 89 
(paragraph 5.78).  The US, however, found this unacceptable: ibid. 
572
  ICCAT14 Report, in ICCAT Green Book 1996/1, supra n 534, 45 at 56 (paragraph 
12.4); “Statement by the Observer from Iceland” (Annex 5-3 to ICCAT14 Report), ibid., 101.  
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…Iceland as a coastal state in respect of the east Atlantic bluefin stock and a state 
whose economy is overwhelmingly dependant [sic] on the exploitation of the living 
marine resources has certain interests in this stock, as well as rights, in accordance 
with international law. 
Therefore the Commission should, in its work, fully take into account that the rights 
of those who have been fishing for the stock on the high seas and elsewhere are 
subject to these rights and interests of Iceland, as well as of the rights and interests of 
other coastal states, of course.  This should be done in respect of [both short- and] 
long term management. 
… 
Regarding the long term management, the Commission should take into account that 
those states now fishing for the stock have no rights to continue the over harvesting 
of the stock and thus to deprive the Coastal States of the future economic benefit of 
harvesting this resource.
573
 
The following year Iceland took a similar stance: 
The management of the Atlantic bluefin stock must take fully into account rights and 
interests of coastal States.  As a coastal State Iceland has full rights to require those 
currently exploiting the Atlantic bluefin tuna to limit their catches in order to allow 
                                                                                                                                                                    
The 1966 Convention neither provides for reservations nor prohibits them.  Although a detailed 
treatment of this question is beyond the scope of this work, it is submitted that a reservation 
tailored to permit Iceland to take a reasonable amount of ABT in its own EEZ, pending the 
setting of a catch limit for it consonant with its rights as a coastal State under the relevant 
provisions of UNCLOS, would have been reasonable in the circumstances and not incompatible 
with the object and purpose of the 1966 Convention: see Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, supra Introduction n 18, Article 19(c).  Because the 1966 Convention is the constitutive 
instrument of ICCAT, however, the latter’s acceptance would have been required: ibid., Article 
20(3), and from the tenor of the debates it seems unlikely that this would have been forthcoming. 
573
  “Statement by Iceland on Eastern Bluefin Tuna” (Appendix 2 to Reports of the Meetings 
of Panels 1 to 4 (Annex 7-1 to Report of Tenth Special Meeting of the Commission, San 
Sebastian, November 22-29, 1996 (hereinafter ICCATSM10 Report))), in ICCAT, Report for 
biennial period, 1996-97 Part I (1996) - Vol.1 (hereinafter ICCAT Green Book 1997/1), 133 at 
133-134. 
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the stock to recover and to allow for reasonable harvesting of the coastal States that 
have not yet been able to develop their fisheries.
574
 
Invited instead to apply for admission as a Cooperating Party under the 1997 
Resolution establishing that status,
575
 Iceland replied that: 
It seems pointless for Iceland to apply for the status of Cooperating Party if that 
would mean that Iceland would have to fish in conformity with the conservation 
decisions of ICCAT.  In the case of bluefin tuna that is to fish nothing at all.  Such a 
position would not in any way recognize the rights of Iceland to utilize this 
important resource that occurs within our EEZ in significant quantities.
576
 
By 2000 the situation had not changed.  The Icelandic observer told that year’s 
ICCAT meeting: 
The current allocation system, where the sovereign rights of coastal States such as 
Iceland are disregarded, is unacceptable and we can not [sic] allow measures based 
on this approach to become binding for us.  Until the allocation system is changed, 
Iceland’s involvement in ICCAT meetings will have to be limited to participating as 
observers.
577
 
The position of ICCAT is set out in letters of warning it sent to coastal States, among 
them Iceland, calling for compliance with the measures if it was not to impose 
restrictions on imports from them of the species concerned: 
The Commission recognizes that coastal States have sovereign rights and jurisdiction 
with respect to living marine resources within their EEZs.  When those resources are 
                                                          
574
  “Statement by Iceland on Atlantic Bluefin Tuna” (Annex 6-7 to Report of the Fifteenth 
Regular Meeting of the Commission, Madrid, Spain -  November 14 to 21, 1997 (hereinafter 
ICCAT15 Report)), in ICCAT, Report for biennial period 1996-97 Part II (1997) - Vol.1 
(hereinafter ICCAT Green Book 1998/1), 90. 
575
  “Resolution by ICCAT on Becoming a Cooperating Party, Entity or Fishing Entity” 
(Annex 5-17 to ICCAT15 Report), ibid., 79. 
576
  “Statement by the Observer from Iceland on the Status of the Bluefin Tuna Stock” 
(Annex 6-E to Eleventh Special Meeting of the Commission, Santiago de Compostela, Spain – 
November 16 to 23, 1998 (hereinafter ICCATSM11 Report)), in ICCAT, Report for biennial 
period 1998-99 Part I (1998) - Vol.1 (hereinafter ICCAT Green Book 1999/1), 89. 
577
  “Statement by the Observer of Iceland to the Opening Plenary Session” in “Statements 
to the Plenary Sessions” (Annex 4 to ICCATSM12 Report), in ICCAT Green Book 2001/1, 
supra n 571, 61 at 75. 
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highly migratory species, however, and when a regional fishery management 
organization such as ICCAT has been created to regulate those species, it is 
incumbent upon the coastal States to join the organization or, at a minimum, to apply 
the fishing rules adopted by the organization.  If each coastal State of the Atlantic 
Ocean determined for itself how much bluefin tuna should be harvested within its 
respective EEZ, there could be no effective management of bluefin tuna. 
… 
For both the eastern and western Atlantic, ICCAT Contracting Parties have had to 
reduce harvests for conservation reasons.  Moreover, for the western Atlantic stock, 
the Commission has recently adopted a strict 20-year rebuilding program.  The 
Commission finds it unacceptable that, in the face of such measures, Icelandic 
vessels are increasing their harvests and that Iceland is unwilling to cooperate fully 
with ICCAT by ensuring that such vessels abide by ICCAT conservation and 
management measures for bluefin tuna.
578
 
There can be no quarrel with the sentiment that leaving each coastal State to 
determine for itself how much it catches would frustrate proper management of the 
stock.  Yet this reasoning does not adequately answer the coastal States’ objection 
that joining ICCAT would not automatically entitle them to any quota, let alone one 
equitably reflecting the preferential status of coastal States under UNCLOS Article 
116, paragraph (b).
579
  Nor can it be supposed that this is the effect of Article 7, 
paragraph 2 of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement, which requires mutual compatibility 
                                                          
578
  “Commission Chairman’s Letters to Non-contracting Parties, Entities or Fishing Entities 
Pursuant to the ICCAT Swordfish and Bluefin Tuna Action Plan and the 1998 Resolution on IUU 
Catches” (Appendix 5 to Report of the 9
th
 Meeting of the Permanent Working Group for the 
Improvement of ICCAT Statistics and Conservation Measures (PWG) (Annex 10 to ICCATSM12 
Report)), in ICCAT Green Book 2001/1, supra n 571, 255 at 257.  A letter identical to this, 
mutatis mutandis, was sent to Denmark, in respect of the Faroe Islands: ibid., at 256.  See also the 
letters to Argentina (at 260), Belize (at 264-265), Barbados (at 260-261), Cambodia (at 265-266), 
Grenada (at 261), Honduras (at 266-267), Liberia (at 261-262), Malta (at 258), Mozambique (at 
262-263), the Netherlands Antilles (at 263), Norway (at 263-264), St Vincent and the Grenadines 
(at 267), Turkey (at 258-259) and Vanuatu (at 259-260); most of these are Atlantic coastal States. 
579
  See also on UNCLOS Article 116(b) T. Skarphedinsson, “Management of the Utilization 
of Living Marine Resources”, in Nordquist et al (eds), supra Ch II n 437, 399 at 401-402. 
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of coastal State and high seas conservation measures.
580
  Were it otherwise, the 
balance between coastal States and distant-water fishing States would be sharply 
shifted in the latter’s favour, which would vindicate the decision of Chile, Ecuador 
and Peru to stand aloof from the Agreement because of their perception that the 
compatibility provision undermines coastal States’ rights in their EEZs.581 
2 The ICCAT Working Group on Allocation 
ICCAT set up a Working Group on Allocation Criteria in 1998 when nine members 
and four observers, all developing countries, called for it in the wake of difficulties 
encountered the previous year in allocating catch shares in the South Atlantic 
swordfish stock.
582
  A prime illustration of an unsuccessful allocation process was an 
informal meeting held earlier that year on the southern albacore fishery, which 
brought to the fore some of the problems evident with ICCAT’s propensity to 
allocate catch shares based on historic participation in the fishery.  This led to the 
parties announcing voluntary catch limits whose sum exceeded the TAC they were 
trying to allocate.
583
  Namibia had then complained that:  
…we are concerned about the impacts of allocation mechanisms on economic 
development opportunities, especially for coastal developing states.  In our view, the 
allocation processes which we understand are currently the basis for allocations of 
                                                          
580
  For a detailed exposition of the effect of Article 7(2), see Oude Elferink, supra n 517. 
581
  Much of the argumentation of Orrego Vicuña, supra n 477, is an attempt to show that 
these States are under a misapprehension in this regard.  If so, it persists: see the paper submitted 
by these and several other States to the 2006 Review Conference for this Agreement: UN doc 
A/CONF.210/2006/12 (23 May 2006), Annex to the note verbale dated 22 May 2006 from the 
Permanent Missions of Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Mexico and Peru to the United Nations addressed to the Secretariat. 
582
  ICCATSM11 Report, in ICCAT Green Book 1999/1, supra n 576, 27 at 31-32 and 34; 
“Resolution by ICCAT to Establish a Working Group on Allocation Criteria” (Annex 5-15 to 
ICCATSM11 Report), ibid., 80.  On allocation see also J.F. Caddy, “An Objective Approach to 
the Negotiation of Allocations from Shared Living Resources”, (1996) 20 Marine Policy 145. 
583
  Report of the Informal Multi-lateral Consultation on Southern Albacore (Cape Town, 
South Africa – April 23-24, 1998) (Appendix 14 to Reports of the Meetings of Panels 1 to 4 
(Annex 10 to ICCATSM11 Report)), in ICCAT Green Book 1999/1, supra n 576, 173 at 181. 
 204 
fishing opportunities within ICCAT, are not consistent with the rights of coastal 
states under UNCLOS, and especially with the provisions of the UN Agreement on 
Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (“The Agreement”).  In 
particular, Namibia cannot accept allocations of fishing opportunities based on 
historical fishing patterns because Namibia as a nation did not have the opportunity 
to participate in fishing in the past. 
Namibia considers that a new approach to the allocation of fishing opportunities 
within ICCAT is required; that this approach should be based on the appropriate 
provisions of the Agreement; and that historical fishing levels should be a minor 
factor in the application of these provisions.
584
 
Overreliance on historic catch may also punish a previous cessation of fishing, 
whether voluntary or involuntary.  Involuntary cessation, by which is meant 
withdrawal from a fishery because of falling catches attributable to overfishing 
mainly by others, may then be an obstacle to the coastal State’s desire to re-enter it.  
In 1998, for example, Norway stated that 
Norwegian tuna fisheries had developed in the 1950s and 1960s but had ceased in 
1986 when the seasonal migration patterns of the stock failed.  As the stock was now 
present in the waters of neighboring States, the possibility of the old migration routes 
being re-established was being studied.
585
 
Nor, however, would it be wise to discourage voluntary cessation of fishing, 
reinforcing the tragedy of the commons, by permitting those States that continue 
fishing to use their subsequent catch history to their own advantage.  In 1997 Brazil 
presented a paper elaborating on what it saw as a proper basis for allocation; the next 
year it made a statement equating historic catch shares with “quantitative 
responsibility” for endangering the stock.586 
                                                          
584
  “Statement by the Republic of Namibia on Coastal Developing States” (Annex 6-4 to 
ICCAT15 Report), in ICCAT Green Book 1998/1, supra n 574, 85 at 85. 
585
  ICCATSM11 Report, supra n 582, at 29. 
586
  “Technical Considerations by Brazil at the Inter-sessional Meeting relevant to the 
Allocation of Catch Quota for the South Atlantic Swordfish Stock” (Addendum 4 to Report of the 
Informal Inter-sessional Meeting of Panel 4 (Joao Pessoa, Brazil - July 15 & 16, 1997) 
(Appendix 9 to Reports of the Meetings of Panels 1 to 4 (Annex 10 to ICCAT 15 Report))), in 
ICCAT Green Book 1998/1, supra n 574, 194 at 195; “Statement by Brazil on the Concerns of 
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ICCAT’s 1999 and 2000 meetings saw several strong statements devoted to this 
issue which was clearly exercising many delegations,
587
 and the meetings of the 
Working Group were reported at great length.  The series of meetings began, as is 
common, with reiteration of entrenched positions, the European Community arguing 
that “international law does not recognize preferential rights for coastal states”, and 
Japan that “coastal state preferential rights for highly migratory species is [sic] not 
seen in any existing international legal instruments and should not constitute a factor 
of an allocation scheme.”588  Japan did, however, recognise that the historic catch 
criterion was disadvantageous to newcomers, although it denied that a simple 
reallocation would be equitable, given its own lowered quota and scientific 
expenditures.
589
  Japan went on to point out that Article 11 of the UN Fish  Stocks 
Agreement, listing a number of allocation criteria favouring coastal States, was 
expressed as applying only to new members, not existing ones.
590
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Coastal States & Developing Nations” (Annex 6-B to ICCATSM11 Report), in ICCAT Green 
Book 1999/1, supra n 576, 86. 
587
  See the statements of Denmark (in respect of the Faroe Islands) in 1999, in “Statements 
by Observers” (Annex 4.2 to ICCAT16 Report), in ICCAT Green Book 2000/1, supra Ch I n 
242, at 61-62 and several States in 2000: Annex 4 to ICCATSM12 Report, supra n 577, at 73-74 
(Denmark), 76 (Mexico) and 77-78 (Norway); see also South Africa at Annex 6 to ICCAT16 
Report, supra Ch II n 427, 84 at 85. 
588
  Annex 6 to ICCAT16 Report, supra n 587, at 86. 
589
  “Opening Statement by Japan” in Appendix 3 to Annex 6 to ICCAT16 Report, supra Ch 
II n 427, at 104-105. 
590
  “Closing Statement by Japan” in “Closing Statements” (Appendix 7 to Annex 6 to 
ICCAT16 Report), ibid., 111 at 112.  This is an example of the myopic argumentation to which 
delegations sometimes resort.  If ICCAT as a whole had adopted this view, it would not only 
have been an incentive to coastal States to refrain from joining ICCAT pending the report of the 
Working Group, for fear of losing the benefit of Article 11, but might even have persuaded 
existing members of long standing not participating in certain fisheries that, in order to gain the 
benefit of Article 11, they should denounce the 1966 Convention and reaccede later at a more 
opportune moment.  The same is true of the view expressed by Japan on collective responsibility 
for past overcatch, infra text at n 595, which would deny the “clean hands” argument for a higher 
share of an allocation to new entrants who are members of ICCAT, but not to those outside. 
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At the Second Meeting of the Working Group the following year, the European 
Community maintained that the real interest qualifying a State for membership of a 
commission should be its effective fishing capacity,
591
 provoking contrary statements 
from Morocco, Namibia and Cape Verde;
592
 as a corollary, it disapproved of 
chartering as a way of increasing that capacity, a sentiment shared by Japan but not 
Brazil.
593
  In its view, for stocks already allocated, historic catch should be the only 
criterion for future allocation, a stance opposed by Namibia, Brazil and South 
Africa.
594
  A similar divide was observed on the question of responsibility for past 
overexploitation of the stock: South Africa, Morocco and Mexico favoured a broad 
interpretation, but the United States did not want to penalise States that had abided 
by historical conservation measures, even if those were in retrospect seen to have 
been insufficiently stringent, while Japan said ICCAT as a whole should be 
responsible for the history, not individual Contracting Parties.
595
 
The idea that the spatio-temporal distribution of the biomass of a stock should govern 
the allocation was supported by Brazil and Namibia but rejected by Canada, the 
European Community and Japan on the ground that the Standing Committee on 
Research and Statistics had indicated that reliable data were not available, but even if 
                                                          
591
  Annex 6 to ICCATSM12 Report, supra n 571, at 82 (paragraph 5.7).  By way of added 
justification, the EC sought to imply that the share of supply should be influenced by that of 
demand for the species, noting that the parties with major historic catch records were also those 
that developed the existing markets for those species, into which States wishing to develop their 
own industries intended to sell their catch: “Opening Statements to Allocation Criteria Meeting – 
2000” (Appendix 3 to Annex 6 to ICCATSM12 Report), in ICCAT Green Book 2001/1, supra n 
571, 105 at 107.  This would give development by a State of a fishery for export lesser legitimacy 
than development to supply its own market and would not have been well received by developing 
States, as a denial of their right to development. 
592
  Annex 6 to ICCATSM12 Report, supra n 571, at 82 (paragraphs 5.8 (Morocco), 5.9 
(Namibia) and 5.14 (Morocco and Cape Verde)). 
593
  Ibid. (paragraphs 5.10 (Japan), 5.12 (Brazil) and 5.13 (EC and Brazil)). 
594
  Ibid., at 85 (paragraphs 5.39 (EC), 5.40 (Namibia) and 5.41 (Brazil and South Africa)). 
595
  Ibid., at 87 (paragraph 5.66).  
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they were, this would result in the Committee in effect making the allocation.
596
  The 
last consideration is unpersuasive.  If the idea of spatio-temporal distribution is sound 
either in its own right, or because it acts as a proxy for the degree to which each 
participant could affect the fishery in the absence of agreement, it does not follow 
that ICCAT’s management organ would be abdicating its allocative function to the 
scientific organ merely because it bases its decision on the latter’s input.  Even were 
it to remain fixed for an extended period, it would still be the management organ that 
determined the formula for deriving the output (allocations) from the inputs.  The 
only danger is politicisation of the science, in which individual scientists manipulate 
the inputs to their own State’s advantage.  Though this is not completely fanciful, the 
inherent transparency of the scientific process means that there is a high probability 
of any such manipulation being detected and discounted by other delegations.
597
 
Much greater convergence of views was evident at the Working Group’s Third 
Meeting, where the debate about “real interest” resumed.  South Africa would have 
allowed each State to determine for itself whether it had one, while the position that 
coastal States with a resource in their EEZs must have a right to it was put forward 
by Mexico, Norway and Iceland.
598
  The European Community said that quota under 
this head should go only to States able to fish themselves or developing a plan to do 
so.  Brazil, however, opposed any link to a domestic fishing fleet as discriminating 
                                                          
596
  Ibid., at 88 (paragraphs 5.74 (supporters) and 5.75 (opponents)). 
597
  The CCSBT is a possible exception, its smallness being one reason advanced by 
Maguire, supra Ch II n 441, at 211-212, why the “mutual distrust” among scientists referred to in 
“Japan’s Proposal on Enhancement of CCSBT Function” (Attachment E to Report of the Peer 
Review Workshop, First Part, 23, 24 and 26 November 1999, Canberra, Australia (hereinafter 
Peer Review Workshop Report), in CCSBT Blue Book 2001, supra Ch I n 242, 158 at 158) 
persisted there, with one camp reacting to the other’s real or imagined manipulation by counter-
manipulation of its own. 
598
  Report of the 3
rd
 ICCAT Ad Hoc Working Group on Allocation Criteria (Brussels, 
Belgium – May 21 to 23, 2001) (Annex 6 to ICCAT17 Report), in ICCAT Green Book 2002/1, 
supra Ch I n 228, 121 at 125 (paragraphs 7.18 (South Africa) and 7.23 (Mexico, Norway, 
Iceland)). 
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against developing countries; how were they expected to plan without a quota?
599
  
But the United States, supported by France (on behalf of St Pierre et Miquelon) and 
Japan, said ICCAT should not have responsibility to distribute resources to non-
members merely because they were coastal States.  If such States wanted quota for 
species managed by ICCAT, the onus was on them to join the commission; there 
would be no point in having ICCAT at all if coastal States could simply fish the 
stock.
600
  South Africa in response made the obvious point that ICCAT should avoid 
depriving coastal States of all incentive to work within the system.
601
  There was 
debate as to whether the fact of occurrence of a species in a coastal State’s EEZ, as 
opposed to the relative extent of its presence there, would be used as a criterion.
602
 
In a sign that polarisation was lessening, Japan admitted that current holders of quota 
would have to make sacrifices to allow opportunities for newcomers.  Its readiness to 
see gradual application of the criteria to stocks already allocated was not, however, 
matched by Canada, which called for no immediate adjustment to be made where the 
stock was at a low level of abundance and a rebuilding program was in place.  Brazil 
and Mexico opposed their exclusion from stocks under rebuilding plans.
603
 
Agreement was also reached on the weight to be accorded to historic catch.  With all 
ready to include it as a criterion, the European Community was isolated in insisting 
to the last on its paramountcy,
604
 and at its next meeting the Working Group was able 
to present a consensus text to the Commission with allocation criteria.
605
 
                                                          
599
  Ibid., at 124 (paragraphs 7.16 (EC) and 7.17 (Brazil)). 
600
  Ibid., at 125 (paragraph 7.24). 
601
  Ibid., at 126 (paragraph 7.31). 
602
  Ibid., at 129 (paragraphs 7.65 to 7.71). 
603
  Ibid., at 126 (Japan at paragraph 7.36, Canada at paragraph 7.35), 128 (Brazil and 
Mexico at paragraph 7.60). 
604
  Ibid., at 127 (paragraphs 7.46 and 7.50). 
605
  “ICCAT Criteria for the Allocation of Fishing Possibilities” (Annex 8 to ICCAT17 
Report), ibid., 211; Report of the 4
th
 ICCAT Ad Hoc Working Group on Allocation Criteria 
(Murcia, Spain – November 7 to 9, 2001) (Annex 7 to ICCAT17 Report), ibid., 177 at 191 
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The Working Group referred to the Commission four unresolved issues that may 
affect allocation decisions:
606
 Contracting Parties’ arrears of financial contributions 
to ICCAT, vessel chartering, temporary quota transfers and, as Japan’s condition for 
accepting the omission from the criteria of its proposal that catches made under 
objection be excluded from historic catch calculations,
607
 use of the objection 
procedure. 
3 The 2001 allocation criteria – unfinished business 
The allocation criteria can be seen as a job only half done.  Although for Iceland, the 
Working Group’s 2001 report “changed the situation, making it possible…to join 
ICCAT in the expectation of getting our fair share of the fisheries”,608 they contain 
no actual arithmetical formula for allocation, but leave these to be worked on out on 
a stock-by-stock basis by the panels responsible for each stock, to whom they give 
only general guidance.  While this is understandable given the varying considerations 
attending stocks already subject to allocated catch limits and those which might need 
to be so limited in future, there seems to have been no recognition that the legal and 
political issues would not be finally resolved until the various factors were given 
some numerical expression – a concrete weighting of the factors admitted as 
legitimate, even if only as maxima or minima. 
                                                                                                                                                                    
(paragraph 6.85).  In view of the consensus reached in the Working Group, the plenary does not 
appear to have seen a need to endorse the criteria formally: see ICCAT17 Report, ibid., 49 at 51 
(paragraphs 6.1 to 6.4). 
606
  ICCAT17 Report, supra n 605, at 51 (paragraph 6.3); Annex 7 to ICCAT17 Report, 
supra n 605, at 191 (paragraph 6.85). 
607
  “Opening Statements – Allocation Criteria – Brussels 2001” (Appendix 2 to Annex 6 to 
ICCAT17 Report), ibid., 137 at 141; “Proposal by Japan on Allocation Criteria” (Appendix 5 to 
Annex 6 to ICCAT17 Report), ibid., 168 at 168-169. 
608
  “Statements to the Plenary Sessions” (Annex 4 to ICCATSM13 Report), in ICCAT 
Green Book 2003/1, supra Ch II n 427, 70 at 74-75.  See also the statements of Denmark 
(“seriously considering” membership) and Norway (accession to the 1966 Convention 
imminent): at 85 and 86-87 respectively.  
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As if to confirm that this issue was far from settled despite the agreement on the 
allocation criteria, Panel 2 deferred their application to the western stock of ABT 
until the next stock assessment, deciding that meanwhile the allocation in the 1998 
rebuilding program would continue.
609
  Similarly the European Community stated in 
Panel 4 that for the South Atlantic swordfish stock “the automatic transfer of quotas 
was not feasible at this time and there was no alternative other than to maintain the 
2000 recommendation”.610  The Recommendation adopted by the Commission for 
this stock completely failed to come to grips with the allocation problem: a TAC was 
set but left unallocated, and the parties fishing the stock were asked to set their own 
quotas so as not to exceed the TAC.
611
 
Like problems have continued to plague the question of allocation of the TAC of the 
eastern stock of ABT.  In 2003 Turkey, Mexico and Morocco called in Panel 2 for 
application of the 2001 criteria to allow new members a share of quota.
612
  Turkey 
charged that the quotas were not in line with the criteria, with non-contracting parties 
expected by application of a 1994 Recommendation to make the 25 per cent 
reduction on their 1993-94 catch that many Contracting Parties had themselves failed 
to make.
613
  The United States agreed that “expectation of receiving quota is an 
                                                          
609
  Reports of the Meeting of Panels 1-4 (Annex 13 to ICCAT17 Report), in ICCAT Green 
Book 2002/1, supra Ch I n 228, 297 at 305 (paragraph 6.9). 
610
  Ibid., at 315 (paragraph 6.c.5). 
611
  “Recommendation by ICCAT on South Atlantic Swordfish” (Annex 9-13 to ICCAT17 
Report), ibid., 228. 
612
  Reports of the Meeting of Panels 1-4 (Annex 8 to Proceedings of the 18
th
 Regular 
Meeting of the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (Dublin, Ireland 
- 17 to 24 November 2003) (hereinafter ICCAT18 Report)), in ICCAT, Report for Biennial 
period 2002-03 Part II (2003) - Vol.1 (hereinafter ICCAT Green Book 2004/1), 177 at 183. 
613
  “Statements by Turkey to Panel 2” (Appendix 5 to Annex 8 to ICCAT18 Report), ibid., 
202 at 202-203, referring to “Recommendation by ICCAT for the Management of Bluefin Tuna 
Fishing in the Eastern Atlantic Ocean and Mediterranean Sea” (Annex 18 to Proceedings of the 
Ninth Special Meeting of the Commission, Madrid, November 28 – December 2, 1994 
(hereinafter ICCATSM9 Report)), in ICCAT, Report for biennial period, 1994-95 Part I (1994) - 
Vol.1 (hereinafter ICCAT Green Book 1995/1), 186. 
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incentive for new members to join ICCAT and take part in its conservation and 
management programs.”614  Japan on the other hand, despite professing itself “eager” 
to work with new members on the allocation question, wanted to “protect” the 
previous year’s Recommendation.615  The European Community argued that quota 
allocations to new members should come out of the previous allocation to “others”,  
but Turkey complained that a reduction in that category would be a disproportionate 
burden on non-members and a disincentive for them to join ICCAT.
616
 
South Africa accepted past performance as being “of crucial importance” for sharing 
the southern albacore fishery among coastal States, but this needed to be balanced 
with “genuine needs of developing coastal states to develop their fisheries”.617  In 
Panel 3 it tabled a lengthy policy statement which is the first, and so far only, one of 
its type on the application of the 2001 Allocation Criteria.  Its central theme was that 
[i]n principle…the majority of the allocation should go to range states bordering the 
oceanic region/s within which a stock resides and migrates.  As a starting point… 
distant water fleets should not be allocated more than 50% of the South Atlantic 
albacore TAC.
618
 
Allocation among distant-water States should be proportional to their catch in the 5-
year period preceding any review, and 
[u]ltimately, once all participating states have had adequate opportunity to develop 
their fisheries, recent past performance should serve as the best measure of any state’s 
ability, capacity and need to fish a stock…Allocation of TAC shares cannot remain 
fixed in perpetuity.  There are many reasons why fishing capacities and aspirations 
                                                          
614
  Annex 8 to ICCAT18 Report, supra n 612, at 183. 
615
  Ibid., at 184.  The Recommendation in question was “Recommendation by ICCAT 
Concerniing [sic] a Multi-Year Conservation and Management Plan for Bluefin Tuna in the East 
Atlantic and Mediterranean” (Annex 8.8 to ICCATSM13 Report), in ICCAT Green Book 2003/1, 
supra Ch II n 427, 167 (see esp at 168 (paragraph 6)). 
616
  Annex 8 to ICCAT18 Report, supra n 612, at 183 (Turkey), 184 (EC). 
617
  Ibid., at 188. 
618
  “South African Policy Statement to the 2003 Meeting of Panel 3 Regarding 
Development of an ICCAT Sharing Arrangement for South Atlantic Albacore” (Appendix 11 to 
Annex 8 to ICCAT18 Report), ibid., 207 at 207. 
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may change over time (inter alia shifts in targeting, economic constraints, changes in 
resource distribution, decrease and/or development in fisheries).  Past performance 
over some agreed range of recent years should therefore be used to periodically revise 
allocations, together with other relevant considerations.
619
 
Nor was it either feasible or desirable, South Africa argued, to develop a 
mathematical sharing formula for South Atlantic albacore, incorporating specific 
measures and weightings of the 2001 criteria.
620
  Instead, it called for preference for 
coastal States that have demonstrated a clear interest in fishing for the stock using 
their own fishing fleet under their own flag, States having artisanal fleets of vessels 
less than 24 metres in length targeting the stock, States having demonstrated a 
specific interest and developed a degree of socio-economic or food-provision 
reliance on fishing for species under ICCAT management, especially South Atlantic 
albacore (but not other non-ICCAT stocks).
621
 
Moved to respond to South Africa’s statement, Taiwan also committed its views to 
paper.  It opposed South Africa’s 50 per cent rule as lacking justification, and recent 
past performance was not the same as the “historical catches” mentioned in the 2001 
criteria.  It went on: 
The very reason for ICCAT to take such pain and effort to develop these Criteria 
was to instill the merits of transparency into the quota allocation process.  The 
development of a workable sharing formula is yet to be completed.  It is precisely 
the weighting and the objective way of calculation to implement the rather abstract 
and vague Criteria that awaits further development.  Undoubtedly, such development 
                                                          
619
  Ibid., at 208.  This formulation suffers from the paradox of the diminished usefulness of 
information from a State’s catch and effort data when either catch or effort is subject to a legal 
limitation such as a national allocation under a TAC.  In that event, only a substantial shortfall in 
catch compared to the national allocation would actually affect the catch history.  It would be of 
no use among the original parties to the 1993 Convention, for example (apart from the additional 
Japanese catch under its disputed experimental fishing program, to whose inclusion in the catch 
history Australia and New Zealand would for obvious reasons be predicted to object). 
620
  Ibid. 
621
  Ibid., at 209. 
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will never be an easy matter.  But such move is necessary, if there is any meaning 
for having reached the Criteria in the first place.
622
 
It is difficult to disagree with these sentiments.  Nor can Taiwan’s analysis of the 
transition underway be faulted, which it accepted despite being a net loser from it:  
With the development concerns of the coastal countries in mind, the quota allocation 
process is in fact a re-distribution and adjustment of the present shares of fishery 
resources pertaining to each of the participants as reflected in the original quota duly 
assigned thereto…It should be noted that the significance of minimizing economic 
dislocation lies in the necessity for smooth predictable, bearable and manageable 
transformation in all fishing-related industries of the participants whose current catch 
level is subject to such sacrifice.
623
 
4 NAFO and NEAFC – closure in all but name? 
The two North Atlantic non-tuna fisheries commissions have gone furthest in the 
direction of this neo-abstention.  NAFO adopted the following resolution at its 21st 
annual meeting in 1999: 
1. NAFO is an open organization.  Non-members may join the organization by 
depositing an instrument of accession in accordance with Article XXII of the 
Convention.  In accordance with Article IV of the Convention, all Contracting 
Parties are Members of the General Council. 
2. Should any new member of NAFO obtain membership in the Fisheries 
Commission, in accordance with Article XIII(1) of the Convention, such a new 
member should be aware that presently, and for the foreseeable future, stocks 
managed by NAFO are fully allocated, and fishing opportunities for new members 
are likely to be limited, for instance, to new fisheries (stocks not currently allocated 
by TAC/quota or effort control), and the “Others” category under the NAFO Quota 
Allocation Table.
624
 
                                                          
622
  “Comments by Chinese Taipei on the Draft ICCAT Sharing Formula for South Atlantic 
Albacore” (Appendix 12 to Annex 8 to ICCAT18 Report), ibid., 210 at 211. 
623
  Ibid. 
624
  “Resolution to Guide the Expectations of Future New Members with Regard to Fishing 
Opportunities in the NAFO Regulatory Area” (Attachment 3 to General Council Annual Meeting 
13-17 September 1999, Dartmouth, N.S., Canada), in NAFO Annual Report 1999, supra n 519, 
62.  The Convention referred to is the Convention on Future Multilateral Cooperation in the 
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More recently the North-East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC),
625
 at its 22nd 
Annual Meeting in 2003 adopted a document entitled “Guidelines for the expectation 
of future new Contracting Parties with regard to fishing opportunities in the NEAFC 
Regulatory Area” whose operative paragraphs are reproduced below: 
Non Contracting Parties of NEAFC should be aware that presently and for the 
foreseeable future, stocks regulated by NEAFC are fully allocated, and fishing 
opportunities for new members likely to be limited to new fisheries (stocks not 
currently allocated),  
New Contracting Parties will participate, on the same basis as existing Contracting 
Parties, in future allocations of stocks which are unregulated at the time when the 
application is made,  
New Contracting Parties who were previously Cooperating Non Contracting Parties 
may request an allocation of a part of the relevant Co-operative quota.  Such 
allocations will be done on a case by case basis.
626
  
These conditions are extremely restrictive, coming very close to Norway’s 
suggestion that “The message to new entrants should be: future members cannot 
have a share in stocks that are already regulated.”627  In essence, new members that 
were previously cooperating non-contracting parties are restricted to part of the 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries, supra n 556.  Article XIII(1) limits membership of the Fishery 
Commission to those parties who either participate in the fisheries of the Regulatory Area 
defined in Article I(1) and (2), or satisfy the General Council at an annual meeting that they 
expect to do so in that or the next year. 
625
  Created by the Convention on Future Multilateral Cooperation in the Northeast Atlantic 
Fisheries, done at London, 18 November 1980, 1285 UNTS 129. 
626
  See NEAFC, Report of the 22
nd
 Annual Meeting of the NEAFC, 10-14 November 2003, 
Vol I, Main Report, at 26-27.  The Guidelines are not included in the report of the 2003 Annual 
Meeting, but are available on the NEAFC website at <www.neafc.org/about/becoming-cp.htm> 
(visited on 12 June 2008). 
627
  See NEAFC, “Meeting of the Working Group on the Future of the North-East Atlantic 
Fisheries Commission 10.00 a.m. 13 May 2003”, a draft summary record of the meeting, 
available on the NEAFC website at <www.neafc.org/reports/future-neafc/docs/wgfn_2003.pdf> 
(visited on 12 June 2008), at 3, part of an informative discussion of the issue reported in extenso 
at 1-4. 
 215 
relevant cooperative quota which is subtracted from that quota for this purpose, 
leaving even less for future new entrants.  In other words, “to be blunt, a just and 
reasonable share of the TACs for new entrants is interpreted largely as being what is 
left over.”628  The proposal of several unidentified NAFO Members not to share the 
benefits of the access to the stocks even if they recover, “in recognition of their 
[Members’] restraints and contributions to conservation”629 provokes Molenaar’s 
scorn: “irresponsible management in the past thereby provides a justification for 
minimising allocations to new participants in the present and future.”630 
5 WCPFC 
The debate on reservation of access to stocks for members took a somewhat different 
tack in the WCPFC at its 2007 (fourth) annual meeting.  Here the context was the 
consideration of applications from a number of States for cooperating non-member 
status under the relevant resolution.
631
  Adopted at the WCPFC’s first meeting in 
2004,
632
 this measure is more restrictive than its counterparts in other fisheries 
                                                          
628
  FAO Fisheries Technical Paper No 465, supra Ch I n 123, at 47. 
629
  NAFO doc NAFO/GC Doc. 99/4, Report of the Working Group on Allocation of Fishing 
Rights to Contracting Parties of NAFO and Chartering of Vessels Between Contracting Parties, 
13-15 April 1999, Halifax, N.S., Canada (unpublished, copy supplied by NAFO Secretariat on 
file with author), at 4, opposing the original US proposal ibid. which envisaged broader sharing 
should the stocks recover; see also Molenaar, supra n 517, at 515-516. 
630
  Molenaar, supra n 517, at 516.  At 520 Molenaar contrasts this with the position in 
ICCAT, where those States apt to be excluded by such a policy were already in the commission 
and thus able to mount the obvious arguments to counter it.  Munro, however, would argue that 
only in this way can existing members have sufficient incentive to limit their catches to allow the 
stocks’ recovery at all. 
631
   Conservation and Management Measure 2004-02, “Cooperating Non-Members”, 
available at <www.wcpfc.int/pdf/Measure2004-02.pdf> (visited on 2 August 2008). 
632
  WCPFC doc WCPFC/Comm.1/8 (10 December 2004), First Session of the Commission 
Summary Record (hereinafter WCPFC1 Report), <www.wcpfc.int/pdf/Comm_8_Summary_ 
record.pdf> (visited on 2 August 2008), at 3 (paragraph 21). 
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commissions
633
 in two ways.  One is that cooperating non-member status is only for 
a year at a time.
634
  The other is that it allows the WCPFC in deciding on applications 
to have regard to “the state of its fish stocks and the levels of fishing effort in the 
fishery”, as well as applicants’ record of compliance with the Honolulu Convention 
and the conservation and management measures of the WCPFC and other fisheries 
commissions.
635
  The WCPFC is also to exercise caution “so as not to introduce into 
the Convention Area the excessive fishing capacity of other regions”.636 
One camp at the 2007 meeting consisted of those concerned at the prospect of having 
to give applicants participatory rights should their applications succeed and fearing 
the potential overcapacity this would create given current concerns over the health of 
Western and Central Pacific tuna stocks.
637
  The other comprised those seeing “the 
importance of…acknowledging the rights of States…[outside the WCPFC] to fish on 
the high seas in a responsible manner” and others stressing the WCPFC’s “duty to 
encourage cooperation in managing stocks, particularly with States that have a 
history of fishing in the Convention Area, and to follow open and transparent criteria 
when considering…applications.”638  Presumably favouring a declaration along 
NAFO/NEAFC lines, some members stated that non-members 
                                                          
633
  See the resolutions of ICCAT, supra n 575, CCSBT, infra Ch IV n 803 and IOTC, 
Report of the Fourth Session of the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission, Kyoto, Japan, 13-16 
December 1999 (Victoria: IOTC, 2000) (IOTC doc IOTC/S/04/99/R[E], hereinafter IOTC4 
Report), at 47 (Appendix XI: Resolution 99/04 On the Status of Co-operating Non-contracting 
Parties). 
634
   WCPFC Conservation and Management Measure 2004-02, supra n 631, paragraph 4. 
635
  Ibid., paragraph 5(b) and (c). 
636
  Ibid., paragraph 9. 
637
  WCPFC, Commission for the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish 
Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean, Fourth Regular Session, 2-7 December 2007, 
Tumon, Guam, USA (hereinafter WCPFC4 Report), available at <www.wcpfc.int/wcpfc4/pdf/ 
WCPF4%20Summary%20Report%20and%20Attachments.pdf> (visited on 2 August 2008), at 4 
(paragraph 22). 
638
  Ibid., at 5 (paragraph 28). 
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should be aware that presently and for the foreseeable future, stocks of yellowfin, 
bigeye, South and North Pacific albacore, swordfish and striped marlin that are 
regulated by the WCPFC are fully fished, and that fishing opportunities are therefore 
limited to new fisheries.
639
 
Ultimately Belize was granted cooperating non-member status,
640
 but for inability to 
secure consensus in their favour, the applications of Senegal, Ecuador and El 
Salvador were rejected.
641
  New Zealand did not support Senegal’s application, on 
the basis of its non-compliance with the previous year’s request to withdraw its 
vessels “and that the current status of fish stocks cannot support any increase in 
fishing capacity.”  New Zealand also questioned whether Senegal had a real interest 
in fisheries in the Western and Central Pacific, a precondition to its right to 
participate in them.  More moderately, Australia voiced concern about the WCPFC’s 
ability to meet the aspirations of new cooperating non-members given the current 
status of fish stocks and the conservation and management measures already in 
place.
642
  Because of its dissatisfaction with the development and implementation of 
those measures, Samoa stated that it could not support any applications for new 
cooperating non-members.
643
  New Zealand also opposed the applications of 
Ecuador
644
 and El Salvador, citing in the latter’s case its “failure…to demonstrate 
compliance” with WCPFC conservation and management measures.645 
The Federated States of Micronesia went so far as to admit that the Honolulu 
Convention 
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  Ibid., at 6 (paragraph 31). 
640
  Ibid. (paragraph 36). 
641
  Ibid., at 7 (paragraph 45 (Senegal)) and 8 (paragraphs 50 (Ecuador) and 55 (El 
Salvador)). 
642
  Ibid., at 7 (paragraph 43). 
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  Ibid. (paragraph 44). 
644
  Ibid., at 8 (paragraph 48). 
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  Ibid. (paragraph 53). 
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was designed to make it harder for new entrants to become members, because of 
problems of overcapacity; also, because unlike other tuna regions, most participants 
are small island countries for which tuna resources are important. 
It then pointed to Article 35 of the Honolulu Convention, which permits States that 
participated in the conference that produced the Convention to accede to it at any 
time, whereas all others can do so only by being invited to become a Member by a 
consensus decision of the Commission.
646
 
The trouble was not that the WCPFC was denying applications for reasons 
extraneous to the criteria in the 2004 resolution, as supporters of the applications 
appeared to imply,
647
 but that the criteria themselves were already skewed ab initio 
against all applicants.  Yet paragraph 12 of the resolution requires the Executive 
Director to encourage States whose vessels fish in the Convention Area to apply for 
such status.  Working at cross-purposes with paragraph 5, this exposes the poorly 
conceived nature of this instrument, resting as it does on the politically unreliable 
and legally false assumption that surfaced in the 2007 debate.  It may be true that to 
admit applicants as cooperating non-members would raise squarely the matter of 
their participatory rights in WCPFC-regulated fisheries, but it does not follow that 
rejecting them ensures that the question will not arise.  By confusing the issues of 
cooperation and equitable allocation, the WCPFC did a disservice to both causes.
648
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  Ibid., at 5 (paragraph 26). 
647
  Ibid., at 4 (paragraph 22), to varying degrees also by Canada, Australia and the US at 6 
(paragraph 34). 
648
  See also WCPFC, Commission for the Conservation and Management of Highly 
Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean, Third Regular Session, 11–15 
December 2006, Apia, Samoa, available at <www.wcpfc.int/wcpfc3/pdf/WCPFC3%20 
Summary%20Report%20Consolidated%20report.pdf> (visited on 2 August 2008) at 2-3 
(paragraphs 16-21) where the applications of Belize and Senegal were met with a less than 
enthusiastic response and in particular the instruction to the Executive Director (at 3 (paragraph 
21)) to write a letter “advising Senegal to remove all its vessels from the Convention Area.” 
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6 Assessment 
The practice of States within ICCAT, NAFO and NEAFC shows that there is not 
merely the classic divide between coastal States and distant-water fishing States, but 
a further distinction between those already participating in a fishery, who may be 
called “ins”, and will often make common cause to restrict or discourage entry to the 
fishery by others, the “outs”.  Despite paragraph (b) of Article 116 of UNCLOS, this 
is so even when the latter are coastal States.  The temptation for “ins” to conspire 
against “outs” is in one sense no more than a consequence of the tendency towards 
replication on the international plane of the limited-entry fisheries that States have 
enacted in their municipal law, which act as a preventative measure against the 
tragedy of the commons if the limitations on entry are sufficiently strict. 
Remarkably, there is no evidence of any State objecting to its exclusion from a share 
of the catch in the NAFO and NEAFC fisheries on the basis of the documents quoted 
in the previous subsection.  The likeliest explanation is that, by comparison with the 
1950s, a much larger number of States now have a stake in at least one international 
fishery, and see on balance more benefit from shoring up their position by excluding 
newcomers from those, even at the price of their own exclusion from fisheries they 
have not themselves yet entered.  Applebaum may therefore have been ahead of his 
time in treating abstention as custom (without using the word) where a fishery is 
managed by a commission.
649
 
Although it is largely the “ins” that have dominated ICCAT through their original 
membership and their superior ability to devote resources to it, they have exhibited 
some awareness that complete exclusion of “outs” is not permissible.  Even though 
coastal States may not yet be ready to develop a fishery for a given species in their 
EEZ, they understandably wish to preserve their right to do so, which the “ins” are 
now willing to concede.  This is sometimes manifested in ICCAT Recommendations 
as a divide between large and small participants in a fishery, where catch limits are 
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  Applebaum, supra Ch I n 124, at 303. 
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accepted by the large, while those whose catch is too small to be individually 
threatening are each permitted to fish unrestricted as long as their catch does not rise 
above a certain level.  This may result in TACs that are less than the sum of their 
implied parts, as the national allocations of the large participants, added to the catch 
ceiling of all other members multiplied by their number, exceeds the stated TAC.
650
  
While this is arithmetically untidy, it does seem to offer a modus vivendi that works 
in practice to avoid friction – no small achievement for international fisheries law. 
Yet the 2007 debate in the WCPFC on applications for cooperating non-member 
status appears to be a reversion to the traditional coastal States versus distant-water 
fishing States contest.  New Zealand’s leading role in speaking against applications 
for cooperating non-member status seems to be at odds with its punctilious regard for 
other States’ rights in its response to the CCSBT’s externally obtained advice on 
quota trading.
651
  It also risks being counter-productive, since the main obligation of 
a cooperating non-member is to abide by the Convention and all conservation and 
management measures under it, whereas it would otherwise be subject only to a 
general duty of cooperation.
652
  Thus, to reject an application for non-compliance 
with an unsoundly based request to withdraw vessels, when the very purpose of the 
application is to bring those vessels’ fishing within the system, verges on the 
perverse, as does denying the “real interest” of States recently engaged in fishing in 
the Convention Area.  New Zealand and those arguing along similar lines appear to 
have forgotten that the obligation to cooperate is mutual: in rejecting an application 
for cooperating non-member status, the WCPFC is essentially telling applicants it 
does not wish to cooperate with them, and thereby relieving the applicants 
                                                          
650
  An example of this is the “Recommendation by ICCAT Concerning Bluefin Tuna Catch 
Limits in the East Atlantic and Mediterranean” (Annex 7-9 to ICCATSM12 Report), in ICCAT 
Green Book 2001/1, supra n 571, 142. 
651
  Infra Ch V, text at n 1074. 
652
  This was a point raised in the 2007 debate: WCPFC4 Report, supra n 637, at 4 
(paragraph 22). 
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themselves of their duty.  In the medium-to-long term this can only be to the 
detriment of the WCPFC’s effectiveness.653 
The reason for the distant-water fishing States speaking up in favour of admitting 
applicants rather than acting as “ins” is not obvious, but may be a consequence of 
them being latecomers themselves to the WCPFC (involuntarily so in the European 
Community’s case, whose application first had to be approved under Article 35 of 
the Honolulu Convention – this occurred at the first meeting in 2004654).  It is 
difficult to believe that the test for applications in the 2004 resolution would not have 
been substantially less stringent had they had any part in the negotiation of its text. 
F Conclusions 
The failure of the abstention principle to be accepted into international fisheries law, 
although a transitory setback for the cause of conservation, is in retrospect not 
surprising.  During consultations on abstention with the United Kingdom by visiting 
United States officials in 1953, Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, Member of the International 
Law Commission and Michael Graham, a leading fisheries scientist of the day, made 
the telling point to the visitors that abstention would not work in the North Sea.  This 
was because most of the States collectively overexploiting the fisheries of that body 
of water were coastal States, and as such would be exempt from its application.
655
  
Though its North American proponents were ahead of their time in promoting the 
need for a much stronger role for conservation as a basis for international fisheries 
law and identifying the new entrants problem as the chief obstacle to it, abstention 
was the wrong solution to the problem.  In particular, its allocative consequences 
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  Again this was noted in the debate, ibid., at 6 (paragraph 30), where some participants, 
“concerned that the Commission’s tools for managing the fishing activities of non-members are 
not as robust as its tools for managing the fishing activities of [those within the WCPFC]”, 
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  WCPFC1 Report, supra n 632, at 1(paragraph 6). 
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were unpalatable to the international community.
656
  It is also difficult to see how a 
legal principle can be erected on a voluntary waiver of rights without making that 
waiver compulsory, in other words abolishing the underlying right.  The abstention 
doctrine thus became a historical curiosity of international fisheries law, confined to 
the 1952 Convention, and the concrete problems it sought to solve in the Northeast 
Pacific were ultimately settled by the new concept of the 200-mile EEZ and the near-
ban on fishing on the high seas for anadromous species in Article 66 of UNCLOS. 
Has anything changed since Judge Oda criticised the 1958 Fishing Convention for 
not tackling allocation, an omission to which he attributed its lack of influence in the 
management of international fisheries?  He feared that the high seas fisheries 
provisions of UNCLOS might suffer the same fate for the same reason: 
[T]he obligation [in the 1958 Convention] to negotiate among the states concerned 
was virtually ignored in practice…and there have been few instances of international 
agreements or national legislation referring to it.  The basic problems facing us in 
respect of high seas fisheries concern the search for universally agreed principles 
according to which a limited amount of these resources should be allocated among 
nations, all of whom will undoubtedly clamor for greater shares.  Just as the 1958 
Convention did not provide any solution to the problems of allocation of fishery 
resources among states, thus failing to be implemented in any concrete case, so the 
1982 Convention—even allowing that, with its accent on the EEZ, it puts high seas 
fisheries in a rather different context—has likewise overlooked the importance of 
these basic problems of allocation by simply suggesting cooperation among nations 
for the conservation of these resources.  The institution for the settlement of 
disputes, if requested to tender its views on conservation of high seas fisheries, will 
inevitably be faced with the difficult issues surrounding the philosophy of fishery 
resource allocation. 
                                                          
656
  The fact that early exploiters of a fish stock typically have low fishing costs per tonne 
because of the high abundance and thus make good profits – at least while the biomass is above 
that generating their respective maximum economic yields – may explain why what amounts to a 
claim for preferential treatment for pioneer investors has had so little resonance in fisheries, 
unlike the case of deep seabed mining; see supra Ch II n 439. 
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…[I]t will inevitably be the power of diplomatic negotiations of each nation, not any 
legal principle, that will be determinant in settling the difference of views among 
nations with regard to the allocation of fishery resources…[W]hile the persistent 
difference of views among nations will make a mutually satisfactory solution 
difficult, their dispute will hardly be of so predominantly legal a character as to be 
suitable for submission to any judicial body.  Once conservation has been ensured, 
the regulation of competition for the high seas catch is surely, under the present 
regime, a political, not a legal, concern.
657
  
This overlooks the fact that it is precisely because of the underlying allocative 
tensions that conservation will often not be ensured; the only way the parties can 
avoid the difficulty is by taking a greater – and unsafe – overall catch in the short 
term, but one which is unlikely to be sustainable.  It is submitted, however, that the 
answer lies not in intensifying the search for elusive primary rules of allocation, but 
rather in a secondary, procedural mechanism that encourages States to resolve their 
differences before they collectively deplete the stock.  This is achieved by the 
expedient of subjecting allocation, despite its admittedly political character, to the 
institution of compulsory dispute settlement.  The knowledge that a third party can 
impose settlement at the instance of any party provides a powerful incentive to the 
compromise of differences that has hitherto been lacking.  It is significant that 
McDougal and Burke, while critical of most of the substance of the 1958 Fishing 
Convention,
658
 approve of its provision in Article 9 for compulsory dispute 
settlement – here by a five-member ad hoc “special commission” – as the only way 
of resolving issues of this nature.  This is to be contrasted with the optional dispute 
settlement protocol applying to the other three 1958 Conventions.
659
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  S. Oda, “Fisheries under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea”, (1983) 
77 American Journal of International Law (hereinafter AJIL) 739 at 754. 
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  McDougal and Burke, supra Ch I n 271, 959-1007, esp at 998ff. 
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  The Optional Protocol of Signature concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, 
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Under UNCLOS Article 116, paragraph (b), by which the high seas freedom of 
fishing is now subject to coastal States’ rights, duties and interests, Japan’s position 
in law is more precarious than its prominence in the CCSBT might suggest: it has 
only the same right as Korea and Taiwan to fish for SBT on the high seas, unless its 
long history of fishing for the species somehow gives it a superior right.  Some of 
Japan’s utterances suggest that this is its attitude,660 but this makes for a problematic 
legal basis given that this very history is largely one of depleting the stock.  Given 
that international fisheries law has little more to say about allocation of catch among 
States participating in a fishery, why has Article 116(b) gone largely unused, not 
only in the CCSBT but also elsewhere?
661
  Possibly it is because in practice the 
coastal State’s superior interest is only with difficulty realisable for highly migratory 
species, since insisting on absolute priority within the allowable catch for as much as 
it can itself take in its EEZ deprives of it any lever to induce catch restraint by States 
whose high seas fleets are beyond its enforcement reach.  Arguably the United States 
would have been better off in 1952 conceding to Japan a fixed share of the salmon 
catch close to its Pacific coast given the risk, which subsequently materialised, that 
the meridian of longitude 175° West established as the eastern limit of abstention by 
Japan from fishing for salmon would prove to lie too far east to prevent unrestricted 
interception on the high seas of salmon spawned in North American rivers.
662
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
&lang=en> (visited on 26 September 2008). 
660
  For example, in its written pleadings in the dispute (see Japanese memorial, supra Ch II 
n 433, at footnote 117 (page 80)) Japan stated that the effect of UNCLOS Art 297(3) was to 
shield decisions on conservation measures of States generally, not just of the coastal State in the 
EEZ, from the compulsory dispute settlement procedures of Part XV – as if its long history in the 
SBT fishery had elevated it to an equivalent status. 
661
  In ICCAT this is illustrated by the debate in 2003 on whether to divide the southern 
albacore TAC into individual shares, in which, of the four States that expressed clear opinions, 
one coastal State and one distant-water fishing States lined up on each side: Brazil and Taiwan 
were in favour, Namibia and Japan against: Annex 8 to ICCAT18 Report, supra n 612, at 188 
(Brazil, Namibia), 189 (Japan, Taiwan). 
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  Herrington, supra n 536, at 109; Scheiber, supra Ch I n 177, at 89. 
 225 
In the longer term, because the preference given to coastal States by Article 116, 
paragraph (b) of UNCLOS is an abstract right, particularly for highly migratory 
species, if coastal States are to benefit from this right they will need to be willing to 
commute it into a fixed share of the TAC higher than their political and economic 
clout alone would warrant.  They may wish to build in a sliding scale, so that as the 
TAC rises and falls the coastal State is partly protected against the fluctuations.  This 
will be difficult in ICCAT, which now has 46 Contracting Parties, almost all of them 
bordering the Atlantic Ocean and its adjacent seas (though few fish all the species 
subject to quota solely in their own EEZs),
663
 but the CCSBT offers more fertile 
ground for this innovation.  The advantage is that each year’s negotiations would be 
confined to the TAC and not to its division among participants in the fishery.  A 
partial example of this is ICCAT’s 1995 North Atlantic swordfish recommendation, 
by which 94 per cent of the TAC is divided in fixed shares among Canada, Japan, 
Portugal, Spain and United States, with the remaining 6 per cent left for “others”.664 
The duty to have regard to the interests of others in Article 87, paragraph 2 remains – 
so even though UNCLOS Article 116, paragraph (b) and UN Fish Stocks Agreement 
Article 11 establish priority of access for coastal States, that is no justification for 
those at the top of the priority ladder to monopolise the stock.  They must consider 
the interest even of those at the bottom: in the case of SBT, the Philippines as a 
would-be new entrant to the fishery on the high seas, and other developed States that 
may in future wish to enter the fishery.  Although the coastal State opponents of the 
UN Fish Stocks Agreement appear to favour a strategy of barricading themselves 
into their own EEZs, any attempt to capture the whole of the benefits for coastal 
States and place the entire conservation burden on distant-water fishing States is 
destined to fail because of the lack of reciprocity and thus of commitment as argued 
                                                          
663
  See the full list infra Ch IV n 900. 
664
  “Recommendation by ICCAT to Establish Percentage Shares of Total Allowable Catch 
(TAC) and Overage & Underage Provisions for Nations Fishing for North Atlantic Swordfish” 
(Annex 4-11 to ICCAT14 Report), in ICCAT Green Book 1996/1, supra n 534, 89. 
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above.  The top-down approach also makes the necessary trade-offs much easier to 
achieve than the bottom-up alternative.
665
 
As a practical matter, there appears to be little alternative to the call by Australia in 
the preliminary objections phase of the Annex VII arbitration for cooperation and 
compromise, admittedly an incomplete legal answer: 
The question is what tonnage it is equitable for [the non-Members] to fish, given 
both the state of the stock and the pre-existing interests in the stock of the three 
parties currently before the Tribunal.  In fact the third parties tell us that it was not 
they who depleted the stock in the first place.  And they do have a point...Equally, 
however, if the new entrants were to build up their own catch without limit, that 
would compound the danger and court disaster.  The solution must lie in co-
operation and compromise.
666
 
Even so, the “ins” versus “outs” dynamic remains a motor of debates in CCSBT as 
well as ICCAT, and is a continuation in another guise of the old doctrine of 
abstention.  The next chapter examines in detail how the CCSBT has treated third-
party entry issues and the extent to which it too may have unwittingly embraced 
abstention. 
                                                          
665
  Ørebech et al, supra Ch II n 315, at 129.  For East Atlantic and Mediterranean ABT, 
however, Costa Duarte et al, supra Ch I n 107, at 33 show coastal States are in a strong position 
through their ability to fish in their own EEZs. 
666
  Oral submissions to the Annex VII tribunal of counsel for Australia, Mr Serdy, on 8 May 
2000, in First Round Presentation of Australia and New Zealand, May 8, 2000 (hereinafter 
Transcript for 8 May 2000), at 192-193, archived under the item of 7 May 2000 at 
<www.icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/ICSID/ViewNewsReleases.jsp> (visited on 23 June 2008). 
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CHAPTER IV 
New entrants and the CCSBT 
A Introduction 
This chapter relates the history of the new entrants issue within the CCSBT.  The 
actions and goals of the CCSBT and its Members are measured against the yardstick 
of the modern rules of international fisheries law on new entrants.  The evidence 
suggests that, irrespective of whether they are party to the UN Fish Stocks 
Agreement,
667
 the Members’ aim has been to go beyond its rules and exclude new 
entrants to the extent possible, at times invoking concepts redolent of the doctrine of 
abstention unsuccessfully promoted by the United States in the 1950s. 
At the time of writing, of the States in whose EEZ SBT occurs or which catch 
significant quantities of it on the high seas – Australia, Indonesia, Japan, Korea 
(Republic of), New Zealand and South Africa – all six are party to UNCLOS, and all 
but one are parties to the UN Fish Stocks Agreement, the exception being Indonesia, 
which has signed it.
668
  Taiwan is not eligible to become party to either treaty.
669
  The 
CCSBT has made some attempt to take account of the Agreement’s implications for 
the way in which it manages the SBT stock, but has made little progress in this 
regard.
670
  Most notably, a management strategy consistent with Annex II was long 
                                                          
667
  Supra Introduction n 4. 
668
  See the electronic Status List for the UN Fish Stocks Agreement maintained by the 
Treaty Section of the UN Secretariat at <treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src= 
TREATY&id=460&chapter=21&lang=en> (visited on 26 September 2008). 
669
  Article 1(3) of the Fish Stocks Agreement suggests, however, that Taiwan as a fishing 
entity may be able to become party to any fisheries treaty not expressly limited to States: see A. 
Serdy, “Bringing Taiwan into the International Fisheries Fold: The International Legal 
Personality of a ‘Fishing Entity’”, (2004) LXXV British Year Book of International Law 183 at 
219 and generally. 
670
  The matter seems to have progressed no further than a report written by the Secretariat 
discussed by the Members before the 1999 Annual Meeting – see “Report from the Secretariat” 
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resisted by Japan; though work to develop such a strategy is now under way, in 2006 
it suffered a major setback and is now not due to be completed until 2011 or 2012.
671
  
For the time being, therefore, the UN Fish Stocks Agreement applies only to the 
purely bilateral interactions that the five States concerned have with each other in 
relation to SBT, but these are extremely limited, for example the potential for 
boarding and inspection of each other’s vessels on the high seas under Articles 20 to 
22 of the Agreement in case of a suspected violation of CCSBT measures. 
As regards the CCSBT’s openness to new entrants, the 1993 Convention672 on its 
face poses no obstacle to them.  Non-members fishing for SBT have a choice either 
of remaining outside the Commission, in which case Article 15 will apply to them: 
1. The Parties agree to invite the attention of any State or entity not party to this 
Convention to any matter relating to the fishing activities of its nationals, residents 
or vessels which could affect the attainment of this Convention. 
2. Each Party shall encourage its nationals not to associate with the southern 
bluefin tuna fishery of any State or entity not party to this Convention, where such 
association could affect adversely the attainment of this Convention. 
3. Each Party shall take appropriate measures aimed at preventing vessels 
registered under its laws and regulations from transferring their registration for the 
purpose of avoiding compliance with the provisions of this Convention or measures 
adopted pursuant to it. 
4. The Parties shall cooperate in taking appropriate action, consistent with 
international law and their respective domestic laws, to deter fishing activities for 
southern bluefin tuna by nationals, residents or vessels of any State or entity not 
party to this Convention where such activity could affect adversely the attainment of 
the objective of this Convention. 
                                                                                                                                                                    
(Attachment 10 to CCSBT5(1) Report), in CCSBT Blue Book 2000, supra Ch II n 413, 23 at 24 
(paragraph 9) – but has never found its way onto the formal agenda of any CCSBT meeting. 
671
  CCSBT-EC6 Report, supra Ch I n 141, at 22 (paragraphs 115 and 118).  See infra Ch 
VI, text between nn 1330 and 1334 on the crisis caused by the admissions of past overcatch 
which invalidated the data on which the strategy adopted in 2005 was based, just when it was 
about to be implemented. 
672
  Supra Introduction n 5. 
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or of acceding to the 1993 Convention under Article 18, which reads as follows: 
After the entry into force of this Convention, any other State, whose vessels engage 
in fishing for southern bluefin tuna, or any other coastal State through whose 
exclusive economic or fishery zone southern bluefin tuna migrates, may accede to it.  
This Convention shall become effective for any such other State on the date of 
deposit of that State’s instrument of accession. 
In theory, hence, the only condition for accession to the 1993 Convention by a State 
fishing for SBT or lying on the migratory path of the species is the deposit of an 
instrument of accession.  In practice, however, as the next section will demonstrate, 
matters have not been so straightforward.  The CCSBT is nonetheless a principal 
means by which those of its Members that are parties to the UNCLOS and the UN 
Fish Stocks Agreement and other fisheries treaties can implement their obligations 
under those treaties.  The next section examines the approach taken by the CCSBT 
and its Members since its formation to fishing for SBT by non-members individually 
and collectively, and the question of their membership. 
B The CCSBT’s dealings with third parties 
The most remarkable feature of the CCSBT’s handling of the new entrants issue has 
been the extent to which Article 18 of the 1993 Convention has been disregarded.  
Article 18 quoted above allows any State whose vessels catch SBT to become a 
member of the CCSBT and instantly acquire a veto over the setting of TAC and 
national allocations through the consensus rule for decision-making in Article 7.
673
  
No States have however taken advantage of this possibility.  This may be because 
they are reluctant to use deadlock as a political tool as their first act on entry, or 
because the Article 11 formula for sharing the costs of the CCSBT, which the 
Commission has conceded imposes a significant burden on Members with smaller 
                                                          
673
  Quoted supra Ch II, text following n 427; the whole Convention is reproduced infra in 
Appendix C, Part I. 
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catches, particularly if they are developing countries,
674
 makes them hesitant to join 
until the size of their allocation is known with some degree of certainty.  At all 
events, the first two new entrants since the 1993 Convention came into force – the 
Republic of Korea and Taiwan – chose to negotiate quotas first as a precondition of 
entry.  While Korea’s plaint at one point that its “strenuous efforts to be a member of 
CCSBT was [sic] not rewarded as expected”675 might be dismissed as an isolated 
rhetorical flourish, there were practical reasons peculiar to Taiwan rendering it 
unable to accede under Article 18.
676
 
This does not, however, account for the collective ignorance that descended over the 
debate in 2002 about South Africa’s possible accession.  For this the only plausible 
explanation is that the practice adopted regarding the first two new entrants appears 
to have infected the thinking of the CCSBT, its Members and would-be Members in 
relation to Article 18 generally.  Ignoring both Article 18 of the 1993 Convention and 
Article 8, paragraph 3 of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement, South Africa claimed a 
right under UNCLOS to accede to the 1993 Convention
677
 and purported to apply to 
do so.
678
  For its part, the Extended Commission is recorded as having been unable to 
                                                          
674
  The formula splits the budget into two components for the purposes of calculating 
assessments: 30% is shared equally among the Parties, and 70% in proportion to their “nominal 
catches” of SBT: see the text of Article 11(2), reproduced infra n 854.  For example, suppose for 
simplicity’s sake that South Africa, which at one point sought a national allocation of 250 tonnes 
(infra, text at n 771), by acceding to the 1993 Convention were able to secure an allocation equal 
to 1.5% of the TAC.  As one of six Members, its share of the CCSBT’s budget expressed as a 
percentage would then be (30 ÷ 6) + (70 x 0.015) = 6.05%, over four times its share of the catch.  
675
  “Opening Statement by the Republic of Korea” (Attachment F to Report of the Sixth 
Annual Meeting, Second Part, 21-23 March 2000, Canberra, Australia (hereinafter CCSBT6(2) 
Report)), in CCSBT Blue Book 2001, supra Ch I n 242, 73. 
676
  Infra, section C. 
677
  Attachment 6 to CCSBT-EC1 Report, supra Ch I n 242, at 55.  In the same statement 
South Africa dismissed the notion of “join[ing] on the basis of a mere prospect of a quota at some 
time in the future” (at 54). 
678
  CCSBT-EC1 Report, supra Ch I n 293, at 18 (paragraph 23).  See also the assumption 
by New Zealand of South Africa making an application for “full membership” of CCSBT in 
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agree on the terms and conditions it would require for this.
679
  Moreover, the 
information supplied by the Secretariat to the UN Secretariat for the Second Informal 
Meeting of States Parties to the UN Fish Stocks Agreement
680
 in 2003 states outright 
that the CCSBT “accepts new members by agreement among existing members.”  
This is so clearly erroneous – as well as being contrary to Article 8, paragraph 3 of 
the UN Fish Stocks Agreement, by which relevant fisheries commissions must be 
open to the participation of States with a real interest in the fishery concerned – that 
to persist with this line in future must threaten the CCSBT’s credibility. 
The CCSBT has however encouraged attendance by pertinent non-members at its 
meetings and those of its subsidiary bodies, as provided for in Article 14, paragraph 
1 of the 1993 Convention: 
The Commission may invite any State or entity not party to this Convention, whose 
nationals, residents or fishing vessels harvest southern bluefin tuna, and any coastal 
State through whose exclusive economic or fishery zone southern bluefin tuna 
migrates, to send observers to meetings of the Commission and of the Scientific 
Committee. 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Report of the Special Meeting of the Extended Commission, 26-27 April 2004, Busan, Republic of 
Korea (Appendix 3 to Report of the Special Meeting of the Commission, 26-27 April 2004, 
Busan, Republic of Korea; hereinafter CCSBTSM4 Report)), in CCSBT Blue Book 2005 supra 
Ch I n 34, 112 at 118 (paragraph 19) and China’s reported advice that it did not “intend to apply 
for full membership or cooperating non-membership of the CCSBT”, ibid. (paragraph 23).  
Further, in “Opening Statement by the Philippines” (Attachment 5 to CCSBT-EC3 Report), in 
CCSBT Blue Book 2005, supra Ch I n 34, 51, it expected the “upgrade of the Philippines’ status 
from being a cooperating non-member to member of the Commission”, as though this were not a 
matter in its own hands. 
679
  CCSBT-EC1 Report, supra Ch I n 293, at 18 (paragraph 25). 
680
  UN doc A/58/215 (5 August 2003), The status and implementation of the Agreement for 
the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention for the Law of the Sea of 
10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and 
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (the Fish Stocks Agreement) and its impact on related or proposed 
instruments throughout the UN system, with special reference to implementation of Part VII of 
the Fish Stocks Agreement, dealing with the requirements of developing States: Report of the 
Secretary-General, at 17 (paragraph 55(f)). 
 232 
As Table 3 on the next page shows, Taiwan and Indonesia attended the CCSBT’s 
First Meeting
681
 and Korea and Taiwan have not missed any meeting since 1996; 
both, but especially Taiwan, have also regularly attended Scientific Committee 
meetings and to a lesser extent ad hoc meetings such as workshops. 
1 Early attempts to reduce non-party catch – the 41 per cent 
formula 
No sooner had the CCSBT been formed than it turned its attention to the growing 
catch of SBT by vessels other than those flagged to its Members, adopting at its First 
Meeting an Action Plan in relation to non-parties.  This called for a series of joint 
diplomatic demarches to Indonesia, the Republic of Korea and Panama to request 
their cooperation with and participation in the conservation of SBT, as well as joint 
unofficial presentations to Taiwan for the same purpose.
682
  It also envisaged the 
collation, sharing and review of all trade, scientific and other relevant data on SBT 
available from non-parties with a view to determining the magnitude of their catches.  
The parties further agreed to monitor ICCAT’s statistical document program for 
                                                          
681
  Taiwan and Indonesia in fact began to attend meetings after the 1993 Convention had 
been signed but before its entry into force: 12th Trilateral Scientific Meeting Report, supra Ch II 
n 348, at 1 (paragraph 1): a representative from Taiwan, in attendance for the first time, offered 
to provide 5° square catch and effort data from Taiwanese longline and drift gillnet fisheries.  
The reiteration of this offer is recorded in 13th Trilateral Scientific Meeting Report, supra Ch I n 
46, at 1 (paragraph 1), where it is also stated that Indonesia was represented for the first time by 
an official who gave an update on SBT fishery developments within the Indonesian EEZ. 
682
  CCSBT1 Report, supra Ch I n 273, at 4 and Annex 3.  But this did not proceed until 
1998: see Attachment 10 to CCSBT5(1) Report, supra n 670, at 23 (paragraph 3), and the 
repeated intentions expressed at successive Commission meetings to that point: CCSBT2 Report, 
supra Ch II n 414, at 7; CCSBTSM1(2) Report, supra n 683, at 5; CCSBT3(2) Report, supra Ch 
II n 413, at 9; “Programme for Approaches to Non-Parties (Attachment G to CCSBT4(2) 
Report), in CCSBT Blue Book 1999, supra Ch I n 126, 80; and oral submissions to the Annex 
VII tribunal of counsel for Australia, Mr Serdy, on 8 May 2000 (Transcript for 8 May 2000, 
supra Ch III n 666, at 192-193).  See also the draft work program in Report of the Accession of 
Non-Parties Meeting, 13 May 1997, Sydney, Australia (hereinafter May 1997 Meeting on Non-
Parties Report), in CCSBT Blue Book 1999, supra Ch I n 126, 205 at 210. 
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Table 3: Attendance at meetings of the CCSBT and its principal subsidiary 
bodies by non-members exploiting the SBT stock
683
 
 
                                                          
683
  CCSBT1 Report, supra Ch I n 273, at 1; CCSBT2 Report, supra Ch II n 414, at 1; 
Attachment to CCSBTSM1(1) Report, supra Ch I n 38; Attachment 1 to Report of the 
Reconvened First Special Meeting, Canberra, 17 – 19 January 1996 (hereinafter CCSBTSM1(2) 
Report, <www.ccsbt.org/docs/pdf/meeting_reports/ccsbt_2/report_of_special_meeting1_part2. 
pdf> (visited on 13 June 2008)); Attachment B to CCSBTSM2 Report, supra Ch I n 289; 
CCSBT3(1) Report, supra Ch I n 102, at 1; CCSBT3(2) Report, supra Ch II n 413, at 1; 
CCSBT4(1) Report, supra Ch I n 126, at 2; Report of the Fourth Annual Meeting, Second Part, 
19-22 January 1998, Canberra, Australia (hereinafter CCSBT4(2) Report), ibid., 57 at 59; 
Report of the Fourth Annual Meeting, Third Part, 19-21 February 1998, Canberra, Australia 
(hereinafter CCSBT4(3) Report), ibid., 87 at 89; CCSBT5(1) Report, supra Ch II n 413, at 3; 
Report of the Fifth Annual Meeting, Second Part, 10-13 May 1999, Tokyo, Japan (hereinafter 
CCSBT5(2) Report), in CCSBT Blue Book 2000, supra Ch II n 413, 71 at 73; CCSBT6(1) 
Report, in CCSBT Blue Book 2001, supra Ch I n 242, 1 at 3 (paragraph 1); CCSBT6(2) Report, 
ibid., 49 at 51 (paragraph 1); Report of the Special Meeting, 16-18 November 2000, Canberra, 
Australia (hereinafter CCSBTSM3 Report), ibid., 107 at 109 (paragraph 2); CCSBT7 Report, 
supra Ch III n 449, at 3 (paragraph 1); CCSBT8 Report, supra Ch I n 30, at 63 (paragraph 6); 
Attachment 3 to CCSBT-EC1 Report, in CCSBT Blue Book 2003, supra Ch I n 46, 33 at 37 and 
40-41; CCSBT-EC2 Report, supra Ch II n 353, at 15 (paragraph 5); Attachment 2 to CCSBT-
EC3 Report, in CCSBT Blue Book 2005, supra Ch I n 34, 33 at 34-35 and 38-40; Appendix 2 to 
CCSBTSM4 Report, ibid., 106 at 111; Attachment 1 to CCSBT-EC4 Report, supra Ch I n 248; 
Attachment 2 to CCSBT-EC5 Report, supra Ch I n 102; Attachment 2 to Report of the Special 
Meeting of the Extended Commission, 18-19 July 2006, Canberra, Australia (hereinafter 
CCSBT-ECSM Report; Appendix 3 to CCSBT, Report of the [5th] Special Meeting of the 
Commission, 18-19 July [2006], Canberra, Australia (hereinafter CCSBTSM5 Report), <www. 
ccsbt.org/docs/pdf/meeting_reports/ccsbt_13/report_of_special_ meeting_2006.pdf> (visited on 
13 June 2008)); Attachment 2 to CCSBT-EC6 Report, supra Ch I n 141; CCSBT-SC2 Report, 
supra Ch I n 240, at 1; Report of the Fourth Meeting of the Scientific Committee, 3-6 August 
1998, Tokyo, Japan (hereinafter CCSBT-SC4 Report), in CCSBT Blue Book 2000, supra Ch II n 
413, 95 at 97; Report of the Fifth Meeting of the Scientific Committee, 19-24 March 2001, Tokyo, 
Japan (hereinafter CCSBT-SC5 Report) in CCSBT Blue Book 2002, supra Ch I n 30, 151 at 153 
(paragraph 1); CCSBT-SC6 Report, supra Ch I n 291, at 229 (paragraph 2); Attachment 1 to 
CCSBT-ESC1 Report, in CCSBT Blue Book 2003, supra Ch I n 46, 138 at 141-142; Attachment 
A to CCSBT-ESC2 Report, in CCSBT Blue Book 2004, supra Ch I n 32, 135 at 138; Attachment 
1 to CCSBT-ESC3 Report, in CCSBT Blue Book 2005, supra Ch I n 34, 191 at 192 and 194; 
Attachment 1 to CCSBT-ESC4 Report, supra Ch I n 114; Attachment 1 to Report of the 
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Meeting Year Indonesia Korea 
(Republic of) 
South Africa Taiwan 
Commission Meetings      
First Meeting 1994 X   X 
Second Meeting 1995 X X  X 
First Special Meeting, First Part 1995 no attendance by non-members 
First Special Meeting, Second Part 1996 no attendance by non-members 
Second Special Meeting 1996 no attendance by non-members 
Third Meeting, First Part 1996 X X  X 
Third Meeting, Second Part 1997  X  X 
Fourth Meeting, First Part 1997  X  X 
Fourth Meeting, Second Part 1998 X X  X 
Fourth Meeting, Third Part 1998 X X  X 
Fifth Meeting, First Part 1999  X X X 
Fifth Meeting, Second Part 1999 X X X X 
Sixth Meeting, First Part 1999  X X X 
Sixth Meeting, Second Part 2000  X X X 
Third Special Meeting* 2000  X X X 
Seventh Meeting 2001 X X X X 
Eighth Meeting 2001  X**  X 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Extended Scientific Committee for the Eleventh Meeting of the Scientific Committee, 12-15 
September 2006, Tokyo, Japan (hereinafter CCSBT-ESC5 Report; Appendix 2 to Report of the 
Eleventh Meeting of the Scientific Committee, 12-15 September 2006, Tokyo, Japan, <www. 
ccsbt.org/docs/pdf/meeting_ reports/ccsbt_13/report_of_SC11.pdf> (visited on 13 June 2008); 
Attachment 1 to CCSBT-ESC6 Report, supra Ch I n 141; Attachment 1 to Report of the First 
Meeting of the Compliance Committee, 8 – 9 October 2006, Miyazaki, Japan, <www.ccsbt.org/ 
docs/pdf/meeting_reports/ ccsbt_13/report_of_CC1.pdf> (visited on 13 June 2008); Attachment 
2 to Report of the Second Meeting of the Compliance Committee, 14 – 15 October 2007, 
Canberra, Australia, <www.ccsbt.org/docs/pdf/meeting_reports/ccsbt_14/report_of_cc2.pdf> 
(visited on 13 June 2008).  For brevity documents titled “List of Participants” with or without the 
name of the meeting are referred to simply by their attachment or appendix number.  Resumed 
meetings are disregarded where they were held in conjunction with an immediately following 
meeting.  For a full list of the meetings of the CCSBT and its subsidiary bodies since entry into 
force of the 1993 Convention see <www.ccsbt.org/docs/pdf/meeting_schedule/ccsbt_previous_ 
meetings.pdf> as from time to time updated.  Meetings of the various working groups, workshops 
and similar are omitted from the table for manageability. 
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Meeting Year Indonesia Korea 
(Republic of) 
South Africa Taiwan 
Ninth Meeting 2002  **  *** 
Tenth Meeting* 2003 X **  *** 
Fourth Special Meeting 2004 X **  *** 
Eleventh Meeting* 2004 X ** X *** 
Twelfth Meeting* 2005 X **  *** 
Fifth Special Meeting* 2006  **  *** 
Thirteenth Meeting**** 2006 X **  *** 
Fourteenth Meeting* 2007 X ** X *** 
Scientific Committee Meetings      
First Meeting 1995 no attendance by non-members 
Second Meeting 1996 X    
Third Meeting 1997 no attendance by non-members 
Fourth Meeting 1998 X X  X 
Fifth Meeting 2001  X X  
Sixth Meeting 2001 X X X X 
Seventh Meeting 2002 X **  *** 
Eighth Meeting 2003  **  *** 
Ninth Meeting 2004  **  *** 
Tenth Meeting 2005 X **  *** 
Eleventh Meeting 2006  **  *** 
Twelfth Meeting 2007 X **  *** 
Compliance Committee Meetings      
First Meeting 2006  **  *** 
Second Meeting 2007  **  *** 
 
* Meeting also attended by the Philippines. 
**  Korea deposited its instrument of accession to the 1993 Convention during the Eighth 
Meeting. 
***  Taiwan participated from the Ninth Meeting as a full Member of the Extended 
Commission established in 2001: text accompanying n 857 infra. 
****  Meeting also attended by both the Philippines and the European Community. 
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ABT and consider the merits of a similar scheme for SBT, as well making every 
effort to discourage their nationals from involvement in fishing, transactions or other 
non-party activity where these were likely to undermine the effectiveness of their 
SBT conservation effort.
684
  
At an informal meeting in October 1994, Japan proposed that “surplus” quota from 
the reductions in catch of new Members be used for “research quota”.  Australia 
responded that their catch restraint would actually have to occur before such an idea 
could be considered, while New Zealand voiced concern that this might as act as a 
disincentive to catch restraint by non-members considering joining the CCSBT.
685
  
Japan presented a draft paper on quota allocation for new entrants.  In calculating the 
potential quota for new entrants, Japan said, it had ignored catch data from after the 
signature of the 1993 Convention (10 May 1993), so that prospective newcomers 
would not have an incentive to increase their fishing effort in order to build a larger 
catch history as a basis for seeking additional quota, an approach for which Australia 
and New Zealand expressed general support.
686
  At the April 1995 informal meeting, 
the parties agreed that new entrants should be required to accept the same reduction 
in their catch as the parties themselves had accepted since the last year before they 
had imposed catch limits under the trilateral arrangements, namely to 41 per cent of 
their former catch.  On this basis they expected that the cumulative allocations to 
new entrants would not exceed 615 tonnes.
687
  At its second meeting the CCSBT 
                                                          
684
  CCSBT1 Report, supra Ch I n 273, at 5; except perhaps as regards transactions, the last 
is no more than is required by CCSBT Article 15(2), reproduced supra, text following n 671. 
685
  Japan – Australia – New Zealand Southern Bluefin Tuna Consultations, Canberra 17-19 
October 1994, Summary Record (hereinafter October 1994 Summary Record, subsequently 
incorporated into the report of the CCSBT’s first meeting: supra Ch II n 413), at 4. 
686
  Ibid., at 4-5. 
687
  April 1995 Draft Summary Record, supra Ch II n 413, at 8; this implies a cumulative 
annual catch by significant non-Members of 1,500 tonnes, corroborated by the ICCAT Standing 
Committee on Research and Statistics noting in 1992 that catches by other countries had 
increased and were now estimated at more than 1,600 tonnes: Report of the Standing Committee 
on Research and Statistics (SCRS) (Madrid, November 2-6, 1992) (Annex 14 to Proceedings of 
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decided that in principle any new entrant would be offered a quota equal to 41 per 
cent of its average yearly catch in the years 1991 to 1993, a figure that might be 
adjusted by negotiations with the new entrant on the basis of the factors set out in 
Article 8, paragraph 4 of the 1993 Convention.
688
 
The CCSBT did not immediately reveal the rationale behind its position.  Although 
considerations of equity are implicit in it, neither this nor any other legal basis was 
offered for it.  As subsequent events showed, a more generous offer might have 
induced Korea and Taiwan to cooperate with the CCSBT much sooner than they did.  
As it was, with no compelling argumentation to support taking a 59 per cent cut in 
their catch, they simply continued fishing and, at least at first, made no effort to 
restrict the growth of their SBT catches. 
Not until its Second Meeting, held a month after the UN Fish Stocks Agreement was 
adopted, did the CCSBT give explicit reasons for catch restraint by third parties.  
Attributing the “urgent need for all non-parties fishing for southern bluefin tuna to 
                                                                                                                                                                    
the Eighth Special Meeting of the Commission, Madrid, November 9-13, 1992 (hereinafter 
ICCATSM8 Report)), in ICCAT, Report for biennial period, 1992-93 Part I 1992 (hereinafter 
ICCAT Green Book 1993), 127 at 182.  The base year of 1986 (see infra n 689) was however the 
first restricted, not the last unrestricted year, which negates any implicit rationale on which the 
CCSBT may have been relying. 
688
  CCSBT Article 8(4) provides that: 
4. In deciding upon [Parties’ national] allocations...the Commission shall consider: 
(a) relevant scientific evidence;  
(b) the need for orderly and sustainable development of southern bluefin tuna fisheries; 
(c) the interests of Parties through whose exclusive economic or fishery zones southern 
bluefin tuna migrates; 
(d) the interests of Parties whose vessels engage in fishing for southern bluefin tuna 
including those which have historically engaged in such fishing and those which have 
southern bluefin tuna fisheries under development; 
(e) the contribution of each Party to conservation and enhancement of, and scientific 
research on, southern bluefin tuna; 
(f) any other factors which the Commission deems appropriate. 
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come within the Convention regime” to the depleted state of the stock, the report 
argued that  
given…the restraint that Commission members had been required to demonstrate as 
a result, it was of crucial importance to the future of the fishery that the non-parties 
did not expand their fishing effort or take any other action that could undermine the 
objectives of the Commission.
689
  
2 Further growth in non-member catches 
In 1996, at the second session of the First Special Meeting, the Members recognised 
that their difficulties on management measures could hinder efforts to secure third 
parties’ participation, but blamed each other for this.  Japan charged that the 
CCSBT’s “negative attitude...towards the optimum utilisation of SBT reduced the 
incentives for non-parties to join”; Australia and New Zealand replied that failure by 
the Commission to demonstrate responsible management of the stock would reduce 
the attraction for non-parties to join it.
690
  There can be seen in hindsight to be 
substance in both accusations, Japan’s in the longer term and Australia’s and New 
Zealand’s in the shorter term (though Japan’s is largely negated by the peculiar sense 
in which it employs the term “optimum utilisation”691).  The most important reason, 
however, continued to be the quota allocation formula. 
Later that year at the CCSBT’s Third Meeting, Korea pledged to cooperate with it in 
the conservation and management of SBT and said that in principle it would be 
willing to join the Commission, but could not do so while “the catch allocation for 
new entrants [was] so small that the Korean fishing industry would not be able to 
                                                          
689
  CCSBT2 Report, supra Ch II n 414, at 7-8.  See also the text circulated by the Chair 
outlining principles for determining quota allocation for new entrants, reproduced at Annex 6 to 
the Report, in which a footnote states the base for the Parties’ own 59% reduction was 1986, 
when their combined catch was 28,841 tonnes.  Although this figure is supported by Caton et al, 
supra Ch I n 36, at 21, in Table 2 (supra Ch I) the three Parties’ total catch for that year is 28,319 
tonnes; the difference may be because the Table presents catch by calendar year. 
690
  CCSBTSM1(2) Report, supra n 682, at 5. 
691
  See the discussion of this infra in Appendix A, n 1493 and accompanying text. 
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sustain their fishing business”.  It requested the CCSBT to rethink the catch 
allocation formula for new entrants.
692
  Indonesia regarded the CCSBT as “useful” 
for the conservation and management of SBT, but declined to join.  Its representative 
noted Indonesia’s lack of fisheries data and asked the existing Members to cooperate 
with it to remedy this.
693
  The Commission directed the Secretariat to write to both 
governments seeking information on their SBT fisheries.
694
  
Taiwan announced that it would in future restrict its catch to the 1995 level of 1,447 
tonnes whole weight
695
 and that it had secured funding to attend Scientific 
Committee meetings and introduced a vessel monitoring system to collect catch and 
other fisheries data and provide daily reporting of catch statistics to its authorities.
696
 
When the Meeting resumed three months later, all Members noted the need for the 
CCSBT to take stronger action than in the past to secure the participation of third 
parties.  They again expressed strong concern at the continued expansion of catch by 
Korea, Indonesia and Taiwan, who had all signed or expressed support for the UN 
Fish Stocks Agreement, at a time when the Members themselves were exercising 
restraint.  Japan also noted the need to consider other countries that were just starting 
to fish for SBT.  It was agreed that each Member would nominate a representative to 
work as part of a small team to develop options for encouraging Korea and Indonesia 
to join the CCSBT and Taiwan to cooperate with its management measures, while 
                                                          
692
  CCSBT3(1) Report, supra Ch I n 102, at 4.  Korea repeated the point at the second 
session of the meeting: CCSBT3(2) Report, supra Ch II n 413, at 9. 
693
  CCSBT3(1) Report, supra Ch I n 102, at 4. 
694
  Ibid., at 11. 
695
  Ibid., at 10.  At the second session of the meeting Taiwan rounded this up to 1,450 
tonnes: infra text at n 699.  The 1,447 tonnes did not include 110 tonnes caught by a vessel in 
December 1995 that were not landed until January 1996: CCSBT4(1) Report, supra Ch I n 126, 
at 6.  The fortuitous consequence of this was that the level of Taiwan’s voluntary cap was lower 
than it would have been had these fish been landed in 1995, since Taiwan’s catch for that year, 
and presumably its voluntary limit, would have been 1,557 tonnes. 
696
  CCSBT3(1) Report, supra Ch I n 102, at 4. 
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senior representatives of Members would seek direct discussions with counterparts 
from Indonesia, Korea and Taiwan to the same end.
697
 
For its part, Korea was prepared to have one of its scientists attend the next Scientific 
Committee meeting as an observer.
698
  Taiwan too reaffirmed its intent to become a 
full Member and said that, to cooperate with the CCSBT, it had imposed a maximum 
catch of 1,450 tonnes in 1996, a limit it would maintain while the current TAC 
prevailed, but if the TAC were raised in future, Taiwan would increase its own catch 
limit by the same percentage.
699
 
All Members expressed support for aspects of the Secretariat’s recommendations for 
work to identify countries eligible to join the CCSBT, and for inviting them to do so, 
or at least attend as observers.
700
  The Commission summarised its position vis-à-vis 
the non-members in the following Communiqué it adopted: 
The Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT), which 
was…established…to provide an international forum for the conservation, 
management and optimum utilisation of southern bluefin tuna (SBT), is urging other 
countries who fish SBT to a significant level to join the Commission, and fishing 
entities to cooperate by applying SBT conservation and management measures. 
The United Nations Agreement on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory 
Fish Stocks established that the long term viability of stocks can only be effectively 
secured if countries become members of, or in the case of fishing entities cooperate 
in applying, the conservation and management measures established by regional 
fisheries management organisations, in this instance the CCSBT.  
The current Commission members, Australia, Japan and New Zealand, have 
developed and implemented strict controls on the taking of SBT in order to rebuild 
the stock.  Members of the Commission are required to set a Total Allowable Catch, 
which for the year 1996/97 is 11,750 tonnes.  However, the benefits of these 
conservation measures are being eroded by non-member fishing fleets not only 
                                                          
697
  CCSBT3(2) Report, supra Ch II n 413, at 9. 
698
  Ibid.  
699
  Ibid., at 10. 
700
  Ibid. 
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continuing to fish but in some instances increasing their catches of SBT in recent 
years.  Reported catches of non-members were in excess of 3,000 tonnes in 1996.  
The Commission regrets that the restrictions imposed on the fleets of member 
countries are being undermined by the action of fleets from non-members and again 
calls upon those countries and entities to acknowledge and participate in the stock 
rebuilding programme.  In the case of non-members currently taking significant SBT 
catch, the Commission strongly believes they should accede to the Convention or 
cooperate by applying the Commission’s conservation and management measures 
and thereby contribute to a more rapid recovery of the stock.  The Commission will 
pursue, (as a matter of high priority), further discussions with non-member SBT 
fishing nations and entities with a view to securing this participation, as required by 
Article 15 of the Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna.  
The Commission requests:  
1. That as a matter of priority non-members actively limit their catch of SBT;  
2. That non-members as soon as possible accede to the Convention for the 
Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna, or cooperate by applying the 
Commission’s conservation and management measures;  
3. That non-members provide accurate SBT fishing data to the Commission.
701
  
3 Negotiations begin with non-members 
Following an intersessional meeting at which the Members agreed that a more 
flexible approach on quota allocation to new entrants was needed than had been 
pursued to date,
702
 Korea and Taiwan began to be more forthcoming with 
information on their SBT fisheries. 
At the CCSBT’s Fourth Meeting, the Korean delegation advised that Korean 
longliners targeting yellowfin and bigeye tuna had moved progressively into the SBT 
grounds, and in recent years fishing occurred through most of the year.  Catch had 
increased to 1,179 tonnes in 1996, taken by eight longliners.  While the domestic 
consumption of SBT was increasing, 70 to 80 per cent of the catch was exported to 
                                                          
701
  Ibid., at 13 and Attachment J. 
702
  May 1997 Meeting on Non-Parties Report, supra n 682, at 209. 
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Japan.
703
  In addition, Korea for the first time indicated the size of the quota it saw as 
appropriate for itself: 
My country has also wanted...to join this organisation.  However, the...member 
countries of CCSBT have closed their door and they are not willing to open.  
Member countries suggested a quota allocation formula for us to accede to [the 1993 
Convention], but we think that the suggestion is unreasonable for a new entrant to 
join the organisation. ...Korea has considered...accession…, if we can secure an 
appropriate quota which would amount to at least about 1000 Mt a year.
704
  
Taiwan reported that most of its SBT catch was bycatch.
705
  Once 1,450 tonnes had 
been reached, SBT caught subsequently were required to be returned to the ocean – a 
practice New Zealand found unsatisfactory as a catch-limiting mechanism.
706
 
                                                          
703
  CCSBT4(1) Report, supra Ch I n 126, at 6-7.  Note that, despite the opprobrium it 
attracts from existing participants, new entrants expecting their catch history to play a part in the 
size of the quota negotiated have an incentive to overstate rather than understate their catch.  This 
gives existing participants a choice between querying the catch figures and condemning the 
overfishing they represent; they cannot credibly do both.  Earlier the same year, for example, the 
CCSBT had queried the discrepancy between Korea’s stated catch of 1,179 tonnes and Japanese 
import statistics which indicated a significantly lower catch than could be expected if the claimed 
percentage of Korea’s catch was exported to Japan.  There is also a note of incredulity in the 
CCSBT’s comment that the extensive fishing areas indicated for the Korean vessels operating in 
the fishery were largely outside known SBT fishing areas: CCSBT3(2) Report, supra n 413, at 9-
10.  Japan also disagreed with Taiwan’s assertion that its fleet fished in areas where SBT would 
only be taken as bycatch, since the areas identified in Taiwan’s report were largely south of other 
tuna fishing grounds, at latitudes where SBT was a target species: CCSBT4(1) Report, supra Ch I 
n 126, at 6. 
704
  “Opening Statement – Republic of Korea” (Attachment G to CCSBT4(1) Report), in 
CCSBT Blue Book 1999, supra Ch I n 126, 28. 
705
  “Review of SBT Fisheries – Taiwan” (Attachment O to CCSBT4(1) Report), in CCSBT 
Blue Book 1999, supra Ch I n 126, 43 at 45. 
706
  CCSBT4(1) Report, supra Ch I n 126, at 6.  In 2002, however, Taiwan admitted that it 
had managed its catch on a 5-year average of 1,450 tonnes, though it would introduce yearly 
catch limits to replace this.  Thus, despite its catches in 1999 and 2000 of 1,513 and 1,638 tonnes 
respectively, Taiwan calculated its average catch over 1996-2000 as 1,387 tonnes: CCSBT8 
Report, supra Ch I n 30, at 66 (paragraph 38) and 138 (Attachment K-5, “Review of Taiwan SBT 
Fishery of 2000/01”). 
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In reaction, the CCSBT now saw as urgent the need for Korea and Indonesia to join 
it and for securing Taiwan’s cooperation.  Their catch had risen over the past few 
years to the point where it threatened the recovery of the SBT stock, contrary to their 
international obligations to cooperate in its conservation and management.
707
 
The Second Part of the CCSBT’s Fourth Annual Meeting saw the adoption of an 
Action Plan to deal with the non-member issue.  It had five operative paragraphs: 
1. The Commission renews its calls on non-members fishing for SBT to honour 
their international obligations to cooperate in the conservation and management of 
SBT, to respect the competence of the Commission, and to 
a) accede to the Convention or decide to apply the conservation and management 
measures currently adopted by the Commission with regard to southern bluefin 
tuna; and 
b)  collect more comprehensive and accurate data concerning the fisheries for 
southern bluefin tuna by their nationals, residents and vessels, to verify such 
data and to provide them to the Commission. 
2. Having considered the low level of parental biomass and the need to rebuild the 
SBT stock, but acknowledging that reasonable but limited allowance should be made 
for Non-members fishing for SBT, the Commission has determined that no more 
than 2550 mt of SBT should be taken in total by Non-members which accede to the 
Convention or decide to apply the Commission’s conservation and management 
measures.  The Commission notes the strong obligation for Non-members to accede 
immediately, but until such time as they accede to the Convention or decide to apply 
its conservation and management measures, the Commission considers that the only 
responsible action for Non-members to take is to substantially reduce their catch of 
SBT to ensure that their cumulative catches of SBT do not exceed 2550 mt and to 
implement voluntarily other conservation and management measures decided upon 
or recommended by the Commission.  
3. The Commission will consider a scheme to collect more accurate and 
comprehensive information on SBT fishing though trade, with a view to evaluating 
and designing such a scheme.  A special working group for this purpose will be 
established.  
                                                          
707
  CCSBT4(1) Report, supra Ch I n 126, at 7. 
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4. The Commission will periodically review the effectiveness of conservation and 
management measures of the Commission, based on catch data compiled by the 
CCSBT, national statistics, trade information and other relevant information 
obtained at ports and at the fishing grounds.  If the effectiveness of CCSBT 
conservation and management measures is being undermined by the fishing 
activities of particular non-members, the Commission will immediately take 
appropriate further measures in accordance with international law, to ensure the 
effectiveness of conservation and management measures of the CCSBT.  
5. The parties will adopt appropriate measures in accordance with Article 15.2 and 
Article 15.3 of the Convention within the limits of their authority.  These measures 
will include, but are not limited to, measures to discourage their nationals from 
engaging in or cooperating with Non-member fishing activities for SBT, i.e. on 
board fishing vessels registered in Non-members, as fishing master, vessel operation 
supervisor, or crew.
708
  
A number of points may be noted.  First, although it is not apparent how the figure of 
2,550 tonnes was arrived at, it is clearly a substantial advance on the 1994 formula 
which yielded a collective limit for non-member catch of around 615 tonnes.
709
  
Implicitly the CCSBT was inviting the non-members to co-ordinate with each other, 
either directly or through the Secretariat, since there is no other way in which they 
could adhere to the collective limit.  Yet, as subsequent events were to show,
710
 it 
was still insufficient. 
                                                          
708
  “Action Plan concerning Promotion of Accession to, and Cooperation with, CCSBT by 
non-Member States and Entities” (Attachment F to CCSBT4(2) Report), in CCSBT Blue Book 
1999, supra Ch I n 126, 78 at 78-79.  The lengthy preamble is not reproduced. 
709
  Supra, text at n 687. 
710
  Given the quotas negotiated with Korea and Taiwan of 1,140 tonnes each – infra text at 
nn 738 and 740 – this would leave Indonesia a quota of 270 tonnes at most, and ignores the later 
advent of South Africa, which as a coastal State on the SBT migratory path could also reasonably 
expect a quota.  Implicitly the total was raised to 3,829 tonnes in 2001, being the difference 
between the most recent estimated catch of 15,579 tonnes adopted as a “provisional global catch 
limit” and the 11,750 tonnes of the original three Parties’ cumulative national allocations: see 
CCSBT8 Report, supra Ch I n 30, at 70 (paragraph 75). 
 245 
Secondly, the call to apply the conservation and management measures is made in 
the abstract, since, due to the impasse within the CCSBT on a TAC and national 
allocations, apart from the recently adopted obligation to use tori poles south of 30°S 
as a seabird bycatch mitigation measure, at the time no such measure was in force for 
Australia and New Zealand whose season had ended,
711
 while Japan’s had only a few 
weeks to run.
712
 
Thirdly, since UNCLOS Articles 64 and 116-119 do not contain a specific obligation 
to this effect, it is not clear where the Members thought the source of the “strong 
obligation for Non-members to accede immediately” could lie unless Article 8 of the 
UN Fish Stocks Agreement had already acquired the force of custom.
713
  
At the CCSBT’s Fifth Meeting in 1999, Korea’s opening statement referred to its 
serious concern about “recent discord among member states over the function of the 
organization”, noting that such “instability” of the Commission could dissuade Korea 
from joining it.  The principal hindrance to that step, however, remained the 
“insufficient offer of quota for Korea which is far from the present reality of Korean 
SBT industry”.  Reporting catches in 1996 and 1997 of 1,179 and 1,325 tonnes 
respectively and an expected catch for 1998 of 1,562 tonnes, Korea asked for a 
“more practical” quota of at least twice the 550 tonnes previously offered, indicating 
                                                          
711
  See infra Ch V n 1168. 
712
  CCSBT4(1) Report, supra Ch I n 126, at 8 accepting the recommendations of the 
Ecologically Related Species Working Group at 52 (Attachment U, “Recommendations to the 
Commission relating to Ecologically Relate [sic] Species”, paragraph 3).  As the Commission’s 
power to bind its Members in Article 8(3) of the 1993 Convention is expressed to be “[f]or the 
conservation, management and optimum utilisation” of SBT, it is uncertain whether measures 
relating to seabird bycatch come under this provision, since the management of the SBT stock, in 
the absence of a predator/prey relationship, is unaffected, except to the extent that the efficiency 
of fishing effort is impaired because a longline hook with a bird impaled on it is thereby disabled 
from catching a fish. 
713
  See now infra Ch VI n 1218 and accompanying text. 
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willingness to participate in any experimental fishing program that the Members 
might adopt by consensus.
714
 
The CCSBT sent a letter to the Korean Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries 
referring to its objective of restoring the SBT stock to 1980 levels by 2020 and its 
serious concern at Korea’s increasing catches and the lack of comprehensive data on 
these.  After giving notice that it was considering a trade certification scheme similar 
to ICCAT’s, the letter renewed the CCSBT’s call on Korea to “recognise the 
obligation of States under international law, including [UNCLOS] and the UN Fish 
Stocks Agreement, to cooperate through regional fishery management organisations 
and to apply the conservation and management measures imposed by [them].”  
Repeating the Action Plan’s wording that “a reasonable but limited allowance should 
be made for non-members fishing for SBT”, the CCSBT was “prepared to negotiate 
an acceptable level of quota to be made available to non-members which accede to 
the Convention”.  Accordingly, it invited Korea to “undertake formal negotiations to 
accede to the Convention at the resumed session of the Fifth Meeting.”715  Taiwan 
received a letter similar in substance, though tailored in form to Taiwan’s 
international status and its existing voluntary catch limit.
716
  Australia undertook to 
prepare for the next session a proposal to facilitate Indonesia’s accession.717 
At the second session of the meeting, Japan reported bilateral discussions it had held 
with Korea and Taiwan without securing any firm commitment from either.  Korea 
again indicated that “as a responsible fishing nation” it wished to cooperate with the 
                                                          
714
  “Opening Statement by Korea” and “Annual Review of Korean Southern Bluefin Tuna 
Fisheries” (Attachments 7 and 16 respectively to CCSBT5(1) Report), in CCSBT Blue Book 
2000, supra Ch II n 413, 20 and 42 respectively.  Although there is no record of a 550-tonne 
offer to Korea, application of the 41% formula to Korea’s catch using 1997 rather than 1991-93 
as the base year yields 543.25 tonnes. 
715
  Attachment 18 to CCSBT5(1) Report, in CCSBT Blue Book 2000, supra Ch II n 413, 45 
at 45. 
716
  Attachment 19 to CCSBT5(1) Report, ibid., 47. 
717
  CCSBT5(1) Report, supra Ch II n 413, at 4. 
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CCSBT to achieve proper management of the stock, but repeated its industry’s 
concern that joining it might mean an unacceptable reduction in its catch.  As usual, 
Taiwan indicated that it would continue to cooperate with the CCSBT by limiting its 
catch to 1,450 tonnes per annum, working with it on the issue of flag of convenience 
vessels and participating in any trade information scheme.  Should its long-term 
objective of full membership of the Commission not be taken seriously, however, “it 
would be difficult to maintain full cooperation with CCSBT management 
arrangements in the long term.”718 
Outside the plenary there were separate discussions with Indonesia, Korea and 
Taiwan.  With Indonesia there was general discussion of a “package” to assist 
Indonesia’s accession to the 1993 Convention, but Indonesia expressed a preference 
for the SBT fishery to be managed by the IOTC.
719
  Korea reported 1998 catch in 
excess of 2,000 tonnes and evinced a general reluctance to avoid any step that might 
endanger its authorities’ “good relationship with industry”.720  The meeting with 
                                                          
718
  CCSBT5(2) Report, supra n 683, at 75.  On flag of convenience vessels see infra, text at 
nn 798-801. 
719
  “Record of the Bilateral Meeting between Representatives of the Commission and 
Indonesia, Mita Kaikan, Tokyo, 12 May 1999” (Attachment E to CCSBT5(2) Report), in CCSBT 
Blue Book 2000, supra Ch II n 413, 85 and 86 (Annex 1, “Opening Statement by Indonesia”).  
This may be because Indonesia would bear a much higher proportion of the CCSBT’s running 
costs under the formula in Article 11 of the 1993 Convention (see supra n 674) than it would of 
the IOTC’s, given the far greater number of members of the latter – 17 at the time: see the status 
list maintained by the FAO as depositary at <www.fao.org/Legal/treaties/013s-e.htm> (visited 
on 1 August 2008) – and the fact that the IOTC’s funding formula apportions 80% of the budget 
in ways that give an effective discount to Members with low per capita income and low 
development status: “Scheme for Calculation of Contributions to the Administrative Budget of 
the Commission” (Annex to Financial Regulations (Appendix F to Report of the First Special 
Session of the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission, Rome, Italy, 21-24 March 1997 (hereinafter 
IOTCSS1 Report))), in IOTCSS1 Report (FAO Fisheries Report No 554; Rome: FAO, 1997), 41. 
720
  “Record of discussion between the representatives of the Republic of Korea and the 
Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT), Tokyo, 12 May 1999” 
(Attachment F to CCSBT5(2) Report), in CCSBT Blue Book 2000, supra Ch II n 413, 87 at 87-
88. 
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Taiwan
721
 centred on Taiwan’s relationship with the CCSBT and is treated below in 
section C. 
4 The Commission turns to trade measures to enforce non-member 
cooperation 
By late 1999 Japanese impatience with Korea and Taiwan had become intense.  All 
Members agreed that the increasing catch by non-members was cause for concern as 
it “eroded the Commission’s work for the conservation and optimum utilisation” of 
the SBT stock.  The report of the Sixth Meeting records an exchange on this issue 
among Japan, Korea and Taiwan, in which Japan referred to Korea’s readiness to 
accept in 1998 of an allocation of 1,000 tonnes,
722 and described Korea’s insistence 
on a significant increase above this amount to cover the rise in its catch since then as 
“completely unreasonable” given the fall of over 70 per cent in Japan’s own 
allocation in the late 1980s.
723
 
                                                          
721
   See “CCSBT Record of Discussions between the Commission and Representatives of 
Taiwan, Tokyo, 12 May 1999” (Attachment G to CCSBT5(2) Report), ibid., 89 at 89-90. 
722
  CCSBT6(1) Report, supra Ch I n 219, at 4 (paragraph 15); see also supra text at n 704. 
723
  Note that Japan employs here the tactic of claiming credit for its reduction from an 
unsustainable base.  It did so again in the preliminary objections phase of the Southern Bluefin 
Tuna Case, describing as an “achievement” the fall in the three parties’ quota from 38,650 tonnes 
in 1985 to 11,750 tonnes in 1989 and highlighting Japan’s “contribution” of reducing by 74% its 
own catch from 23,150 tonnes to 6,065 tonnes: oral submissions to the Annex VII tribunal of 
counsel for Japan, Professor Ando, Transcript for 7 May 2000, supra Ch II n 433, at 30; Counsel 
for Australia, Mr Serdy, pointed out the following day that Japan’s base figure was “not [even] 
remotely sustainable”: Transcript for 8 May 2000, supra Ch III n 666, at 193.  See also the 
written pleadings of the applicants (Reply on Jurisdiction of Australia and New Zealand 
(hereinafter Applicants’ Reply), archived under the item of 7 May 2000 at <www.icsid. 
worldbank.org/ICSID/ICSID/ViewNewsReleases.jsp> (visited on 23 June 2008), at 89n), noting 
that not until 1989 did Japan have to curtail its fishing effort in order not to exceed its catch 
limits.  The 59% reduction underlying the 1994 quota allocation formula for new entrants, supra 
nn 687 and 688 and accompanying text, is somewhat more reasonable, but the fate of that 
formula shows that even then, those who needed to be convinced found it unpersuasive. 
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Dissatisfied with the responses of Korea and Taiwan, Japan tabled a draft plan for 
trade-related measures based on the ICCAT model for bluefin tuna and swordfish.
724
  
For its part, Korea announced that it would voluntarily limit its catch to 1,600 tonnes 
and that by withdrawing three vessels from the SBT fishing grounds it had reduced 
its capacity from 19 vessels to 16.  It also undertook to provide catch and effort data 
under the planned Trade Information Scheme should the CCSBT adopt it, and noted 
its desire to have its scientists attend meetings of the Scientific Committee.
725
  When 
the meeting resumed some months later, Korea reduced its demand to 1,500 tonnes, 
and offered the additional explanation that at the time it had requested 1,000 tonnes, 
“officials had not been aware of the current catch levels of their fishing fleet.  Recent 
catch data indicated catches were in the order of 2000 tonnes and therefore…a quota 
of 1500 tonnes was reasonable.”  This increase “was not designed to increase 
Korea’s allocation but was caused by the fall of the won in 1997.”726 
                                                          
724
  CCSBT6(1) Report, supra Ch I n 219, at 4 (paragraph 16).  The Japanese draft Action 
Plan is at 31 (Attachment L, “(Draft) Resolution by CCSBT concerning an Action Plan to Ensure 
Effectiveness of the Conservation Measures for Southern Bluefin Tuna”).  Trade restrictions as a 
tool for enforcing fisheries management measures were not a new idea.  They were first proposed 
in 1965 for what became ICCAT by the FAO Working Party for Rational Utilization of Tuna 
Resources in the Atlantic Ocean, at whose two sessions the 1966 Convention, supra Introduction 
n 6, was negotiated on the basis of a draft presented to the first session by the United States, 
before being taken to a diplomatic conference in Rio de Janeiro: J.E. Carroz and A.G. Roche, 
“The Proposed International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas”, (1967) 61 
AJIL 673 at 673, but did not survive into the final text of the Convention adopted there.  Draft 
Article IX(4) adopted by the Second Session of the Working Party provided that “The 
Contracting Parties agree to prohibit traffic in fish, in any form, taken in contravention of 
approved Commission recommendations to which they have not objected under the provisions of 
Article VIII.”  See FAO, Report of the Second Session, FAO Working Party for Rational 
Utilization of Tuna Resources in the Atlantic Ocean, Rome, 6-13 July 1965 (FAO Fisheries 
Report No 27) (Rome: FAO, 1965), at 18. 
725
  “Opening Statement by the Republic of Korea” (Attachment F to CCSBT6(1) Report), in 
CCSBT Blue Book 2001, supra Ch I n 242, 25. 
726
  CCSBT6(2) Report, supra n 683, at 51 (paragraph 7).  The implied link in the chain of 
causation is that it thereby became profitable for Korean vessels to export SBT to Japan. 
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The Action Plan was adopted at the resumed session of the Sixth Meeting in a 
resolution
727
 based on the Japanese draft, but mentioning in addition in its preamble 
Article 15, paragraph 4 of the 1993 Convention (obliging Parties to cooperate in 
taking appropriate action to deter non-Party fishing that could adversely affect the 
Convention’s object).  The operative paragraphs of the resolution were as follows: 
1. The Commission requests non-Members catching SBT to cooperate fully with 
the Commission in implementing the measures applicable to Members for 
conservation, management and optimum utilisation of SBT (hereinafter referred to 
as “conservation and management measures”).  The Commission also requests those 
non-Members to advise it of their actions taken in that regard.  
2. The Commission will identify, at or before the Seventh, and then at each 
subsequent Annual Meeting of the Commission, those non-Members whose vessels 
have been catching SBT in a manner which diminishes the effectiveness of the 
conservation and management measures, based on catch data compiled by the 
Commission, trade information and other relevant information obtained in ports and 
on fishing grounds. 
3. The Chair of the Commission shall request those non-Members identified 
pursuant to paragraph 2 to rectify their fishing activities so as not to diminish the 
effectiveness of the conservation and management measures and to advise the 
Commission of their actions taken in that regard. 
4. Members shall jointly and/or individually request non-Members catching SBT to 
cooperate fully with the Commission in implementing the conservation and 
management measures. 
5. The Commission will review, at subsequent Annual Meetings as appropriate, 
actions taken by those non-Members to which requests have been made pursuant to 
paragraphs 3 and 4, and identify those non-Members which have not rectified their 
fishing activities. 
6. The Commission may decide to impose trade-restrictive measures consistent 
with Members’ international obligations on SBT products, in any form, from the 
non-Members identified pursuant to paragraph 5.  
                                                          
727
  “Action Plan” (Attachment I to CCSBT6(2) Report), in CCSBT Blue Book 2001, supra 
Ch I n 242, 76. 
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Japan suggested identifying non-members who were not taking steps towards 
cooperating with the CCSBT.  Korea argued that, with quota negotiations continuing, 
and voluntary restraint by Korea of its catch, the action set out in the Plan would be 
premature.  It complained that the CCSBT was attempting to impose requirements on 
non-members beyond the provisions of UNCLOS, all the more egregiously given 
that Members had not themselves arrived at an agreed TAC.
728
  The Chair pointed 
out that the Resolution was not aimed at non-members cooperating with the CCSBT, 
nor was it intended to undermine the Commission’s negotiations with them.  Rather, 
it was aimed at the operations of non-members and vessels whose actions were 
undermining the CCSBT’s management arrangements, so as to encourage them to 
join the Commission or cooperate with its arrangements.
729
  This, it is submitted, is 
sufficient to dispose of Korea’s true but irrelevant objection.  The pressure exerted 
on it by the CCSBT is consistent with Article 8 of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement 
and the legality of trade restrictions would depend on their consistency with the 
GATT.
730
  Even the fact that the CCSBT as a whole had not set a TAC is not fatal to 
trade restrictions provided the World Trade Organization (WTO) Member imposing 
them has limited its own catch.
731
 
                                                          
728
  CCSBT6(2) Report, supra n 683, at 52 (paragraphs 12 and 14). 
729
  Ibid. (paragraph 14). 
730
  Australia and New Zealand stressed that any proposed measures would need to be 
consistent with Members’ obligations under international law, particularly those under GATT, 
supra Introduction n 22: ibid.  Japan stated that its draft was modelled on ICCAT’s 1994 Plan, 
“which was designed to ensure consistency with”  GATT: “Opening Statement by Japan” 
(Attachment D to CCSBT6(2) Report), in CCSBT Blue Book 2001, supra Ch I n 242, 70 at 71. 
731
  Serdy, supra Ch III n 448, at 99.  Article XX of GATT, supra Introduction n 22, is 
headed “General Exceptions” and provides, so far as material (emphasis added), that: 
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would 
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the 
same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this 
Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting 
party of measures: 
… 
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At its Seventh Meeting the CCSBT identified Cambodia, Equatorial Guinea, 
Honduras and Belize under paragraph 2 of the Resolution as non-members whose 
vessels had been catching SBT in a manner that diminished the effectiveness of its 
conservation and management measures.  Although no action was taken against 
those States, the CCSBT decided to continue to monitor their activity.  Belying the 
Chair’s previous denial that the principal third parties were the targets of the Action 
Plan, there was discussion of both Indonesia and Taiwan under this agenda item, and 
the question of Indonesia was remitted for review at the Eighth Meeting.
732
 
The report of that meeting records no decision on Indonesia under the relevant 
agenda item.  There was however a draft decision appended to the report, in which 
the CCSBT identified Indonesia under paragraph 2 of the Action Plan as a non-
member whose vessels were catching SBT in a manner diminishing the effectiveness 
of its conservation and management measures.  The draft instructed the Executive 
Secretary to write to Indonesia bringing this to its attention and requesting it to 
rectify its fishing activities so as not to diminish the measures’ effectiveness and 
advise the CCSBT of its actions taken to that end, as well as urging Indonesia to take 
measures to prevent fishing on the SBT spawning grounds and ensure that SBT 
Statistical Documents were completed in accordance with the Trade Information 
Scheme’s requirements.733 
Instead, the CCSBT’s attention turned to action targeted at specific vessels as an 
alternative to banning imports of SBT from all vessels of a particular flag.
734
  
Cambodia, Equatorial Guinea and Honduras were identified pursuant to paragraph 5 
                                                                                                                                                                    
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made 
effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption[.] 
 
On disguised restriction on trade, see infra n 905 and accompanying text. 
732
  CCSBT7 Report, supra Ch III n 449, at 6 (paragraphs 26 and 27). 
733
  “Draft Decision regarding Indonesia pursuant to the 2000 Action Plan” (Attachment I to 
CCSBT8 Report), in CCSBT Blue Book 2002, supra Ch I n 30, 100. 
734
  CCSBT8 Report, supra Ch I n 30, at 65 (paragraph 26). 
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as non-members having failed to rectify their fishing activities so as not to diminish 
the effectiveness of the CCSBT’s measures.  The Executive Secretary was instructed 
to write to each of them informing them that, unless a satisfactory response were 
received by the time of the next meeting, that meeting would consider taking trade-
restrictive measures under paragraph 6.
735
  The decision on Belize noted in its 
preamble a “limited response from Belize indicating some willingness to cooperate 
with the Commission, but that it is unable to provide information on fishing vessels 
until domestic measures are put into place to collect such information”.  The 
Executive Secretary was instructed to write to Belize informing it that in the absence 
of a satisfactory response by the time of the next meeting, the CCSBT would identify 
Belize pursuant to paragraph 5 as a non-member having failed to rectify its fishing 
activities so as not to diminish the effectiveness of the Commission’s measures, and 
could at the same meeting take trade-restrictive measures under paragraph 6.
736
  At 
the Tenth Meeting Members agreed that no further action needed to be taken against 
Belize, Cambodia, Equatorial Guinea and Honduras because the Trade Information 
Scheme showed that their catch had dropped to zero; nor against Indonesia and the 
Philippines because of their undertakings to cooperate with the CCSBT.  Action 
against the Seychelles was suspended in consequence of its undertaking to Japan not 
to fish for SBT.
737
 
5 Korea and Taiwan accept quota offers and join the Commission 
At the CCSBT’s November 2000 Special Meeting, the Republic of Korea advised 
that it accepted the quota offer of 1,140 tonnes made to it and now intended to accede 
to the 1993 Convention.
738
  Korea ultimately deposited the necessary instrument on 
17 October 2001, during the CCSBT’s Eighth Meeting.739 
                                                          
735
  Attachment H to CCSBT8 Report, supra Ch I n 254. 
736
  Attachment G to CCSBT8 Report, supra Ch I n 254. 
737
  CCSBT-EC2 Report, supra Ch II n 353, at 18 (paragraphs 27-29). 
738
  CCSBTSM3 Report, supra n 683, at 109 (paragraph 11) and 127 (Attachment F; 
“Opening Statement by the Republic of Korea”).  The quantum of the offer does not appear in the 
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At the Eighth Meeting Taiwan too accepted the CCSBT’s offer of 1,140 tonnes as a 
basis for its application for membership of the Extended Commission.  Taiwan said it 
would not issue trade information scheme certificates to any SBT catch above that 
quota, nor to any fresh SBT caught on the spawning ground once the latter’s location 
was advised to it by the CCSBT.
740
  Suggesting that tension continued until the last 
moment, however, the Commission said its acceptance of that application would 
depend on its being made by the end of 2001 and an immediate undertaking by 
Taiwan to restrict its annual catch to 1,140 tonnes pending the completion of its 
domestic legal processes required to give effect to its membership of the Extended 
Commission.  The CCSBT also threatened to identify Taiwan under paragraph 2 of 
its Action Plan,
741
 if these conditions were not met, as a non-member whose vessels 
were catching SBT in a manner diminishing the effectiveness of its conservation and 
management measures, and to consider trade-restrictive measures under paragraphs 5 
and 6 of the Action Plan.  In reply, Taiwan claimed – not without justification – that 
“after all those concessions we have made, it would be unreasonable to resort to 
                                                                                                                                                                    
report, but can be deduced from the Korean catch limit mentioned in reports of subsequent 
meetings – “Item 9 – Statement by Australia” and “Statement by Japan on Agenda Item 9.2” 
(Attachments N-1 and N-2 respectively to CCSBT8 Report), in CCSBT Blue Book 2002, supra 
Ch I n 30, 143 at 143 (Australia), 145 (Japan). 
739
  CCSBT8 Report, supra Ch I n 30, at 63 (paragraph 11); see also the website maintained 
by the Australian Government as depositary of the 1993 Convention, <www.austlii.edu.au/au/ 
other/dfat/treaty_list/depository/sbtuna.html> (visited on 2 November 2008).  Note that the 
revised 2001 budget includes an amount for Korea that represents half of a full-year assessment: 
Report of the Finance and Administration Committee, 16-18 October 2001, Miyako, Japan 
(Attachment J to CCSBT8 Report), in CCSBT Blue Book 2002, supra Ch I n 30, 101 at 105 
(Annex 3).  By Regulation 5.5(a) of the Financial Regulations (adopted at the Reconvened First 
Annual Meeting, supra Ch II n 413, <www.ccsbt.org/docs/pdf/about_the_commission/financial_ 
regulations.pdf>, visited on 13 June 2008), if a new Member joins the Commission in the second 
half of the year, it pays half of what it would have paid for the full year, and other Members’ 
assessments are reduced accordingly for that year. 
740
  “Statement made by Taiwan in the Plenary” (Attachment F to CCSBT8 Report), in 
CCSBT Blue Book 2002, supra Ch I n 30, 97.  On the Extended Commission see section C infra. 
741
  Supra n 727. 
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Action Plan against such a cooperative non-member.”742  The conditions appear to 
have been satisfied, as Taiwan took its place in the Extended Commission at the 
CCSBT’s Ninth Meeting in October 2002.743 
6  The long road to Indonesian accession 
Indonesia’s infrequent attendance at CCSBT meetings before becoming party to the 
1993 Convention – see Table 3 above – meant that most of its interaction with the 
Members took place informally on the scientific level.  As a developing country, 
Indonesia faced a twofold additional obstacle to its participation beyond the Article 
11 formula in the 1993 Convention for financial upkeep of the Commission: a lack of 
institutional fisheries management capacity, firstly to gather information on what is 
mainly a bycatch fishery for SBT and secondly to impose and enforce limits on catch 
of SBT.
744
  Thus estimates of Indonesia’s catch presented at CCSBT meetings have 
tended to vary widely.  For example, in 2000 the Commission was informed that the 
Indonesian industry estimated its catch at 150 tonnes, the Indonesian Government at 
800-850 tonnes and Australian scientists at 2,500 tonnes.
745
  In 2001 Indonesia told 
the CCSBT that it believed its take of SBT to be largely bycatch, though some SBT 
was targeted by Taiwanese vessels or vessels with Taiwanese fishing masters 
                                                          
742
  CCSBT8 Report, supra Ch I n 30, at 64 (paragraph 13). 
743
  CCSBT-EC1 Report, supra Ch I n 293, at 16 (paragraph 2).   
744
  See the remarks of Counsel for Australia, Mr Serdy, in Transcript for 8 May 2000, supra 
Ch III n 666, at 184-185: 
A complicating factor in [Indonesia’s] case is that most, if not all, of its SBT catch is taken as 
bycatch from its yellowfin and bigeye tuna fishery.  Indonesia, it need hardly be said, is not a 
country at the same stage of development as the parties before you.  Until now, it has had 
neither the legal tools nor the administrative machinery that we take for granted in enforcing 
our catch limits domestically.  It does plan to acquire them, we understand, but laws have to 
be passed and administrative systems established, and...this takes time.  Australia has been 
leading for the Commission in discussion with Indonesia aimed at...familiarizing Indonesian 
fisheries officials with modem management methods and also at introducing the Indonesian 
fleet to methods of fishing that would reduce Indonesia’s SBT bycatch to a point where its 
adherence to a quota on accession to the 1993 Convention becomes feasible. 
745
  CCSBT6(2) Report, supra n 683, at 51 (paragraph 9). 
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operating out of Bali; while about 300 tonnes of SBT were landed, there was a need 
to clarify whether this represented the whole catch or some had been transhipped.  
Indonesia said it was keen to determine where exactly on the spawning grounds, and 
in what season, spawning occurs, so that it could advise its fishermen accordingly 
“and perhaps regulate their fishing practices.”746 
At the CCSBT’s Eighth Meeting, however, there was further criticism of Indonesia’s 
data collection and provision, Japan complaining that the Trade Information Scheme 
data it received from Indonesia had been “quite poor” and with “considerable 
missing information”.  The CCSBT agreed to develop options for a plan to secure 
Indonesia’s accession to the 1993 Convention and improve data provision, with 
Australia to act as the main point of contact.
747
  Indonesia’s interest in joining the 
CCSBT was tempered by concern to be compensated for reducing its catch on the 
spawning grounds, and the level of the membership fee.
748
 
                                                          
746
  CCSBT7 Report, supra Ch III n 449, at 5 (paragraphs 17-19). 
747
  CCSBT8 Report, supra Ch I n 30, at 65 (paragraphs 16 and 18). 
748
  CCSBT6(2) Report, supra n 683, at 51 (paragraph 9); see also CCSBT7 Report, supra 
Ch III n 449, at 3: “budgetary and financial considerations had been a major constraint” 
(paragraph 6).  At the 2003 annual meeting the CCSBT conceded that the formula was a 
hindrance to developing countries’ accession to the 1993 Convention and agreed to review it, but 
in 2004 said it preferred to look for mechanisms other than an amendment to Article 11, “which 
would be difficult to achieve in a short timeframe”: CCSBT-EC2 Report, supra Ch II n 353, at 16 
(paragraph 13); CCSBT-EC3 Report, supra Ch I n 78, at 24 (paragraphs 55 and 56).  Note that 
the participation of one or more members of the Indonesian delegation was financed out of the 
CCSBT budget: ibid., at 17 (paragraph 12), 55 (Attachment 7a-1, “Commission for the 
Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna Revised General Budget - 2004) and 58 (Attachment 7b-
1, “Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna General Budget - 2005 
(CCSBT11), providing for the same in the following year).  This support has continued up to the 
present: see “Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna General Budget - 2006 
(CCSBT13)” (Attachment 7b-1 to CCSBT-EC4 Report, supra Ch I n 248), “Table 1: General 
Budget - 2007 (CCSBT14)” in (untitled) Attachment 7 to CCSBT-EC5 Report, supra Ch I n 102; 
and CCSBT-EC6 Report, supra Ch I n 141, at 4 (paragraph 30) and “General Budget for 2008” 
(Attachment 7a to CCSBT-EC6 Report). 
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At the Tenth Meeting Indonesia referred to a forthcoming revision of its fisheries law 
that would cover regional cooperation, as well as of its improved data collection 
mechanism which would distinguish between SBT and bigeye tuna.  Aware that a 
resolution on cooperating non-members was likely to be adopted, it asked in its 
opening statement to be admitted to the CCSBT as a “non-cooperating [sic] non-
member”.749  Although at the 2004 Special Meeting Indonesia announced that it had 
a submitted an application to that end, at the subsequent Eleventh Meeting Indonesia 
indicated that it was no longer pursuing this objective,
750
 prompting the CCSBT to 
write to Indonesia to warn that it was considering taking stronger action against 
Indonesia under the 2000 Action Plan, while still wishing Indonesia to become a 
cooperating non-member as soon as possible.
751
 
The crucial nature of Indonesian cooperation to the CCSBT’s ability to manage its 
stock is shown by the Extended Scientific Committee’s enumeration of the 
consequences of ending the monitoring of Indonesian catch: the CCSBT would have 
no reliable information on the size and age composition of the spawning stock with 
which to gauge the impact of current and future management measures on its 
composition; limited or no information on removals from the spawning stock by the 
Indonesian fishery, fluctuations in which, at the current estimated biomass, have the 
potential to affect appreciably the accuracy of stock assessments.  It would be unable 
to assess changes in operations of the Indonesian fleet and foreign fleets operating 
under the Indonesian flag.  Lack of information on the age structure of the SBT catch 
as a direct input into the stock assessment would increase uncertainty in relation to 
recent changes in the spawning stock and predictions about the impact of future 
                                                          
749
  “Opening Statement by Indonesia” (Attachment 5-1 to CCSBT-EC2 Report), in CCSBT 
Blue Book 2004, supra Ch I n 32, 53. 
750
   “Opening Statement by Indonesia” (Attachment 4-6 to Appendix 3 to CCSBTSM4 
Report), in CCSBT Blue Book 2005, supra Ch I n 34, 139; see also Appendix 3 to CCSBTSM4 
Report, supra n 678, at 117 (paragraph 18), indicating that a “formal application would be 
received in the near future.” 
751
  CCSBT-EC3 Report, supra Ch I n 78, at 27 (paragraphs 84 and 85). 
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catches; data for estimating the age at maturity and relative spawning potential and 
possible changes in these over time would also be lacking.
752
 
At the 2005 meeting Indonesia explained that disagreement within its government 
was the cause of its decision, but it still intended to cooperate with the CCSBT.
753
  
Members were especially concerned at Indonesia’s rising catch and its effect on the 
spawning stock.
754
  Were Indonesia to reverse its decision, they decided, it would be 
granted an 800-tonne quota.
755
  Indonesia queried the figures, which may have been 
inflated by transshipping.
756
  No trade measures were taken, because the earlier 
decision allowing catch to be landed in ports of a Member or cooperating non-
member only from vessels nominated by one of their number had the same effect.
757
  
Even so, Indonesia asked at the 2006 meeting for their “removal”, with a renewed 
commitment to cooperating with the CCSBT and again promised to seek the status of 
cooperating non-member “in the near future”.758  Its quota was reduced to 750 
tonnes.
759
  At the 2007 meeting Indonesia said that it now expected to become a full 
Member, but still cited internal legal processes for its inability to act to date;
760
 
                                                          
752
  CCSBT-ESC3 Report, supra Ch I n 236, at 186 (paragraph 115). 
753
  CCSBT-EC4 Report, supra Ch I n 248, at paragraph 24.  See also “Opening Statement 
by Indonesia” (Attachment 6). 
754
  Ibid., at paragraph 23. 
755
  Ibid., at paragraph 67. 
756
  Ibid., at paragraph 79. 
757
  Ibid., at paragraph 118.  See Resolution on Illegal, Unregulated and Unreported Fishing 
(IUU) and Establishment of a CCSBT Record of Vessels over 24 meters [sic] Authorized to Fish 
for Southern Bluefin Tuna (Attachment 10 to CCSBT-EC2 Report), in CCSBT Blue Book 2004, 
supra Ch I n 32, 90. 
758
  CCSBT-EC5 Report, supra Ch I n 102, at 17 (paragraph 97); see also Attachment 6-2 
(“Opening Statement by Indonesia”). 
759
  Ibid., at 13 (paragraph 64). 
760
  CCSBT-EC6 Report, supra Ch I n 141, at 35 (paragraphs 186 and 187); see also 
“Opening Statement by Indonesia” (Attachment 6-1), indicating that only the requisite 
Presidential decree remains outstanding. 
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ultimately its instrument of accession to the 1993 Convention was deposited on 8 
April 2008.
761
 
7 The remaining significant non-members 
With Indonesia, Korea and Taiwan now within the CCSBT, South Africa is the most 
significant non-member State.  The Philippines also attended two meetings in 2000 – 
see Table 3 above – and has expressed interest in joining the CCSBT, as well as its 
intent to cooperate with it; although its SBT catch was bycatch, it wished to develop 
a targeted SBT fishery in future.
762
  It subsequently also became a cooperating non-
member, as did South Africa and the European Community.
763
  There is also a 
growing problem of unregulated fishing for SBT by vessels flying flags of 
convenience but controlled by the Members’ own industries. 
At the CCSBT’s Tenth Meeting, Members expressed pleasure that Indonesia and the 
Philippines were interested in taking up the new status of cooperating non-member 
pursuant to the resolution passed at that meeting,
764
 and that Seychelles had 
indicated, through Japan, that it would not fish for SBT.
765
  The Executive Secretary 
was instructed to write to South Africa, the Philippines and Indonesia inviting them 
to apply for association with the Extended Commission under that status, though the 
latter was intended not to be permanent but as an interim step towards accession to 
the 1993 Convention.
766
 
                                                          
761
  See the depositary website supra n 739. 
762
  CCSBT-EC2 Report, supra Ch II n 353, at 17 (paragraph 20). 
763
  Infra, text at nn 790, 782-783 and 796 respectively. 
764
  Infra n 803. 
765
  CCSBT-EC2 Report, supra Ch II n 353, at 17 (paragraph 18).  According to figures 
provided by Japan, 177 tonnes of SBT were imported into Japan from Seychelles-flagged vessels 
in 2002: see “Import Statistics of SBT by Japan” (Appendix 2 to Attachment 8-3 to CCSBT-EC2 
Report), in CCSBT Blue Book 2004, supra Ch I n 32, 77. 
766
  CCSBT-EC2 Report, supra Ch II n 353, at 17 (paragraphs 23 and 24). 
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(a) South Africa 
Since its first appearance as an observer at the CCSBT’s Fifth Meeting in 1999, 
South Africa’s attendance at meetings has been more regular than Indonesia’s.  South 
Africa reported that its domestic tuna fishery consisted mainly of pole and line 
operations directed at albacore rather than SBT.  The occasional landings of SBT 
over the last ten years had never been more than 1 tonne in dressed weight.  The 
catch from a new experimental longline fishery in 1997, targeting billfish and tuna 
other than SBT, was 756 kg.  In addition, Japan and Taiwan reported to South Africa 
under their respective access agreements catches of SBT from South Africa’s EEZ, 
the mean reported Japanese catch in the years 1990-1998 having been 34 tonnes.  
Taiwan reported 14 tonnes in 1997 and three tonnes in the first half of 1998.
767
 
                                                          
767
   “Opening Statement by South Africa” (Attachment 8 to CCSBT5(1) Report), in CCSBT 
Blue Book 2000, supra Ch II n 413, 21.  Signed in Pretoria on 6 December 1977, the Agreement 
on Fisheries between the Government of Japan and the Government of the Republic of South 
Africa, available online in the Internet Guide to International Fisheries Law <www.intfish.net/ 
treaties/bilaterals/texts/jap-rsa/1977.htm> (visited on 4 November 2008), entered into force on 
signature by Article 9 and was to have run until 31 December 1979.  By an exchange of Notes on 
20 December 1979 between the Consul-General of Japan in Pretoria and a Deputy Secretary of 
the South African Department of Foreign Affairs, the Agreement was extended for a further two 
years initially and thereafter would remain in force “until the expiration of six months from the 
date on which either Government shall give notice to the other of its intention to terminate the 
Agreement.”  The text of the Notes is appended to that of the Agreement, ibid.  A similar treaty 
with the Republic of China, with which South Africa at that time maintained diplomatic relations, 
was signed in Cape Town on 26 January 1978 and entered into force the same day by virtue of 
Notes exchanged simultaneously with signature between the Ambassador of the Republic of 
China and the South African Minister of Foreign Affairs: Agreement between the Republic of 
China and the Republic of South Africa on Mutual Fishery Relations and Memorandum of 
Understanding, available online in the Internet Guide to International Fisheries Law <www. 
intfish.net/treaties/bilaterals/texts/chi-rsa/1978.htm> (visited on 4 November 2008), Article 8.  
Since Taiwanese vessels targeted albacore rather than SBT, their catch of SBT in South Africa’s 
EEZ over the years would have been taken as bycatch.  By Article 10 the Agreement could be 
terminated by either Party on 12 months’ notice at any time after ten years from the date of its 
entry into force.  Taiwan’s access to South African waters appears to have continued even past 
South Africa’s recognition of the People’s Republic of China, to judge by the announcement on  
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The appointment of a South African national as Chair of the Scientific Committee
768
 
will have heightened South Africa’s interest, though its validity depends on a 
creative reading of the 1993 Convention.
769
  At the CCSBT’s Seventh Meeting South 
Africa expressed interest in attaining full membership, with the matter under 
consideration by its Government.
770
  Although not present at the Eighth Meeting, it 
indicated that it would be seeking a quota allocation of 250 tonnes.
771
 
Subsequently the question of South Africa’s accession became entangled in the 
resolution of the allocation question, as it did for Korea.  This is analysed below in 
section E.  South Africa’s absence from the Tenth Meeting of the CCSBT was an 
early indication of this happening.  Welcoming coastal States in the abstract, Taiwan 
said that a catch limit should be decided for them before they joined the Extended 
Commission as cooperating non-members.
772
  While some Members supported South 
Africa’s entitlement to develop its SBT fishery, others were concerned about the 
development of a flag of convenience fishery in South Africa.
773
  At the 2004 Special 
Meeting of the CCSBT, South Africa presented its history of catches of SBT in its 
EEZ.  Although this showed catches exceeding the 30 tonnes that the CCSBT offered 
it, Japan thought South Africa would be unable to develop a substantial SBT fishery 
                                                                                                                                                                    
2 August 2002 of the Minister for Environmental Affairs and Tourism, Mr Moosa, that access of 
Taiwanese as well as Japanese vessels to South African waters would end: “Moosa suspends 
Japanese Fishing in SA Waters”, <www.info.gov.za/speeches/2002/02080510461002.htm> 
(visited on 13 June 2008).  South Africa received half-yearly summarised catch returns and catch 
per vessel per month statistics, but carried out no independent evaluation of any of these data 
except one observer trip aboard a Japanese vessel: “National Report of South Africa”, in ICCAT 
Green Book 2003/3, supra Ch I n 228, 72 at 72 and 74.  Monthly returns from Japan are noted in 
“National Report of South Africa”, in ICCAT Green Book 2004/3, supra Ch I n 188, 84 at 88. 
768
  See CCSBT6(2) Report, supra n 683, at 54 (paragraph 28). 
769
  Infra n 847 and accompanying text. 
770
  CCSBT7 Report, supra Ch III n 449, at 3 (paragraph 6). 
771
  CCSBT8 Report, supra Ch I n 30, at 65 (paragraph 20). 
772
  “Opening Statement by the Fishing Entity of Taiwan” (Attachment 4-2 to CCSBT-EC2 
Report), in CCSBT Blue Book 2004, supra Ch I n 32, 44 at 44-45. 
773
  CCSBT-EC2 Report, supra Ch II n 353, at 17 (paragraph 19). 
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unless it were to operate outside its EEZ with large-scale vessels, so that the offer 
should stand until development of the fishery indicated the need to review it, a 
position which Australia and Korea were prepared to adopt.  Only New Zealand 
pointed out South Africa’s rights as a coastal State under international law and that 
the Members had a duty to cooperate with it, such that a national allocation of more 
than 30 tonnes would be justified.  The CCSBT’s response should “not alienate” 
South Africa and affect its cooperation.
774
  A decision was deferred until the 
Eleventh Meeting,
775
 but here too no decision was taken, with South Africa advising 
that it intended to develop a tuna fishery of 50 large-scale longline vessels which 
would in all likelihood catch SBT, as it occurred in the South African EEZ.  The 
catch might possibly be as high as 400 tonnes, but South Africa could entertain a 
voluntary upper limit of 250 tonnes.
776
 
The report notes that South Africa as a party to the UN Fish Stocks Agreement 
“should not enter the fishery unless it first accedes to the [1993] Convention or 
otherwise applies the conservation and management measure of the CCSBT.”777  
Taiwan argued for historical catch to be taken into account, favouring allocation only 
for new entrants “who have demonstrated their development of a fishery, rather than 
acquiring catch limits with the hope or aspiration of future possible development of 
                                                          
774
  Appendix 3 to CCSBTSM4 Report, supra n 678, at 118 (paragraph 19).  
775
  Ibid. (paragraph 20). 
776
  Attachment 6 to CCSBT-EC3 Report, supra Ch III n 524, at 52-53.  In this document 
South Africa quoted in extenso from the conclusions of the 2002 FAO Expert Consultation on the 
Management of Shared Fish Stocks, in particular the sentence that “Zonal attachment was 
considered especially important for that segment of the resource to be found within the EEZ” 
and, on the question of whether the coastal State’s historic catch included only its own catch or 
those of foreign vessels also, “The consensus is that all catches within the EEZ are to be counted, 
when establishing the historical catch record of the coastal state.”  It concluded that  
the Commission has placed South Africa in the untenable position of being forced to 
establish a catch history, which may in all likelihood contribute to the unsustainable 
depletion of the resources and acting contrary to the stock rebuilding efforts of the CCSBT. 
777
  CCSBT-EC3 Report, supra Ch I n 78, at 18 (paragraph 17). 
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the fishery.”778  Nonetheless there was recognition of South Africa’s right to an 
allocation by virtue of its catch history and the migration of SBT through its EEZ, 
and the Extended Commission “did not want to place South Africa in a position 
where it might fish in a manner inconsistent with the conservation and management 
measures of the CCSBT.”779  The offer of 30 tonnes was renewed which it believed 
sufficient for initial implementation of South Africa’s longline fishery as advised, 
with progress in development of the fishery to be monitored and future catch limits 
to be “established in the light of the management and conservation measures of the 
Extended Commission.”780  This delphic phrase could be interpreted as indicating 
either that the CCSBT was resigned to South African catch growing to 250 tonnes 
but could not yet bring itself to admit it, or that it thought the catch would not grow 
to that extent and would be prepared to offer a quota of roughly whatever the lower 
level might be at which it stabilised.  The latter was more likely, as in 2005 South 
Africa made a revised request for 60 tonnes.
781
  Despite the “recent poor response… 
to requests from the Secretariat for catch information” and the low state of the stock, 
the CCSBT agreed to increase its offer to 45 tonnes on condition of South Africa 
formally becoming a cooperating non-member.
782
  South Africa subsequently did 
so,
783
 but the allocation it received in 2006 was only 40 tonnes for reasons not 
explained in the meeting report, though there is a hint that it may have been because 
of annoyance at South Africa’s non-attendance despite its new status, which meant 
that it was not in a position to resist the 5-tonne cut.
784
  In 2007 South Africa 
supplied its catch data for the years 1998 to 2004 showing modest catches of SBT 
                                                          
778
  “Opening Statement by the Fishing Entity of Taiwan” (Attachment 4-2 to CCSBT-EC3 
Report), in CCSBT Blue Book 2005, supra Ch I n 34, 45. 
779
  CCSBT-EC3 Report, supra Ch I n 78, at 18 (paragraphs 18 and 19). 
780
  Ibid., at 22 (paragraph 40). 
781
  CCSBT-EC4 Report, supra Ch I n 248, at paragraph 72. 
782
  Ibid., at paragraphs 67 and 74. 
783
  CCSBT-EC5 Report, supra Ch I n 102, at 16 (paragraph 87). 
784
  Ibid., at 13 (paragraph 64) and 16 (paragraph 88). 
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(that of 2004 at 19 tonnes was the highest) and declared its willingness to provide 
further information.
785
  Because of the small allocation and the fact that most of the 
SBT it caught was predominantly bycatch from other fisheries, South Africa 
indicated that it could not give a commitment for the moment to accede to the 1993 
Convention.
786
  Its status as cooperating non-member was renewed.
787
 
(b) The Philippines  
The Philippines indicated in 2003 its intention to apply for cooperating non-member 
status as soon as the necessary resolution could be adopted.
788
  At the CCSBT’s 2004 
Special Meeting, Japan advised that the Philippines was “almost ready to accept 
catch limits of 50 tonnes”; the Commission noted that the Philippines was fishing by 
agreement in Indonesia’s EEZ, and that its acquisition of that status would assist the 
CCSBT’s attempts to control fishing on the spawning ground.789  At the Eleventh 
(2004) Meeting the Philippines joined the Extended Commission as a cooperating 
non-member and advised that it wished to develop its distant-water fleet further in 
future and become a full member of the Commission.
790
  Though accepting a catch 
limit of 50 tonnes, it “observed that rejection of its proposal to increase its catch limit 
to 70 tonnes must send a message to other developing countries about the Extended 
Commission’s willingness to embrace their legitimate aspirations.”791  Its status and 
quota were both renewed in 2005,
792
 and a report on the Philippines fishery was 
submitted.
793
  In 2006 its status was again renewed, but in the context of the poor 
                                                          
785
  CCSBT-EC6 Report, supra Ch I n 141, at 10 (paragraphs 56 and 57). 
786
  Attachment 5-2 to CCSBT-EC6 Report, supra Ch I n 243, at 2.  It is unclear whether a 
cause-and-effect relationship between the two factors is being asserted. 
787
  CCSBT-EC6 Report, supra Ch I n 141, at 35 (paragraph 185). 
788
  Attachment 5-2 to CCSBT-EC2 Report, supra Ch I n 248, at 54. 
789
  Appendix 3 to CCSBTSM4 Report, supra n 678, at 117 (paragraph 17). 
790
  CCSBT-EC3 Report, supra Ch I n 78, at 18-19 (paragraphs 20 and 21).  As for South 
Africa, there is no obstacle to its immediate accession to the 1993 Convention under Article 18. 
791
  Ibid., at 22 (paragraphs 39 and 41). 
792
  CCSBT-EC4 Report, supra Ch I n 248, at paragraphs 67 (quota) and 73 (status). 
793
  Ibid., Attachment 8-5 (“2005 Philippine Report to CCSBT”). 
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state of the stock and the voluntary reductions by Korea and Taiwan, though “sorry” 
to see its quota reduced,
794
 the Philippines accepted a cut to 45 tonnes, and in 2007 it 
requested and was granted renewal of its cooperating member status and 45-tonne 
quota.
795
  The issues raised by the Philippines’ intention to develop a fishery for SBT 
are similar to those of South Africa, except that it is not a coastal State on the SBT 
migratory path, and are considered below in Section E. 
(c) The European Community 
The European Community has had cooperating member status since 2006 with an 
allocation of 10 tonnes to cover a small amount of SBT taken as bycatch.
796
  It 
neither attended the 2007 meeting nor advised its catch of SBT, attracting criticism 
from the Secretariat for the “serous shortcomings with the level of cooperation” from 
it and prompting a decision for the Chair to write a “stern letter” requesting it to 
comply with its obligations and attend the annual meetings.
797
  
8 Resolution on flags of convenience 
At its Fifth Meeting the CCSBT adopted a resolution on catches of SBT by fishing 
vessels flying flags of convenience
798
 in which it urged its Members to  
take measures, in accordance with their domestic laws and international law, to 
ensure that their nationals and companies do not engage in FOC [i.e. flag of 
convenience] fishing activities in an attempt to avoid compliance with 
                                                          
794
  CCSBT-EC5 Report, supra Ch I n 102, at 13 (paragraphs 57 and 64) and 16 (paragraph 
85). 
795
  CCSBT-EC6 Report, supra Ch I n 141, at 34 (paragraphs 181 and 182). 
796
  For the history of this see supra Ch I nn 252-253 and accompanying text. 
797
  CCSBT-EC6 Report, supra Ch I n 141, at 34 (paragraphs 180) and 35 (paragraph 183). 
798
  The resolution does not define this term, although the preamble cites concern “at the 
reflagging of fishing vessels by nationals and companies of Parties to [the 1993 Convention] in 
order to avoid compliance with international fisheries conservation and management measures”.  
It is usually understood to mean vessels flagged to States which are not members of the relevant 
fishery commission for the stock concerned and, the “genuine link between the State and the 
ship” required by UNCLOS Article 91(1) being tenuous or non-existent, take no interest in their 
fishing activity in general or their catch of species regulated by the commission in particular. 
 266 
internationally agreed management measures including those under the Convention, 
including: 
(a) monitoring and promoting, though the Commission, other regional fisheries 
management organisations and the FAO, the exchange of information on FOC 
fishing activities and on ownership of and investment in FOC vessels; 
(b) preventing the transfer of vessels registered under their flags to the registers of 
countries which are not members of a regional fisheries management organisation 
and regulating the export of fishing vessels catching the stocks concerned; 
(c) urging the flag States of FOC vessels to withdraw the registration of vessels 
owned by nationals and companies of [parties to the 1993 Convention]; 
(d) calling upon States and other fishing entities in which owners of FOC vessels 
reside or are incorporated, to repatriate those vessels (that is, to return them to their 
own registers); 
(e) exploring effective vessel scrapping programs to ensure that fishing vessels 
surplus to their fishing requirements cannot become FOC vessels; 
(f) controlling, regulating or preventing transshipment of catch from FOC vessels, 
including refusing to such vessels, where possible, entry into their ports; 
(g) discouraging and prohibiting their nationals engaging in fishing activities on 
FOC vessels; and 
(h) monitoring and discouraging commercial activities, including trade and 
transshipment, in respect of SBT caught by FOC vessels.
799
 
There appears to be a particular problem with Taiwanese interests owning a great 
many fishing vessels under flags of convenience.  Taiwan said at the same meeting 
that it would make every effort to repatriate FOC fishing vessels built in Taiwan.
800
  
                                                          
799
  “Catches of Southern Bluefin Tuna by Flag Of Convenience Fishing Vessels” 
(Attachment 20 to CCSBT5(1) Report), in CCSBT Blue Book 2000, supra Ch II n 413, 49. 
800
  CCSBT5(1) Report, supra Ch II n 413, at 4.  See also Taiwan’s statement to ICCAT in 
1998, “Statement by the Observer from Chinese Taipei Concerning the Unreported and 
Unregulated Fishing Vessels in the Convention Area” (Appendix 7 to Report of the 7th Meeting 
of the Permanent Working Group for the Improvement of ICCAT Statistics and Conservation 
Measures (PWG) (hereinafter ICCAT-PWG7 Report; Annex 8 to ICCATSM11 Report)), in 
ICCAT Green Book 1999/1, supra n 576, 116 at 116-117:  
 267 
At the CCSBT’s Seventh Meeting there was discussion of joint action being taken by 
Japan and Taiwan involving the return of Taiwan-built flag-of-convenience vessels 
to control under the Taiwan flag and the buyback and scrapping of second-hand flag-
of-convenience vessels built in Japan.
801
  At the Fourth Special Meeting there was 
criticism of Taiwan’s unwillingness to act against vessels that were now registered in 
Indonesia.  Australia, Japan and New Zealand all observed that this was contrary to 
Article 15, paragraphs 2 and 3 of the 1993 Convention as well as the UN Fish Stocks 
Agreement (not, however, specifying the provision of the latter they had in mind).
802
 
9 The Resolution on Cooperating Non-Members  
At the CCSBT’s Tenth Meeting a resolution formalising the status of “co-operating 
non-member” was adopted,803 pursuant to which South Africa, the Philippines and 
the European Community have since acquired that status.
804
  Article 8 of the UN Fish 
Stocks Agreement can be seen as the inspiring force for this, even though it was not 
mentioned by Japan in calling for the CCSBT to “develop immediately a system 
                                                                                                                                                                    
In so far as the letter of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea is strictly construed, 
the party whose nationals own the vessels which fly another party’s flag shall not bear the 
responsibility for the conduct of those vessels.  However, we understand that to [ensure] the 
effectiveness of the conservation and management measures on the tuna and tuna-like stocks 
in the Convention Area is a common obligation and duties for all the parties fishing in this 
region.  With this understanding and within our jurisdictional rights, we have taken the 
necessary moves in tackling this issue.  First of all, moral suasion has been…imposed on the 
owners of these vessels.  At the same time, our Government has started to figure out a proper 
legal framework and administrative mechanisms domestically to cope with these vessels, 
either to have them return to the adequate flag or to impose some sort of restrictive 
measures…so as to make their conducts [sic] difficult and commercially unviable. 
801
  CCSBT7 Report, supra Ch III n 449, at 6 (paragraph 28). 
802
  Appendix 3 to CCSBTSM4 Report, supra n 678, at 118 (paragraph 21). 
803
  “Resolution to Establish the Status of Co-operating Non-Member of the Extended 
Commission and the Extended Scientific Committee” (Attachment 7 to CCSBT-EC2 Report), in 
CCSBT Blue Book 2004, supra Ch I n 32, 61. 
804
  Supra, text at nn 782-783, 790 and 796 respectively. 
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where only countries which cooperate in the framework of CCSBT, can be permitted 
to catch SBT”.805  
As this 2003 resolution shares much wording with the resolution two years earlier 
that established the Extended Commission and Extended Scientific Committee and is 
fully analysed below,
806
 it need not be discussed in detail.  Rather, it suffices to list 
its salient features. 
By paragraph 2, the Executive Secretary is instructed to invite every year all non-
member States and entities whose fishing vessels harvest SBT or through whose 
exclusive economic or fishery zone SBT migrates to co-operate with the CCSBT by 
acceding to the 1993 Convention, becoming a member of the Extended Commission 
or applying to that body for the status of a co-operating non-member. 
Paragraph 4 requires an applicant State or entity to give a number of written 
commitments.  Of these the most noteworthy are the commitments to “abide by 
conservation and management measures and all other decisions and resolutions 
adopted in accordance with the Convention” and, cryptically, to “negotiate with the 
members of the Extended Commission to develop any other criteria for its admission 
in the capacity of a Cooperating Non-Member specific to its situation.”  A possible 
explanation of the latter lies in paragraph 5, which states that “In deciding upon a 
total allowable catch and its allocation the Extended Commission may negotiate 
catch limits for Cooperating Non-Members.  Cooperating Non-Members shall abide 
by any negotiated limit.”  It is not clear from this whether the catch limit is to be 
negotiated solely among the Members of the Extended Commission and presented to 
the applicant on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, or negotiated with the applicant, or has 
been deliberately left vague to accommodate either possibility.  The 800 tonnes 
                                                          
805
  “Opening Statement by Japan” (Attachment 4-3 to CCSBT-EC2 Report), ibid., 46 at 47 
(paragraph 5). 
806
  Infra, text following n 849.  
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“offered to Indonesia” under the 2003 TAC decision807 contains no clue as to the 
CCSBT’s intention in this regard. 
Paragraph 7 then gives the State or entity so admitted the right “to participate 
actively in meetings of the Extended Commission, the Extended Scientific 
Committee and their subsidiary bodies, including, but not limited to, the right to 
make proposals and the right to speak, but not to vote”, and permits the Extended 
Commission to “restrict the participation of a cooperating non-member in a particular 
Agenda item.”  Paragraph 11 amends the Extended Commission’s Rules of 
Procedure accordingly. 
Paragraphs 6 and 8 provide for reaffirmation of these commitments by the 
Cooperating Non-Member at the Annual Meeting of the Extended Commission, 
which will determine whether the latter qualifies for continuation of its status by 
reference to its performance against the commitments.  In this the cooperating non-
member’s status is similar to that of a Cooperating Party under ICCAT’s 1997 
resolution,
808
 and ranks below that of a member of the Extended Commission, which 
is not subjected to any such procedure.  If the Extended Commission determines that 
a co-operating non-member has not fulfilled its commitments, paragraph 9 provides 
for the Extended Commission to “proceed in accordance with the 2000 Action Plan, 
or take other appropriate steps.”809 
Noting that China had begun catching SBT for export to Japan but had made known 
its intention not to accede to the 1993 Convention or apply to become a cooperating 
non-member under the 2003 Resolution, and that Spain was reported to have started 
a program of exploratory fishing on the SBT fishing grounds, in order to avoid an ad 
hoc approach to dealing with such issues the CCSBT instructed its Secretariat in 
                                                          
807
  CCSBT-EC2 Report, supra Ch II n 353, at 24 (paragraph 51). 
808
  Infra n 820. 
809
  The 2000 Action Plan is discussed supra, text at nn 727-737. 
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2004 to prepare draft criteria for admission of new members.
810
  Little appears to 
have come of this work: at the Eleventh Meeting later that year, the CCSBT merely 
expressed “concern” at China’s expanding fishing capacity and noted the consequent 
need to observe its future catches.
811
  In 2005 China was recorded as not answering 
correspondence, which resulted in the invocation of the Action Plan against it.
812
  
The following year it did reply, but only note to that it had no interest in SBT except 
as a very minor bycatch.
813
 
C The entry of Taiwan into the CCSBT  
1  Introduction 
In addition to the generic problem of controlling non-member catch, in the case of 
Taiwan the CCSBT and its Members faced the specific issue of how they could have 
any confidence that Taiwan would adhere to any commitments they might secure 
from it, unless these were legally binding.  Although not explicitly stated in any of 
the meeting reports, the underlying assumption of all three original Parties to the 
1993 Convention appeared to be that their lack of diplomatic relations with the 
Taipei authorities implied the complete impossibility of formal international legal 
relations – an assumption whose soundness there only gradually became cause to 
question from the mid-1990s.  Nor was the problem merely one-sided, for why 
should Taiwan give a binding commitment to States not prepared to regard their own 
undertakings to Taiwan as binding?  This section recounts the history of how the 
CCSBT grappled with this issue, also dwelling briefly on a second possible 
alternative solution and offering a possible reason for why it was not followed, 
before turning to an examination of the provisions of the Resolution.  The theme is 
largely one of separating the legal from the political element of this mix. 
                                                          
810
  Appendix 3 to CCSBTSM4 Report, supra n 678, at 118 (paragraphs 23-25). 
811
  CCSBT-EC3 Report, supra Ch I n 78, at 19 (paragraph 22). 
812
  CCSBT-EC4 Report, supra Ch I n 248, at paragraphs 21 and 119. 
813
  CCSBT-EC5 Report, supra Ch I n 102, at 18 (paragraph 101). 
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The CCSBT’s consideration of the difficult issue of how to include Taiwan in its 
operations benefited from the previous work done on this by ICCAT, where the 
matter has a long history.  ICCAT’s Standing Committee on Research and Statistics 
lamented in its report to the 1974 meeting of that Commission that: 
the Committee’s scientific work was much hampered by the lack of certain data on 
the Chinese (Taiwan) fleet.  It was, however, noted that some national scientists and 
the Secretariat staff have kept a good working relationship with Taiwanese fisheries 
representatives and have obtained important segments of data.  The Committee 
wishes to draw…attention…to the fact that data from the Taiwanese fleet are very 
essential in carrying out its assignment, and that the problem cannot be solved by 
the Committee because of its political implications.
814
  
This is no less true of CCSBT in relation to SBT.  At its first meeting, 
[t]he Commission noted the desirability of Taiwan attending meetings of the 
Commission as an observer and of seeking the [sic] greater participation by Taiwan 
in the conservation and management activities of the Commission.  
… 
The observer from Taiwan indicated that Taiwan was prepared to take measures to 
collect further statistics on southern bluefin tuna and expected general preparedness 
on the part of Taiwan to cooperate on the southern bluefin tuna conservation and 
management process.
815
  
Although Taiwan had attended the 1993 and 1994 trilateral scientific meetings as an 
observer,
816
 initially, in Japan’s view, the most that could be done was to request 
                                                          
814
  Report of the Standing Committee on Research and Statistics (SCRS), Madrid, 
November 13-19, 1974 (Annex 9 to ICCATC3 Report, supra Ch III n 570), in ICCAT Green 
Book 1975, supra Ch I n 220, 70 at 89-90. 
815
  CCSBT1 Report, supra Ch I n 273, at 4. 
816
  Supra n 681.  Although reports of the proceedings of the trilateral meetings have not 
been published, summaries (including the fact of Taiwan’s attendance) were reported by Japan to 
ICCAT: see Report of the Meeting of the Standing Committee on Research and Statistics (SCRS) 
(Madrid, November 1-5, 1993) (Annex 23 to Proceedings of the Thirteenth Regular Meeting of 
the Commission, Madrid, November 8-12, 1993 (hereinafter ICCAT13 Report)), in ICCAT, 
Report for biennial period, 1992-93 Part II (1993) (hereinafter ICCAT Green Book 1994), 167 at 
220; Report of the Meeting of the Standing Committee on Research and Statistics (SCRS) 
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Taiwan to cooperate with the CCSBT on an informal and voluntary basis.  Australia 
and New Zealand both stressed the need to identify some mechanism which, “whilst 
still respecting the existing political situation with regard to Taiwan” would ensure 
that Taiwan committed itself to controlling the SBT operations of its fleet.  They 
considered that Taiwan’s significant catch of SBT meant that it was essential that 
Taiwan be brought within the CCSBT regime in some effective way.
817
  
For Taiwan, the overriding consideration was equality of treatment.
818
  For a number 
of reasons it did not achieve that within ICCAT.
819
  By the time of ICCAT’s 1998 
meeting, however, Taiwan had acquired the status of a “cooperating fishing entity” 
under a Resolution adopted the previous year,
820
 having submitted an application for 
                                                                                                                                                                    
(Madrid, November 21-25, 1994) (Annex 25 to ICCATSM9 Report, supra Ch III n 613), in 
ICCAT, Report for biennial period, 1994-95 Part I (1994) - Vol.2, 5 at 91.  
817
  October 1994 Summary Record, supra n 685, at 4. 
818
  See e.g. Taiwan’s objection to a paragraph in draft correspondence from ICCAT urging 
Taiwan to limit its bigeye tuna catch to 12,000 tonnes as “discriminatory and unfair” given “the 
absence of a general formulation announced by ICCAT”: “Statement by Taiwan to the 
Chairman’s Letter on Taiwanese Fishing Activities in the Atlantic Ocean & Mediterranean Sea” 
(Appendix 4 to ICCAT-PWG4 Report), in ICCAT Green Book 1996/1, supra Ch III n 534, 206.  
It also objected to a separate letter to a number of non-members including Taiwan which 
requested them to use the mean of their 1993 and 1994 catches of ABT in the Eastern Atlantic 
and Mediterranean rather than the 1994 catch as the base for the 25% reduction, as no such 
request was made to members whose catch had also increased in 1994: “Statement by Taiwan to 
the Chairman’s Letter to Non-Contracting Parties whose Bluefin Tuna Catches have Recently 
Increased Substantially in the Mediterranean Sea” (Appendix 6 to ICCAT-PWG4 Report), ibid., 
207.  But after Taiwan admitted to a much higher catch than it had previously reported, a 1997 
resolution limited Taiwan’s catch of bigeye tuna to 16,500 tonnes in 1998: “Resolution by 
ICCAT on Chinese Taipei Bigeye Tuna Catches” (Annex 5-15 to ICCAT15 Report), in ICCAT 
Green Book 1998/1, supra Ch III n 574, 77.  See also Taiwan’s protest at its non-invitation to an 
intersessional meeting: “Statement by Chinese Taipei to Panel 4” (Appendix 11 to Reports of the 
Meetings of Panels 1 to 4 (Annex 10 to ICCAT15 Report)), ibid., 215. 
819
  For a fuller recounting of the history of this issue in ICCAT, see Serdy, supra n 669, at 
200-207. 
820
  Annex 5-17 to ICCAT15 Report, supra Ch III n 575, paragraph 2.  The Resolution is 
reproduced in Serdy, supra n 669, at 204-205; traces of it may be seen in the CCSBT’s 2001 
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that status and the Permanent Working Group for the Improvement of ICCAT 
Statistics and Conservation Measures having approved the sending of a letter by the 
Secretariat informing it of this.  The letter requested confirmation from Taiwan that it 
would abide by the relevant measures listed within it.
821
  Contingent on that 
confirmation, Taiwan received a “special allocation” of ABT in the Eastern Atlantic 
and Mediterranean for the years 1999 and 2000.
822
 
2 The obstacles 
In theory the requirement that Taiwan must be a “State” in order to accede to the 
1993 Convention need not be an obstacle to Taiwan’s accession, although in practice 
it can hardly avoid being so.  The CCSBT has international legal personality which 
the Parties to the Convention are bound to recognise,
823
 and could itself in turn treat 
Taiwan as a State if it so wished.  Yet in reality the CCSBT will not wish to do so, as 
it has no will independent of its Members – its decisions are adopted by consensus824 
– and all of its Members maintain diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Resolution to Establish an Extended Commission and Extended Scientific Committee, supra Ch 
II n 408, reproduced infra Appendix D and discussed in subsection 4 of this section. 
821
  ICCAT-PWG7 Report, in ICCAT Green Book 1999/1, supra Ch III n 576, 99 at 101-103 
(paragraphs 5.1, 5.4, 5.10 and 5.11); “Letter to Chinese Taipei Regarding Cooperating Status” 
(Appendix 4 to Annex 8 to ICCATSM11 Report), ibid., 114-115. 
822
  “Recommendation by ICCAT on the Limitation of Catches of Bluefin Tuna in the 
Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean” (Annex 5-5 to ICCATSM11 Report), ibid., 65. 
823
  The first sentence of Article 6(9) of the 1993 Convention provides that:  
The Commission shall have legal personality and shall enjoy in its relations with other 
international organisations and in the territories of the parties such legal capacity as may be 
necessary to perform its functions and achieve its ends. 
The better view is that this relates to personality on the international rather than the domestic 
plane, since no purpose is served by the Commission having as many separate domestic law 
personalities as the Convention has parties; this is supported by the reference to relations with 
other international organisations, most of which are likely to be endowed with similar 
international legal personality. 
824
  1993 Convention, supra Introduction n 5, Article 7. 
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China.  Thus any acceptance of Taiwan as a State by the CCSBT could occur only 
with the knowledge and approval of all its Members. 
For their part, the authorities on Taiwan regard themselves as a continuation of the 
Republic of China which has existed since 1912 but now controls only the island of 
Taiwan and some small outlying islands.  This is the result of losing the civil war, 
which saw the establishment on 1 October 1949 of the People’s Republic by the 
victorious Communist side.  Since 1971 it has been the People’s Republic that 
occupies the Chinese seat in the UN
825
 and maintains diplomatic relations with most 
other States.  The number of States recognising the Republic of China fell steadily 
after 1949 but has recently achieved a measure of stability in the higher twenties.  
The three original Members of the CCSBT all recognised the People’s Republic and 
terminated their diplomatic relations with the Taipei authorities in the early 1970s, 
but continue to maintain economic and trade ties with Taiwan.
826
 
In formalising their previous informal cooperation through the 1993 Convention, the 
original Parties took care to permit the continuation of their nascent cooperation with 
Taiwan, through Article 14, paragraph 1: 
The Commission may invite any State or entity not party to this Convention, whose 
nationals, residents or fishing vessels harvest southern bluefin tuna, and any coastal 
State through whose exclusive economic or fishery zone southern bluefin tuna 
migrates, to send observers to meetings of the Commission and of the Scientific 
Committee. 
                                                          
825
  “Resolution on the Restoration of the Lawful Rights of the People’s Republic of China 
in the United Nations”, Resolution 2758 (XXVI), 25 October 1971, in Resolutions adopted by the 
General Assembly during its Twenty-Sixth Session, 21 September – 22 December 1971, General 
Assembly Official Records: Twenty-Sixth Session, Supplement No 29 (A/8429) (New York: UN, 
1972), at 2. 
826
  For present purposes it suffices to note that both the People’s Republic of China and the 
Republic of China claim to be the government of the whole territory of China and that the former 
regards the establishment by a State of diplomatic relations with the latter as incompatible with 
the maintenance of such relations with itself. 
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At the CCSBT’s 1996 Annual Meeting, the Taiwanese observer noted Taiwan’s right 
under the UN Fish Stocks Agreement to join regional management regimes.
827
  
Presumably he had in mind Article 1 of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement, whose 
subparagraph 2(b) lists by cross-reference to Article 305 and Annex IX of UNCLOS 
a number of entities that are eligible, in addition to all States under Articles 37-39, to 
become party to that Agreement, after which paragraph 3 goes on to say that: “This 
Agreement applies mutatis mutandis to other fishing entities whose vessels fish on 
the high seas.”828  From here the putative chain of reasoning would move to the 
conclusion that Article 8, paragraph 3, by which relevant fisheries commissions must 
be open to the participation of States with a real interest in the fishery concerned, 
applies by extension to fishing entities.  In addition, by Article 17, paragraph 3, such 
“fishing entities...which have...vessels in the relevant area...shall enjoy benefits from 
participation in the fishery commensurate with their commitment to comply with 
conservation and management measures in respect of the stocks.” 
Although at this early stage the Members’ main preoccupation was the sensitivity of 
some them regarding nomenclature for Taiwan,
829
 by early 1998 the CCSBT saw the 
need to formalise cooperation between itself and Taiwan.  Australia and New 
Zealand expressed a preference for a memorandum of understanding, while Japan 
stated that “due to the sensitive nature of its relationship with Taiwan” it needed 
further time to decide on the appropriate form of instrument.
830
  At the Fifth Meeting 
the following year, Japan drew the other Members’ attention to ICCAT’s 1997 
resolution by which “Any non-contracting party, entity or fishing entity which seeks 
to be accorded Cooperating Party, Entity or Fishing Entity status shall apply to the 
                                                          
827
  CCSBT3(1) Report, supra Ch I n 102, at 24. 
828
  The received view is that the term “other fishing entity” in paragraph 3 of Article 1 is 
intended to refer to Taiwan: T. Treves, “The Settlement of Disputes According to the Straddling 
Stocks Agreement of 1995” in Boyle and Freestone (eds), supra Ch III n 496, 253 at 261; Juda, 
supra Ch III n 517, at 156. 
829
  May 1997 Meeting on Non-Parties Report, supra n 682, at 209-210. 
830
  CCSBT4(2) Report, supra n 683, at 59. 
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Executive Secretary [, giving a] firm commitment to respect the Commission’s 
conservation and management measures” and to supply all data to ICCAT that the 
Contracting Parties themselves had to supply.
831
 
At the same meeting Taiwan acknowledged that it was obliged to cooperate with the 
Parties to the 1993 Convention to manage the resource sustainably, but claimed it 
should have the same rights as those parties; in particular, it wished to accede “to 
become a full member” of the CCSBT.832  This theme continued in a bilateral 
meeting between Taiwan and CCSBT representatives at the second session of that 
Meeting.  The CCSBT noted Taiwan’s interest in becoming a “full member”, but 
stated that the 1993 Convention did not allow for this.  In this it was being somewhat 
disingenuous, for “any other State, whose vessels engage in fishing for southern 
bluefin tuna” may accede to the Convention under Article 18.833  Thus it is not the 
1993 Convention itself but all its parties’ recognition of the People’s Republic of 
China’s sovereignty over Taiwan that was the real obstacle.834  The CCSBT in fact 
implicitly conceded this point as it went on to draw Taiwan’s attention to the 
“political reality” of the situation, with the parties “not in a position to have Taiwan 
accede...with member status”.  Nonetheless it wished to conclude an arrangement 
that provided for Taiwan’s “cooperation with and participation in the work of the 
Commission,” to which end it was developing mechanisms that it wished to discuss 
further with Taiwan in due course.  The Taiwanese representatives acknowledged the 
difficulties associated with accession to the 1993 Convention and said that, if this 
prevented Taiwan’s membership of the CCSBT, they were prepared to respond in a 
flexible manner, provided Taiwan would be treated “in an equitable manner with 
other members within the framework of the Commission”.  Acknowledging this 
                                                          
831
  Annex 5-17 to ICCAT15 Report, supra Ch III n 575, paragraph 2. 
832
  “Opening Statement from Taiwan” (Attachment 9 to CCSBT5(1) Report), in CCSBT 
Blue Book 2000, supra Ch II n 413, 22. 
833
  The text of Article 18 is reproduced supra, text between nn 672 and 673. 
834
  Supra, text at nn 824 and 826. 
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desire, the CCSBT averred that it aimed to “provide the fullest possible involvement, 
with similar privileges and responsibilities to those of members.”835 
Despite this apparent meeting of minds, at the start of the CCSBT’s 1999 Annual 
Meeting Taiwan handed the Chair a letter applying for “contracting Party status to 
the [1993] Convention”, while conceding that an “arrangement…to make our Party 
status possible” that was “fair, workable and duly respecting Taiwan’s status” might 
be acceptable.
836
  It should be noted that in doing so Taiwan was not purporting to 
accede to the 1993 Convention; this would have required lodging an instrument of 
accession with Australia as depositary.  It can, however, be taken as a request to its 
parties to amend Article 18 of the Convention so as to allow entities other than States 
to accede.
837
  It would be consonant with Article 1, paragraph 3 of the UN Fish 
Stocks Agreement, it is submitted, for, say, “a fishing entity to which Article 1 [of 
the Agreement] applies” to be eligible to accede to the 1993 Convention.  Nor would 
it be out of step with wider developments relating to Taiwan’s fragmentary 
international legal personality, which provides an alternative route.  Now that Taiwan 
is a Member of the WTO, States having accepted the Separate Customs Territory of 
Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu as having sufficient international legal 
personality to accede to the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization 
                                                          
835
  Attachment G to CCSBT5(2) Report, supra n 721, at 89-90. 
836
  “Opening Statement by Taiwan” (Attachment H to CCSBT6(1) Report), in CCSBT Blue 
Book 2001, supra Ch I n 242, 27.  See also CCSBTSM3 Report, supra n 683, at 109 (paragraph 
8), where Taiwan said it was “looking forward to working on an equal footing with the Members 
of the Commission.”  For similar statements uttered by Taiwan in other fisheries commissions 
see Serdy, supra n 669, at 202 (ICCAT) and 210 (Commission for the Conservation and 
Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean).  By 
this time Taiwan had acquired cooperating fishing entity status in ICCAT: supra nn 820-822 and 
accompanying text. 
837
  See Article 20 of the 1993 Convention for the amendment procedure.  Note that the 
European Community, though generally recognised as having international legal personality, is 
not a State and hence could not accede to the Convention under Article 18 in its present form. 
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under Article XII(1), Taiwan could become party to any fisheries treaty expressed to 
be open for signature or accession by “Members of the WTO”.838 
The drawback to this is that amending treaties takes time.  With varying degrees of 
parliamentary scrutiny applying to multilateral treaties in all three original parties, it 
would also have provided ample opportunity for the People’s Republic of China to 
raise public objection if it wished.  It is also possible that the Republic of Korea, 
which expressed its intention at the CCSBT’s November 2000 meeting to accede to 
the 1993 Convention,
839
 might have done so before the amendment entered into 
force, in which case it too would need to accept the amendment.  This might not be 
automatic given that the Korean authorities would only recently have taken the 
original Convention through their internal approval procedures and might be 
reluctant to do so again after only a short interval. 
3 A possible solution not pursued 
An alternative way of bringing Taiwan into the CCSBT as a Member is afforded by a 
curiosity in the drafting of the 1993 Convention, which, unlike most treaties creating 
fisheries commissions, does not provide for either the parties themselves or any of 
their individual delegates to be members of the CCSBT.
840
  This is left to the Rules 
of Procedure.
841
 
                                                          
838
  Taiwan has been a WTO member since 1 January 2002: see the WTO’s press release 
WTO doc Press/244 (18 September 2001), “WTO successfully concludes negotiations on entry 
of the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu” <www.wto.org/ 
english/news_e/pres01_e/pr244_e.htm> and <www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/ 
chinese_taipei_e.htm> (visited on 13 June 2008).  By necessary implication from paragraphs 1 
and 2 of the Action Plan reproduced supra, text at n 708, the CCSBT itself saw Taiwan as early 
as 1997 as having sufficient personality to have “obligations” attributed to it. 
839
  Supra n 738 and accompanying text. 
840
  Contrast Article I(7) of the Convention for the Strengthening of the Inter-American 
Tropical Tuna Commission Established by the 1949 Convention Between the United States of 
America and the Republic of Costa Rica, done at Antigua Guatemala, 27 June 2003, not yet in 
force, text available online at <www.iattc.org/PDFFiles2/Antigua_Convention_Jun_2003.pdf> 
(visited on 13 June 2008)); Article IV(1) of the IOTC Agreement, supra Introduction n 7; Article 
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Given this, it might have been possible to amend the definition of “Member” in 
either of the ways described above in the context of Article 18 of the Convention.
842
  
This would not be attended by any of the delays inherent in the equivalent treaty 
amendment.  The Rules of Procedure prescribe no particular formal or procedural 
requirement for their own amendment.  Yet this would be only a partial solution at 
best, for the Rules of Procedure must be subject to the 1993 Convention itself, and 
though Taiwan would be a Member of the CCSBT, it would still not be a party to the 
Convention.  Hence any right or obligation the Convention assigns to a “Party” could 
not apply to Taiwan, even if the Rules of Procedure assign the right to a “Member”.  
That is, Taiwan would not be on a footing of equality with the other Members.  An 
irreducible minimum of four such legal disabilities may be identified: 
(a)   Voting – Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure gives each Member one vote, but by 
Article 7 of the 1993 Convention only Parties have the right to vote.  The Rules 
are thus consistent with the Convention only if all Members are also Parties. 
(b)   Financial contribution – by Article 11, paragraph 2 of the 1993 Convention, 30 
per cent of the costs of the CCSBT is split equally among the Parties and the 
remaining 70 per cent is assessed in proportion to the “nominal catch” of SBT 
                                                                                                                                                                    
34(4) of the Honolulu Convention, supra Introduction n 8; Article 6(1) of the SEAFO 
Convention, supra Ch III n 519.  Earlier tuna commission treaties such as the Convention for the 
Establishment of an Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission, supra Ch I n 28, and the 1966 
Convention, supra Introduction n 6, do not rely on a concept of membership, although the home 
page of the commission created by the former lists 16 “member countries”: <www.iattc.org/ 
HomeENG.htm> (visited on 13 June 2008) and Article X(2)(a) of the 1966 Convention provides 
that the basic fee for a Contracting Party’s “membership” of ICCAT is US$1,000 per annum. 
841
  Rule 1(1) provides in its first sentence that “Each Party to the [1993 Convention] shall 
be a member (Member) of the [CCSBT] and shall be represented in the Commission by not more 
than three delegates who may be accompanied by experts and advisers.”  The Rules of Procedure 
as since amended may be seen at <www.ccsbt.org/docs/pdf/about_the_commission/rules_of_ 
procedure_of_the_commission.pdf>. 
842
  Supra, text at n 838.  
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by each of them.
843
  Were Taiwan to become a Member without being Party to 
the Convention, no annual contribution towards the Secretariat’s costs would be 
assessable against it.  This could amount to a sizable subsidy by the other 
Members.  If the CCSBT’s annual budget ran to $1 million and Taiwan became 
the fourth Member taking 11 per cent of the four-Member catch,
844
 it would 
avoid paying $152,000.  While Taiwan could contribute by way of gift, as 
Article 11 does not limit the CCSBT’s sources of income to the Parties’ annual 
contributions,
845
 there would be no corresponding debt to the Commission.  
There are also other difficulties in applying the formula to a non-Party.
846
 
(c) Quorum – by Article 6, paragraph 7 of the 1993 Convention, two thirds of the 
parties constitute a quorum.  The corresponding provision in the Rules of 
Procedure, Rule 2(4), substitutes “Members” for “Parties”.  Once again it is not 
inconsistent with the Convention as long as all Members are Parties.  If Taiwan 
were unable to be counted towards a quorum, the CCSBT could potentially be 
                                                          
843
  The meaning of this phrase is not defined.  In practice the parties have taken it to mean 
the national allocation of each party forming part of the TAC decided each year up to 1997 by the 
CCSBT under Article 8(3)(b) of the 1993 Convention, with no subsequent adjustment among the 
parties on the basis of the actual catch of each discernible from the CCSBT’s reports.  Curiously, 
while from 1998 to 2002 no TAC and national allocations were set by the CCSBT, the Secretariat 
continued to assess the Parties in proportion to the 1997 national allocations, even though in 1998 
and 1999 Japan’s catch was significantly higher than its 1997 allocation, the difference being the 
catch from its experimental fishing programs which were the subject of the 1998-2001 dispute. 
844
  At the time the Resolution was being drafted, the Republic of Korea and Indonesia had 
not yet acceded to the 1993 Convention.  In 2000 Taiwan’s catch of 1,448 tonnes was roughly 
11% of the total of its own catch and that of the three original parties.  Of the TAC of 14,030 
tonnes adopted by the CCSBT in October 2003 – see supra Ch I n 276 and accompanying text – 
Taiwan’s share was 1,140 tonnes, or a little over 8%.  The equivalent calculation in the current 
six-member Extended Commission, assuming a national allocation to Indonesia identical to the 
750-tonne allowance it had before its accession – supra n 759 and accompanying text – reduces 
Taiwan’s share to approximately 7.7% and yields a subsidy to Taiwan of around $104,000. 
845
  This is not unusual, as such a limitation would also preclude the earning of bank interest. 
846
  See infra n 855. 
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quorate with only two out of its four Members present (or three out of five once 
the Republic of Korea had acceded to the 1993 Convention). 
(d) Chairs of the CCSBT and of its Scientific Committee – Article 6, paragraph 4 
provides that the Chair and Vice-Chair of the Commission shall be from 
different parties, while Article 9, paragraph 5 lays down the same rule for the 
Chair and Vice-Chair of the Scientific Committee.  By necessary implication, it 
is submitted, a non-party to the Convention cannot supply the holder of any of 
these four offices.
847
 
While the CCSBT could have amended its Rules of Procedure so as to substitute 
“Party” for “Member” wherever the admission of Taiwan as a Member would have 
the effect of making the Rules inconsistent with the 1993 Convention, for the reason 
just outlined this would have created a second class of membership for Taiwan.  
This, going by its previous statements,
848
 would have been unacceptable to it. 
Instead, another more innovative vehicle was found.  At its Seventh Meeting in April 
2001 the CCSBT adopted a Resolution establishing an “Extended Commission” and 
“Extended Scientific Committee”.  The text of the Resolution, and of the annexed 
Rules of Procedure for the Extended Commission, is set out in Appendix D.  The 
next section analyses it in some detail. 
4 Exegesis of the 2001 Resolution 
It is evident that much care has gone into the drafting of this Resolution, which is far 
more comprehensive than the 1997 ICCAT resolution on which it is partly based.
849
 
                                                          
847
  Note that the position would be different if instead the rule were expressed as “Chair and 
Vice-Chair may not be from the same Party”.  Article 8(2)(a) gives the CCSBT power to interpret 
the 1993 Convention, and the appointment of a South African national as Chair of the Scientific 
Committee – supra n 768 – depends on treating the rule in this way; no harm appears to be done 
to either Parties or non-parties by doing so in this instance. 
848
  Supra, text at nn 832-836.  
849
  Supra n 831. 
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The preamble states that, if the SBT stock is to be sustainably exploited, all those 
fishing it must cooperate through the CCSBT, then expresses the Commission’s wish 
that all States that fish for SBT should accede to the 1993 Convention if eligible, 
while “entities or fishing entities with vessels fishing for SBT” are encouraged to 
implement the CCSBT’s conservation and management measures.850 
Paragraph 1 establishes an Extended Commission for the Conservation of Southern 
Bluefin Tuna and an Extended Scientific Committee and provides that, as well as the 
Parties to the 1993 Convention, the Members of the Extended Commission include 
“any entity or fishing entity, vessels flagged to which have caught SBT at any time in 
the previous three calendar years”, once admitted by the Extended Commission 
under later paragraphs.  Three years, though arbitrary, is more than enough to capture 
Taiwan.  The opening words of the paragraph indicate that the CCSBT is acting 
under Article 8, paragraph 3(b) and Article 15, paragraph 4 of the 1993 Convention.  
While the former authorises the CCSBT to decide on binding measures “other” than 
a TAC and national allocations, in order to further the conservation, management and 
optimum utilisation of SBT, the focus of the latter, on deterring fishing by non-party 
States and entities, seems somewhat antagonistic towards Taiwan. 
                                                          
850
  Note that in the Preamble, and again in some of the operative paragraphs, the CCSBT 
has followed the 1997 ICCAT resolution’s false distinction between “entities” and “fishing 
entities” and perpetuated the error into which the latter Commission fell.  Moreover, the 1993 
Convention itself refers to “entities” simpliciter: by Article 15(1), 
[t]he Parties agree to invite the attention of any State or entity not party to this Convention to 
any matter relating to the fishing activities of its nationals, residents or vessels which could 
affect the attainment of the objective of this Convention. [emphasis added] 
In addition, paragraph 4 of the same article provides for cooperation among the Parties “to deter 
fishing activities for southern bluefin tuna by nationals, residents or vessels of any State or entity 
not party to this Convention” [emphasis added] where such activity could adversely affect the 
attainment of that objective.  See also Article 14(1), text following n 680 supra.  Thus if 
arguendo “fishing entities” are indeed creatures distinct from “entities”, then the CCSBT has 
exceeded its powers in so far as it purports to make provision for cooperation with the former. 
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Paragraph 2 directs the Extended Commission and Scientific Committee to perform 
the same tasks as their original counterparts, in particular deciding on TAC and its 
allocation among the Members, who, crucially for Taiwan, all have equal voting 
rights.  All provisions of the 1993 Convention relating to the Commission and 
Scientific Committee proper – that is, Articles 6 to 9 – apply mutatis mutandis to 
their Extended versions, with two exceptions (paragraphs 9 and 10 of Article 6) that 
do not affect the equality principle.
851
  There is a non-binding mechanism for settling 
disputes concerning the interpretation or implementation of the Resolution in terms 
drawn from Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations.  In somewhat unclear 
terms, a dispute about the interpretation and implementation of the Resolution is 
defined to include disputes about the interpretation and implementation both of the 
articles of the 1993 Convention specified in the Resolution and of an Exchange of 
Letters for which paragraph 6 provides.
852
 
Paragraph 3 is a straightforward provision directing the CCSBT Secretariat to 
function as the Secretariat of the Extended Commission, so avoiding unnecessary 
duplication of administrative machinery. 
With paragraph 4 the purpose behind the establishment of the Extended Commission 
and Extended Scientific Committee becomes clear.  In order to include Taiwan in 
decision-making, that function of the CCSBT, from which Taiwan remains excluded, 
is essentially hived off to the Extended Commission, in which Taiwan has (from 
paragraph 2) an equal voice.  Since it would be contrary to Article 8, paragraph 3 of 
the 1993 Convention for the CCSBT to abdicate completely its decision-making 
powers to the new body, it is necessary for its controlling role to be preserved, yet in 
such a way as to give Taiwan comfort that a decision of the Extended Commission, 
by which it is bound under paragraph 6, will as near to automatically as possible be 
                                                          
851
  These paragraphs respectively give the CCSBT legal personality and privileges and 
immunities and allow it to choose its headquarters. 
852
  Although this is not quite what the fourth sentence says, it does, with some sacrifice of 
clarity for brevity, appear to be its intent. 
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adopted subsequently by the Commission proper, so binding the Convention’s parties 
to the same decision.  This is done by the device of having the Extended Commission 
report its decisions to the Commission.  Decisions once reported are deemed adopted 
by the Commission proper unless reversed by it
853 by the end of the meeting session.  
Of course, it would also be ultra vires for the CCSBT to put it out of its own power 
to rescind the Resolution.  Thus an additional non-binding clause (“should not be 
taken”) encourages “prior due deliberation” by the Extended Commission of any 
CCSBT decision “that affects the operation of the Extended Commission or the 
rights, obligations or status of any individual Member within [it]”. 
Paragraph 5 establishes the initial Rules of Procedure for the Extended Commission 
in an Annex to the Resolution and leaves their future amendment in the hands of the 
Extended Commission itself.  The Annex itself is wholly unremarkable. 
By paragraph 6,  
[a]ny entity or fishing entity, vessels flagged to which have caught SBT at any time 
in the previous three calendar years, may express its willingness to the Executive 
Secretary of the Commission to become a member of the Extended Commission...In 
so doing, the applicant shall give…its firm commitment to respect the terms of the 
Convention and comply with such decisions of the Extended Commission as become 
decisions of the Commission [by] paragraph 4. 
This last sentence ensures that the Parties proper cannot use the Extended 
Commission to impose a binding decision on national catch limits on the other 
Members and then sanctify by a CCSBT decision higher limits for themselves only. 
Paragraph 7 states that if the Extended Commission decides to admit the applicant, it 
negotiates a catch level of SBT by the applicant pending the next decision of the 
CCSBT setting a total allowable catch and its allocation among the Members.  This 
is formalised in an exchange of letters with the Executive Secretary by which the 
applicant assumes the status of Member of the Extended Commission. 
                                                          
853
  It will be recalled that the CCSBT operates by consensus: 1993 Convention, Article 7. 
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Paragraph 8 allows the Extended Commission Members to be represented and speak 
as observers at meetings of the CCSBT and its subsidiary bodies, an added safeguard 
for Taiwan in ensuring that its procedural rights under paragraph 6 are respected. 
By paragraph 9 the contributions to the Extended Commission’s annual budget of a 
Member not party to the 1993 Convention are determined by application mutatis 
mutandis of Article 11 of that Convention.
854
  In practice the contributions to the 
Commission proper of those Members that are parties are taken as satisfying at the 
same time their obligation in respect of the Extended Commission.
855
  
Superfluously, and perhaps serving only to betray the nervousness of its drafters, or 
their slavish deference to precedent,
856
 paragraph 10 provides that “The provisions of 
this Resolution relating to participation by entities or fishing entities in the operations 
of the Extended Commission are solely for the purposes of the Convention.” 
Paragraph 11 makes consequential amendments to the CCSBT’s Rules of Procedure 
by including in the provisional agenda for each annual meeting approval of decisions 
taken by the Extended Commission. 
                                                          
854
  Article 11(2) provides that: 
2. The contributions to the annual budget from each Party shall be calculated on the 
following basis: 
(a) 30% of the budget shall be divided equally among all the Parties; and 
(b) 70% of the budget shall be divided in proportion to the nominal catches of 
southern bluefin tuna among all the Parties. 
855
  Serdy, supra n 669, at 198n shows that, except in one particular circumstance unlikely to 
appeal to any Member but Taiwan, it is mathematically impossible for the respective proportions 
among Members specified in Article 11 to be followed at once in relation to both the full set of 
Extended Commission Members and the subset of those who are parties to the 1993 Convention. 
856
  Annex I to the Honolulu Convention, supra Introduction n 8, provides in paragraph 4 
that “The provisions of this Annex relating to participation by fishing entities are solely for the 
purposes of this Convention.”  Surely, however, one must regard with extreme scepticism the 
efficacy of any statement in a document to the effect that “this is not to be used a precedent”.  
Presumably whatever special circumstances led to the adoption of the provision in question in the 
first place would make the same solution equally acceptable to all concerned if they arose again. 
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5 Events subsequent to the passing of the Resolution 
At the CCSBT’s Eighth Meeting in October 2001 Taiwan announced that it would 
apply to become a Member of the Extended Commission as soon as possible.
857
  The 
application of the “Fishing Entity of Taiwan” met with success and with a negotiated 
quota of 1,140 tonnes Taiwan took its place within the Extended Commission at the 
CCSBT’s Ninth Meeting in 2002.  Reports of meetings of the Commission proper 
since 2002 are very short, but each with a very long attachment that is the report of 
the associated meeting of the Extended Commission.
858
  Similarly, reports of the 
Scientific Committee are near-hollow shells, with all its business beyond formalities 
now found in the appended reports of the Extended Scientific Committee.
859
 
The passage by the Extended Commission in 2003 of the resolution establishing the 
status of “Co-operating Non-Member”,860 and the fact that this new status is confined 
to the Extended Commission, demonstrate the degree to which the Extended 
Commission is now for practical purposes the central body within the framework of 
the 1993 Convention.  Sometimes, however, this is obscured by failure to observe the 
legal niceties in the drafting of resolutions, attributable to use of precedents from 
other commissions without making the necessary changes to adapt them to the 
CCSBT framework.
861
 
                                                          
857
  Attachment F to CCSBT8 Report, supra n 740.  
858
  CCSBT9 Report, in CCSBT Blue Book 2003, supra Ch I n 46, 1; CCSBT10 Report, in 
CCSBT Blue Book 2004, supra Ch I n 32, 1; CCSBTSM4 Report, in CCSBT Blue Book 2005; 
supra Ch I n 34, 101; CCSBT11 Report, supra n 683; CCSBT12 Report, supra Ch I n 248; 
CCSBT13 Report, supra Ch I n 102; CCSBT14 Report, supra Ch I n 141. 
859
  CCSBT-ESC1 Report, supra Ch I n 293; CCSBT-ESC2 Report, supra Ch I n 32; 
CCSBT-ESC3 Report, supra Ch I n 236; CCSBT-ESC4 Report, supra Ch I n 114; CCSBT-ESC5 
Report, supra n 683; CCSBT-ESC6 Report, supra Ch I n 141. 
860
  Supra n 803. 
861
  For example in the resolution establishing the CCSBT Record of Vessels (Attachment 
10 to CCSBT-EC2 Report, supra n 757, at 91), the Extended Commission describes itself in the 
preamble as acting “in accordance with paragraph 3(b) of Article 8 of the [1993] Convention”, 
even though for all Members of the Extended Commission but Taiwan, the obligations resulting 
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Formally Taiwan’s position remains one of dissatisfaction with its status and wanting 
the CCSBT to allow it to become a member of the Commission proper,
862
 but it is 
not pursuing the matter with any vigour.  
There is also a question about Taiwan’s ability to host and chair meetings of the 
Extended Commission and subsidiary bodies of the CCSBT.  On the rotation 
principle it was Taiwan’s turn to chair the Extended Commission in 2005, each of the 
other four Members having chaired the CCSBT in as many years (Japan 2001, 
Australia 2002, New Zealand 2003, Republic of Korea 2004).  Evidently, however, 
there is still a degree of sensitivity about this: although Taiwan offered to host the 
2004 management procedure workshop, it was held in Korea.
863
  Even so, the fact 
that Taiwan supplied the Vice-Chair of the Extended Commission in 2004 (though 
not of the Commission proper),
864
 which is also the usual precursor to chairing the 
following year, showed that Members were willing to adhere to this principle.  
Accordingly, although the Twelfth Meeting was hosted and chaired by Japan, with 
Australia as Vice-Chair,
865
 Taiwan hosted and chaired the associated Extended 
Commission and Extended Scientific Commission meetings of 2005, as well as that 
                                                                                                                                                                    
from this Resolution flow from the omnibus approval decision of the Commission (CCSBT10 
Report, supra n 858, at 3 (paragraph 5)), not that of the Extended Commission.  The American 
spelling of “meters” and the reference to “Contracting Parties” in paragraph 1 suggest that an 
ICCAT resolution has been used as the template for this resolution: “Recommendation by 
ICCAT Concerning the Establishment of an ICCAT Record of Vessels over 24 Meters 
Authorized to Operate in the Convention Area” (Annex 8.22 to ICCATSM13 Report), in ICCAT 
Green Book 2003/1, supra Ch II n 427, 186. 
862
  “Statement by the Fishing Entity of Taiwan to the Admission, Canberra October 15-18, 
2002” (Attachment 1 to CCSBT-EC1 Report), in CCSBT Blue Book 2003, supra Ch I n 46, 30. 
863
  CCSBT, Report of the Second Meeting of the Management Procedure Workshop, 7-9 & 
12, 14-15 April 2003, Queenstown, New Zealand (hereinafter CCSBT-MPW2 Report), in 
CCSBT Blue Book 2004, supra Ch I n 32, 239 at 250 (paragraph 48); CCSBT-MPW3 Report, 
supra Ch I n 306. 
864
  CCSBT-EC2 Report, supra Ch II n 353, at 28 (paragraph 81).  The Vice-Chair of the 
Commission proper was nominated by Japan: CCSBT10 Report, supra n 858, at 3 (paragraph 7). 
865
  As decided in 2004: CCSBT11 Report, supra n 683, at 3 (paragraphs 6 and 7).  
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of the Stock Assessment Group and the 2006 meeting of the Ecologically Related 
Species Working Group.
866
 
6 Conclusions 
The CCSBT’s 2001 Resolution which established the Extended Commission has 
proved to be an effective way of enticing Taiwan into the workings of the CCSBT 
and gaining its cooperation, despite what on the surface appeared to have been an 
unpromising legal basis on which to operate.  Taiwan has been accepted by the 
CCSBT and its Members as having sufficient legal personality to be bound by 
obligations relating to its SBT fishing activities.  In the light of the more significant 
treaty law steps taken seven months earlier (September 2000) to accommodate 
Taiwan in the WCPFC, and even more so in 2003 in the Inter-American Tropical 
Tuna Commission’s new Antigua Convention,867 it may be concluded that neither the 
CCSBT nor Taiwan – nor, for that matter, China – has an interest in upsetting the 
mutually satisfactory arrangement reached through the 2001 Resolution. 
                                                          
866
  See CCSBT-EC4 Report, supra Ch I n 248; CCSBT-ESC4 Report, supra Ch I n 114; 
CCSBT, Report of the Sixth Meeting of the Stock Assessment Group, 29 August - 3 September 
2005, Taipei, Taiwan (hereinafter CCSBT-SAG6 Report, <www.ccsbt.org/docs/pdf/meeting_ 
reports/ccsbt_12/report_of_SAG6.pdf> (visited on 27 July 2008)), at 3 (paragraph 8); CCSBT, 
Report of the Sixth Meeting of the Ecologically Related Species Working Group, 20-23 February 
2006, Kaohsiung, Taiwan (<www.ccsbt.org/docs/pdf/meeting_reports/ccsbt_13/report_of_ 
ERSWG6.pdf> (visited on 13 June 2008)). 
867
  Annex I to the Honolulu Convention, supra Introduction n 8, contemplates the delivery 
by Taiwan of a written instrument to the depositary, by which it “agree[s] to be bound by the 
regime established by this Convention” (paragraph 1), participates in the decision-making, and 
“shall comply with the obligations under this Convention” as a Member of the Commission 
(paragraph 2) and submits to “final and binding arbitration in accordance with the relevant rules 
of the Permanent Court of Arbitration” of disputes concerning the interpretation or application of 
the Convention (paragraph 3): Serdy, supra n 669, at 213.  Taiwan (sub nomine Chinese Taipei) 
has “signed” the Antigua Convention in accordance with its terms and there is even provision for 
a procedure akin to ratification, apparently accepted without rancour by China: ibid. at 215 and 
sources there cited. 
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One note of caution should be sounded about the potential for conflict within the 
CCSBT were China to accede to the 1993 Convention, as on the face of Article 18 it 
is entitled to do, on the basis of catch of SBT taken by vessels flagged to Taiwan, as 
occurred in the IOTC.
868
  Nonetheless, Taiwan’s status as a Member of the Extended 
Commission is firmly grounded in the 2001 Resolution, about which there has been 
no protest by China.  Nor is there any prospect of other Members wishing to rescind 
it in order to encourage to China to join, should such rescission be its price.  With 
Taiwan a much more significant catcher of SBT than China, it seems reasonable to 
predict that, faced with a choice between including Taiwan at the cost of excluding 
China and vice versa, the other Members will opt for the former – at least as long as 
political factors extraneous to international fisheries policy can be kept at bay. 
D Legal aspects of documentation of trade in SBT 
One of the difficulties posed by non-members of a fisheries commission catching any 
species is that they are under no obligation to provide catch and effort data to that 
commission.  The duty in UNCLOS Article 119 to exchange data is a weak substitute 
and seldom observed.  As a consequence, the scientists carrying out the periodic 
stock assessments need to make estimates of incomplete third-party catch data, 
which makes the resultant assessments all the more unreliable.  Although the UN 
Fish Stocks Agreement places a duty on its parties to provide such data to the 
relevant commission,
869
 its utility as against non-parties is open to question, though 
                                                          
868
  Ibid., at 208. 
869
  Supra Introduction n 4.  Article 14, paragraph 1 is in the following terms: 
States shall ensure that fishing vessels flying their flag provide such information as may be 
necessary in order to fulfil their obligations under this Agreement.  To this end, States shall 
in accordance with Annex I: 
(a) collect and exchange scientific, technical and statistical data with respect to fisheries for 
straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks;  
(b) ensure that data are collected in sufficient detail to facilitate effective stock assessment 
and are provided in a timely manner to fulfil the requirements of subregional or regional 
fisheries management organizations or arrangements; and  
(c) take appropriate measures to verify the accuracy of such data. 
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this is one of the provisions that may be susceptible of becoming customary 
international law in due course. 
In the meantime, the commissions have little alternative to resorting to self-help.  In 
the 1990s ICCAT, troubled by catch of ABT by non-members of that Commission, 
developed a Statistical Document Program whose centrepiece was a standard 
statistical document prescribed for use by exporters, “validated” by the flag State or 
entity of the vessel that caught the ABT.
870
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Article 3 of Annex I, headed “Basic fishery data”, provides that: 
1. States shall collect and make available to the relevant subregional or regional fisheries 
management organization or arrangement the following types of data in sufficient detail to 
facilitate effective stock assessment in accordance with agreed procedures:  
(a) time series of catch and effort statistics by fishery and fleet;  
(b) total catch in number, nominal weight, or both, by species (both target and non-target) as 
is appropriate to each fishery. [Nominal weight is defined by the Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations as the live-weight equivalent of the landings];  
(c) discard statistics, including estimates where necessary, reported as number or nominal 
weight by species, as is appropriate to each fishery;  
(d) effort statistics appropriate to each fishing method; and  
(e) fishing location, date and time fished and other statistics on fishing operations as 
appropriate.  
2. States shall also collect where appropriate and provide to the relevant subregional or 
regional fisheries management organization or arrangement information to support stock 
assessment, including:  
(a) composition of the catch according to length, weight and sex;  
(b) other biological information supporting stock assessments such as information on age, 
growth, recruitment, distribution and stock identity; and  
(c) other relevant research, including surveys of abundance, biomass surveys, hydro-acoustic 
surveys, research on environmental factors affecting stock abundance, and oceanographic 
and ecological studies. 
870
  On possible application of the document to trade in SBT, given that the 1966 
Convention, supra Introduction n 6, covers all tunas in the Atlantic Ocean by virtue of the 
reference in Article IV(2)(b) to the “maintenance of the populations of tuna and tuna-like fishes 
in the Convention area” and that the early confusion over whether the reference to “all bluefin 
tuna” in “Recommendation by ICCAT Concerning the ICCAT Bluefin Tuna Statistical 
Document Program” (Annex 6 to ICCATSM8 Report), in ICCAT Green Book 1993, supra n 
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The 1992 SBT trilateral meeting was the first at which a certificate of origin scheme 
for SBT was discussed.
871
  The 1993 meeting considered the appropriateness of 
introducing a Statistical Document Program similar to that used by ICCAT.  Japan 
advised that the ICCAT program was directed to identifying from which sub-stock 
(i.e. the Atlantic or Pacific Ocean) tuna was taken.  As there is only one stock of 
SBT, Japan did not support the adoption of such a scheme at this stage.  Nonetheless, 
all three States undertook to assess the merits of introducing a certificate of origin 
scheme for SBT before the next trilateral management meeting.
872
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
687, 67 covers SBT as well as ABT has never been permanently settled, see Serdy, supra Ch III 
n 491, at 242.  ICCAT has never adopted any SBT management measure, though occasionally its 
panel on temperate tunas, Panel 3, has called for copies of scientific reports produced by the 
principal States engaged in the SBT fishery.  In 1976 the Panel agreed with the recommendation 
of the Standing Committee on Research and Statistics that past and future results of cooperative 
studies between Australian and Japanese scientists be made available to the Committee by its 
next meeting: Reports of the Meetings of Panels 1 Through 4 (Annex 5 to ICCATC4 Report), in 
ICCAT Green Book 1977, supra Ch I n 259, 54 at 60.  In 1982 the Secretariat was requested to 
obtain from participants at the approaching first trilateral meeting copies of all scientific papers 
presented and conclusions reached: Reports of the Meetings of Panels 1–4 (Annex 8 to 
ICCATSM3 Report), in ICCAT Green Book 1983, supra Ch I n 204, 73 at 81-82.  The only 
member of this panel not engaged in the SBT fishery that has occasionally expressed concrete 
views on it is the United States.  In 1977 the US supported all SBT-related recommendations of 
the Standing Committee on Research and Statistics including the “halt in the further expansion of 
effort”, while in 1988 it voiced satisfaction with the reduction of the three-country catch to 17500 
tonnes, but drew the Chairman’s attention to ICCAT’s continuing ability to take measures for 
SBT under the 1966 Convention: Reports of the Meetings of Panels 1-4 and Joint Meeting of 
Panels 1 and 4 (Annex 4 to ICCAT5 Report), in ICCAT Green Book 1978, supra Ch I n 191, 59 
at 67; Reports of the Meetings of Panels 1-4 (Annex 6 to Proceedings of the Sixth Special 
Meeting of the Commission, Madrid, Spain, November 14-16, 1988), in ICCAT, Report for 
biennial period, 1988-89 Part I (1988), 59 at 66.  In 1992 Japan notified ICCAT of improved 
statistical systems it had introduced to collect data on bluefin imports, the main improvement 
being the separation of ABT and SBT in the statistics: ICCATSM8 Report, in ICCAT Green 
Book 1993, supra n 687, 29 at 34. 
871
  1992 Conclusion, supra Ch II n 350, at 4. 
872
  November 1993 Draft Summary Record, supra Ch I n 289, at 4. 
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1 The CCSBT Trade Information Scheme 
At the CCSBT’s Fourth Meeting, Australia called for the immediate introduction of a 
program along the same lines to provide accurate information on origin and volume 
of SBT entering international trade.  Further, a certification scheme should be 
developed by 30 November 1997 and implemented by 1 March 1999 as a necessary 
part of a coordinated approach to documenting and controlling rapidly expanding 
non-member catch.  The Members made a “strong commitment to intersessional 
work, with the objective of evaluating such a scheme as soon as practicable”,873 but 
when the meeting resumed some months later, Japan doubted the necessity for it, 
because, SBT being a single stock, there was no need to collect trade data by area, 
and some non-member catch was not traded internationally.  The scheme would thus 
not be a panacea for non-member issues.
874
  New Zealand believed development of 
such a scheme was necessary to encourage accession or cooperation by non-
members, consistent with the requirement in Article 15 of the 1993 Convention that 
parties discourage SBT fishing activities of non-members.
875
  Nevertheless Japan 
endorsed the establishment of a Working Group on this issue. 
This Working Group met twice.  At its first meeting it had before it a Secretariat 
document which indicated that, Japanese trade statistics apart, little SBT-specific 
statistical information was available.
876
  Japan explained the history, background and 
                                                          
873
  CCSBT4(1) Report, supra Ch I n 126, at 8. 
874
  CCSBT4(2) Report, supra n 683, at 61. 
875
  Ibid., at 61-62.  The “Action Plan Concerning Promotion of Accession to, and 
Cooperation with, CCSBT by Non-Member States and Entities” adopted at this meeting – supra 
n 708 – stated inter alia that “the Commission will consider a scheme to collect more accurate 
and comprehensive information on SBT fishing through trade, with a view to evaluating and 
designing such a scheme, and that a special working group for this purpose will be established.” 
876
  “Database Format Maintained in the Secretariat (Proposal by Australia)” (Attachment C 
to Report of the Peer Review Workshop, Second Part, 20 March 2000, Canberra, Australia 
(hereinafter Peer Review Workshop Report bis)), in CCSBT Blue Book 2001, supra Ch I n 242, 
203.  Those statistics themselves had only a short history, as until 1993 Japan’s import statistics 
included SBT in “other tuna species”: “Japan’s Proposal for Database Format Maintained in 
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practical implementation of the ICCAT Bluefin Tuna Statistical Document Program 
(including its own experiences in implementing its requirements) and described its 
import application form for ABT.  The participants began work to evaluate and 
design such a scheme for the CCSBT that would be “transparent, non-discriminatory, 
administratively efficient and consistent with the Parties’ international obligations 
including under the GATT”, in essence adapting the ICCAT program to CCSBT 
requirements.
877
  At its Fifth Meeting the CCSBT drafted letters to non-members, 
with the July 1998 workshop report attached, advising that it was considering the 
establishment of a scheme to collect more accurate and comprehensive data on SBT 
fishing by monitoring trade in the species and seeking their understanding for the 
application of such a scheme and cooperation in its implementation once adopted.
878
 
Based on text drafted by the second meeting of the Working Group in July 1999, a 
Trade Information Scheme was finally adopted by the CCSBT at its Sixth Meeting 
late that year, to come into operation on 1 June 2000.
879
 
Early reports of the operation of the scheme were promising despite some teething 
troubles.  It highlighted a link between Indonesian and Taiwanese fishing through the 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Secretariat for Enhancement of Function of the CCSBT” (Attachment D to Peer Review 
Workshop Report bis), ibid., 206 at 208. 
877
  Report of the Trade Information Scheme Workshop, 8-10 July 1998, Tokyo, Japan, in 
CCSBT Blue Book 2000, supra Ch II n 413, 191 at 193 (paragraph 10). 
878
  “Elements for Letter to Non Members, Trade Certification Scheme” (Attachment 22 to 
CCSBT5(1) Report), ibid., 52. 
879
  CCSBT6(1) Report, supra Ch I n 219, at 4 (paragraph 18).  The full details of the 
scheme are set out at 32 (Attachment M), but some of the text is square-bracketed, indicating that 
the points concerned were left by the parties to subsequent negotiation.  When the meeting 
resumed some months later, the Executive Secretary advised that in the interim the details of the 
scheme had been sent to those non-members identified by Japan as having exported SBT to it 
within the last five years, and to other international fishery commissions.  A finalised version of 
the scheme was then adopted: CCSBT6(2) Report, supra n 683, at 53 (paragraph 21); the full 
specification of the scheme is in “CCSBT Southern Bluefin Tuna Statistical Document Program” 
(Attachment J to CCSBT6(2) Report), in CCSBT Blue Book 2001, supra Ch I n 242, 77. 
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recording of over 1,800 tonnes of SBT imports into Japan from Taiwan, despite 
Taiwan’s voluntary restraint to 1,450 tonnes.  Taiwan agreed to investigate this catch 
further,
880
 and appears to have initially accepted responsibility for the catch of 
Taiwan-owned vessels fishing in Indonesian waters in declaring catches for 1999 and 
2000 of 1,787 tonnes and 1,689 tonnes respectively.
881
  At the following (Eighth) 
Meeting of the CCSBT, however, Taiwan reclassified the SBT caught by these 
vessels as unregulated Indonesian catch, as they were in fact flagged to Indonesia.
882
 
The meeting repeated the previous year’s concern that Taiwanese vessels were 
catching SBT under flags of convenience and at Taiwan’s “apparent inability to exert 
any control over these vessels, or to provide information concerning the number of 
vessels, or the flags that they flew.”  Japan urged Taiwan to follow its example by 
making it illegal for its citizens to target SBT using a flag-of-convenience vessel.
883
 
2 Japan’s domestic catch data: a flaw in the Scheme? 
A weakness of the Scheme is that does not apply to SBT caught on the high seas by 
Japanese vessels and landed by them in Japan, because this is not trade, a point 
                                                          
880
  CCSBT7 Report, supra Ch III n 449, at 6-7 (paragraphs 33-36). 
881
  Attachment F-5 to CCSBT7 Report, supra Ch I n 234, at 47. 
882
  CCSBT8 Report, supra Ch I n 30, at 66 (paragraph 39).  The SBT catches by the 
Philippines and the Seychelles detected by the Scheme were also thought to be by Taiwanese-
owned vessels operating under flags of convenience: ibid. at 71 (paragraph 90).  The 1999 and 
2000 catches have been reduced to 1513 and 1638 tonnes respectively in Attachment K-5 to 
CCSBT8 Report, supra Ch I n 231, at 138.  The Scheme may in addition have been instrumental 
in exposing Taiwan’s use of a 5-year average: supra n 706.  See also “Statement by Chinese 
Taipei Concerning Re-flagging of Flag of Convenience (FoC) Vessels” (Appendix 12 to Annex 7 
to ICCAT16 Report), in ICCAT Green Book 2000/1, supra Ch I n 242, 133. 
883
  CCSBT8 Report, supra Ch I n 30, at 71 (paragraph 91). 
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confirmed by Japan in response to a query from Australia.
884
  While Australia 
reluctantly accepted this answer as correct, New Zealand advanced the position that, 
to be consistent with Article III of the GATT,
885
 under the Scheme Parties’ domestic 
catch must be subject to substantially equivalent reporting requirements.
886
  Yet this, 
it is submitted, is insupportable.  This Article is directed, in the words of its heading, 
at ensuring “National Treatment on Internal Taxation and Regulation”, that is, non-
discrimination against imported goods, once they have passed through the customs 
barrier, so that when a tariff is “bound” at a given level by a Contracting Party under 
Article II, paragraph 1, the resultant obligation not to raise it above that level is not 
circumvented by the imported product being subject to a higher rate of taxation or 
more exacting regulation than the like domestic product.  In other words, Article III 
does not prohibit, as a condition of the importation through the customs barrier, more 
stringent documentary requirements for imported products than apply to domestic 
products.  Since the Scheme’s requirements are imposed on SBT at the customs 
                                                          
884
  CCSBT6(1) Report, supra Ch I n 219, at 4 (paragraph 20).  Serdy, supra Ch III n 448, 
points out at 91 that, although GATT (supra Introduction n 22) does not define the concept of 
importation, the 1973 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna 
and Flora, supra Introduction n 13, distinguishes it from “introduction from the sea”, which is 
defined by Article I(e) as “transportation into a State of specimens of any species which were 
taken in the marine environment not under the jurisdiction of any State”.  In 2007 the ICCAT 
scheme for ABT on which this was modelled became a catch documentation program embracing 
non-traded catch also: Recommendation by ICCAT on an ICCAT Bluefin Tuna Catch 
Documentation Program, in “Recommendations Adopted by ICCAT in 2007” (Annex 5 to 
ICCAT20 Report), in ICCAT Green Book 2008/1, supra Ch III n 568, 149 at 160-169. 
885
  Supra Introduction n 22.  The text of the relevant paragraph of GATT Article III reads: 
4.  The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any 
other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to 
like products of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting 
their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use.  The 
provisions of this paragraph shall not prevent the application of differential internal 
transportation charges which are based exclusively on the economic operation of the means 
of transport and not on the nationality of the product. 
886
  CCSBT6(1) Report, supra Ch I n 219, at 4-5 (paragraph 20). 
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barrier as a condition of their importation, they are not captured by the text of Article 
III.  Were it otherwise, Article III would require that imported goods be completely 
freed from the burden of paperwork connected with the importation, since domestic 
products by definition need no such paperwork in order to enter internal trade. 
It is also open to question how fatal this weakness this really is.  All SBT on the 
Japanese market must either have been imported, in which they case are subject to 
the Scheme, or be the product of Japanese vessels’ catch.  As confirmed by the 2006 
revelations of overcatch, detected through discrepancies between market and import 
statistics for SBT in Japan, if the Scheme succeeds in eliminating these discrepancies 
for imported product, the cause of any remaining discrepancy is identified by process 
of elimination as Japan’s domestic catch of SBT.  This is shown by Japan’s treatment 
of a shipment of SBT imported, according to its trade statistics, from China.  The fish 
were captured by a Japanese vessel and processed in China by a Japanese company 
in a special export zone from which trade does not enter China’s own trade statistics 
as either imports or re-exports.
887
  
Nonetheless, Japan agreed to apply voluntarily the provisions of the Scheme to fish 
landed by Japanese vessels using New Zealand quota under joint venture.
888
 
Australia at the November 2000 Special Meeting tabled a paper
889
 arguing that the 
narrow definition of trade prevented the CCSBT from collecting (in the words of the 
Report of the July 1999 workshop) “information not currently available that can be 
                                                          
887
  Appendix 2 to Attachment 8-3 to CCSBT-EC2 Report, supra n 765.  It is doubtful, 
however, whether the admission of these fish into Japan without documentation on the basis of 
their non-traded status under Chinese law was really justified, as one would have expected 
Japan’s classification of them as imports to be decisive of the matter. 
888
  CCSBT6(1) Report, supra Ch I n 219, at 4 (paragraph 19) and “Arrangement for 
collecting information on Joint Venture operations” (Attachment N to CCSBT6(1) Report), in 
CCSBT Blue Book 2001, supra Ch I n 242, 42 at 42-43. 
889
  CCSBT doc CCSBT/0011/16, “Full implementation of the Commission for the 
Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna Trade Information Scheme/Statistical Document 
Program” (Attachment H to CCSBTSM3 Report), ibid., 130. 
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used to improve stock assessments.”  It stated that “growing non-member catches 
and the possibility of an expansion in non-member markets for SBT make trade an 
inappropriate basis for collecting comprehensive information on catches of SBT”.  
Moreover, by deciding to provide voluntarily the like data for domestic commercial 
catch, the CCSBT would gain non-members’ confidence, raising the likelihood of 
their joining it.  Less persuasively, the Australian paper said that without this step “it 
would be difficult to justify taking any action in respect of non-members that do not 
cooperate with the Commission’s conservation and management measures”, citing 
States’ obligation under UNCLOS Article 119 for their conservation measures not to 
discriminate in form or in fact against the fishermen of any State.
890
  It advocated the 
Patagonian toothfish scheme of the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic 
Marine Living Resources
891
 (CCAMLR) as the best model on which to base an 
expansion of the program, pointing out that, while trade-related, it was triggered at 
the point of landing or transhipment, all vessels of Parties fishing for toothfish being 
issued with forms on which to provide catch details at the point of landing.
892
 
A working group formed at the CCSBT’s 2003 meeting noted in its report that the 
scheme had a “deficiency” in monitoring domestic consumption and trade of SBT, 
                                                          
890
  There being no such measure relating specifically to non-traded catch, this may have 
been a hint that Australia would oppose trade measures under the Action Plan unless Japan 
agreed to supply domestic catch data. 
891
  Created by the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, 
drawn up at Canberra, 20 May 1980, 1329 UNTS 47, ATS 1982 No 9. 
892
  Attachment H to CCSBTSM3 Report, supra n 889, at 131.  First embodied in 
Conservation Measure 147/XIX: Provisions to Ensure Compliance with CCAMLR Conservation 
Measures by Vessels, Including Cooperation between Contracting Parties, the CCAMLR scheme 
is now renumbered and retitled as Convention Measure 10-05 (2006), Catch Documentation 
Scheme for Dissostichus spp. (see <www.ccamlr.org/pu/e/e_pubs/cm/07-08/10-05.pdf>, visited 
on 13 June 2008), which obliges Contracting Parties inter alia to inspect vessels that intend to 
land or tranship toothfish in their ports, deny vessels access to port unless they make a written 
declaration that they have not engaged in or supported illegal, unregulated or unreported fishing 
in CCAMLR’s Convention Area, and deny landing or transshipment of fish if there is evidence 
that the vessel has fished in contravention of CCAMLR conservation measures. 
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and recommended that the Commission investigate strategies “to best characterise” 
such catch and trade.
893
  The report observed that SBT markets were developing in a 
number of countries including the United States, Hong Kong, Korea and the 
Philippines, while Taiwan advised that it had begun actively promoting domestic 
consumption of SBT in view of the glutted Japanese market, and the Indonesian 
catch monitoring workshop had indicated that some of Indonesia’s catch went to 
Europe.  It therefore recommended that the forms should be amended to require 
disclosure of the export destination.
894
 
3 GATT implications of the Scheme 
In their 1992 joint paper to ICCAT on a Certificate of Origin Program for Bluefin 
Tuna, Canada, Japan and the United States stated that the program  
can be implemented consistent with obligations under the General Agreement on 
Trade and Tariffs [sic], by reason that the purpose of this program is to collect catch 
information necessary for the proper conservation and management of Atlantic 
bluefin tuna, and that requirement of submission of certificate of origin is “strictly” 
indispensable for this purpose.
895
  
That doubts about this were entertained by many States is shown by the fate of a 
Japanese draft resolution in ICCAT which had a provision concerning prohibition of 
entry into port.  At the meeting of the subsidiary body where it was introduced, 
Spain, Portugal and France all said it was contrary to GATT, and Portugal also 
                                                          
893
  Report of the working group on Trade Information Scheme matters (Attachment 11 to 
CCSBT-EC2 Report), in CCSBT Blue Book 2004, supra Ch I n 32, 95 at 96. 
894
  The Extended Commission accepted the recommendation: CCSBT-EC2 Report, supra 
Ch II n 353, at 26 (paragraph 61). 
895
  “Canada-Japan-United States Certificate of Origin Program for Bluefin Tuna” 
(Appendix 2 to Reports of the Management Review Committee for West Atlantic Bluefin Tuna 
(Annex 9 to ICCATSM8 Report)), in ICCAT Green Book 1993, supra n 687, 76 at 76-77. 
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considered that it was contrary to UNCLOS.
896
  In response to Canada’s denial of 
this and the United States’ querying of it, Spain explained that the unilateral nature of 
the measure was the basis of its reasoning.
897
  The provision in question was 
amended so as to authorise refusal of fishing access in the Contracting Parties’ 
EEZs,
898
 but even this was omitted from the resolution ultimately adopted.
899
  
Despite its confidence in 1992, part of the reason for Japan’s reticence in approving 
in principle the idea of a trade information scheme in the CCSBT was its worry that 
it would be vulnerable to challenge in the WTO, given that neither the United States 
nor the European Community was a Member of the CCSBT, whereas both belonged 
to ICCAT.
900
  This objection is however without substance. 
                                                          
896
  Report of the Second Meeting of the Permanent Working Group for the Improvement of 
ICCAT Statistics and Conservation Measures (Tokyo, Japan - April 19-21, 1994) (Annex 15 to 
ICCATSM9 Report), in ICCAT Green Book 1995/1, supra Ch III n 613, 105 at 111 (paragraphs 
8b.6 (Spain), 8b.7 (France) and 8b.8 (Portugal)). 
897
  Ibid., at 112 (paragraphs 8b.9 (Canada), 8b.11 (United States) and 8b.12 (Spain)).  In 
later years, however, there was no questioning of Iceland’s reference to its refusal of port access 
to non-member vessels for landing ABT to highlight its willingness to cooperate with ICCAT 
despite not being willing to join without recognition of its right to a reasonable quota as a coastal 
State: see e.g. “Opening Statement by the Observer from Iceland”, in Appendix 3 to Annex 6 to 
ICCAT16 Report, supra Ch II n 427, at 107.  
898
  “Draft Resolution by ICCAT to Ensure Compliance with ICCAT Conservation and 
Management Measures” (Appendix 7 to Annex 15 to ICCATSM9 Report), in ICCAT Green 
Book 1995/1, supra Ch III n 613, 124 at 125 (paragraph k). 
899
  Resolution by ICCAT on Compliance with the ICCAT Conservation and Management 
Measures (Annex 13 to ICCATSM9 Report), in ICCAT Green Book 1995/1, supra Ch III n 613, 
100. 
900
  Since 1986 Australia at times, and New Zealand once, have attended meetings as 
observers, after the Chairman’s suggestion the previous year that they be invited to attend in that 
capacity given their exploitation of SBT: Proceedings of the Ninth Regular Meeting of the 
Commission, Palma de Mallorca, Spain, November 13-19, 1985, in ICCAT, Report for biennial 
period, 1984-85 (Part II 1985), 33 at 37; “List of Participants” (Annex 2 to Proceedings of the 
Fifth Special Meeting of the Commission, Madrid, Spain, November 12-18, 1986) in ICCAT, 
Report for biennial period, 1986-87 Part I (1986), 58 at 64; “ICCAT Working Group on Vessel 
Monitoring List of Participants” (Appendix 2 to Annex 6-2 to ICCAT14 Report), in ICCAT 
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Though no WTO Member has ever litigated before a panel an exclusion of its vessels 
from ports for failure to comply with conservation measures of a fishery commission, 
in a dispute over swordfish in the south-east Pacific, the European Community has 
challenged Chile’s closure of its ports to Spanish vessels engaging in that fishery.  
Under a temporary settlement the dispute has not been heard, but is still on foot in 
the WTO.
901
  While a thorough analysis of the applicable GATT provisions
902
 is 
beyond the scope of this work, it may be noted that the usual approach to interaction 
between fisheries measures and the GATT is to assume that the measure breaches the 
latter and then turn to its Article XX(g), a defence for measures “relating to the 
conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective in 
conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption”.  By the 
chapeau of Article XX, this defence is “[s]ubject to the requirement that such 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Green Book 1996/1, supra Ch III n 534, 128 at 129; “Participants at the ICCAT Inter-sessional 
Meeting on Monitoring and Compliance (Washington, D.C. – May 5 to 7, 1997)” (Appendix 2 to 
Annex 7 to ICCAT15 Report), in ICCAT Green Book 1998/1, supra Ch III n 574, 106 at 108.  
The Members comprise Albania, Algeria, Angola, Barbados, Belize, Brazil, Canada, Cape Verde, 
China, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, the European Community, France (St. 
Pierre et Miquelon), Gabon, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Honduras, Iceland, Japan, Korea 
(Republic of), Libya, Mexico, Morocco, Namibia, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, the 
Philippines, Russia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, São Tomé e Principe, Senegal, South 
Africa, Syria, Trinidad & Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, United Kingdom (Anguilla, Bermuda, St. 
Helena, Turks and Caicos), United States, Uruguay, Vanuatu and Venezuela.  Other members of 
ICCAT in the past have been Cuba (1975 to 1991) and Benin (1978 to 1994).  France, Spain, 
Portugal, the United Kingdom and Italy withdrew from ICCAT following the 1997 accession of 
the European Community, as did Cyprus and Malta in 2004, though France and the United 
Kingdom shortly afterwards rejoined it on behalf of their overseas territories outside the 
Community, listed above: see <www.iccat.int/en/contracting.htm>, visited on 2 November 2008. 
901
  See M.A. Orellana, “The Swordfish Dispute between the EU and Chile at the ITLOS and 
the WTO”, (2002) 71 Nordic Journal of International Law 55 at 65-69 and Serdy, supra Ch III n 
448, at 87-88.  For the latest ITLOS Order continuing the suspension of the parallel proceedings 
before a Special Chamber of ITLOS and noting that the parties intend to try to settle the dispute 
during 2008 see Conservation and Sustainable Exploitation of Swordfish Stocks (Chile/European 
Community), Order of 30 November 2007, ITLOS Reports 2005-2007, p.128. 
902
  Supra Introduction n 22. 
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measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail”. 
The defensibility under GATT of a measure pursuant to what the WTO calls a 
multilateral environmental agreement
903
 depends neither on the number of States that 
are party to the latter nor on their share of overall world trade, but in the case of the 
1993 Convention may be affected by the parties’ collective share of the SBT market 
and fishery.  Even with only three CCSBT Members at the time, they accounted for 
almost all the market and most of the fishery, much of the remainder attributable to 
Korea, Taiwan and Indonesia, which were in dialogue of varying degrees of intensity 
with the CCSBT and did not dispute its authority to regulate the stock.  The United 
States and (until recently) the European Community have stayed outside the CCSBT 
because their vessels do not target SBT and their bycatch of it is either negligible or 
nil.  As long as they and other potential participants are not denied a priori either 
membership or the necessary statistical documents, it is hard to see how conditioning 
of access to Members’ markets for imported SBT on presentation of a valid such 
document amounts to “arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination” in the sense of 
Article XX of GATT.
904
  Nonetheless, although the clear conservation motive and 
information-gathering character of the Scheme would probably protect it against a 
charge of being a “disguised restriction on trade”, it is not altogether certain that this 
would extend to an actual import ban under the Action Plan.  With the parties openly 
on record as wanting to protect their share of the catch of SBT, conceivably a WTO 
dispute settlement panel could view this as a surrogate for market share, given that 
the latter must ultimately depend on the former,
905
 and the wording of the phrase is 
on its face wide enough to encompass that.  No obvious line can be drawn between 
the actions of a government aimed at conserving for future generations a straddling 
                                                          
903
  This terminology is criticised in Serdy, supra Ch III n 448, at 114n. 
904
  Note, however, that the CCSBT’s misrepresentation of the condition for accession to the 
1993 Convention may undermine its own case in this regard: supra, text at nn 677-680. 
905
  See on this point Serdy, supra Ch III n 448, at 103-104. 
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or highly migratory fish stock exploited by its fleet, and actions aimed at bolstering 
the profitability of its own fleet at the expense of a possibly more efficient foreign 
fleet.  Either purpose might equally well be served by a given measure.
906
  Ultimately 
it may hinge on the onus of proof, which lies on the party invoking an article XX 
defence.
907
  The question of trade restrictions imposed by members of a fishery 
commission against non-members is considered more fully in the next sub-section. 
4 Trade restrictions on non-members 
At the CCSBT’s Tenth Meeting Australia and New Zealand renewed their call for a 
catch and information documentation scheme that was not restricted to traded catch.  
Australia urged members to report their catch to the Secretariat on a monthly basis.  
The Commission asked the Secretariat to prepare intersessionally a report on catch 
monitoring options.
908
 
The nub of the issue is the permissibility under GATT of fisheries commissions 
omitting to subject their own members as well as non-members to trade sanctions for 
objectively identical behaviour.  In 1997, possibly fearing such sanctions by ICCAT 
for its catch of ABT in its own EEZ, Mexico, present as an observer, had this to say:  
                                                          
906
 As related by L. de La Fayette, “Access to Ports in International Law” (1996) 11 IJMCL 
1 at 20, in 1989 the EC requested consultations with Canada under Article XXII of GATT, supra 
Introduction n 22, objecting to two provisions of Canada’s port access policy providing for denial 
of access to foreign vessels competing for the same species as Canadian vessels, and for grant of 
access where economic benefit for Canada would ensue or the vessels were from countries with 
which Canada had “favourable fishery relations”, a determination apparently left to officials’ 
virtually unfettered discretion.  The EC did not, however, object to a third aspect of the policy 
which provided for closure of ports for conservation reasons to vessels engaged in overfishing of 
depleted stocks, and did not pursue the case once the two aspects of the Canadian policy to which 
it objected were removed. 
907
 The WTO Appellate Body confirmed in European Communities – Conditions for the 
Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries, WTO doc WT/DS246/AB/R (7 April 
2004) at 38 (paragraph 95) that “[i]t is well-established that Article XX(g) is an exception in 
relation to which the responding party bears the burden of proof” (italics in original).  
908
  CCSBT-EC2 Report, supra Ch II n 353, at 25-26 (paragraphs 59 and 62). 
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…it is worrying…that the fleets under the jurisdiction of ICCAT Contracting Parties 
do not fully comply with the management and conservation measures recommended 
and agreed by the Commission…It also seems inappropriate that, faced with this 
situation, it is recommended that sanctions be applied to non-Contracting Parties for 
not cooperating with the Commission by not complying with its recommendations.  
Does this mean that compliance with responsible management of living marine 
resources can be evaluated in different ways depending on whether or nor States are 
members of international organizations?  In keeping with international law… 
compliance with such measures by non-Contracting Parties should be demanded 
once the Parties of the organization itself comply with the conservation and 
management measures they have adopted, otherwise, this will be interpreted as a 
double standard.
909
 
It is submitted that the Article XX chapeau requirement to avoid arbitrary and 
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail 
would be impossible to meet if the commission concerned were not willing to subject 
its own members to the same restraints it wished to impose on others.  Seemingly in 
recognition of this, ICCAT imposed trade restrictions in certain species on Equatorial 
Guinea, one of its own members.
910
  
                                                          
909
  “Statement by Mexico on Cooperation with ICCAT” (Annex 6-5 to ICCAT15 Report), 
in ICCAT Green Book 1998/1, supra Ch III n 574, at 87.  See also Brazil’s criticism of the 
extension to the South Atlantic swordfish stock of compliance procedures applied to certain 
North Atlantic stocks as discriminatory, allowing coastal developing States that export swordfish 
to be punished, but not developed importers: ICCAT15 Report, ibid., 38 (paragraph 10.8). 
910
  Recommendation by ICCAT regarding Equatorial Guinea pursuant to the 1996 
“Recommendation regarding compliance in the bluefin tuna and North Atlantic swordfish 
fisheries” [99-10] (Annex 5-10 to ICCAT16 Report), in ICCAT Green Book 2000/1, supra Ch I 
n 242, 79; extended to bigeye tuna by Recommendation by ICCAT Regarding Equatorial Guinea 
pursuant to the 1998 Resolution Concerning the Unreported and Unregulated Catches of Tuna by 
Large-Scale Logline Vessels in The Convention Area [00-16] (Annex 7-16 to ICCATSM12 
Report), in ICCAT Green Book 2001/1, Ch III n 571, 151 at 152 (paragraph 1).  The sanctions 
were lifted in 2004 by Recommendation by ICCAT concerning the lifting of trade sanctions 
against Equatorial Guinea [04-13], in “Recommendations Adopted by ICCAT in 2004” (Annex 5 
to Proceedings of the 14
th
 Special Meeting of the International Commission for the Conservation 
of Atlantic Tunas (New Orleans, USA - November 15 to 21, 2004) (hereinafter ICCATSM14 
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In the CCSBT the problem has been less one of indifference to or wilful disregard by 
Members of their catch limits (as opposed to marginal overcatch, which has been 
compensated for by reduced catch in subsequent years
911
), than the absence of a TAC 
altogether from 1998 to 2003.  Such limits as the Members then imposed on 
themselves were voluntary. 
Basing unilateral trade restrictions on such limits, is not, however, fatal to them.  In 
United States — Importation of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, the WTO’s 
Appellate Body ultimately upheld on the basis of Article XX(g) a redesigned 
unilateral United States measure aimed at reducing bycatch of turtles in shrimp 
fisheries
912
 after it found the application of the original one discriminated arbitrarily 
and unjustifiably between countries where the same conditions prevailed.
913
  If the 
importing State’s vessels are subject to a voluntary limit, that is, one that the State 
has imposed on itself, and it admits the importation of the species only from other 
members of the fishery commission that have given like self-limiting undertakings, 
then the fact that there is no overarching limitation binding in international law 
should not be an obstacle to the exclusion of imports from States that have accepted 
no limitation at all.  It cannot be assumed, of course, that this condition invariably 
will be satisfied, nor will it be effective against a State that does have a voluntary 
limit of its own, but one that is higher than the relevant fishery commission accepts. 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Report)), in ICCAT, Report for Biennial period 2004-05 Part I (2004) - Vol.1 (hereinafter 
ICCAT Green Book 2005/1), 125 at 142. 
911
  See infra Ch V, text at nn 1108-1115. 
912
  United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products: Recourse to 
Article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia, WTO doc WT/DS58/AB/RW (22 October 2001), 
paragraphs 135-138. 
913
  United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WTO doc 
WT/DS58/AB/R (12 October 1998). 
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E The CCSBT “closed shop” and the new abstention 
Commissions refusing to admit new entrants with a “real interest” in an international 
fishery in defiance of Article 8, paragraph 3 of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement have 
been described by Rayfuse as “closed shops”.914  The CCSBT by Article 18 of the 
1993 Convention is no closed shop, yet by its statements.
915
 appears determined to 
act as far as possible as though it were.  The modern version of the abstention 
principle, as described in the previous chapter, rests on just such attempts to deprive 
potential new entrants of the opportunity to establish a real interest in a fishery. 
Though limitation of entry may be a necessary condition for a given stock to recover, 
it should be recalled that the context for the abstention doctrine to apply in the 1952 
International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean
916
 
was a fishery being exploited at an intensity approximating that generating catch of 
the order of the MSY.  To apply it to a depleted stock such as SBT, however, is in a 
distributive justice sense much less defensible, even though limited entry is no less 
necessary.  As the new entrants from New Zealand onwards were not responsible for 
the depletion of the SBT stock, on what basis can those among them who can fish for 
it only on the high seas be expected to refrain from exercising their residual 
UNCLOS Article 116 right to do so?  In particular, if as a result of its depleted state 
the current replacement yield of the stock is well below the theoretical maximum 
sustainable yield, do the “ins” collectively have the right to prevent the stock from 
recovering to the biomass corresponding to that theoretical maximum by taking the 
entire replacement yield, as has been the practice in CCSBT? 
It is now over a quarter of a century since the Third UN Conference on the Law of 
the Sea adopted Article 61, paragraph 3 and Article 119, paragraph 1(a) calling for 
stocks to be maintained at the MSY-producing biomass as qualified by economic and 
                                                          
914
  R. Rayfuse, “Countermeasures and High Seas Enforcement”, (2004) LI Netherlands 
International Law Review 41 at 55. 
915
  See text accompanying n 680 supra. 
916
  Supra Ch III n 536. 
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environmental factors, and for depleted stocks to be restored to that level.  A 
necessary consequence of this is that States, whether fishing in their own EEZs or on 
the high seas, may not collude directly inter se or through a commission either to 
deplete the stock or to delay its rebuilding at the expense of other interested States.  
It is submitted that the exclusion of “outs” innocent of responsibility for depleting the 
stock ought to be permitted only while the excluding States are themselves 
exercising catch restraint sufficient to allow the stock to return to the mandated 
biomass within a reasonable time.  In the extreme case, if overfishing of a given 
stock has induced an equilibrium shift in the ecosystem such that a return to that 
level is no longer possible, as may be the case for cod in the North-West Atlantic, it 
cannot be reconciled with any notion of equity for an aspiring new entrant to be 
permanently excluded from the smaller fishery the stock now supports simply 
because a once much larger one had been depleted by others.  Although no 
timeframe is specified for doing so, the task cannot be postponed indefinitely for the 
convenience of the States currently exploiting the depleted stock, and in 2002 the 
World Summit on Sustainable Development set a target date of 2015: 
31.  To achieve sustainable fisheries, the following actions are required at all levels: 
(a) Maintain or restore stocks to levels that can produce the maximum sustainable 
yield with the aim of achieving these goals for depleted stocks on an urgent basis 
and where possible not later than 2015;
917
 
This seems to have had no effect on the CCSBT, however, which the previous year 
had been advised by the Chair of its Scientific Committee that the 2000 catch level of 
15579 tonnes appeared to be roughly close to the replacement yield, with equal 
probabilities of the stock increasing or decreasing at this harvest level.  Further, 
while no effort had yet been made to estimate the harvest level required to achieve 
                                                          
917
  Resolution 2, “Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable 
Development”, Annex (hereinafter WSSD Plan of Implementation), paragraph 31, in UN doc 
A/CONF.199/20, Report of the World Summit on Sustainable Development, Johannesburg, South 
Africa, 26 August-4 September 2002 (New York: UN, 2002), at 23. 
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recovery of the parental stock to its 1980 level by 2020, most of the assessment 
results indicated low probability of attaining this target at that catch level.
918
  New 
Zealand stated that “[t]he logical and responsible conclusion we draw from this is 
that catch levels must be reduced in order to achieve our stated management 
objectives”,919 reasoning that cannot be faulted, but the debate centred instead on 
Japan’s insistence on redistributing to existing Members part of the “spare quota” it 
identified from overestimates of Indonesia’s catch.920 
The TAC and national allocations ultimately adopted in 2003 also made no attempt 
at reducing the overall catch of the existing Members, the CCSBT preferring to 
postpone any concerted effort to rebuild the stock until the adoption of the 
management strategy, then scheduled for 2004.  The fact that attainment of the 
Johannesburg target date of 2015 might not be possible for SBT even with zero 
catch
921
 calls for the substitution of a later date, not for abandoning the effort 
entirely.  As a result, the CCSBT continues to have a difficult task ahead of it in 
accommodating the interests of new entrants, and its handling of the question to date 
is open to criticism.  But the criticisms made are not always well targeted. 
At the CCSBT’s 2003 Meeting the Philippines asked for “the usual consideration and 
concessions granted developing countries that have been accepted and recognized” in 
other fishery commissions and in UNCLOS, but without specifying what these were.  
With little regard for the history of Australia and New Zealand in the fishery, it 
argued that the original Members “ranged the high seas in exercise of the freedom to 
fish”.  Given the rhetoric of other Members, however, it appears to have been on 
                                                          
918
  CCSBT8 Report, supra Ch I n 30, at 67 (paragraph 43). 
919
  “New Zealand Statement” (Attachment N-4 to CCSBT8 Report), in CCSBT Blue Book 
2002, supra Ch I n 30, 147. 
920
  For the summary of the debate see infra Appendix A, text at nn 1475-1477. 
921
  This follows doubly a fortiori from the statement in CCSBT-MPW2 Report, supra n 
863, at 244 (paragraph 22) that even under zero catch recovery of the parental biomass to its 
1980 level by 2020 is not guaranteed. 
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stronger ground, if somewhat exaggerating, in indicating that, with the admission of 
Korea and Taiwan the CCSBT “became a closed club”, treating “[o]utsiders wishing 
to join in, invariably developing economies…almost…as “gate crashers”, not 
exercising the freedom to fish in the high seas, but rather as villains out to deprive 
the participating States of their catch entitlement.”922 
The responses of the CCSBT to its newest coastal State member and the other coastal 
State still outside the Commission give varying degrees of encouragement.  The 
special position of Indonesia as a developing coastal State has long been recognised, 
and when in 2003 the CCSBT for the first time since 1997 set a TAC, it reserved 800 
tonnes of quota for Indonesia.
923
  On the other hand, Indonesia as the State in whose 
EEZ the stock spawns would have reason to be dissatisfied with an allocation of less 
than 6 per cent of the TAC, which this represents.  In 1980 Gulland suggested that 
some of the reasons for favouring the State of origin’s complete control over 
anadromous stocks, for which UNCLOS Article 66 now provides, may be at least 
partly replicated in other stocks: 
One major reason why it is accepted that the coastal state concerned should have 
authority over salmon and other anadromous species is that without such acceptance 
the states concerned would have little or no interest in maintaining suitable 
conditions, and in due course there would be few if any salmon for anyone to catch. 
Similar considerations can apply to purely marine species.  A country is likely to 
expect a large allocation of a stock when the productivity of the stock is critically 
dependent on conditions in the EEZ of that country, especially when activities by the 
country can affect those conditions.  For example, many offshore stocks have their 
nursery grounds in inshore areas – lagoons and estuaries, etc. – which can be 
seriously affected by land-reclamation, cutting of mangroves, etc.  If a country 
controls these activities for the benefit of the fisheries it would expect a susbtantial 
[sic] allocation, regardless of the location of the fishing grounds, especially if these 
controls cause losses to other sectors of the national economy. 
                                                          
922
  Attachment 5-2 to CCSBT-EC2 Report, supra Ch I n 248, at 54-55.  
923
  CCSBT-EC2 Report, supra Ch II n 353, at 24 (paragraph 51). 
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The factors that might be taken into consideration in setting allocations will include 
the position of the spawning areas, the nursery grounds, and the main feeding 
grounds of the adult fish, as well as the areas where the actual catches are taken.
924
 
It thus may well be that 800 tonnes will not be the CCSBT’s last word if Indonesia, 
now a full member, can provide evidence that it has developed its fishing technology 
and management tools to a point where it is realistic to expect that it will not 
habitually exceed whatever national allocation it may be assigned. 
South Africa is a different matter.  Japan’s preference has been to treat the size of its 
allocation as a completely separate matter from its accession, even going so far as to 
note that States could accede with no initial quota allocation.
925
  Although this has 
been overtaken by events now that South Africa already has a quota as a cooperating 
non-member, it would have been a risky and short-sighted course of action for the 
CCSBT.  Failure to make an allocation to South Africa is not the same as giving it a 
zero allocation, and once a Member of the CCSBT, South Africa could simply block 
consensus on TAC while voluntarily limiting its catch to its own preferred tonnage
926
 
– or, as was shown in the previous chapter, invoking the UN Fish Stocks Agreement 
dispute settlement mechanism with reasonable prospects of obtaining a quota of the 
order of the 250 tonnes it at once stage sought. 
                                                          
924
  J.A. Gulland, Some Problems of the Management of Shared Stocks (FAO Fisheries 
Technical Paper No 206) (Rome: FAO, 1980), at 16.  Southey as long ago as 1970 suggested that 
gains be divided according to capacity and willingness to sabotage international agreements: C. 
Southey, “The International Fishery: A Proposal Based on the New Welfare Economics”, in L.M. 
Alexander (ed), The Law of the Sea: The United Nations and Ocean Management: Proceedings 
of the Fifth Annual Conference of the Law of the Sea Institute, June 15 – June 19, 1970, 
University of Rhode Island (Kingston: University of Rhode Island, 1971), 53 at 58. 
925
  CCSBT8 Report, supra Ch I n 30, at 65 (paragraph 20). 
926
  The original parties to the 1993 Convention are fortunate that Korea did not simply 
terminate its quota negotiations and accede to it as Article 18 indubitably permits, thereby 
gaining equal veto power with them over the TAC and its own national allocation: see supra text 
at n 674. 
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F Concluding remarks 
The legal aspects of documentation of trade in SBT as a means of obtaining data on, 
and attempting to restrain, SBT catches of third parties have been well handled by 
the CCSBT, which has so far navigated safely around the obvious hazards posed by 
the GATT implications of its Trade Information Scheme and Action Plan, which may 
lead to flag States being singled out for restrictions on imports of SBT from their 
vessels.  By contrast, the integration into the CCSBT of Korea and Taiwan, though 
ultimately successful, was impeded by an exclusionary attitude that sought to attain 
the objectives of abstention under another guise; the same self-inflicted problem, this 
time with Korea and Taiwan defending their new interests as “ins”,927 retarded 
Indonesia’s accession and still threatens to magnify its cost in quota, although the 
same risk in respect of South Africa has not materialised.  In this regard it will be 
instructive to see whether the Philippines will maintain its interest in becoming the 
next non-coastal State seeking access to the targeted fishery.  In 2004 the CCSBT 
was still using the old argument that “in the context of the circumstances of the 
fishery including that it is depleted and that existing members have made sacrifices 
there were significant impediments to new entrants in the fishery.”928 
The ability of CCSBT to assert its competence over actual and potential new entrants 
to the SBT fishery will depend on the degree to which its status as the worldwide 
administrative authority for the species gains widespread international recognition.  
This will be all the more crucial if its first faltering steps on quota trading, considered 
in the next chapter, are not to be deliberately or inadvertently undermined by them. 
                                                          
927
  Only three years after joining the CCSBT, Korea was saying (“Opening Statement by the 
Republic of Korea” (Attachment 4-5 to CCSBT-EC3 Report), in CCSBT Blue Book 2005, supra 
Ch I n 34, 50), without any trace of irony, that “non-members represent a growing threat to 
undermine the conservation and management measures taken by the Commission.  We need to 
introduce stronger…measures…so that the non-members may abide by the Commission’s 
conservation and management measures.” 
928
  CCSBT-EC3 Report, supra Ch I n 78, at 25 (paragraph 65). 
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CHAPTER V 
Quota trading – CCSBT as a pioneer malgré soi? 
A Introduction 
There is now a large literature on individual transferable quotas (ITQs) and their 
advantages at the national level which shows that, even if they are not a panacea for 
the problems of overfishing, property rights of some kind are likely to be a necessary 
part of any solution.  Limitation of entry generally preceded the institution of ITQs, 
and remains an essential feature of them: any system will rely at bottom on a general 
prohibition of fishing other than in conformity with the management measures in 
force,
929
 which in the case of ITQs means operators having (or acquiring) sufficient 
quota to cover their catch.
930
  While many of the same ills bedevil international 
fisheries, the basic principle of freedom of fishing on the high seas would appear, at 
least at first sight, to preclude any limitation of entry, so here the developments are 
happening in reverse order.  Pressure was until recently growing in the CCSBT to 
allow trading in quota, a notion that has been debated – and in some cases resisted – 
in a number of other fisheries commissions. 
This chapter considers whether such trading could make adjustment of allocations 
easier in the CCSBT and other commissions and less likely to become mired in the 
allocative conflicts that hamper their overall conservation efforts.  Under a first-
principles analysis from an international legal perspective, it is shown that the 
standard concept of national allocations within a total allowable catch creates no 
tradable rights.  Nor is trading in allocated catch or effort quotas contemplated in the 
                                                          
929
  See e.g. in Australia cll 9.1 and 10.1 of the Southern Bluefin Tuna Fishery Management 
Plan 1995, supra Ch I n 31, which employ the formula that a person is entitled to fish for SBT “if 
and only if” certain conditions, including that the person holds sufficient statutory fishing rights, 
are met. 
930
  While it is assumed here that what is being traded is allocations expressed as limitations 
of catch, much the same considerations apply if the limitation is on effort, however measured, 
rather than on removals from the stock: see OECD, supra Ch I n 53, 93-94. 
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constitutive treaties of most fisheries commissions.  Yet trading in quota in such 
commissions does have a substantial history: there are ad hoc examples of transfers 
of quota actually taking place in at least three such bodies: ICCAT, NAFO
931
 and the 
International Baltic Sea Fisheries Commission (IBSFC).
932
  These are examined and 
it is demonstrated that, for the CCSBT to follow suit, it would be a relatively simple 
matter to set up a system for this – and there would be no need to amend the 1993 
Convention.  Rather, the main novelty in what would be required is a moderately 
elaborate administrative machinery to support the trading, including a rigorous 
system of accounting for catch.  The chapter concludes with an assessment of the 
prospects of the quota shares represented by national allocations becoming 
permanent, in effect creating a new species of quasi-property in international law, 
and some obstacles to this step. 
B  National allocations under freedom of fishing: what are 
they? 
1 Origin of national allocations 
The mere fact that transfers are already taking place answers in the affirmative what 
might otherwise have been the threshold question: is trading of quotas possible under 
international law?  To understand what is happening in legal terms, however, it is 
instructive to look for instances where trading might not be possible.  Before quota 
can be traded between States, it is necessary for there to be something for them to 
trade – that is, the TAC must be divided into national allocations.  This is a relatively 
recent phenomenon in fisheries, although similar arrangements were known earlier in 
the regulation of high seas capture of marine mammals.  The 1911 Bering Sea Fur 
                                                          
931
  Created by the Convention on Future Multilateral Cooperation in the Northwest Atlantic 
Fisheries, supra Ch III n 556. 
932
  Created by the Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources in the 
Baltic Sea and Belts, done at Gdańsk, 13 September 1973, 1090 UNTS 54. 
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Seals agreement
933
 divided not the harvesting itself but its product.  In return for 
refraining from pelagic sealing, which by Article I was prohibited for all parties in 
the Pacific Ocean north of 30ºN, Canada and Japan were each granted a 15 per cent 
share, by number and value, of the much larger number of skins of the Pribilof and 
Commander Islands rookeries which the United States
934
 and Russia
935
 respectively 
were able as a result of their sole stewardship to harvest sustainably on their island 
territories.  Each of the other three parties would obtain a 10 per cent share of the 
skins from Japan’s Robben Island rookery,936 with an equivalent obligation on Great 
Britain if any seal herd were to establish itself on Canadian islands in the Convention 
area.
937
  Although no national allocations were formally possible in the International 
Whaling Commission (IWC),
938
 the States concerned came to agreements outside the 
IWC on the division among themselves of the catch limits.
939
 
                                                          
933
  Convention between the United States of America, Great Britain, Russia and Japan for 
the Preservation and Protection of Fur Seals, done at Washington DC, 7 July 1911, [United 
States] Treaty Series No 564. 
934
  Ibid., Article X.  Article XI qualified this by obliging the United States to deliver a 
minimum of 1,000 skins annually to Canada and Japan unless it closed its commercial 
operations, in which case they were each to be compensated by US$10,000 annually unless there 
were fewer than 100,000 seals frequenting the islands. 
935
  Ibid., Article XII, including the qualification that harvesting and the associated sharing 
obligation could be suspended for as long as there were fewer than 18,000 seals on the islands. 
936
  Ibid., Article XIII, including the qualification that harvesting and the associated sharing 
obligation could be suspended for as long as there were fewer than 6,500 seals on the islands. 
937
  Ibid., Article XIV. 
938
  Created by the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, done in 
Washington, 2 December 1946, 161 UNTS 72, ATS 1948 No 18. 
939
  See S.J. Holt, “Sharing the Catches of Whales in the Southern Hemisphere” in R. 
Shotton (ed), Case Studies on the Allocation of Transferable Quota Rights in Fisheries (FAO 
Technical Paper No 411; Rome: FAO, 2001), 322 at 343ff.  The international legal status of the 
quotas so reached is not clear, but potentially, had the subset of IWC members involved in the 
quota negotiations wanted them to become binding obligations inter se, there would not have 
been any legal obstacle to this, and indeed at least one of the agreements in question was of treaty 
status: Arrangements for the Regulation of Antarctic Pelagic Whaling, done at London, 6 June 
1962, 486 UNTS 263.  The pre-war agreements on quotas negotiated directly among the whaling 
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National allocations in their modern international form have been with us for less 
than 40 years.  Perhaps with the memory of private trading in whale quota in mind, 
when in 1968 Crutchfield initially proposed TACs and national allocations for cod 
and haddock in the North-West Atlantic, he simply assumed they would be tradable: 
“[I]f, as seems essential, quotas are made transferrable [sic], the problem [of the 
impossibility of limiting entry of all on the high seas] may be eased somewhat.”940  
Soon after, Kask called for licences to be auctioned internationally, which he saw as 
a way to allow free (but not costless) access to the world’s tuna resources.941 
Notwithstanding its residual character, the freedom of fishing in UNCLOS Article 
116
942
 still exerts a powerful influence on matters of allocation.  This is not because 
that freedom is completely unfettered, but because neither the qualifications in 
paragraphs (a) to (c) of Article 116 nor customary international law impose any ex 
ante quantifiable limit on the tonnage of fish that a State’s vessels may harvest on the 
high seas.  (Note, though, that in many, perhaps most circumstances now, the duty of 
cooperation on which modern international fisheries law is founded may impose an 
obligation to negotiate in good faith with other interested States to establish such a 
limit.)  Quotas imply numbers, and fisheries commissions are the usual vehicle or 
forum in which States interested in a fishery engage in bargaining, generally on a 
yearly basis, to establish those numbers.  When the numbers are transformed into 
binding limits by or under the treaty establishing the commission, the exception to 
freedom of fishing envisaged in paragraph (a) of Article 116 is at work – though, 
                                                                                                                                                                    
companies of various States (Holt, supra this n, at 327), in order to reduce the number of 
expeditions through limiting by freely transferable quotas the catch and effort of each expedition, 
would have been binding not as treaties, but as contracts each subject to a domestic proper law 
ascertained by the rules of private international law. 
940
  J.A. Crutchfield, “National Quotas for the North Atlantic Fisheries: An Exercise in 
Second Best”, in Alexander (ed), supra Ch III n 538, 263 at 272. 
941
  Kask, supra Ch II n 416, at 31n. 
942
  See text supra following Ch III n 495. 
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under the pacta tertiis principle,
943
 it applies only to the parties to the relevant treaty, 
not to new entrants. 
That said, the freedom of fishing is not in itself an obstacle to trading in national 
allocations.  Even if new entrants cannot be peremptorily excluded from a fishery, so 
that the exclusivity associated with property rights is absent,
944
 the risks of their 
appearance can be diminished by trade and other economic measures, as is shown by 
the history of whaling.  It is perhaps not coincidental that Norway and the United 
                                                          
943
  Supra Introduction n 18 and accompanying text. 
944
  From an economic point of view, according to A. Scott, “Introducing Property in Fishery 
Management” in R. Shotton (ed), Use of Property Rights in Fisheries Management, Vol 1 (FAO 
Fisheries Technical Paper No 404/1; Rome: FAO, 2000), 1 at 5-6, the four main characteristics of 
property are duration, security, exclusivity and transferability.  In legal terms too, property is not, 
contrary to the loose sense in which it is often used, either a thing or its ownership , but a simple 
term for a rather complex relationship between a person and a thing: Yanner v. Eaton (1999) 201 
CLR 351 at 366 per Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Kirby and Hayne JJ, quoting with approval this 
passage from K. Gray, “Property in Thin Air” (1991) 50 Cambridge Law Journal 252 at 299: 
'[P]roperty' consists primarily in control over access. Much of our false thinking about 
property stems from the residual perception that 'property' is itself a thing or resource rather 
than a legally endorsed concentration of power over things and resources.  
W.N. Hohfeld, “Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning” (1917) 26 
Yale Law Journal 710 at 746ff analysed property rights as the multiplicity of duties imposed on 
an indeterminate number of persons not being duties of positive performance but of exclusion; 
i.e. the right consists of a general protection from interference.  In R v. Toohey; ex parte 
Meneling Station Pty Ltd (1982) 158 CLR 327, Mason J (as he then was) adopted at 342 the 
following passage in Lord Wilberforce’s speech in National Provincial Bank Ltd v. Ainsworth 
[1965] AC 1175 at 1247-1248: 
Before a right or an interest can be admitted into the category of property, or of a right 
affecting property, it must be definable, identifiable by third parties, capable in its nature of 
assumption by third parties, and have some degree of permanence or stability. 
In Yanner v. Eaton, however, Gummow J noted that transferability is not itself a necessary 
incident of property (at 388).  See also M. Tsamenyi and A. McIlgorm, “Enhancing Fisheries 
Rights through Legislation – Australia’s Experience”, in R. Shotton (ed), Use of Property Rights 
in Fisheries Management, Vol 2 (FAO Fisheries Technical Paper No 404/2; Rome: FAO, 2000), 
88 at 88 and the many judicial and academic authorities there cited. 
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Kingdom maintained a number of deterrent measures which largely succeeded in 
keeping the number of new entrants relatively small.
945
 
Given that under Article 8, paragraph 4 of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement
946
 only 
those States that are members of the relevant fisheries commission or participate in 
an equivalent arrangement, or agree to apply its conservation and management 
measures, retain access to the fishery resources to which those measures apply, it 
may be asked whether creation of a commission of itself does away with the freedom 
of fishing for the areas and/or stocks concerned, at least among its members.  It is 
possible to isolate the legal effect of a commission’s establishment by looking at 
what happens when, for whatever reason, the commission is unable to set a TAC or 
renew or amend it as it expires.  If the freedom of fishing is displaced, this would 
mean that members may not fish at all without an affirmative decision to allow this 
by the commission; that would in part be the function of the TAC and in its absence 
the members would be obliged to refrain from fishing until such time as a TAC was 
set.
947
  Yet, when such situations occurred in both the CCSBT and ICCAT, there was 
no cessation of fishing
948
 – members in some cases announced voluntary catch limits, 
but all carried on harvesting. 
                                                          
945
  Holt, supra n 939, at 324 and 327-329. 
946
  Text reproduced supra Ch III, text between nn 517 and 519. 
947
  Often many years pass between the coming into existence of a commission and its 
establishment of catch or effort limits, the IOTC and WCPFC being cases in point.  In no such 
situation has fishing been suspended in the interim.  This reasoning does not, however, apply to 
the many fishery commissions such as the Asia-Pacific Fishery Commission (supra Introduction, 
text between nn 10 and 11), that have only advisory rather than management functions; as they 
are constitutionally incapable of establishing TACs and national allocations, the issue of the 
trading of such allocations can never arise. 
948
  As to the tardy setting of TACs in the CCSBT’s early years see supra Ch II n 430.  In 
1998 Japan implemented unilaterally an experimental fishing program in addition to its 
commercial catch; since Australia and New Zealand opposed the additional catch, no TAC could 
be adopted at all for several years, but the members continued to harvest SBT in roughly the 
same amounts as before, as seen in the Global Catch table, Attachment 4 to CCSBT-ESC4 
Report, supra Ch I n 141.  ICCAT’s failure to make any recommendation on a catch limit for 
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It is conceivable for the members of a fisheries commission to agree to pool their 
respective rights in a fishery, vesting them in the commission as the representative of 
their collective interests, so that for the right to fish they must henceforth come to 
terms with it, but again non-members will not be bound by that.  The obligation of 
States to refrain from fishing for a stock or in an area governed by a fisheries 
commission of which they are not a member may be in the process of entering the 
corpus of custom,
949
 but would need substantial qualification if it is not to degenerate 
into an endorsement of closed shop commissions in which the “ins” discriminate 
against the “outs” by insisting that the only way to cooperate with them is to take 
zero catch.  One could say that non-members have a duty to cooperate with the 
commission, in the sense that non-members already owe members that duty under 
the relevant provisions of UNCLOS, and it would seem to be in the members’ power 
to authorise the commission to receive non-members’ cooperation on their behalf, 
i.e. to insist that the duty be discharged by cooperating with the commission as their 
collective delegate rather than with the member States individually. 
States, however, have long preferred to keep the fisheries commissions they create 
institutionally weak with respect to their members, for reasons identified by Koers.
950
  
                                                                                                                                                                    
ABT at its 2001 meeting is seen in ICCAT17 Report, supra Ch III n 605, at 55-56 (paragraphs 
14.4-14.10).  For 2002 reported catches totalled around 30,000 tonnes, and if unreported catches 
are factored in, the true total was likely to be around 35,000 tonnes, little different from 2001, 
when a TAC applied: Annex 8 to ICCAT18 Report, supra Ch III n 612, at 182. 
949
   See supra Ch IV, text accompanying n 713 and infra Ch VI, text accompanying n 1218. 
950
  Koers, supra Ch I n 285, at 36 writes: “It is a political reality that States are extremely 
reluctant to give up any of their prerogatives in favour of international law.”  At 194-195 States’ 
reluctance to give international fishery commissions binding powers on members is attributed to 
the fact that, under freedom of fishing, membership of them is voluntary, and binding authority 
“would expose them to the risk of being forced to accept a certain conservation measure, whereas 
non-member States would be under no obligation with regard to such a measure.”  He adds, at 
275-276: “States have demonstrated over and over again that they are willing to yield authority to 
international institutions only if this becomes unavoidable.”  But by the time States are convinced 
of its necessity, “irreparable harm may have been inflicted upon the resources…The history of 
international fisheries commissions is an unfortunate illustration of this point.”  Burke, supra Ch 
 318 
The otherwise innovative WCPFC review procedure,
951
 for example, for all its 
benefits, lacks one important element in that it fails to cast any organ of that 
commission in the role of defender of its decision against an individual aggrieved 
member seeking to overturn it. 
2 National allocations analysed from first principles 
What precisely, then, do States do when they set a TAC in a fishery commission, and 
divide it into national allocations?  They depart inter se from the residual freedom of 
fishing on the high seas, but what do they put in its place?  In theory the answer lies 
in the commission’s constitutive treaty, but such treaties rarely say anything about it.  
Thus Article 8, paragraph 3 of the 1993 Convention in subparagraph (a) directs the 
CCSBT not merely to adopt a TAC, but also to divide it into national allocations, 
while preserving the possibility of some other measure being adopted instead; 
subparagraph (b) permits the introduction of further measures in addition to these: 
For the conservation, management and optimum utilisation of southern bluefin tuna: 
(a) the Commission shall decide upon a total allowable catch and its allocation 
among the Parties unless the Commission decides upon other appropriate measures 
on the basis of the report and recommendations of the Scientific Committee referred 
to in paragraph 2(c) and (d) of Article 9; and 
(b) the Commission may, if necessary, decide upon other additional measures. 
It is thus necessary to go back to first principles.  On this basis, it is submitted, all 
that States which are members of a fishery commission are doing through national 
allocations is each limiting their own catch in return for similar (though not 
necessarily equal) limits being accepted by each other member.
952
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
I n 80, at 92 predicts that high seas fisheries management will continue to fail if States persist in 
withholding authority from fishery commissions (and in ICCAT’s case, the financial resources to 
do its job: at 250); at 95 he argues that the EEZ was an earlier consequence of this failure. 
951
  Supra Ch II, text accompanying n 436. 
952
  Except where the context otherwise requires, “member” in this chapter is taken to 
include not only each State that is party to the treaty establishing the fishery commission, but any 
other State or fishing entity formally cooperating with the commission under a mechanism such 
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In the simplest case, suppose there are three members A, B and C which share a 
1,000-tonne TAC as follows: A 500, B 400, C 100.  The fleets of all three States fish 
in the same area for the species at the same stage of its life cycle using the same gear, 
so that, as long as the aggregate of A, B and C’s catch remains below 1,000 tonnes, 
there is no effect on the stock from one State’s share of the TAC rising and another’s 
falling commensurately.  If so, then under this classical type of national allocation, A 
owes a duty to B and C to limit its catch to 500 tonnes, B owes a duty to A and C to 
limit its catch to 400 tonnes, and C owes a duty to A and B to limit its catch to 100 
tonnes.
953
  Now imagine that C wishes to increase its catch to 200 tonnes and B is 
prepared to see its catch fall to 300 tonnes.  How can they bring this about?  Three 
situations are possible: before, during and after the relevant fishing season. 
If the following year’s allocation has not been made, B and C could simply let it be 
known that their wish for quota for the following year was 300 tonnes and 200 
tonnes respectively, and if A wishes to continue to catch 500 tonnes and the 
condition of the stock has not deteriorated, there should be no problem.  It will be 
noticed, however, that on one hand there are many conditions attached to this simple 
case,
954
 and on the other it does not necessarily involve trading as such of quota.  
                                                                                                                                                                    
as the CCSBT’s resolution establishing the status of cooperating non-member, supra Ch IV n 803 
and text following, and accepting a quantified catch limit in token of that cooperation. 
953
  In addition, it might be possible to speak of A, B and C each owing the same duty to the 
fisheries commission in addition to, or perhaps even to the exclusion of, duties owed to each 
other: this is the approach taken by the New Zealand opinion on trading of quota in the CCSBT, 
infra, text following n 1059.  In Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United 
Nations, ICJ Reports 1949, p. 174, the ICJ in an advisory opinion held (at 181-182) that not only 
did the UN have international legal personality vis-à-vis its own members – which was not stated 
in the UN Charter, but held to be a necessary implication – but was owed certain duties by them.  
This will remain without practical significance, however, unless the commission is given some 
sort of enforcement power over its members – again conceivable in theory, but not, at any rate 
hitherto, actually encountered in practice. 
954
   A frequent complication would be the case of non-equivalence of catch by B and C in 
terms of its effect on the stock.  If 100 tonnes of catch by C has less impact on the stock than 100 
tonnes caught by B, then there is no reason to oppose the transaction.  But if its effect is greater – 
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After all, in practice TACs and national allocations are rarely fixed for more than one 
year at a time.  It is therefore open to a commission in theory to vary the allocation 
completely from one year to the next – say allocating the entire TAC to member X in 
one year and to member Y in the following year.  In practice this does not happen 
because members value stability and predictability, hence the best way to predict a 
given member’s share of the TAC in any year is to look at what it was the previous 
year – changes often occur, but are seldom dramatic. 
If the national allocations have already been made, but either fishing has not yet 
started, or it is early enough in the season for both B and C to be below the lesser of 
their pre- and post-transaction catch limits, the position is different.  Suppose that C 
makes B an offer for 100 tonnes of B’s quota, which B accepts.  B and C proceed to 
catch 300 and 200 tonnes of fish respectively.  In terms of the original analysis, B is 
in no difficulty: its duty to A and C was to catch 400 tonnes or less, and it has done 
so.  For C, however, the position is more complicated.  Its duty to A and B was to 
catch no more than 100 tonnes.  B may be taken to have waived its correlative right 
as a necessary consequence of the transaction, at least to the extent that it cannot 
complain of any breach of duty by C if the latter’s catch remains below the sum of 
the original 100 tonnes and the further 100 tonnes it gained through the transaction, 
i.e. 200 tonnes.  But A has granted no such waiver to C.  Thus C’s duty to A remains 
one of limiting its catch to 100 tonnes, which it will breach if it makes use of the 
extra quota acquired from B.  
The same is true if B purports to transfer all or part of its allocation to D, a non-
member of the commission.  In the specific case of the CCSBT, this could be 
                                                                                                                                                                    
and in the mid-1980s 1 tonne of Australia’s surface fishery catch was having roughly the same 
impact on the parental biomass of SBT as 2.25 tonnes of Japan’s longline catch: supra Ch I, text 
accompanying n 261 – then it would be reasonable for A to insist on an adjustment to restore the 
equivalence.  Conversely, a member whose catch has less impact tonne-for-tonne might be able 
to persuade the commission to allow it to apply a coefficient greater than 1 to any quota sold to it 
by B. 
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contrary to Article 15, paragraph 4 of the 1993 Convention, which calls for 
cooperative action “to deter fishing activities…by nationals, residents or vessels of 
any State or entity not party to this Convention where such activity could affect 
adversely the attainment of the objective of this Convention”.  Even if no comparable 
provision exists in the putative commission’s treaty, however, D is in no position to 
exercise B’s rights under the treaty against A and C, and the transaction is no defence 
to any case A and C might mount against D independently of the treaty – though 
perhaps B would be able to absolve itself of responsibility for any subsequent 
overcatch by D of its quota.  A and C might in this situation prevail upon B to 
exercise whatever remedies it has against D, but none of the existing fisheries 
commission treaties considered below contains the sophisticated provision that 
would be needed for them to be able to compel B to do this. 
In the simple case, then, trading cannot take place as of right except in the trivial 
instance of a two-member commission.  A waiver must be gained from all non-
participants in the transaction.  The easiest way of doing this, and the only one that 
occurs in practice, is for the waiver to be granted by the fisheries commission itself 
on behalf of all its members.  If decisions of this kind, which are substantive rather 
than procedural, require consensus under the constitutive treaty,
955
 then A can 
prevent the transaction by voting against the granting of approval for it. 
What about after fishing has ceased?  Let us return to the initial scenario, and 
suppose the catches in the year were A 495, B 375, C 120.  With a total of 990 
tonnes caught, the TAC as a whole is not being exceeded, but C has overcaught its 
                                                          
955
  Many fisheries commissions formally take decisions by simple or qualified majority, in 
which case a State in A’s position will succeed in preventing the commission from giving its 
blessing to the transaction only if it can persuade a sufficiently large number of fellow members 
to join it in voting against the granting of approval.  In practice, however, commissions often go 
to great lengths to secure consensus even when the treaty does not require this (for example, in 
the WCPFC, by Article 20(2) of the Honolulu Convention, infra Appendix C, Part III, voting can 
occur only once “all efforts to reach a decision by consensus have been exhausted”), and votes 
are rarely called. 
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quota by 20 tonnes, while A and B between them have undercaught theirs by 30 
tonnes.  Should C be able to purchase quota from B to cover its excess catch? 
ICCAT approved such a transfer in 2005, but not before the United States and 
Canada had expressed disapproval of retroactive transfers as a solution to overcatch, 
preferring “[r]eal guarantees…not to exceed catch limits.”956  This is understandable 
as a desire to maintain internal discipline, but clearing overcatch through trade is not 
greatly different in substance from the year-to-year accounting mechanism already 
under discussion in ICCAT for carrying forward balances of overcatch and 
undercatch, adjusting the next year’s nominal national allocations commensurately to 
compensate.
957
  If there were such a mechanism in place, C might be able to carry its 
overcatch into the following year; the 20-tonne overcatch from year 1 would be 
counted against its year 2 national allocation, and if that too were 100 tonnes, then its 
actual catch limit in that year would be 80 tonnes.
958
  It would then be for C to decide 
whether it preferred to clear its overcatch by debit against its future catch, or buy 
additional quota if any is available, or some combination of the two.  The relative 
attraction of the two courses of action would be affected by any penalty applicable to 
the overcatch.  ICCAT has a flat 25 per cent penalty,
959
 which would increase the 
                                                          
956
  Resolution by ICCAT to Authorize Catch Limit Adjustments in the Bigeye Tuna 
Fishery, in “Resolutions Adopted by ICCAT in 2005” (Annex 6 to Proceedings of the 19
th
 
Regular Meeting of the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (Seville, 
Spain – November 14 to 20, 2005) (hereinafter ICCAT19 Report)), in ICCAT, Report for 
biennial period 2004-05 Part II (2005) - Vol.1 (hereinafter ICCAT Green Book 2006/1), 173 at 
173; for the debate in Panel 1 see Reports of the Meetings of Panels 1-4 (Annex 8 to ICCAT19 
Report), ibid., 191 at 194. 
957
  Infra n 1124 and accompanying text. 
958
  If the national allocation were raised or lowered, the carry-over from the previous year 
would represent a commensurately lesser or greater proportion of the year 2 national allocation, 
e.g. 20 tonnes would represent 18.2% of 110 tonnes but 22.2% of 90 tonnes.  This is a self-
correcting mechanism: in a fishery for a stock whose parental biomass is growing, overcatch is 
less serious than in one where it is falling. 
959
  The 25% penalty applies if quota is exceeded during two consecutive management 
periods: “Recommendation Regarding Compliance in the Bluefin Tuna and North Atlantic 
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attraction of purchasing-in quota to cover overcatch; the Australia-New Zealand 
South Tasman Rise orange roughy arrangement has no penalty for the season’s first 
100 tonnes of overcatch, but a 100 per cent penalty above that.
960
  Conversely, if 
undercatch can be carried forward, then B may prefer to do that rather than sell its 
unused quota to C; where carry-forward is permitted, it is generally on a 1:1 basis up 
to some specified limit,
961
 so if B’s undercatch is greater than that limit, it will have 
an incentive to come to terms with C.  In the example above, B could sell C enough 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Swordfish Fisheries” (Annex 5-14 to ICCATSM10 Report), in ICCAT Green Book 1997/1, 
supra Ch III n 573), 95, extended to the southern swordfish stock in “Recommendation by 
ICCAT Regarding Compliance in the South Atlantic Swordfish Fishery” (Annex 5-8 to 
ICCAT15 Report), in ICCAT Green Book 1998/1), supra Ch III n 574, 70. 
960
  2000 Arrangement between the Government of Australia and the Government of New 
Zealand on the Conservation and Management of Orange Roughy on the South Tasman Rise, 
supra Ch II n 314.  Under paragraph 7 a party’s “annual catch limit” takes account of any 
overcatch in previous season(s) by 
(b) debiting against its quota for that season catch, rounded to the nearest tonne, taken by it 
in excess of its annual catch limit for the previous season (its excess catch), as follows: 
  (i) one tonne to be debited for each of the first 100 tonnes of excess catch; and  
 (ii)  two tonnes to be debited for each tonne of excess catch thereafter. 
Paragraph 8 goes on to provide that: 
If a Party’s quota for any season is insufficient to absorb the amount to be debited under 
paragraph 7(b), the Party concerned will debit any remaining amount against its quota for the 
following season, and any subsequent season as may be required. 
See further on this Serdy, supra Ch II n 314, at 497-498n. 
961
  For example, ICCAT had a 50% carryover limit for the northern albacore stock, now 
reduced to 25%, so that there is no build-up of banked quota lest it damage the stock if all drawn 
down at once: see Recommendation by ICCAT on North Atlantic Albacore Catch Limits for the 
Period 2004-2006, in “Recommendations Adopted by ICCAT in 2003” (Annex 5 to ICCAT18 
Report), in ICCAT Green Book 2004/1, supra Ch III n 612, 141 at 144 (Recommendation [03-
06], paragraph 6); Recommendation by ICCAT on North Atlantic Albacore Catch Limits for the 
Period 2008-2009, in Annex 5 to ICCAT20 Report, supra Ch IV n 884, at 150 (Recommendation 
[07-02], paragraph 6).  For the bigeye stock, a maximum of 30% of underage may be carried over 
to either of the next two years: Recommendation by ICCAT on a Multi-Year Conservation and 
Management Program for Bigeye Tuna, in Annex 5 to ICCATSM14 Report, supra Ch IV n 910, 
at 126 (Recommendation [04-01], subparagraph 4(a)). 
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quota to eliminate the latter’s overcatch and still have 5 tonnes left to carry forward 
into year 2.
962
 
These being the basic underlying rules and concepts, the next step is to see to what 
extent they have been applied or modified in the treaties by which fisheries 
commissions have been established. 
3 Relevant provisions of treaties constituting fisheries 
commissions 
Most fishery commission treaties are either silent or describe the measures the 
commission may adopt with sufficient generality to allow for the institution of 
trading.  Tuna treaties are considered first in reverse chronological order, followed 
by several others that also shed light on the matter, and two treaties that regulate an 
international fishery without establishing a commission. 
(a)  IATTC 
Paragraph 1 of Article VII (headed “Functions of the Commission”) of the new 
Antigua Convention
963
 will on entry into force give the IATTC the following 
functions inter alia: 
(c) adopt measures that are based on the best scientific evidence available to ensure 
the long-term conservation and sustainable use of the fish stocks covered by this 
Convention and to maintain or restore the populations of harvested species at levels 
                                                          
962
  A system designed with conservation in mind would presumably permit quota to be 
purchased only from undercatch, especially if there is a penalty for overcatch.  Say there is a 50% 
penalty for overcatch above 20 tonnes, and B’s catch was 440 tonnes.  In year 2 B’s actual catch 
limit, assuming no change in its national allocation, would be 350 (= 400 – 20 – 20 x 1.5) tonnes.  
Though A has only 5 tonnes spare undercatch, if B were to purchase 20 tonnes of quota from it, it 
could have an actual catch limit in year 2 of 380 tonnes, the 30-tonne difference reflecting the 
50% penalty it would thereby have avoided.  A would not be liable to any penalty because its sale 
of quota would leave it with overcatch of only 15 tonnes.  In order not to undermine the penalty’s 
deterrent effect it would be prudent to permit A to sell B no more than 5 tonnes, or provide that 
quota purchased should first be applied against ordinary overcatch and only then against penalty 
overcatch, or both at once. 
963
  Supra Ch IV n 840. 
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of abundance which can produce the maximum sustainable yield, inter alia, through 
the setting of the total allowable catch of such fish stocks as the Commission may 
decide and/or the total allowable level of fishing capacity and/or level of fishing 
effort for the Convention Area as a whole; 
(e) …, determine, on the basis of criteria that the Commission may adopt or apply, 
the extent to which the fishing interests of new members of the Commission might 
be accommodated, taking into account relevant international standards and practices;  
(h) adopt appropriate measures to prevent or eliminate overfishing and excess fishing 
capacity and to ensure that levels of fishing effort do not exceed those commensurate 
with the sustainable use of the fish stocks covered by this Convention; 
(l) where necessary, develop criteria for, and make decisions relating to, the 
allocation of total allowable catch, or total allowable fishing capacity, including 
carrying capacity, or the level of fishing effort, taking into account all relevant 
factors[.] 
(b)  WCPFC 
The Honolulu Convention
964
 sets in out in great detail in Article 10 the functions of 
the WCPFC: 
1. Without prejudice to the sovereign rights of coastal States for the purpose of 
exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing highly migratory fish stocks 
within areas under national jurisdiction, the functions of the Commission shall be to: 
(a) determine the total allowable catch or total level of fishing effort within the 
Convention Area for such highly migratory fish stocks as the Commission may 
decide and adopt such other conservation and management measures and 
recommendations as may be necessary to ensure the long-term sustainability of such 
stocks; 
(b) promote cooperation and coordination between members of the Commission to 
ensure that conservation and management measures for highly migratory fish stocks 
in areas under national jurisdiction and measures for the same stocks on the high 
seas are compatible; 
(c) adopt, where necessary, conservation and management measures and 
recommendations for non-target species and species dependent on or associated with 
                                                          
964
  Supra Introduction n 8. 
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the target stocks, with a view to maintaining or restoring populations of such species 
above levels at which their reproduction may become seriously threatened; 
… 
(g) develop, where necessary, criteria for the allocation of the total allowable catch 
or the total level of fishing effort for highly migratory fish stocks in the Convention 
Area; 
… 
(k) agree on means by which the fishing interests of any new member of the 
Commission may be accommodated; 
…; and 
(o) discuss any question or matter within the competence of the Commission and 
adopt any measures or recommendations necessary for achieving the objective of 
this Convention. 
2. In giving effect to paragraph 1, the Commission may adopt measures relating to, 
inter alia: 
(a) the quantity of any species or stocks which may be caught; 
(b) the level of fishing effort; 
(c) limitations of fishing capacity, including measures relating to fishing vessel 
numbers, types and sizes; 
… 
4. The Commission may adopt decisions relating to the allocation of the total 
allowable catch or the total level of fishing effort.  Such decisions, including 
decisions relating to the exclusion of vessel types, shall be taken by consensus. 
(c)  IOTC  
At the other end of the scale is the IOTC Agreement,
965
 in which a single provision, 
Article V, subparagraph 2(c), gives the Commission the authority to enact catch 
limits, national allocations and, semble (though the reference to UNCLOS may cast 
some doubt on this), permit these to be traded: 
                                                          
965
  Supra Introduction n 7. 
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2. …the Commission shall have the following functions and responsibilities, in 
accordance with the principles expressed in the relevant provisions of the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: 
(c) to adopt, in accordance with Article IX and on the basis of scientific evidence, 
conservation and management measures, to ensure the conservation of the stocks 
covered by this Agreement and to promote the objective of their optimum utilization 
throughout the Area[.] 
(d)  ICCAT 
Subparagraph 1(a) of Article VIII of ICCAT’s constitutive treaty966 is similarly in 
very general terms:  
The Commission may, on the basis of scientific evidence, make recommendations 
designed to maintain the populations of tuna and tuna-like fishes that may be taken 
in the Convention area at levels which will permit the maximum sustainable catch.  
These recommendations shall be applicable to the Contracting Parties under the 
conditions laid down in paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Article. 
(e)  South-East Atlantic Fisheries Organisation 
Venturing beyond the tuna world, like the IATTC’s new treaty but more briefly, 
Article 6, paragraph 3 of the Windhoek Convention that established the South-East 
Atlantic Fisheries Organisation
967
 lists the relevant functions of the Commission, in 
this case an organ of the Organisation, as being to: 
(b) formulate and adopt conservation and management measures; 
(c) determine total allowable catches and/or levels of fishing effort, taking into 
account total fishing mortality, including of non-target species; 
(d) determine the nature and extent of participation in fishing[.] 
(f)  NEAFC 
Examples of the measures NEAFC may take are set out in its Convention at Article 
7.
968
  The list is not exhaustive and would thus not preclude a trading system: 
                                                          
966
  Supra Introduction n 6. 
967
  Supra Ch III n 519. 
968
  Supra Ch III n 625. 
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In the exercise of its functions…, the Commission may consider inter alia measures 
for: 
(e) the establishment of total allowable catches and their allocation to Contracting 
Parties,  
(f) the regulation of the amount of fishing effort and its allocation to Contracting 
Parties. 
(g)  CCAMLR 
Article IX, subparagraph 1(f) of CCAMLR’s constitutive treaty969 directs that 
Commission to “formulate, adopt and revise conservation measures on the basis of 
the best scientific evidence available”.  Paragraph 2 of the same Article then goes on: 
2. The conservation measures referred to in paragraph 1 (f) above include the 
following:  
(a) the designation of the quantity of any species which may be harvested in the area 
to which this Convention applies;  
(b) the designation of regions and sub-regions based on the distribution of 
populations of Antarctic marine living resources;  
(c) the designation of the quantity which may be harvested from the populations of 
regions and sub-regions;  
(d) the designation of protected species;  
(e) the designation of the size, age and, as appropriate, sex of species which may be 
harvested;  
(f) the designation of open and closed seasons for harvesting;  
(g) the designation of the opening and closing of areas, regions or sub-regions for 
purposes of scientific study or conservation, including special areas for protection 
and scientific study;  
(h) regulation of the effort employed and methods of harvesting, including fishing 
gear, with a view, inter alia, to avoiding undue concentration of harvesting in any 
region or sub-region;  
(i) the taking of such other conservation measures as the Commission considers 
necessary for the fulfilment of the objective of this Convention, including measures 
                                                          
969
  Supra Ch IV n 891. 
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concerning the effects of harvesting and associated activities on components of the 
marine ecosystem other than the harvested populations. 
There are two issues here.  First, the use of “include” in the chapeau suggests that the 
list is not exhaustive – although if it were, it would not permit the division of TACs 
into national allocations, consequentially making CCAMLR the only fisheries 
commission actually prevented by its constitutive treaty from establishing a system 
of tradable allocations among its members.  Secondly, assuming national allocations 
are possible, the reference to “designation of the quantity” in subparagraphs (a) and 
(c) may be interpreted as having a connotation of rigidity that would require fixed 
quotas incapable of being traded.  Even so, the catch-all subparagraph (i) would still, 
it is submitted, be sufficient authority to introduce both national allocations and 
trading.  Alternatively, if trading were interpreted to be precluded, this could be 
relatively easily circumvented if the members were so minded, e.g. by vesting the 
nominal right to fish in CCAMLR itself and either confining themselves to trading 
some lesser right, or adopting a policy that, if member X wished to trade all or part of 
its allocation to member Y, X could surrender it to the Commission and an 
equivalent amount of quota would be automatically issued to Y. 
(h)  NAFO 
NAFO has recently completed the overhaul of its 1978 treaty.
970
  In the finalised text 
of the amendments adopted at its 2007 meeting, Article 8 permits the Commission to 
adopt conservation and management measures that expressly include “total allowable 
catches and/or levels of fishing effort and [to] determine the nature and extent of 
participation in fishing”.  In addition Article 9(d) specifically provides for adoption 
by it of supplementary measures aimed at “preventing, deterring and eliminating 
IUU fishing.”971  For the moment, Article XI of the existing treaty assumes that the 
Members will wish to have national allocations, speaking in paragraph 4 of  
                                                          
970
  Supra n 931. 
971
  NAFO doc GC Doc. 07/4, Amendment to the Convention on Future Multilateral 
Cooperation in the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (Annex 17 to NAFO doc GC Doc. 07/5, Report 
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“[p]roposals…for the allocation of catches in the Regulatory Area”, but does not 
specifically require them to be adopted.  
(i)  IBSFC 
Though defunct since 2006, after all its remaining members apart from the European 
Community and the Russian Federation joined the former,
972
 the IBSFC too fits the 
above pattern.  Article X of its constitutive treaty
973
 states that: 
Measures relating to the purposes of this Convention which the Commission may 
consider and in regard of which it may make recommendations to the Contracting 
States are:  
… 
(f) any measures for establishing total allowable catch or fishing effort according to 
species, stocks, areas and fishing periods including total allowable catches for areas 
under the fisheries jurisdiction of Contracting States; 
(g) any other measures related to the conservation and rational exploitation of the 
living marine resources.  
This does not directly authorise national allocations, except by recourse to the all-
purpose paragraph (g), but paragraph (f) too indirectly permits them through the 
possibility of dividing the TAC spatially among the parties’ EEZs, where fishing by 
foreign vessels may be prohibited. 
(j)  IWC 
The only express prohibition on national allocations, and thus on trading, is found in 
Article V of the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling.
974
  
Paragraph 1 lists a number of types of conservation measures that the IWC may 
adopt by way of amendments to the Schedule to the Convention in which the 
                                                                                                                                                                    
of the General Council, 24-28 September 2007, Lisbon, Portugal), available at <http://nafo.int/ 
publications/meetproc/2008/gc/gcsep07/gc-s07.html > (visited on 30 September 2008). 
972
  See <http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/external_relations/rfos/ibsfc_en.htm> (visited on 
18 March 2008). 
973
  Supra n 932. 
974
  Supra n 938. 
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regulations on conservation and utilisation of whale resources are set out.  Among 
these are “(e) …intensity of whaling (including the maximum catch of whales to be 
taken in any one season)”.  Paragraph 2 then continues: 
2. These amendments of the Schedule 
… 
(c) shall not involve restrictions on the number or nationality of factory ships or land 
stations, nor allocate specific quotas to any factory ship or land station or to any 
group of factory ships or land stations[.]  
(k)  Southern Indian Ocean Fisheries Agreement 
The 2006 Southern Indian Ocean Fisheries Agreement
975
 does not create a 
commission, but the powers of the Meeting of the Parties in Article 6 are similar: 
1. The Meeting of the Parties shall: 
… 
(d) formulate and adopt conservation and management measures necessary for 
ensuring the long-term sustainability of the fishery resources, taking into account 
the need to protect marine biodiversity, based on the best scientific evidence 
available; 
… 
(h) develop rules and procedures for the monitoring, control and surveillance of 
fishing activities in order to ensure compliance with conservation and management 
measures adopted by the Meeting of the Parties including, where appropriate, a 
system of verification incorporating vessel monitoring and observation, and rules 
concerning the boarding and inspection of vessels operating in the Area; 
(i) develop and monitor measures to prevent, deter and eliminate illegal, unreported 
and unregulated fishing; 
… 
(k) establish the criteria for and rules governing participation in fishing; and 
(l) carry out any other tasks and functions necessary to achieve the objectives of this 
Agreement. 
                                                          
975
  Southern Indian Ocean Fisheries Agreement, done in Rome, 7 July 2006, not yet in 
force, text available at <www.fao.org/legal/treaties/035t-e.htm> (visited on 24 April 2008). 
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2. In determining criteria for participation in fishing, including allocation of total 
allowable catch or total level of fishing effort, the Contracting Parties shall take into 
account, inter alia, international principles such as those contained in the 1995 
Agreement. 
3. In applying the provisions of paragraph 2, the Contracting Parties may, inter alia: 
(a) designate annual quota allocations or fishing effort limitations for Contracting 
Parties; 
(b) allocate catch quantities for exploration and scientific research; and 
(c) set aside fishing opportunities for non-Contracting Parties to this Agreement, if 
necessary.  
(l)  The Central Bering Sea pollock treaty 
More rigid is the Convention on the Conservation and Management of Pollock 
Resources in the Central Bering Sea,
976
 which likewise creates no commission, but 
works through an annual conference whose functions are listed in Article IV, 
paragraph 1: 
(a) to establish the allowable harvest level for pollock in the Convention Area…for 
the succeeding year; 
(b) to establish an individual national quota of pollock in the Convention Area…for 
the succeeding year for each Party; 
(c) to adopt other appropriate conservation and management measures for the 
pollock resources in the Convention Area[.] 
Paragraph (b) might be thought to mandate classical national allocations (with no 
possibility of trading under the analysis above), but paragraph (c) is probably 
sufficient to permit trading; a scheme would be could be classed as a management 
measure even though it is not directly linked to conservation. 
It is thus apparent that most fisheries commissions are left considerable flexibility by 
their constitutive treaties to allow transfer of quota.  The next two sections consider 
the extent to which they have made use of that flexibility, the extensive treatment by 
CCSBT being preceded by a survey of its antecedents in other commissions. 
                                                          
976
  Supra Ch II n 316. 
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C Precedents for trading by fisheries commissions 
Four international fisheries commissions other than the CCSBT have considered 
trading of quota.  They appear to have done so independently of each other, that is, 
there has been no systematic consideration of quota trading either by commissions in 
concert with each other or as a result of a campaign by an individual State that is a 
member of more than one of them.  The four will now be examined in turn. 
1 ICCAT 
The most detailed consideration of trading of quota – albeit in a context incidental to 
the question of allocation – has been in ICCAT, whose history has been one of 
ambivalence towards the idea: a concerted opposition to allowing it to occur freely, 
balanced by a general tolerance of it when ad hoc transactions are placed on the 
agenda for approval.  Thus at the first meeting in 1999 of the Working Group on 
Allocation, both the European Community and Brazil expressed negative opinions on 
this subject.
977
  At the second meeting in 2000, the Community’s position had subtly 
evolved: it now argued that commercial quota transactions should not be allowed.
978
  
It was prepared to accept, however, that countries that already had quotas could 
legitimately swap them, as long as it did not have a negative impact on conservation 
– a stance with which Japan agreed, but that Brazil opposed.979 
It is not obvious why the European Community should adopt this attitude.  From one 
point of view, its interests might have been suited, as a member seeking fishing 
opportunities for its overcapitalised Iberian fleets, by being able to induce Atlantic 
Ocean coastal States to forgo for value their right to fish ICCAT stocks.  One 
conjectural explanation is that the Community’s insistence on no change in allocation 
                                                          
977
  Annex 6 to ICCAT16 Report, supra Ch III n 587, at 88 (EC, paragraph 6.18), 91 (Brazil, 
paragraph 6.63).  Contrast the view of Iceland at 92 (paragraph 6.75) that quota-sharing may 
under some circumstances be effort-efficient. 
978
  Annex 6 to ICCATSM12 Report, supra Ch III n 571, at 82 (paragraph 5.13), the US 
agreeing, at 83 (paragraph 5.18). 
979
  Ibid., at 89 (paragraphs 5.80 (EC and Japan) and 5.81 (Brazil)). 
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for an already allocated stock, for which it wanted historic catch to be the only 
criterion,
980
 suggests a preference to treat this situation as one of vested rights, even 
if the quotas were theoretically due for renegotiation every two or three years.
981
 
By the time of its fourth meeting, the Working Group “was of the opinion that 
transfer of quota was not an allocation issue but rather a management issue.”  On this 
basis it decided to move to a general prohibition on trading in quota and formed the 
view that “temporary transfers must be authorized by the Commission as part of 
management decisions.”982 
ICCAT accepted this recommendation of its Working Group.  Paragraph 27 of the 
Allocation Criteria it ultimately adopted forbids transfer: “No qualifying participant 
shall trade or sell its quota allocation or part thereof.” 983  The same year, however, it 
showed itself willing to approve ad hoc transfers, adopting a recommendation whose 
operative part was a single line requiring Commission approval: “Any temporary 
quota adjustments shall be done only under authorization by the Commission.”984  
Panel 1 approved with the support of the United States and the EC a transfer of 1,000 
                                                          
980
  Ibid., at 85 (paragraph 5.39). 
981
  This accords with the implication of the EC’s question (in Annex 8 to ICCAT18 Report, 
supra Ch III n 612, at 180) – whether “catch limits” could be transferred in the same way as 
“quota” – that the two were different, presumably on the basis that the latter created vested rights.  
The EC’s implicit assumption may have been that the right was to an absolute tonnage, not a 
relative share, given its assertion that the status of the stock was relevant to allocations since 
“ICCAT cannot allocate what it does not have”: Annex 6 to ICCAT16 Report, supra Ch III n 
587, at 90 (paragraph 6.57) 
982
  Annex 7 to ICCAT17 Report, supra Ch III n 605, at 182 (paragraph 6.22). 
983
  Annex 8 to ICCAT17 Report, supra Ch III n 605, at 212. 
984
  “Recommendation by ICCAT Concerning the Temporary Adjustment of Quotas” 
(Annex 9-2 to ICCAT17 Report), in ICCAT Green Book 2002/1, supra Ch I n 228, 216.  Note 
the implication of some degree of vesting of rights to quota shares in the term “temporary”, 
presupposing a later reversion to the status quo ante.  If so, this opens the question of permanent 
transfers – there is no necessary contradiction between shares of the TAC that last indefinitely 
and, rather than allowing those shares to be traded freely, subjecting each transaction to approval. 
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tonnes of unused bigeye quota for 2003 from Japan to China in consideration and on 
completion of joint work against illegal, unregulated and unreported fishing.
985
  The 
a majority of delegations supported temporary transfers as a way of facilitating 
cooperation among Contracting Parties, to be authorised by the Commission for 
transparency on a case-by-case basis, but some noted that if the quota allocations 
were adjusted to meet the Parties’ needs, quota transfers would be unnecessary.986 
In fact there is now a very long list of quota transactions that have proceeded with 
ICCAT’s approval.  A quota swap between North and South Atlantic swordfish took 
place between the EC and Japan in 2000.
987
  Japan’s excess North Atlantic swordfish 
bycatch for 2001 was allowed to be counted against unused US quota from its 400-
tonne reserve for higher than anticipated discards, and against its own South Atlantic 
quota in 2002.
988
  Under the 2002 decision for this stock, Canada benefited from 
“transfer” of 25 tonnes of US quota in 2003, 2004 and 2005.  There was an effective 
swap between the US and Brazil: 200 tonnes of US quota were permitted to be 
harvested in the northernmost 10 degrees of the southern area (and vice versa for 
Brazil’s quota of southern swordfish in the southernmost 10 degrees of the northern 
                                                          
985
  Annex 13 to ICCAT17 Report, supra Ch III n 609, at 300 (paragraphs 6.b.8 and 6.b.10); 
“Statement by Japan on Agenda Item 6 of Panel 1 (Appendix 5 to Annex 13 to ICCAT17 
Report), in ICCAT Green Book 2002/1, supra Ch I n 228, 326.  See also the transfer of 1,100 
tonnes for 2002; while there was no opposition to this, the Chairman of Panel 1 said that the 
transfer should be provided in writing to the Secretariat for approval by the Commission: Annex 
13 to ICCATSM13 Report, supra Ch III n 531, at 305 (paragraphs 6.1.5 [both] and 6.1.6).  In 
“Statement by Japan to Panel 1” (Appendix 5 to Annex 13 to ICCATSM13 Report), in ICCAT 
Green Book 2003/1, supra Ch II n 427, at 322, possible like action the following year is 
foreshadowed. 
986
  ICCAT17 Report, supra Ch III n 605, at 52 (paragraph 8.3). 
987
  Annex 9 to ICCAT16 Report, supra Ch III n 571, at 177 (paragraph 6.21). 
988
  “Recommendation by ICCAT Concerning Swordfish Catches by the Tuna Longline 
Fishery” (Annex 7-3 to ICCATSM12 Report), in ICCAT Green Book 2001/1, supra Ch III n 
571, 134.  Ultimately the US transferred 215 tonnes of North Atlantic swordfish quota to Japan: 
“National Report of the United States”, in ICCAT Green Book 2004/3, supra Ch I n 188, 105 at 
115. 
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area), whereas Japan could count up to 400 tonnes taken east of 35°W and south of 
15°N against its southern quota.
989
  As regards the eastern stock of ABT, underages 
from Iceland’s successive yearly allocations of 30, 40, 50, 60 tonnes in 2003-06 were 
transferred to the EC.
990
 
The 2003 meeting of ICCAT saw a transfer of 2,000 tonnes of bigeye quota from 
Japan to Taiwan, to accommodate vessels that Taiwan had reregistered from other 
flags in an attempt to control their hitherto unregulated catch.  Taiwan may have 
envisaged this as a permanent solution, but Japan said it was for 2003 only.
991
  In 
Panel 4, however, the United States opposed on procedural grounds a Japanese 
request for temporary quota adjustment by letter; it suggested that ICCAT should 
consider the appropriate process for authorising them, arguing that only a positive 
decision from the Commission in the form of a recommendation would suffice; a 
mere letter from a Contracting Party to the Commission was inadequate.
992
  Two 
resolutions authorised the transfer from Japan to China and Taiwan of 1,250 tonnes 
each of bigeye for 2003, provided there was no carry-forward of underage, and of 
100 tonnes of South Atlantic swordfish quota from Japan to Taiwan.
993
  In 2005 
                                                          
989
  Operative paragraphs 3 and 8 of “Recommendation by ICCAT Relating to the 
Rebuilding Program for North Atlantic Swordfish” (Annex 8.2 to ICCATSM13 Report), in 
ICCAT Green Book 2003/1, supra Ch II n 427, 155 at 156-157; operative paragraph 1 of 
“Recommendation by ICCAT on South Atlantic Swordfish Catch Limits” (Annex 8.3 to 
ICCATSM13 Report), ibid., 159 at 159. 
990
  Annex 8.8 to ICCATSM13 Report, supra Ch III n 615, at 168. 
991
  Annex 8 to ICCAT18 Report, supra Ch III n 612, at 180.  The EC supported Taiwan’s 
proposal on condition of further discussion of underage, overage and catch limit transfers: ibid. 
992
  Ibid., at 193.  As a recommendation is the means by which a decision of ICCAT can 
become contingently binding on its members – see Article VIII(2) of the 1966 Convention, supra 
Introduction n 6 – this accords with the analysis above. 
993
  Resolution by ICCAT to Authorize a Temporary Catch Limit Adjustment in the Bigeye 
Tuna Fishery [03-02] and Resolution by ICCAT to Authorize a Temporary Catch Limit 
Adjustment in the South Atlantic Swordfish Fishery) [03-05], in “Resolutions Adopted by 
ICCAT in 2006” (Annex 6 to ICCAT18 Report), in ICCAT Green Book 2004/1, supra Ch III n 
612, 168 at 168 (bigeye), 169 (swordfish)).  Note that resolutions are not mentioned in the 1966 
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China was the transferee from Japan of 2,000 tonnes of bigeye quota for each year 
from 2005 to 2008.
994
 
In setting catch limits for the northern stock of swordfish in 2006, ICCAT divided 
12,815 tonnes among the EC, the US, Japan and Canada in fixed proportions for 
2007 and 2008, but provided for the annual transfer from the US to Canada of 25 
tonnes without affecting the underlying percentages, and of 20 tonnes from the UK 
on behalf of its overseas territories in the Atlantic to France on behalf of St Pierre et 
Miquelon.
995
  The individual limits of Morocco, Mexico, Senegal and Belize are to 
some extent pooled, in that ICCAT may transfer amounts to any of them whose limit 
is exhausted, provided the TAC does not rise.
996
  The flexibility for Japan to count 
catch in certain parts of the area against its unused limit for the southern stock is 
maintained,
997
 while the US may take up to 200 tonnes of its quota from the southern 
swordfish area.
998
  An innovation is that any party may transfer up to 15 per cent of 
its quota to any other party with an allocation (of which there are 21), which may not 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Convention, supra Introduction n 6, and thus are not binding – but, if adopted by consensus, they 
still serve the same purpose indirectly if taken, as suggested above, as a collective waiver by all 
members of their rights to object to the transaction.  In 2005, the European Community voiced a 
preference for a recommendation over a resolution in this situation, but was prepared to go along 
with the majority: Annex 8 to ICCAT19 Report, supra n 956, at 192. 
994
  Resolution by ICCAT to Authorize Catch Limit Adjustments in the Bigeye Tuna 
Fishery, supra n 956, paragraph 1. 
995
  Supplemental Recommendation by ICCAT to Amend the Rebuilding Program for North 
Atlantic Swordfish, in “Recommendations Adopted by ICCAT in 2006” (Annex 5 to 
Proceedings of the 15
th
 Special Meeting of the International Commission for the Conservation of 
Atlantic Tunas, Dubrovnik, Croatia, November 17 to 26, 2006 (hereinafter ICCATSM15 
Report)), in ICCAT, Report for biennial period, 2006-07 Part I (2006) (hereinafter ICCAT 
Green Book 2007/1), 122 at 124-125 (Recommendation [06-02], paragraph 3(c), footnotes 2 (US 
undercatch) and 4 (UK undercatch)). 
996
  Ibid., footnote 3. 
997
  Ibid., paragraph 7. 
998
  Ibid., paragraph 3(c), footnote 1. 
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retransfer it to a third such party, but transfers to cover overcatch are not allowed.
999
  
A like provision is made for the western stock of Atlantic bluefin tuna,
1000
 and there 
is also provision for transfer of US undercatch: 75 tonnes and 100 tonnes to Mexico 
in 2007 and 2008 respectively not further transferable and 50 tonnes to Canada in 
each of those years.
1001
  This is to be contrasted with the recommendation governing 
the eastern stock of Atlantic bluefin tuna, where transfer of quotas and catch limits 
among members and cooperating non-members requires ICCAT approval.
1002
 
It appears that no proposed quota transfer has ever been refused, although a proposal 
to transfer 1,000 tonnes of Korean eastern ABT underage to Turkey was withdrawn 
in 2004 before the intersessional mail vote on it was completed.
1003
  There are signs, 
however, of pressured building for more systematic treatment of quota transfers.  At 
ICCAT’s 2004 meeting Mexico called for transparent regulation of transfer, arguing 
that, as a form of allocation, it should not affect measures of conservation.
1004
  An 
                                                          
999
  Ibid., paragraph 14.  The rule against retransfer is not much of a discipline, however, 
since it could be argued that it is not the same share of the quota that is being transferred, or the 
sale could precede the purchase. 
1000
  Supplemental Recommendation by ICCAT concerning the Western Atlantic Bluefin 
Tuna Rebuilding Program, in Annex 5 to ICCATSM15 Report, supra n 995, at 146 
(Recommendation [06-06], paragraph 9). 
1001
  Ibid., paragraphs 6(d) (transfers to Mexico) and 6(e) (transfers to Canada). 
1002
  Recommendation by ICCAT to Establish a Multi-Annual Recovery Plan for Bluefin 
Tuna in the Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean, ibid., at 132 (Recommendation [06-05], 
paragraph 11). 
1003
  See “Chairman Miyahara’s position on mail voting”, in “Opening Addresses & 
Statements to the Plenary Sessions” (Annex 3 to ICCATSM14 Report), in ICCAT Green Book 
2005/1, supra Ch IV n 910, 68 at 92.  Korea’s reference in the 2005 report to the proposed 
transfer as one that “had not been approved by the Commission” suggests that it was withdrawn 
because it would have failed to secure the necessary two-thirds majority support: Report of the 
Meeting of the Conservation and Management Measures Compliance Committee (Annex 9 to 
ICCAT19 Report), in ICCAT Green Book 2006/1, supra Ch V n 956, 210 at 214. 
1004
  See Mexico’s Opening Statement in Annex 3 to ICCATSM14 Report, supra n 1003, at 
77. 
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ICCAT working group has also urged, so far without result, that clarification would 
be useful of the rules for transfer of fishing possibilities.
1005
 
While ICCAT would, it seems, disapprove of money changing hands in return for 
temporary quota transfers, consideration of other kinds, as noted in the preceding 
examples, appears to be already accepted.  Yet there is no reason in principle for 
distinguishing between indirect consideration (side payments, in fisheries economics 
parlance) and direct.  Kaitala and Munro argue that exclusion of side payments may 
make the difference between possibility and impossibility of a cooperative solution 
to allocation conflicts.
1006
 
                                                          
1005
  “Request to the Commission by the Key Contacts of the Compendium Working Group 
for Clarification in Relation to Interpretive Issues” (Appendix 3 to Report of the Meeting of the 
Key Contacts of the Working Group to Consider the Development of a Compendium of 
Recommendations and Resolutions (Madrid, Spain, September 21-22, 2004)(Annex 4.3 to 
ICCATSM14 Report)), in ICCAT Green Book 2005/1, supra Ch IV n 910, 122 at 123. 
1006
  Kaitala and Munro (1993), supra Ch I n 120, at 324.  The OECD agrees (OECD, supra 
Ch I n 53, at 163), supporting side-payments as a way of letting Munro’s compensation principle 
work.  This holds that the preferences of the State that values an international fishery most highly 
should be fully reflected in management policy; it can then compensate others, transforming the 
problem from one of allocation of harvests into one of allocation of net benefits from the fishery 
– as was done in the 1911 Bering Sea Fur Seals Convention (supra n 933): Munro (1987), supra 
Ch I n 120, at 282-283.  An intermediate instance of money changing hands, but not directly for 
quota, is the lopsided contributions to new “endowment funds” to underpin a 1999 accord under 
the Treaty between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of 
Canada concerning Pacific Salmon, done at Ottawa, 28 January 1985, 1469 UNTS 357: K.A. 
Miller, “North American Pacific Salmon: A Case of Fragile Cooperation”, in Papers Presented 
at the Norway-FAO Expert Consultation on the Management of Shared Fish Stocks - Bergen, 
Norway, 7-10 October 2002 (Rome: FAO, 2003; FAO Fisheries Report No 695 (Supplement)), 
105 at 116 and 119.  On the application of the compensation model to the SBT fishery, one 
economic model (Kennedy & Watkins, La Trobe University, 1984) considered by Australia’s 
IAC in its 1983-84 inquiry suggested that the greatest combined return to Australia and Japan 
would be achieved by closing down the Australian fishery; foreign investment laws permitting, 
Japanese industry interests would buy all Australian quota at market price and not use it (supra 
Ch I n 44, at 30, 36).  The non-use, though economically rational, is perhaps a bolder assumption 
than the evidence – principally in the form of Japan’s arguments – warrants.  Events in the years 
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2 NAFO  
Transfers of quota are also possible in NAFO, whose Annual Quota Table for 
2000
1007
 has the following footnote in the squid column: 
Any quota listed for squid may be increased by a transfer from any “coastal state” as 
defined in Article 1, paragraph 3 of the NAFO Convention, provided that the TAC 
for squid is not exceeded.  Transfers made to Contracting Parties conducting 
fisheries for squid in the Regulatory Area shall be reported to the Executive 
Secretary, and the report shall be made as promptly as possible. 
On this evidence NAFO is, in relation to squid if nothing else, near the liberal end of 
the scale, with blanket advance permission for transfers, subject only to a notification 
requirement, with no prohibition on payment.
1008
  The squid transfer appears related 
to Japan’s residual access to Canada’s EEZ for this species, but which Japan has 
largely left uncaught.
1009
  Further, 370 tonnes of redfish quota were transferred from 
Canada to Japan in December 2000, also without apparent specific authority.
1010
 
There have been suggestions by France and the Republic of Korea that quotas too 
small to be commercially viable, and hence left unfished, should be transferred to 
                                                                                                                                                                    
since suggest that the position is now reversed due to the Port Lincoln farms’ success in bringing 
their SBT to Japanese markets more cheaply than if they were caught by Japan on the high seas. 
1007
  “Quota Table for 2000” (Annex 5 to Fisheries Commission Annual Meeting 13-17 
September 1999, Dartmouth, N.S., Canada (hereinafter NAFO Fisheries Commission Meeting 
Report 1999)), in NAFO Annual Report 1999, supra Ch III n 519, 96. 
1008
  While there is no express provision as to what the consequence would be of failure to 
notify a transfer, the likeliest result is the default one from the analysis above: that no NAFO 
member not party to the transaction is prejudiced by it, hence any such member can hold the 
purchasing party to its original, pre-transfer quota. 
1009
  See e.g. the Canadian Government’s response to a Parliamentary committee report: 
“Government Response to the Report of the Standing Committee on Fisheries and Oceans (East 
Coast Report) September 1998”, at <www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/COMMUNIC/Reports/east-est/ 
eastresponse_e.htm> (visited on 24 April 2008). 
1010
  “Fishing Activity and Utilization of Fish Resources in the NAFO Regulatory Area 2000” 
(Annex 7 to Fisheries Commission Annual Meeting 18-22 September 2000, Boston, 
Massachusetts, USA), in NAFO, Annual Report 2000, at <archive.nafo.int/open/ar/ar00.pdf> 
(visited on 24 April 2008), 130. 
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other parties that were “in desperate need” of them, but NAFO has not discussed or 
made any decision on these.
1011
  More recently, the United States has tabled a paper 
on allocation adapting the ICCAT Allocation Criteria to NAFO circumstances; 
significantly, this did not include the ICCAT precedent’s prohibition on trading.1012 
Yet actual quota transfers in NAFO, though having a long history, appear to be 
infrequent, with the transfer of 300 tonnes of 3M redfish quota from Russia to Japan 
approved by the Fisheries Commission in 2005 being the first transaction reported 
since 2001.
1013
  Nothing of consequence occurred in either 2006 or 2007, the 
footnote in the quota tables referring to the possibility of trading in squid quota 
simply continuing from year to year.
1014
 
3 NEAFC 
This commission also permits trading.  Since 2002 paragraph 2 of the annual 
recommendations on the pelagic fishery for redfish has left “Contracting Parties… 
free to transfer quantities of their quota to other Contracting Parties.  All transfers 
                                                          
1011
  NAFO Fisheries Commission Meeting Report 1999, in NAFO Annual Report 1999, 
supra Ch III n 519, 77 at 81. 
1012
  “US White Paper on NAFO Allocation” (Annex 9 to Report of the Working Group on 
Allocation of Fishing Rights to the Contracting Parties of NAFO, 26-27 March 2003, Miami, 
Florida, USA), <www.nafo.int/publications/meetproc/2003/GC-FC/html/fc-wg_mar03/annex9-
11.html> (visited on 24 April 2008). 
1013
  NAFO doc FC Doc. 05/15, Report of the Fisheries Commission Meeting, Annual 
Meeting 19-23 September 2005, Tallinn, Estonia <www.nafo.int/publications/meetproc/2006/fc/ 
fcsep05/report-fc.html> (visited on 24 April 2008), agenda item 22; NAFO doc FC Doc. 03/19, 
Report of the Fisheries Commission, 15-19 September 2003, Dartmouth, Nova Scotia, Canada 
<www.nafo.int/publications/meetproc/2004/fc/fcsep03/report-fc.html> (visited on 24 April 2008), 
agenda item 21.  The latter refers to a document summarising quota transfers from 1982-2001. 
1014
  See Annex I.A (Annual Quota Table) in both Annex 9 to NAFO doc FC Doc. 06/14, 
Report of the Fisheries Commission, 18-22 September 2006, Dartmouth, Nova Scotia, Canada 
and Annex 12 to NAFO doc FC Doc. 07/24, Report of the Fisheries Commission, 24-28 
September 2007, Lisbon, Portugal, available on the NAFO website at <http://nafo.int/ 
publications/meetproc/2007/fc/fcsep06/fc-s06.html> and <http://nafo.int/publications/meetproc/ 
2008/fc/fcsep07/fc-s07.html> respectively (both visited on 30 September 2008). 
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shall be reported promptly to the Secretariat.”1015  A debate on quota transfer at 
NEAFC’s 1998 annual meeting showed a division of opinion: there was uncertainty 
in relation to the abundance of the redfish stocks concerned, and Norway in 
particular thought that leaving quota unused would be beneficial to the stock.
1016
 
There has also been a series of quota transfers of Norwegian spring-spawning herring 
among coastal States that appears to relate to access to the EEZ and was not reported 
to NEAFC even though the fishing takes place within its Convention Area, as the 
matter is handled directly among its coastal State members (which all five remaining 
members now are since the 2004 accession of Estonia and Poland to the European 
Community).
1017
  In 2006, however, Recommendation I referred to the Community, 
Denmark (in respect of the Faroe Islands and Greenland) and Norway having agreed 
to transfer 3,766 tonnes of their joint quota to the Russian Federation, the level to be 
reduced and phased out by 2010.
1018
  The formula is repeated in the following year’s 
Recommendation I,
1019
 except that the figure for 2008, in line with the reduction 
                                                          
1015
  “Recommendation on Management Measures on Pelagic Fishery for Redfish for 2002” 
(Annex G to Report of the 20
th
 Annual Meeting of NEAFC, 5-9 November 2001), at <www.neafc. 
org/reports/annual-meeting/docs/20ann_ep01en_annexes.pdf> (visited on 24 April 2008), at 27. 
1016
  North-East Atlantic Fisheries Commission Seventeenth Annual Meeting: 17-20 
November 1998 Summary Report of Meeting (available at <www.neafc.org/reports/annual-
meeting/docs/17ann_rep1998.pdf>, visited on 24 April 2008), at 8 (paragraphs 25-27). 
1017
  R.R. Churchill, “Managing Straddling Fish Stocks in the North-East Atlantic: A 
Multiplicity of Instruments and Regime Linkages—but How Effective a Management?”, in 
Stokke (ed), supra Ch I n 124, 235 at 246 (Table 8.2). 
1018
  Recommendation by the North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission in accordance with 
Article 5 of the Convention on Future Multilateral Cooperation in the North-East Atlantic 
Fisheries at its Annual Meeting in November 2006 to adopt Conservation and Management 
Measures for Mackerel in the NEAFC Convention Area in 2007 (Annex G to Report of the 25
th
 
Annual Meeting of the North-East Atlantic Fisheries Commission, 13-17 November 2006, 
Volume II: Annexes, available at <www.neafc.org/reports/annual-meeting/docs/25neafc_annual_ 
2006_vol2_annexes.pdf> (visited on 24 April 2008), paragraph 4. 
1019
  Recommendation by the North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission in accordance with 
Article 5 of the Convention on Future Multilateral Cooperation in the North-East Atlantic 
Fisheries at its Annual Meeting in November 2007 to adopt Conservation and Management 
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mentioned the previous year, has become 3000 tonnes.  In 2007 there was also a 
cryptic reference in Recommendation II to quotas transferred from one party to 
another,
1020
 reflecting the separate Agreed Record which leaves the question of quota 
transfer to bilateral arrangements.
1021
 
4 IBSFC  
Possibly the oldest systematic treatment of transfer of quotas was in the IBSFC.  The 
first two paragraphs of Rule 2.1 of its Fishery Rules stated that: 
[W]ith a view to achieve a better utilization of existing fishing possibilities of the 
fish stocks subject to regulations agreed by the Baltic Commission, transfers can be 
made between Contracting Parties.  
Contracting Parties shall not later than 1 February inform the Commission of quota 
transfers and exchanges of quotas with other Contracting Parties or third countries.  
Contracting Parties shall inform the Commission on any other quota transfers or 
quota exchanges during the year not later than one month after the transaction.
1022
  
The Secretary of this commission had noted that: 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Measures for Mackerel in the NEAFC Convention Area in 2008 (Annex E to Report of the 26
th
 
Annual Meeting of the North-East Atlantic Fisheries Commission, 12-16 November 2007, 
Volume II – Annexes, available at <www.neafc.org/reports/annual-meeting/docs/26neafc_ 
annual_2007_vol2_annexes.pdf> (visited on 24 April 2008) (hereinafter NEAFC26 Report)), 
paragraph 4. 
1020
  Recommendation by the North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission in accordance with 
Article 5 of the Convention on Future Multilateral Cooperation in the North-East Atlantic 
Fisheries at its Annual Meeting in November 2007 to adopt Conservation and Management 
Measures for Blue Whiting in the NEAFC Convention Area in 2008 (Annex C to NEAFC26 
Report, supra n 1019), paragraph 6. 
1021
  See “Arrangement for the Regulation of the Fisheries of Blue Whiting in 2008” (Annex 
1 to Agreed Record of Conclusions of Fisheries Consultations between Iceland, the European 
Community, the Faroe Islands and Norway on the Management of Blue Whiting in 2008, 
available at <www.neafc.org/news/docs/blue_whiting_2008_agreedrecord_signed.pdf> (visited 
on 24 April 2008)), paragraph 5. 
1022
  The former IBSFC’s website is no longer operational , but the version of the Rules as 
most recently amended in 2003 can be seen at that of the Internet Guide to International Fisheries 
Law, <www.intfish.net/docs/2003/ibsfc/rules.htm> (visited on 24 April 2008). 
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[T]ransfers of quota and/or reciprocal access arrangements have become a normal 
procedure on a bilateral basis…when transfers of quota are made among 
members…, these transfers are not permanent (for one respective year only) and… 
are normally exchanged for quota for other species subject to IBSFC management.  
There have, however, been instances of quota being exchanged in return for 
development assistance payments.
1023
 
While the national allocations here were thus of the time-limited variety, as in 
ICCAT, the distinctive, indeed unique feature of the IBSFC scheme was the 
openness to trading with non-members.  This may well have been a paradoxical 
result of the ease of excluding them:
1024
 because of the Baltic Sea’s narrowness, no 
part of it lies more than 200 nautical miles from land, and thus everywhere within it 
fishing has for many years been subject to the sovereign rights of each coastal State 
in its EEZ (or of the European Community as the delegate of its member States). 
In the IBSFC’s final years the allocated shares also seem to have achieved some 
degree of semi-permanence.  As the Secretary observed in 2002, for the previous few 
years, the members’ allocations had been based on fixed percentages for the 
individual species (cod, herring, sprat and salmon) by country.
1025
 
D Consideration of quota trading in the CCSBT 
The CCSBT has moved at a gentle pace on the question of trading in quota.  At its 
2003 meeting a paper prepared by the Secretariat was considered, but the conclusions 
were less than profound: the issue “was very complex and…the legal implications 
are not clear.”  The Secretariat was requested to prepare a comprehensive review of 
the issue and circulate it to Members for intersessional discussion, and to seek legal 
                                                          
1023
  W. Ranke, “Cooperative Fisheries Management Issues in the Baltic Sea”, in FAO 
Fisheries Report No 695 (Supplement), supra n 1006, 123 at 128. 
1024
  See the passages from Burke and Munro both cited supra Ch III n 555. 
1025
  Ranke, supra n 1023, at 124.  This is confirmed by a comparison of the distribution 
tables for 1999 and 2002 (at 126 and 127 respectively) showing that the absolute amounts of 
TAC for various stocks have changed, but each member’s percentage of each stock in 2002 was 
the same as in 1999 (though an individual member has different percentages of different stocks). 
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advice from all Members as well as independent advice, although the precise 
question on which it should seek advice was not specified.
1026
 
The subsequent terms of reference for the independent advice were in fact very 
detailed: 
1. Provide a brief overview of the international legal framework governing high 
seas migratory fish stocks relevant to the issue of quota trading.  
2. Within this context, provide advice on: 
 the consistency of trading with relevant international law, including the aims 
of the [1993] Convention, allocation principles of the Convention, and the 
respective rights and duties of states under international law. 
 The nature of national allocations established by the Commission, 
specifically: 
o Are allocations “owned” by members? 
o Does a national allocation create a form of “right” that can be 
considered sub-divisible and able to be traded? 
o If allocations are sub-divisible who has lawful authority over allocation 
and reallocation of access to the stock i.e. does the authority rest with 
the member state or the Commission? 
o Does any “right” to an allocation remain ongoing or is it dependent 
upon conditions such as a member’s capacity to harvest it directly? 
o How do these issues apply to the “catch limits” for cooperating non-
members?  Do these limits constitute a different form or nature of 
“right”? 
o Are the circumstances different for high seas and exclusive economic 
zone fishing? 
3. Identify where other regional fisheries bodies have implemented quota trading 
arrangements and within what legal framework these have been developed. 
4. If satisfied that a quota trading system is consistent with the international legal 
framework for highly migratory fish stocks and the Convention, provide advice on: 
                                                          
1026
  CCSBT-EC2 Report, supra Ch II n 353, at 25 (paragraphs 55 and 56). 
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 The general characteristics necessary for a trading system to be consistent 
with international law; 
 The conditions that the Commission may wish to apply to ensure the 
effective functioning, including monitoring, of any trading system; and 
 The process issues that will need to be addressed by the Commission in 
order to establish a trading system.
1027
 
1 The independent advice 
The advice was provided by William Edeson of the Centre for Maritime Policy at the 
University of Wollongong, described as “formally [sic] senior legal counsel at the 
FAO”.  The Edeson advice begins by noting that international law has little to say 
directly on the subject of quota trading.  It contrasts the rights-based fishing within 
zones of national jurisdiction under the sovereign rights of the coastal State, which 
“involve in varying degrees the opportunity for individuals to have a right to quota 
and to trade that right” (the ITQs discussed in Chapter I being an example of this), 
with the position on the high seas, where: 
it is less easy to establish a system of tradable quotas, as no State, or group of States, 
is in a position to give an unqualified right.  It is also much more difficult to predict 
which States might choose to exercise the freedom of fishing on the high seas in 
respect of their nationals.  Thus, any right granted in respect of fishing on the high 
seas will at best be an incomplete or imperfect right.
1028
 
In other words, Edeson is here highlighting the impossibility of limiting entry to the 
high seas fishery.  He confirms that terms such as “appropriate management” and 
“conservation and optimum utilisation” mandated for SBT by Article 3 of the 1993 
Convention “would not on their face exclude trading of quota”.1029  From Article 8’s 
wording he deduces that “quota trading was not in the forefront of the objectives and 
purposes of the Convention.  However, it is not excluded either.”  The broad range of 
                                                          
1027
  “Quota Trading under the Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna” 
(Attachment A to CCSBT doc CCSBT-EC/0410/16, on file with author), at 3. 
1028
  Ibid., at 4. 
1029
  Ibid., at 5. 
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matters the CCSBT may consider (he cites in particular subparagraphs 3(b) and 4(f)), 
“put it beyond doubt that the Extended Commission could address quota trading 
should it wish to do so, and to put in place a process for this.”1030 
Turning to the position of cooperating non-members, Edeson analyses the resolution 
by which that status was created,
1031
 drawing particular attention to the written 
commitments that the candidate State or entity gives to the Extended Commission 
under subparagraph 2(4), including (b) “abide by the conservation and management 
measures and all other decisions and resolutions adopted in accordance with the 
Convention”.  An applicant  
has arguably…bound itself in international law by making the formal written 
statement…even if there is no binding treaty between the Commission and the 
cooperating non member…Further, the actions of the Commission and the non 
member would be governed by international law principles of estoppel and 
acquiescence.
1032
 
Paragraph 8 of the Resolution, which provides for annual renewal of the status by the 
Extended Commission if the cooperating non-member qualifies to retain it, 
will make it impractical for the Extended Commission to deal with the matter except 
temporarily, as there would be no legal basis for compelling the State in question to 
make a longer term commitment short of actually acceding to the Convention.
1033
  
This might require qualification in the case of parties to the UN Fish Stocks 
Agreement, who “would have no choice but to operate through the Commission by 
virtue of article 8.4”, but since not all members of the Extended Commission are 
parties, the reliance that can be placed on this is limited.
1034
 
                                                          
1030
  Ibid., at 5.  This is on the basis (at 7) that the Extended Commission, under the resolution 
that established it (Attachment I to CCSBT7 Report, supra Ch II n 408), reproduced infra at 
Appendix D, “can do, in respect of quota allocations, what the Commission itself can do.” 
1031
  Attachment 7 to CCSBT-EC2 Report, supra Ch IV n 803. 
1032
  Attachment A to CCSBT doc CCSBT-EC/0410/16, supra n 1027, at 10. 
1033
  Ibid., at 11. 
1034
  Ibid., at 11-12. 
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On the specific subject of rights to and ownership of quota, the Edeson advice 
distinguishes between SBT within EEZs and those on the high seas.  In the former, 
rights to fish could be granted to individuals or vessels “that are similar to a tradable 
property right”, but for the latter 
the situation is different in view of the fact that the resources are…subject to the 
freedom of fishing on the high seas, and…all States have a right to fish on the high 
seas.  It should also be noted that the right is given to States, not individuals. 
Thus, any right to fish on the high seas can never be absolute.  Under a treaty regime 
dealing in part with high seas fisheries, while the parties to the treaty might wish to 
grant to their respective nationals a right described as a property right, it can only be 
at best a relative right.
1035
 
On this point, while the 1993 Convention’s application is not spatially restricted (a 
view supported by Article 1, which states that it applies to SBT simpliciter) and it 
does not distinguish between the EEZ and the high seas for allocative purposes, it  
needs to be seen against the background of the preamble to the Convention which 
notes the sovereign rights of the coastal States over the resources in the EEZ.  In 
other words, coastal States would retain the right to do what they wish with their 
quota which has been taken within its [sic] own EEZ, unless there was a decision of 
the Commission to the contrary under article 8…subject to any constraints imposed 
by articles 15.3 and [15.]4.  
…In this situation, it would fall to be determined by each member how it gave quota 
to its nationals.  Thus, if one State chose to allocate its quota to nationals in the form 
of a tradable right as between its own nationals, there would be nothing to stop it.  
On the other hand, it would seem that, once a decision has been made which has the 
consent of all parties, and has been adopted by the Extended Commission and 
confirmed by the Commission, then as a matter of international law, it is binding on 
them.  The Extended Commission could, therefore, impose conditions on tradable 
quotas both in EEZs and on the high seas if it chose to do so.
1036
 
                                                          
1035
  Ibid., at 13-14. 
1036
  Ibid., at 14-15. 
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As to whether UNCLOS prevents States from setting up a system for trading of 
quota in highly migratory species on the high seas, the advice concludes with some 
hesitation that 
there is nothing in the wording of article 64 or articles 116 to 119…which precludes 
trading in quota, so long as the objectives set out in those provisions are observed. 
Further, if a group of States wishes to…set up a tradable quota system among 
themselves, then, provided it does not lead to defeating, for example, the 
conservation or the optimum utilization of the species in question, it would be 
permissible. 
The principle [sic] constraints…would be the need to ensure that such a system did 
not infringe the right of all States for its [sic] nationals to fish on the high seas in 
accordance with article 116, and the requirement that conversation measures adopted 
and their implementation do not discriminate in form or in fact against the fishermen 
of any State (article 119.3).
1037
  
The advice identifies the 1993 Convention as another possible source of constraints, 
but dismisses Article 8, paragraph 3, since any inference from the directive in 
subparagraph (a) for a TAC and its “allocation among the parties” that trading might 
be restricted to being among parties is not supportable in light of the concluding 
words, which allow the CCSBT to decide on “other appropriate measures”.  
Returning to paragraphs 3 and 4 of Article 15, these “do not in their terms actually 
prevent quota being traded”, but “do place an obligation on the parties to ensure that 
any quota traded does not have the effect of undermining any measures adopted”.1038 
The advice thus identifies three distinct situations of trading: (a) among members of 
the Extended Commission there would be “no problem”; (b) from a member to a 
cooperating non-member, the position could depend on where the catch was to be 
taken: within the EEZ of the member it would be subject to the latter’s sovereign 
rights, but on the high seas the written commitments of the non-member would make 
                                                          
1037
  Ibid., at 15-16.  See infra, text at and following n 1084, for an instance of how trading 
might tend to defeat the conservation, though probably not the optimum utilisation, of a stock. 
1038
  Ibid., at 16-17. 
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it “subject to the same restraints as are imposed on members.  It could, it seems, trade 
its quota in the same way as if it were a member.”; and (c) from a member or a 
cooperating non-member to any other State or entity, a “possibility [that] is probably 
just theoretical at the present”, where the conclusion is that, provided the constraints 
in Article 15 of the 1993 Convention are respected, “there appears to be no restraint 
on such transfer”.  For an external transferee party to the UN Fish Stocks Agreement, 
its agreement under Article 8, paragraph 4 of that treaty to “apply the conservation 
and management measures established” would put it “in a position similar to a 
cooperating non-member”, whereas a non-party to the Agreement would merely be 
under a general duty to cooperate in terms of UNCLOS Articles 64 and 116-119.
1039
  
The question on how other fishery commissions have addressed the issue of trading 
is answered by reference to the practice of ICCAT and NAFO, considered more fully 
in the previous section.
1040
 
The last section of the advice deals with the characteristics of a quota trading scheme 
and the factors to be borne in mind should the CCSBT wish to establish one: these 
would depend on how elaborate a system the Extended Commission would wish to 
set up.  At one extreme, it may wish to do no more than to require that members… 
and cooperating non-members seek the approval of the Extended Commission to 
trade quota.  Such permission might have attached to it certain conditions, for 
example, that quota can only be traded among members of the extended commission.  
Or, it might choose to impose conditions on trading quota to chartered vessels. 
At the other extreme, the Extended Commission might wish to set up a much more 
complicated system whereby it set up a regime for all southern blue fin [sic] tuna 
wherever located and allocated the quota directly to those seeking to fish.
1041
 
                                                          
1039
  Ibid., at 17-18.  There also “does not appear to be a substantial difference in effect” 
between national allocations of members and catch limits of cooperating non-members: at 18. 
1040
  Ibid., at 18-19; supra, text at nn 977-1013. 
1041
  Ibid., at 19.  By necessary implication this bypasses the step of national allocations, and 
is thus a sure way of avoiding discrimination contrary to UNCLOS Article 119(3), provided that 
non-members can join and thus make their nationals eligible to bid for quota. 
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After rehearsing the effect of the various provisions of UNCLOS and of the UN Fish 
Stocks Agreement already cited, the advice concludes that: 
The most important element will be to ensure that a quota trading system does not 
result in the abandonment of responsibility for ensuring that the obligations with 
respect to conservation and management are not [sic] observed merely because a 
quota has been transferred.  The most practical means of achieving this would be to 
permit quota trading only among members and cooperating non members, and to 
exclude the possibility of trading outside that group.
1042
 
For a “full fledged quota trading scheme” the CCSBT would then need to consider 
what criteria would give the right to apply for allocation of quota, and whether 
trading should be limited to members, extended to cooperating non-members or also 
to others.  If trading to others were to be permitted, the Edeson advice suggests that it 
may be necessary to attach conditions to such transfers.  These might include respect 
for the conservation and management measures adopted, permitting transfer only 
where the flag State is in a position to ensure compliance with them (which in turn 
might suggest that the Extended Commission should separately authorise each 
transaction of this sort) and monitoring of the utilisation of the quota
1043
 – essentially 
putting the transferee in the same position as if it had given the written commitment 
of a cooperating non-member.  It would be desirable, however,  
to avoid a situation where such States had no choice but to purchase quota as a 
means of gaining access to southern bluefin tuna.  This might give rise to arguments 
that the system was discriminatory towards such States.
1044
 
Another question would be the duration of quota allocations – the fact that 
allocations to cooperating non-members could only be for a year at a time might call 
for adjustment of the yearly renewal cycle if a move to multi-year quotas were being 
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  Ibid., at 20. 
1043
  Ibid., at 21. 
1044
  Ibid., at 22.  In the longer term, however, this is precisely the situation the members 
appear to want to achieve.  As is apparent from nn 1199-1201 infra and accompanying text, 
however, this will come about not by force of the quota trading system itself, but by the operation 
on it of future trends in international fisheries law. 
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contemplated.  Further decisions could be needed on the circumstances in which 
quota might lapse, be reduced or cancelled, and on how chartering and joint ventures 
would be managed in relation to traded quota.  Although a scheme could be instituted 
by a simple resolution of the Extended Commission, an in-principle decision in 
favour of quota trading, “accompanied by an indication of the elements it would like 
to have included in such a scheme” was recommended as a preliminary step to guide 
the drafting of the resolution.
1045
 
2 Responses to the advice 
In response to the Edeson advice, the Secretariat produced a discussion paper
1046
 and 
New Zealand a legal opinion of its own.
1047
 
(a) The Secretariat paper 
The Secretariat summarised the Edeson advice and applied it to the history of the 
SBT fishery, noting that Australia’s ITQ system was an application of property rights 
within the EEZ in exercise of its sovereign rights as a coastal State.  It characterised 
as “trade” the bilateral agreements in the late 1980s and early 1990s by which Japan 
fished Australia’s quota in its EEZ – and apparently also New Zealand’s chartering 
arrangements whereby some of its quota was fished by vessels flagged to non-
members.
1048
  The advice is interpreted as implicitly favouring restricting any quota 
trading system to members and 
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  Ibid. 
1046
  “Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna Quota Trading – 
Discussion Paper” (Attachment B to CCSBT doc CCSBT-EC/0410/16, supra n 1027). 
1047
  “Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna "Quota Trading"” (CCSBT 
doc CCSBT-EC/0410/Info01, on file with author).  
1048
  Attachment B to CCSBT doc CCSBT-EC/0410/16, supra n 1046, at 1-2.  The last 
element is farfetched, since the quota was admitted to be still New Zealand’s; see also the 
analysis of EEZ access in the trilateral period, supra Ch II text at nn 376-382 and New Zealand’s 
own view infra, text at n 1070.  
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formal cooperating non-members at most.  Restriction of participation to this group 
would give a framework for ensuring the conservation and management objectives 
of the CCSBT and would allow a compliance process to be instituted.
1049
 
Restriction to members only could “act as an incentive for cooperating non-members 
to accede” to the 1993 Convention, but would “limit the utility of the system by 
limiting trading opportunities.”1050 
The paper divides States outside this circle into “range states” (i.e. those through 
whose EEZs SBT migrates) and the remainder.  It notes that the former “have some 
rights in relation to the fishery in their EEZs”, singling out South Africa but, oddly – 
since it was still in this category at the time – not Indonesia.  Though South Africa 
“might be bound to the Extended Commission’s conservation and management 
measures because it has ratified the UN Fish Stocks Agreement”, it argues that 
one country’s circumstances should not dictate a general rule for the operation of a 
fundamental system like quota trading.  Exclusion of this group might also encourage 
accession to provide a potential pathway for the development of their fishery.
1051
 
Inclusion of any others, however, “would seem totally inconsistent with the 
objectives of the Convention.  It would transfer management of the fishery outside 
the scope of the Convention.
1052
 
On the question of ownership, the Secretariat paper unexceptionably interprets the 
Edeson advice as being that “it would not be inconsistent with international law” for 
the Extended Commission to institute a “quota trading system that effectively 
granted a tradable right of some kind to members across the fishery.”  This would 
reduce the question for the Extended Commission to the level of quota available for 
trading to be held by members and cooperating non-members.
1053
  It notes that any 
such system would be dependent on there always being a TAC and national 
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  Ibid., at 2-3. 
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  Ibid., at 3. 
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  Ibid. 
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allocations – if these could not be set, the system would be rendered inoperable.  It 
suggests that the need to ensure that the high seas freedom to fish was not infringed 
would be met by restricting its operation to members and cooperating non-members, 
though there would still be a need to cooperate with others in setting conservation 
and management measures.
1054
  As to timing, “any trading would need to be finalised 
prior to the setting of the TAC and national allocations or soon thereafter to be 
practical.”  Since this is done on an annual cycle, the quota trading system would 
need to match it, lest quota trading extending beyond a year “allocate a right to trade 
in a quota that did not exist.”1055 
In ascending order of complexity, the Secretariat paper envisages options ranging 
from trading being allowed within EEZs only, members negotiating trades bilaterally 
and advising the CCSBT subsequently through the Secretariat; bilaterally negotiated 
trades requiring CCSBT approval at annual meetings; and members declaring in 
advance to the CCSBT how much quota they wish to make tradable, with the amount 
subject to approval but not the actual trades, of which the Secretariat would simply 
be kept informed.  Under the last option there could be some requirement, either case 
by case or by application of a formula, that some of the quota to be traded be set 
aside for conservation purposes, e.g. the tonnage gained by the transferee would be 
only half that relinquished by the transferor.
1056
  The paper advocates letting the 
market rather than the CCSBT set the price at which quota is traded, since the latter 
would generate “sub-optimal results from an economic perspective” as well as being 
“very difficult and almost impossible to manage effectively.”  Leaving it to the 
transacting parties would by contrast ensure that “the appropriate price signals and 
national interests would be considered.”1057  For transactions that led to a transfer of 
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  Ibid., at 4.  This appears to be a non sequitur, however, as it is hard to see why opening 
the system to all comers would of itself infringe their freedom to fish. 
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  Ibid. 
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  Ibid., at 4-5. 
1057
  Ibid., at 5. 
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effort between the surface fishery targeting juveniles and the longline fishery 
targeting more mature fish, the paper suggested three options: (a) to trade in fish 
numbers from longlining to the surface fishery, but in weight in the other direction; 
(b) to express trades in “adult equivalent” terms, based on scientific advice as to their 
relative impact on the fishery; (c) to impose an absolute catch limit on the juvenile 
fishery and allow trading only up to the point where the limit is reached.
1058
 
The Secretariat paper also adverts to the need for systems to monitor trade and record 
catch against traded quota.  At minimum it suggests that any trade must be reported 
to the Secretariat for entering in a register to which Members would have access, the 
transferee to be responsible for ensuring the additional quota was not exceeded, with 
all existing requirements as to fishing against national allocations applying to fishing 
against additional quota.  Finally, the system and the trading that took place under it 
should be reviewed at the CCSBT annual meeting, so that their impact on the fishery 
could be taken into account in setting the TAC and national allocations.
1059
 
(b)  New Zealand’s opinion 
The New Zealand legal advice doubles as a policy paper.  It proceeds from a stance 
of scepticism as to the need for a quota trading system, reserving its position on the 
matter and suggesting that further thought be given to it “before resources are spent 
determining the conditions of any such system and the consequent nature of the 
rights a member would enjoy in its allocation.”1060  It treats “quota transfer” as a 
generic term including sale, lease or transfers within season, concentrating on “the 
principle of transfer of allocations rather than on secondary issues such as 
consideration or financial return”, which it suggests are premature.1061 
                                                          
1058
  Ibid., at 5-6.  The last item is an attempt to take account of the complication described 
supra n 954.  At 7 an alternative to (b) is canvassed: quota in trades shifting effort from the 
longline to the surface fishery should be reduced by a factor of three. 
1059
  Ibid., at 6. 
1060
  CCSBT doc CCSBT-EC/0410/Info01, supra n 1047, at 6 and 8. 
1061
  Ibid., at 1. 
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It concludes that under the CCSBT’s legal framework a Member may not unilaterally 
divide and transfer its allocation to another Member or non-member.  To establish a 
system that allowed this, a decision of the CCSBT would be necessary, which would 
have to be in accordance with the Members’ obligations under the 1993 Convention, 
UNCLOS and the UN Fish Stocks Agreement.  While the latter two do not preclude 
such a system, both 
place limits on the extent to which any transfer system may provide for quota trading 
or quota leasing (e.g. flag state responsibilities; coastal state rights; compliance and 
enforcement responsibilities; and obligations to non-members and new members).
1062
 
New Zealand argues that determination of the extent to which a member enjoys 
rights in its national allocation does not ultimately answer the key question of 
whether a member of the CCSBT has the legal capacity unilaterally to subdivide and 
transfer its allocation.  After traversing the relevant provisions of the 1993 
Convention, the New Zealand paper suggests that 
the nature of the obligations the Convention imposes on members is such that there 
is a prima facie duty upon members to recognise the responsibility of the 
Commission to allocate the TAC and to abide by decisions of the Commission. 
The subdivision and allocation of the TAC is a conservation measure, the 
implementation of which has a direct impact on the orderly and sustainable 
development of the resources. 
Members of the Commission recognise the exclusive competency of the 
Commission to determine SBT conservation measures, including the setting of the 
TAC and its allocation…In agreeing to abide by the Commission’s management and 
conservation measures, members effectively limit their right to access the high seas, 
as conferred by UNCLOS article 116, such that their nationals can access the SBT 
fishery only to the extent permitted by the Commission. 
In the current CCSBT legal context, it has not been established that members enjoy 
an ‘entitlement’ in an allocation, where entitlement is an absolute right to a benefit 
granted immediately upon meeting a legal requirement.  The Commission is not 
obliged to set a TAC…the Convention permits the Commission to withdraw, limit, 
amend or reallocate the TAC at any time…members do not enjoy ownership rights 
                                                          
1062
  Ibid., at 1-2. 
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in an allocation in that they are not entitled to compensation from the Commission if 
the allocation were revoked or reallocated, or if their actual catch is less than their 
national allocation permits. 
The allocation by the Commission of the TAC creates a relationship by which it 
could be argued a member enjoys a legitimate right to access the high seas SBT 
fishery but is under a corresponding duty to ensure that its nationals refrain from 
catching more SBT than the amount permitted by the Commission through its 
allocation of the TAC.  The right a member enjoys in its allocation is therefore a 
right to access the SBT fishery only in respect of its own nationals and to the extent 
permitted by the Commission.  The allocation is itself a limit on a member’s right to 
access the fishery as opposed to an entitlement in a resource.
1063
 
Thus New Zealand, though arguing on somewhat different lines from the analysis in 
Section B above, also concluded that national allocations are not in themselves assets 
but limitations on the freedom to fish. The restriction to the members’ own nationals, 
both in principle and in the light of New Zealand’s history of chartering foreign 
vessels, is implicitly confined to the high seas.  This is confirmed when the New 
Zealand paper goes on to argue that the effect of UNCLOS Article 116 is that 
it is through their nationality that individuals and vessels access the resources of the 
high seas.  The concept of flag state responsibilities is essential to the operation of 
international law regulating the high seas.  The establishment of a direct compliance 
relationship between the Commission and the flag state of those fishing against the 
TAC is essential to the proper management of resources under the jurisdiction of an 
organisation of states.  Unilateral transfer beyond ones [sic] own nationals, in the 
absence of a compliance relationship between the Commission and the flag state 
would be inconsistent with members’ obligation to respect flag state 
responsibilities.
1064
 
By “compliance relationship” New Zealand appears to mean inter alia a mechanism 
for accounting for catch of SBT, as discussed in section E below.  It thus implicitly 
disagrees with Edeson’s analysis that Article 15, paragraph 4 of the 1993 Convention 
(not mentioned in its opinion) is no obstacle to transfer of quota to non-members.  It 
                                                          
1063
  Ibid., at 3-4. 
1064
  Ibid., at 4. 
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is not clear, however, what the notion of flag State responsibilities adds here.  Given 
that a national allocation is only a catch limit, it does not follow that a transfer 
agreement between a Member and a non-member engages such responsibility at all.  
If anything, the Member would be doing the CCSBT and its fellow Members a 
service by securing for the first time from the non-member a quantitative limit on its 
catch, which, if adhered to, would mean no net addition of catch.
1065
 
This confusion is only partly resolved by New Zealand seeing in Articles 64 and 118 
of UNCLOS a duty to cooperate with the CCSBT itself, an essential element of 
which is  
the need to adhere to the Commission’s conservation measures, including its decision 
on the allocation of the total allowable catch.  In the absence of an allocation decision 
by which the Commission permits quota transfer, unilateral sub-division and transfer 
of an allocation to another member or non-member would be inconsistent with the 
UNCLOS duty to cooperate because…a collective decision of the Commission would 
be required to determine the necessary conditions of transfer.
1066
 
Again, while it is certainly possible to speak of Members owing duties to the 
CCSBT,
1067
 in the context of internal transfers, this adds nothing to the section B 
analysis, especially as only a transferor’s fellow Members are in a position to enforce 
its obligations.  It may be conceded, however, that the duty to cooperate could be a 
basis on which to resist transfer to non-members in commissions whose constitutive 
treaties lack an equivalent of Article 15, paragraph 4 of the 1993 Convention. 
New Zealand concludes that 
[t]he Commission has not transferred sufficient management and disposal rights to 
its members and has not set up the necessary conditions under which quota transfer 
could operate.  In the absence of an indication otherwise, the argumentation is that 
the Commission retains the capacity to manage the TAC, part of which is the 
management of national allocations, in the collective interest of the Commission 
                                                          
1065
  Assuming the quota was time-limited, however, if the CCSBT did not approve of the 
transaction, it could decline to allocate the same figure to the member the following year. 
1066
  CCSBT doc CCSBT-EC/0410/Info01, supra n 1047, at 4-5. 
1067
  See supra n 953. 
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members…Until such time as the Commission agrees on the conditions under which 
quota transfer would be permitted, any unilateral subdivision and transfer of a 
national allocation would be contrary to members’ obligation to abide by decisions 
of the Commission, particularly its conservation and management measures.
 1068
 
It concedes, however, that “there is no legal reason to prevent the Commission 
establishing a quota transfer system, setting the conditions under which the system 
would operate.” 
As for coastal States’ EEZs, the opinion stresses that the greater rights such a State 
enjoys in its EEZ are  
only in respect of access to its EEZ and its management, consistent with 
international law.  A coastal state member of CCSBT does not, in the current legal 
context, have the capacity to subdivide and transfer its SBT allocation to another 
member or a non-member simply because it is a coastal state.  To do so would 
undermine the Commission’s capacity to define and manage allocations under the 
Convention’s article 8(3).1069 
If a coastal state gives foreign vessels access to its EEZ under Article 62, paragraph 2 
of UNCLOS because it does not itself have the capacity to harvest the entire 
allowable catch, this does not amount to transfer of allocations to another member, 
“because the other member would be fishing either against its own quota or against 
the coastal state’s quota but would not itself enjoy any additional quota.”1070 
On trading under domestic law, the New Zealand opinion is that  
[t]he basis upon which a party may permit quota trading internally is a matter for 
each member to determine in accordance with its own legislation, provided that it 
retains authority over the allocation such that it can comply with any revision of the 
                                                          
1068
  CCSBT doc CCSBT-EC/0410/Info01, supra n 1047, at 5. 
1069
  Ibid. 
1070
  Ibid.  The same logic suggests that allowing a non-member access to the surplus in the 
EEZ would also not be a transfer of quota, since the non-member would be fishing against the 
coastal State Member’s quota. 
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TAC or any other conservation and management decision of the Commission at any 
time.
1071
 
Supporting Edeson’s view that property-like rights can be created in the EEZ, it 
cautions that such rights would “be subject to a member’s continued responsibility to 
ensure that its obligations with respect to the conservation and management measures 
of the SBT fishery were respected in any such arrangement.”1072  
Should the CCSBT decide to permit quota trading, New Zealand notes that “a quota 
transfer system would have to be in compliance with the Commission’s obligations 
under article 8, members’ competing obligations under the [1993] Convention, 
UNCLOS, and where applicable, UNFSA [the UN Fish Stocks Agreement].”1073  It 
considers that such a decision could be made under either subparagraph of Article 8, 
paragraph 3.  Its view of the list of factors going to allocation in paragraph 4, though, 
is that these are not static but “dynamic” and “necessarily…subject to adjustment”.  
Going beyond Edeson’s view of UNCLOS Articles 64 and 116-119, New Zealand’s 
opinion suggests it would not be enough for a quota transfer system just to “observe 
the objectives” of these provisions, it must leave Members able to implement “their 
competing obligations”, in particular to ensure that any conservation measure was 
non-discriminatory, did not undermine the CCSBT’s conservation measures, took 
into account the interests of coastal States through whose EEZs SBT migrates, and 
was reinforced by a compliance relationship with the CCSBT based on flag state 
responsibilities and enforcement.  In addition, Members party to the UN Fish Stocks 
Agreement would need to have a duty to ensure that such a system did not preclude 
any State with a real interest in the fishery from participating in the CCSBT.
1074
 
                                                          
1071
  Ibid., at 6.  This seems more of a theoretical than a practical constraint, since only in 
exceptional circumstances will a Member in this position wish to cut the TAC and national 
allocations in mid-season after they have already been set – and then presumably only because 
the stock is in such poor condition that that quotaholders cannot anyway catch their full shares. 
1072
  Ibid. 
1073
  Ibid. 
1074
  Ibid., at 7-8. 
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Finally, New Zealand answers the original question by observing that: 
[t]he nature of the rights a member would enjoy in its allocation would be 
determined by the extent of the conditions imposed by the Commission.  For 
example, if the Commission permits quota transfer only between members, then the 
nature of the right a member enjoys in its allocation, specifically the transferability 
of the right, would be accordingly limited. In the same way, if the Commission 
limited quota transfer to a particular timeframe then the durability of the right a 
member enjoys in its allocation would be accordingly limited.
1075
 
Despite the implicit divergence of views on the effect of Article 15, paragraph 4 on 
transfers to non-members revealed by the CCSBT’s intersessional activity on quota 
trading in 2004, there thus appears to be a common understanding that it is the nature 
of national allocations, rather than anything in the 1993 Convention or other rules of 
international fisheries law, that prevents them from being traded as assets from one 
Member to another, or to a non-member.  Accordingly, it was open to the CCSBT, 
were it so minded, to establish a system of trading.  The outlines of that system, as 
the Edeson advice and the analysis in section B show, were by no means pre-
ordained, and the design process might have been expected to be taken forward at the 
CCSBT’s 2004 meeting.  The debate there, however, did not proceed very far.  
3 Further debate within the CCSBT 
At the 2004 meeting Korea described quota as a “legal asset”,1076 implying that 
national allocations could be traded without further ado, but it was alone in this view, 
which on the analysis above is premature.  The Philippines, however, “strongly 
endorse[d] the quota trading that has recently been floated” as an alternative way to 
obtain the larger allocation it sought, clearly implying a willingness to pay for it.
1077
 
                                                          
1075
  Ibid., at 8. 
1076
  CCSBT-EC3 Report, supra Ch I n 78, at 26 (paragraph 72).  In this it may have been 
influenced by the EC’s use of the same word in Annex 6 to ICCAT16 Report, supra Ch III n 587, 
at 88 (paragraph 6.17). 
1077
  Attachment 5 to CCSBT-EC3 Report, supra Ch IV n 915, repeated in 2005 in “Opening 
Statement by the Philippines” (Attachment 5 to CCSBT-EC4 Report, supra Ch I n 248). 
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Three opinions were reflected in the meeting report without attribution: (a) while the 
stock is in a serious state, unused quota should not be reallocated through trading, 
since that would result in increased catch; (b) trading is undesirable in principle 
because a Member should not benefit by trading unused quota and allocations are not 
conferred on a permanent basis; (c) quota trading should be considered once the 
management procedure being worked out by the scientists for the Commission’s 
approval was in place.
1078
  Discussion was deferred for another year.
1079
 
In 2005 it appeared that only Korea was still interested in actively pursuing the 
matter given the renewed deterioration of the stock, with members considering 
reduction of the TAC.  Interest was nonetheless expressed, albeit as a low priority, in 
the CCSBT developing a more general policy covering joint ventures and chartering 
as well as buying and leasing of quota, drawing on any ICCAT precedent.
1080
  The 
Executive Secretary orally summarised the Edeson advice, to the effect that a 
positive decision by the CCSBT would be needed for a quota trading system to be 
introduced, but in the meantime chartering and joint ventures could be undertaken 
without transfer of quota, with the Member concerned remaining responsible for 
compliance and other related measures.  Bilateral access to a Member’s EEZ also did 
not require the CCSBT’s approval, but should be reported to it.1081  Undeterred, 
Korea said it would bring a set of principles and guidelines for trading to the 2006 
meeting,
1082
 though this has not yet happened, no doubt because the CCSBT’s 
attention has since early 2006 been consumed by the consequences of the crisis 
caused by revelations of persistent overcatch.
1083
 
                                                          
1078
  CCSBT-EC3 Report, supra Ch I n 78, at 26 (paragraph 73). 
1079
  Ibid. (paragraph 74). 
1080
  CCSBT-EC4 Report, supra Ch I n 248, at paragraphs 107 and 108. 
1081
  Ibid., at paragraph 109. 
1082
  Ibid., at paragraph 111. 
1083
  See infra Ch VI, text accompanying nn 1331-1334. 
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The first two objections appear rooted in the present state of affairs but do not 
amount to an argument against tradability of quotas.  That based on the state of the 
stock – i.e. that quota which a party does not need or propose to fill is best left 
uncaught for the stock’s sake – assumes that the trading being contemplated is 
transfer within a season, and to that extent is sound: making more efficient use of 
quota in this way should mean that less of it is needed overall, that is, the TAC 
should fall if actual catch is not to increase.
1084
  Yet a pari passu reduction of 
national allocations to compensate for the change in efficiency of their use would be 
resisted by the members not party to the transaction, while to require the transacting 
parties to bear it all themselves would deprive the transfer of any benefit to them.  
The objection in principle is understandable in view of the recent history of quota 
negotiations in the CCSBT, in which one new entrant was able to extract a higher 
national allocation from the original members with its recent catch history than it was 
subsequently able to continue catching profitably.
1085
  But it makes no difference 
whether quotas are limited in time or permanent (or, more precisely, indefinite), and 
whether there is any reason to resist the step of making the CCSBT’s national 
allocations indefinite is a separate question.  In view of the need for consensus on an 
initial distribution, however, a member with a persistently large unused portion of its 
quota could not reasonably expect to keep all of it. 
The third view makes trading contingent on a rule for deriving changes to TAC and 
national allocations from a pre-agreed long-term formula rather than the present 
                                                          
1084
  See in this context Arnason’s proof that under this system all quota will be used: 
Arnason, supra Ch I n 105, at 652. 
1085
  That new entrant, ironically, was Korea, whose desire to treat quota as an asset seems 
selective: at the same meeting it noted that its share of the budget did not incorporate a discount 
for the conservation value of leaving its national allocation mostly unused and asked that this be 
considered at the next meeting: CCSBT-EC3 Report, supra Ch I n 78, at 18 (paragraph 14).  But 
nothing appears to have come of this, and since under the formula in Article 11 of the 1993 
Convention Korea could automatically have reduced its contribution by relinquishing part of its 
allocation, a sympathetic hearing was probably more than it could realistically expect. 
 364 
system of annual negotiation with its attendant risk of failure to reach a decision.  
This has much in common with New Zealand’s emphasis on the “compliance 
relationship” as an essential underpinning of any trading system, which could be 
expected to bring significant, if incidental, improvements to international fisheries 
management by forcing commissions to improve their performance in accounting for 
catch of the stocks which they regulate.  This is the subject of the next section. 
E Accounting for catch 
Once set, it has not inevitably been the case that catch limits have been adhered to, 
despite being ostensibly binding.  Perhaps surprisingly, given that TAC and national 
allocations are the central management tool with which the 1993 Convention equips 
the CCSBT, it provides no means for the Parties each to assure themselves that the 
others are adhering to their negotiated catch limits.  To this day the CCSBT lacks a 
uniform catch accounting policy, leaving it to each Member to adopt its own regime, 
with consequent susceptibility to manipulation to conceal overcatch.  In its early 
years, the Members informed each other of their accounting regimes at meetings only 
on an ad hoc basis, continuing the practice of the trilateral period.
1086
 
Thus at the CCSBT’s Third Meeting Australia explained its specialised system of 
accounting for farmed fish,
1087
 but it was Taiwan as an observer that led the way in 
                                                          
1086
  In September 1989 Summary Record, supra Ch II n 368, Japan announced (at 4) that it 
had instituted penalties of 2 years’ jail or ¥500,000 for violation of catch limits, while Australia 
advised (at 3) that stringent measures for monitoring the catch and its size composition were an 
integral part of the Australian SBT Fishery Management Plan; all SBT landed in Australia were 
weighed and assessed for length; recreational fishing groups had agreed not to land SBT; and 
legislation had been introduced to prohibit landings of SBT outside the total Australian quota. 
1087
  See subsection 4 infra. 
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respect of actual catches.  Since 1996, it related,
1088
 every vessel that caught SBT had 
been required to report the weight and fishing ground to the Fisheries Department of 
the Kaohsiung Municipal Government.  At the Fourth Meeting New Zealand 
explained that vessels participating in its SBT fishery compete for catch until the 
annual limit of 420 tonnes was reached.  The Ministry of Fisheries required licensed 
fish receivers and larger vessels that froze their catch to submit weekly catch reports 
for verification.
1089
  
At the CCSBT’s Fifth Meeting Japan explained that the Japan Fisheries Agency set 
an annual catch limit and closed seasons to protect spawning and juvenile fish for 
three separate fishing areas (off Tasmania, off Cape Town and the southern Indian 
Ocean).  It required vessels to report their catches and position, dispatches patrol 
boats, and has observers aboard fishing vessels.  Under government supervision, the 
                                                          
1088
  Attachment K to CCSBT3(1) Report, supra Ch I n 102, at 1.  This information was 
subsequently updated: since 2002 each vessel fishing for SBT must be equipped with a vessel 
monitoring system that provides the vessel’s location to a monitoring centre by satellite, and the 
length of each fish caught must be measured.  In order to obtain the SBT statistical document 
(see supra Ch IV n 879 and accompanying text), daily catch, position and discards records must 
be supplied in weekly reports: “Review of Taiwan’s SBT Fishery of 2003/04” (Attachment 8-2 to 
CCSBT-EC4 Report, supra Ch I n 248), at 1-2.  
1089
  Attachment N to CCSBT4(1) Report, supra Ch I n 210, at 42; see also “Review of New 
Zealand SBT Fisheries for CCSBT-8” (Attachment K-4 to CCSBT8 Report), in CCSBT Blue 
Book 2002, supra Ch I n 30, 134 at 134-135.  In 2003 weekly reporting was required once 25% 
of the quota has been taken, and daily reporting once 50% was taken, with a view to closure of 
the season as close as possible to the New Zealand national allocation being reached; all SBT 
permits holders are then notified that the season is closed and that it would be an offence to take 
SBT for the remainder of the fishing year: Attachment 8-4 to CCSBT-EC2 Report, supra Ch I n 
211, at 80.  From 2004 all operators have been required to furnish monthly catch returns which 
are matched against individual quota holdings.  Financial penalties apply on a monthly basis to 
those who catch SBT without quota; operators have the opportunity to reconcile their quota and 
catch until the end of the fishing year (i.e. by purchase of quota, if available), after which the 
penalties increase.  The total catch is assessed annually and adjustment made in future years’ 
limits to balance the catch from the fishery and the New Zealand national allocation: Attachment 
8-4 to CCSBT-EC3 Report, supra Ch I n 203, at 78. 
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industry itself decided the allocation of the catch among the areas, as well as the 
numbers of vessels and starting dates of fishing in each.  Vessels had to report entry 
to and departure from the fishing ground within three days, and report catches at 
intervals of ten days.  They were encouraged, though not obliged, to report catch data 
including biological data such as size composition and oceanographic data daily via 
satellite.  On the basis of the information so supplied, the Government would 
calculate the date on which the catch limit for each area would be reached, and by 
regulation prohibit fishing after that date.
1090
  From 1 April 2006, in response to the 
revelations of persistent past overcatches, Japan instituted a system of individual 
vessel quotas, with landing of SBT restricted to eight designated ports, all landings to 
be monitored by government inspectors.  Each fish must be individually tagged with 
a serial number and the vessel’s call sign; penalties for infringement are severe and 
could result in suspension of quota for up to five years.
1091
 
Not until the Sixth Meeting of the CCSBT in 2000 did the Parties agree to share 
information on their respective monitoring regimes for catch, landings and non-
retention practice by their vessels, their use of observer programs, licensing systems 
and other relevant elements of their compliance regimes.
1092
  It took even longer for 
the CCSBT to hold a meeting of its Compliance Committee.  Despite a proposal by 
Japan at its very first meeting in 1994 and the decision to establish the Committee 
being made in 1999,
1093
 its first meeting did not take place until 2006.
1094
  What 
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  “Review of Southern Bluefin Tuna (SBT) Fisheries in Japan (1998/97 [sic] season)” 
(Attachment 14 to CCSBT5(1) Report), in CCSBT Blue Book 2000, supra Ch II n 413, 34 at 34-
35.  It is recorded ibid. that five enforcement vessels spent a total of 453 vessel days on station in 
the 1997 season and 589 vessel days in the 1998 seasons respectively.  Observers spent a total of 
1050 days on station spread over 15 vessels and 704 days over ten vessels in the respective 
seasons.  In addition in the 1998 season 15 observers spent a total of 829 days aboard the vessels 
participating in that year’s experimental fishing. 
1091
  Appendix 3 to Attachment 12-5 to CCSBT-EC5 Report, supra n 102. 
1092
  CCSBT6(2) Report, supra Ch IV n 683, at 53 (paragraph 25). 
1093
  Supra Ch II n 413 and references there cited.  No concrete steps were taken for three 
years until Australia and New Zealand made the point that the 40-boats incident underlined the 
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follows is an enumeration of the issues that could conceivably have come to the 
Committee’s attention had it existed earlier; as will be apparent, some were in fact 
considered by the CCSBT in plenary. 
1 Commercial overcatch 
No Party to the 1993 Convention has had an unblemished record of holding its 
catches to its national allocation.  Though views have varied as to what legal 
consequences if any flow from it, they all accept that overcatch is a breach of an 
international obligation made binding by Article 8, paragraph 7 of that Convention, 
and a practice has developed of compensating for it by catch reductions in future 
years, albeit without varying the TAC and national allocations, or the “headline” 
voluntary limit in the years from 1998 to 2003. 
One of the first issues tackled, in the trilateral period, was whether the catch limits 
covered only targeted catch of SBT, or also fish of the same species taken as bycatch.  
Although it is evident that only the latter is a genuine discipline on the catch, since 
quite large amounts of a species may be removed from the sea inadvertently, at first 
Australia’s ITQ system did not include bycatches.  In reporting to the 1988 
management meeting that its fishery plan had been amended to delete provision for 
incidental catches, so that all commercial catches must now be covered by quota, 
Australia disclosed that bycatch had been around 4-5 tonnes per annum.
1095
  
Serious allegations of overcatch were made at the 1990 management meeting, when 
Australia, noting that the method used by Japan to estimate when its quota had been 
caught led to the fishery not being closed until after the 6,065 tonne limit had been 
exceeded, outlined concerns “at the extent to which Japanese vessels may have 
                                                                                                                                                                    
need for the Members to act quickly to establish such a committee: supra Ch II n 429; 
CCSBT3(2) Report, supra Ch II n 413, at 5. 
1094
  See the list of past meetings on the CCSBT’s website, supra Ch IV n 683. 
1095
 7th Trilateral Management Meeting Report, supra Ch II n 359, at 2 (quota henceforth to 
cover all catch) and 8 (bycatch).  Note that the small amounts involved would not have caused 
Australia actually to exceed its catch limits. 
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under-reported SBT catch in the 1990 season”.  Japan’s explanation as understood by 
the Australian rapporteur was that it  
estimates the seasons [sic] catch by extrapolating from CPUE of the previous two 
years to get an estimated CPUE for the current season and uses this to calculate the 
expected date upon which the quota would be reached.  This method gives a 
conservative date for closure of the fishery when the CPUE is decreasing.
1096
  
Yet, while the CPUE had remained stable overall in recent years, it had “risen 
dramatically off Tasmania over the last two years.”  In these circumstances, Japan 
noted, “it was easy to catch over quota, and this was not at all unusual when the 
factors operating in this fishery were considered.”1097 
New Zealand did not immediately accept this as a sufficient excuse:  
New Zealand is of the view that all parties should ensure that national allocations are 
strictly adhered to, and that to this end monitoring and surveillance activities should 
be strengthened.  New Zealand would expect any party that had over-caught its 
allocation to take responsible voluntary action to deal with the situation.
1098
  
Australia was similarly unimpressed:  
We do not regard it as acceptable for Japanese industry to expect that it can blatantly 
flout the agreements made to save the fishery from extinction, and adhered to at 
great cost by Australia, without making some adjustment to compensate for the 
overfishing which has taken place.
1099
  
In response, Japan appeared to deny any obligation to make such a compensatory 
adjustment.  It accepted that more precise methods of catch management were 
desirable, but argued that “the punitive measures proposed go too far”:  
Last year Australia allocated quota to fishermen before agreement on the quota was 
reached, but Japan never demanded punitive measures.  If Australia insists on 
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  Draft 1990 Summary Record, supra Ch II n 342, at 21. 
1097
  Ibid., at 9 and 21. 
1098
  New Zealand 1990 trilateral statement, supra Ch II n 379, at 4.  
1099
  Australian 1990 trilateral statement, supra Ch II n 377, at 2. 
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punitive measures for Japan, Japan may insist upon punitive measures for 
Australia.
1100
 
The following year, Japan reported that it had restricted the number of vessels and set 
seasons for each fishing ground.  It was expecting to fill its quota by 30 September, 
and would therefore close the season on that date.
1101
  New Zealand now “noted the 
difficulties of monitoring the catch of vessels on the high seas in real-time, but hoped 
that Japan had been able to establish a better system.”  Japan’s reply was that, 
while having difficulty in monitoring 200 SBT fishing boats, Japan was 
implementing a new monitoring and enforcement system, including a new radio 
reporting system, together with restrictions on vessel numbers and length of season, 
and random inspections at time of unloading.
1102
 
The explanation for New Zealand’s milder attitude may be that in 1990 New Zealand 
had itself exceeded its quota because of unexpectedly good fishing conditions: 
New Zealand regretted the over-catch in 1990, explaining that it was due to a 
number of factors: it was difficult to monitor a small quota in real-time with a large 
number of vessels over a short time frame, and fishing conditions were particularly 
good that year.  As a result of the over-catch, action was taken to ensure more 
accurate monitoring of catches as they occur.  It is now possible to close the fishery 
                                                          
1100
  Draft 1990 Summary Record, supra Ch II n 342, at 30.  See also Draft 1990 Japanese 
Opening Statement, supra Ch II n 344, at 1: “[Australia’s action in 1989] allowing fishing to 
commence before the end of talks was jumping the gun.  This sort of action will damage the 
trilateral cooperative framework.”  It may be conjectured that, had the 1990 summary record ever 
been finalised, Japan on reflection would have asked for its surprisingly incautious statement to 
be omitted: it presupposes that Australia had thereby breached a rule that there must be no fishing 
before quotas are agreed – but if there were such a rule, this would have allowed Australia to 
impose the very moratorium it advocated at the time (and might in future again advocate) by 
withholding agreement. 
1101
  Draft Summary Record Trilateral Management Meeting for SBT Wellington 30 
September 1991 (unpublished, copy held by author extracted from DPIE files, hereinafter Draft 
1991 Summary Record), at 1-2. 
1102
  Ibid., at 2. 
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as soon as the limit is reached.  Fishermen who continue to fish after this are liable to 
a $5000 fine.
1103
 
Japan’s problem, however, remained unresolved: at the 1992 management meeting 
Australia and New Zealand expressed “serious concern” at three consecutive years of 
catch by the Japanese longline fleet in excess of national allocation;
1104
 the report 
contains no mention of a compensating adjustment to future catch limits. 
These were all examples of unplanned overcatch.  A controversy erupted in 1993 
when Australia proposed to bring forward to the current year 100 tonnes of the next 
year’s quota, in order to alleviate a specific problem faced by its longliners operating 
off New South Wales.
1105
  At the management meeting later that year New Zealand 
said that Australia’s action “threatened the integrity of the trilateral management 
process.”  Acknowledging New Zealand’s concerns, Australia confirmed that it 
would apply in full its “stringent quota provisions” to the quota brought forward and 
make a compensatory 100-tonne reduction in the 1993-94 quota year.  Australia 
noted that it had never exceeded its quota and it was to be hoped that all parties 
would abide by their quota levels and institute effective measures to prevent overruns 
in catch in the future.  Japan said that it had already advised that it did not oppose the 
Australian action on the basis that it was a “one-off decision taken to address specific 
difficult domestic circumstances.”1106  
                                                          
1103
  Ibid.  Japan commented that “compared to New Zealand’s small catch limit, the level of 
overcatch was significant”: ibid., at 1.  New Zealand’s catch of 529 tonnes in 1990 was 109 
tonnes above its 420-tonne quota: see Table 1, supra Ch I n 141.  While it made no mention of a 
compensating adjustment for 1991, the catch in that year was so low (164 tonnes, ibid.) that 
compensation was more than achieved in fact. 
1104
  1992 Conclusion, supra Ch II n 350, at 5. 
1105
  In D. Mussared, “NZ protest letter to Australian Fisheries”, Canberra Times, 10 
September 1993, 13, the New Zealand High Commission is reported as confirming that the New 
Zealand Minister of Fisheries, Mr Kidd, had written on this matter to his Australian counterpart, 
Mr Lee, but declined to give details. 
1106
  October 1993 Draft Summary Record, supra Ch II n 360, at 6.  See also 1993 
Conclusion, supra Ch II n 348, at 8 (Attachment A, “Southern Bluefin Tuna 1993 Trilateral 
Management Discussions – Conclusion of First Session 21-23 October 1993”).  Australia’s 
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In all likelihood Japan either felt, given its own history of overcatch, in no position to 
object to Australia’s request, or was aware that this history would be likely to 
continue, as at the CCSBT’s inaugural meeting a few months later it reported 
overcatch of 250 tonnes in 1993.
1107
  Once the 1993 Convention was in force, 
however, Japan’s attitude changed.  Its reaction to the case of the forty Japanese 
fishing vessels spotted by Australian reconnaissance aircraft in December 1996, their 
catch bringing Japan’s total to 6,373 tonnes, was to debit the 308 tonnes’ excess 
against the Japanese national allocation for the 1997 fishing year, as noted above.
1108
 
This informal self-policing system continued until the major crisis of 2006, when 
Japan was shown by market data to have been significantly overcatching its national 
allocation for many years, leading to a cut of 3,065 tonnes per annum for five years 
thereafter.
1109
  Even then, the “nominal catch” remains at 6,065 tonnes, while it is the 
“allocated catch” that falls to 3,000 tonnes.1110  Before then, the CCSBT had never 
itself had to reduce a Member’s national allocation to compensate for past overcatch.  
National allocations were left unchanged on the understanding that an amount equal 
to past overcatch would not be used.  The same system continued even in the absence 
of TACs in 1998-2003, applied to the Members’ voluntary quotas, though recently 
                                                                                                                                                                    
willingness to take a 100-tonne reduction, even if its excess catch was less than that, may be 
contrasted with Japan’s (uncontested) claim that, based on its actual catch of 5,354 tonnes, it had 
forgone 711 tonnes under the ITLOS provisional measures (infra Appendix A, text at n 1407), 
even though it had opted to set itself a catch limit of 5,365 tonnes for the relevant fishing year, 
700 tonnes below its most recent national allocation from the CCSBT, as its first instalment 
towards compliance with the ITLOS Order. 
1107
  CCSBT1 Report, supra Ch I n 273, at 3. 
1108
  Supra Ch II n 429; “Review of SBT Fisheries – Japan” (Attachment M to CCSBT4(1) 
Report), in CCSBT Blue Book 1999, supra Ch I n 126, 39 at 39. 
1109
  CCSBT-EC5 Report, supra Ch I n 102, at 13 (paragraph 60). 
1110
  This is likely to be because under the 1993 Convention 70% of the CCSBT’s costs are 
divided in proportion to the parties’ “nominal catches”; see Article 11(2)(b) of the 1993 
Convention, infra Appendix C, Part I.  Japan for many years had been bearing a share lower than 
its actual catch would have warranted if authorised in advance, and the unchanged nominal catch 
allows other parties to recoup some of their contributions. 
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the pattern has been for overcatch in one year to be paid back not in the immediately 
following year but in the year after that.
1111
  A possible explanation for this lag is 
that, by the time the catch figures for a year are compiled, the next year’s limit will 
have already been set – and even if there is no strict domestic legal bar to reducing a 
catch limit in mid-season, there may be a political reluctance to do so.
1112
 
                                                          
1111
  This collective nonchalance over prompt compensation, which the depleted state of the 
stock calls for (in fact catch when a fish stock is depleted risks causing greater loss to the stock 
than the amount of the catch: see the eighteenth criticism of Japan’s experimental fishing 
program by Dr Serge Garcia, a senior FAO fisheries official, cited to ITLOS by counsel for 
Australia, Professor Crawford, as evidence for the inadequacy of Japan’s offer to pay back to the 
stock its experimental catch if it could be shown to have damaged it: Transcript for afternoon of 
18 August, supra Ch I n 190, at 24), seems rather lax by comparison with the stringent standard 
set by Australia and New Zealand in paragraphs 7 and 8 of their 2000 (second) Arrangement 
between the Government of Australia and the Government of New Zealand on the Conservation 
and Management of Orange Roughy on the South Tasman Rise, supra n 960 and accompanying 
text.  The latter bespeaks a more serious determination to prevent overcatch and is to be preferred 
on that ground alone.  Note that New Zealand agreed to reduce its catch by 640 tonnes spread 
over seven years, as a result of the large unregulated catch by its fleet in 1999 after it had agreed 
with Australia on catch limits for that year but before New Zealand’s limit could be enacted into 
domestic law: see Molenaar, supra Ch II n 314, at 81 and 84 and sources there cited.  Although 
this represents little more than half of the notional overcatch had the agreed limit been in force, it 
is more than a year’s worth of quota, a proportion unsurpassed in international fisheries practice, 
though now run close by ICCAT’s reduction of Taiwan’s Atlantic bigeye tuna catch limit from to 
16,500 tonnes to 4,600 tonnes for 2006 in response to misreporting catch of around 15,000 
tonnes (as estimated by Japan) from that stock as having been taken in the Indian Ocean where it 
was not subject to quota: see Recommendation by ICCAT Regarding Control of Chinese Taipei’s 
Atlantic Bigeye Tuna Fishery, in Recommendations Adopted by ICCAT in 2005 (Annex 5 to 
ICCAT19 Report), in ICCAT Green Book 2006/1, supra Ch V n 956, 156 at 157-159 and Report 
of the Meeting of the Permanent Working Group for the Improvement of ICCAT Statistics and 
Conservation Measures (PWG) (Annex 10 to ICCAT19 Report), ibid., 238 at 239. 
1112
 See also ICCAT’s rule introduced in 1991 that “if the catch of [a relevant State] exceeds 
its annual or biannual scientific monitoring quota, then in the biannual period or year following 
reporting of that catch to [the Commission], that [State] will reduce its catch to compensate in 
total for that overage”: “Recommendations (made in 1991) for Enhancement of the Current 
Management for Western Atlantic Bluefin Tuna” (Annex 7 to ICCAT12 Report) in ICCAT 
Green Book 1992, supra Ch I n 245, 67 (emphasis added).  For this reason a 2-year rule was 
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Thus Japan began the 2003 season with a catch limit of 5,839 tonnes, reflecting a 
2001 season catch 226 tonnes over its voluntary limit, but not a further 127-tonne 
overcatch in 2002,
1113
 repaid instead in 2004.
1114
  An exception is New Zealand, 
whose season appears short enough for the reduction to be made in the immediately 
following season: overcatch of 16 tonnes in 1994 was paid back in 1995, 37 tonnes 
from 1999 was repaid in 2000, the 2001 quota was reduced by the “approximately 20 
tonnes” overcaught in 2000, and that of 2002 by the 32-tonne overcatch of 2001.1115 
                                                                                                                                                                    
established in “Supplemental Recommendation by ICCAT Regarding Compliance in the Bluefin 
Tuna and Atlantic Swordfish Fisheries” (Annex 5-13 to ICCATSM11 Report) in ICCAT Green 
Book 1999/1, supra Ch III n 576, 76, extended by “Supplemental Recommendation by ICCAT 
Regarding Compliance in the Bluefin Tuna and Atlantic Swordfish Fisheries” (Annex 9-3 to 
ICCAT17 Report, in ICCAT Green Book 2002/1, supra Ch I n 228, 217.  See also the contingent 
125% compensation standard in these three fisheries, supra n 959.  The present generalised rule 
is in “Recommendation by ICCAT Regarding Compliance with Management Measures which 
Define Quotas and/or Catch Limits” (Annex 7-14 to ICCATSM12 Report), in ICCAT Green 
Book 2001/1, supra Ch III n 571, 148: 
For any species under quota/catch limit management, underages/overages from one year may be 
added to/must be subtracted from the quota/catch limit of the management period immediately 
after or one year after that year, unless any recommendation on a stock specifically deals with 
overages/underages, in which case that recommendation will take precedence. 
The rule thus yields to the two years specified as the norm in Annex 8.2 to ICCATSM13 Report, 
supra n 989, at 157 and Annex 8.8 to ICCATSM13 Report, supra Ch III n 615, at 168. 
1113
  Attachment 8-3 to CCSBT-EC2 Report, supra Ch I n 201, at 74-75. 
1114
  Attachment 8-3 to CCSBT-EC6 Report, supra Ch I n 141, at 2.  69 tonnes left uncaught 
in 2003 was added back at the same time: ibid., Japan claiming to be allowed to do this since 
there was no binding CCSBT decision for that year: CCSBT-EC6 Report, supra Ch I n 141, at 8 
(paragraph 47). 
1115
  CCSBT3(1) Report, supra Ch I n 102, at 10; CCSBT6(2) Report, supra Ch IV n 675, at 
57 (paragraph 49); CCSBTSM3 Report, supra Ch IV n 683, at 112 (paragraph 36); Attachment 
8-4 to CCSBT-EC2 Report, supra Ch I n 211, at 78.  Given that the reported overcatch of 20 
tonnes in 2000 included 23 tonnes of PBT, it appears that there was in fact no overcatch of SBT 
by New Zealand in that year, which makes the repayment somewhat puzzling: CCSBT7 Report, 
supra Ch III n 449, at 4 (paragraph 10).  Another curiosity is that, at the time of New Zealand’s 
original announcement at the CCSBT’s 2002 meeting that it had overcaught its voluntary limit 
for its 2001-02 season by 32 tonnes, it undertook to refrain from catching a commensurate 
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Australia reported to the CCSBT in 2003 an incident not treated as overcatch, though 
it now would be under the remedial measures adopted to prevent its repetition.  A 
quantity of SBT estimated at 132 tonnes had escaped from a tow cage before they 
had reached the pens where the sampling would have taken place.  On the best 
available information, 15 tonnes of SBT had died in the incident, which became the 
amount debited against the holder’s quota.  As a result, Australia had decided to 
move from the system of deducting quota when the fish were transferred from tow 
cages to static cages (including mortalities during catching and towing operations) to 
provisional deduction of the estimated weight at the time of capture.
1116
 
2 Institutionalised carryover of overcatch and undercatch 
Crucial though adherence to quotas is for conserving fish stocks, a limited degree of 
flexibility around them may assist fisheries management.  Allowing a modest portion 
of uncaught quota to be carried over into the next year removes the “use it or lose it” 
incentive to try to fill the quota, with its inherent risk of overcatch.  Conversely, if a 
small amount of overcatch may be debited against the following year’s quota, this 
can act as a political safety valve, offering States facing domestic pressures to allow 
overfishing the alternative of legitimately borrowing from the stock, provided that 
repayment is guaranteed.  A system these lines is developing ad hoc in the CCSBT, 
though an earlier suggestion that one be introduced formally was rebuffed. 
At the CCSBT’s Eighth Meeting in 2001 Australia indicated that it was prepared to 
countenance permitting Members to reconcile catches against national allocations 
over a three-year period with limits so as to provide operational flexibility, but not if 
                                                                                                                                                                    
amount in the 2003-04 season: CCSBT-EC1 Report, supra Ch I n 293, at 20 (paragraph 35).  
Taiwan too reacted rapidly to its 158-tonne overcatch in 2004, announcing that it would be paid 
back in 2005: Attachment 8-2 to CCSBT-EC4 Report, supra n 1088. 
1116
  CCSBT-EC2 Report, supra Ch II n 353, at 18 (paragraph 31).  A separate 126-tonne 
overcatch was, however, debited against the next year’s allocation: CCSBT-ESC3 Report, supra 
Ch I n 236, at 166 (paragraph 9). 
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those allocations were increased from their last levels, as Japan was proposing.  As 
there was no agreement on national allocations, this could not be pursued.
1117
  
Australia’s 2002 overcatch, caused by a single operator, highlights an additional 
complex consequence where there are ITQs at the domestic level, but no year-to-year 
accounting mechanism allowing an individual quota-holder’s overrun to be debited 
against the holder’s quota for the following year.  If in that situation the State 
concerned adheres to established CCSBT practice by declaring a commensurately 
lower domestic catch limit in the following year, all quota-holders, whose quota is 
expressed in terms of a fixed share of the total, compensate for the overcatch of one.  
This also creates a powerful incentive for compliance-oriented peer pressure within 
the fleet as long as overcatchers cannot remain anonymous – as was the case here. 
At the CCSBT’s 2004 meeting New Zealand advised that the introduction of SBT 
into its Quota Management System with certain flexibility provisions was expected 
to affect its ability to balance catch from one year to the next, “however NZ will 
ensure that on average the catch from the fishery does not exceed the national 
allocation.”1118  In not seeking the CCSBT’s blessing for this, New Zealand thus 
appeared to be implicitly asserting a claim to be permitted to do it, on the basis that it 
was by now established practice of other Members.  If so, its assessment was correct: 
there were no protests. 
At the 2007 meeting New Zealand tabled a draft resolution that would allow for 
carryover of undercatch into the immediately following year, and only if the national 
allocation for the next year were no less than in the year of undercatch.  Overcatch of 
ten per cent would be permitted without penalty for a member whose national 
allocation was 500 tonnes or less, and two per cent for one of more than 500 tonnes, 
with penalties increasing in three steps, 50, 100 and 200 per cent, the highest rate 
reached at 50 per cent overcatch for a member whose national allocation was 500 
                                                          
1117
  Attachment N-1 to CCSBT8 Report, supra Ch IV n 738, at 143-144.  
1118
  Attachment 8-4 to CCSBT-EC3 Report, supra Ch I n 203, at 76. 
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tonnes or less, and ten per cent for others.  The overcatch and any penalty would be 
deducted over the following two years.
1119
  Taiwan and Korea supported the 
proposal, as did Australia in principle, though in its view the percentages required 
refinement so as to avoid giving an economic incentive to overcatch; Japan had 
concerns about carry-forward of undercatch given the low state of the SBT stock, 
and wished to consider the detail of the proposal further.
1120
  New Zealand was left to 
redraft the text in advance of the next meeting.
1121
 
Until this development, ICCAT had been somewhat more advanced than CCSBT.  
Carryovers were already permitted in the northern albacore fishery, though until 
2007 not in its southern counterpart.
1122
  In 2004 the European Community proposed 
that there be a general rule for management and application of unders and overs, but 
debate on this matter was thrice deferred to 2007, and when it did occur the 
Community withdrew its proposal in favour of a new alternative one from the US 
that failed to be adopted for lack of support.
1123
  In the original draft recommendation 
                                                          
1119
  “Draft Resolution for under and over catch” (Attachment 12 to CCSBT-EC6 Report, 
supra Ch I n 141). 
1120
  CCSBT-EC6 Report, supra Ch I n 141, at 25 (paragraphs 134 (Korea), 135 (Australia), 
136 (Japan) and 137 (Taiwan)).  
1121
  Ibid., at 26 (paragraph 140). 
1122
  See supra n 961 (northern stock); Recommendation by ICCAT on the Southern 
Albacore Catch Limit for 2005, 2006 and 2007, in Annex 5 to ICCATSM14 Report, supra Ch IV 
n 910, at 130 (Recommendation [04-04], paragraph 8: no carry-over of undercatch, partially 
relaxed by Recommendation by ICCAT on the Southern Albacore Catch Limits for 2008, 2009, 
2010 and 2011, in Annex 5 to ICCAT20 Report, supra Ch IV n 884, at 151 (Recommendation 
[07-03], paragraph 7)). 
1123
  To 2005 in Report of the Meeting of the Conservation and Management Measures 
Compliance Committee (Annex 9 to ICCATSM14 Report), in ICCAT Green Book 2005/1, supra 
Ch IV n 910, 187 at 191; to 2006, with the Standing Committee on Research and Statistics asked 
to provide scientific advice on the possible conservation impacts on a stock-by-stock basis of 
carrying forward undercatch, in Annex 9 to ICCAT19 Report, supra n 1003, at 216; to 2007 in 
Report of the Meeting of the Conservation and Management Measures Compliance Committee 
(Annex 10 to ICCATSM15 Report), in ICCAT Green Book 2007/1, supra Ch V n 995), 235 at 
241.  The very brief report of the consideration of the EC and US proposals is in ICCAT20 
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tabled by the Community,
1124
 there was an unclear distinction between “management 
measures” (for which overcatch would be debited against the next year’s allocation 
or that of the subsequent year, while undercatch of up to 10 per cent could be carried 
forward into future years, subject to a cumulative maximum of 30 per cent, although 
it is not clear what effect a change in national allocation in the interim would have 
had on the last figure) and “application measures”, for which overage would always 
be debited in the next year, and at a rate of 125 per cent if it occurred in two years in 
succession.  It may not be coincidental that the Community lost interest in promoting 
its idea just when its own 2006 overcatch of eastern ABT came to be brought to 
account.  Arguing in mitigation that quota would have been available to cover the 
excess had it not declined to carry forward its undercatch of 2004, the Community 
persuaded its fellow members to let it repay the excess over not two but three 
years
1125
 – something not foreseen by the existing regulation, so that an amendment 
to it had to be adopted.
1126
  On the other hand, possibly because of the large tonnages 
involved, Taiwan’s overcatch of 8,000 tonnes of bigeye tuna, and China’s of an 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Report, in ICCAT Green Book 2008/1, supra Ch III n 568, 36 at 40 and Annex 10 to ICCAT20 
Report, supra Ch III n 568, at 221. 
1124
  “Draft Recommendation by ICCAT Concerning Management and Application of 
Underages and/or Overages of the Quotas/Catch Limits” in “Documents Deferred for Discussion 
in 2005” (Annex 11 to ICCATSM14 Report), in ICCAT Green Book 2005/1, supra Ch IV n 910, 
255. 
1125
  Annex 10 to ICCAT20 Report, supra Ch III n 568, at 214 and 218. 
1126
  Recommendation by ICCAT in regard to Compliance with the Multi-Annual Recovery 
Plan for Bluefin Tuna in the Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean, in Annex 5 to ICCAT20 
Report, supra Ch IV n 884, at 152 (Recommendation [07-04]).  Though not opposing this 
recommendation, the US called for the compliance process to be reformed (“Statement by the 
United States to the Compliance Committee” (Appendix 9 to Annex 10 to ICCAT20 Report), in 
ICCAT Green Book 2008/1, supra Ch III n 568, 248 at 249), and decried ICCAT’s “overall 
picture of persistent compliance lapses” and “unwillingness to apply the available corrective 
instruments, namely quota penalties”: “Supplemental Statement by the United States to the 
Compliance Committee” (Appendix 10 to Annex 10 to ICCAT20 Report), ibid., 249 at 249. 
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unspecified amount, were permitted to be compensated for by yearly deductions of 
1,600 tonnes and 500 tonnes respectively in 2005 to 2009.
1127
  ICCAT’s Working  
Group considering the development of a compendium of its recommendations and 
resolutions has also requested clarification from the parent commission of how over- 
and underharvest of transferred quotas should be treated.
1128
  
3 Conversion factors 
It is often necessary to carry out some initial processing of SBT such as gilling and 
gutting before each fish can be measured and weighed.  Since national allocations are 
by necessary implication in whole weight, a formula is needed to convert the weight 
of every processed fish into what it would have weighed at the moment of capture.  
An inaccurate conversion factor can lead to overcatch of quota, deliberate or not, that 
would otherwise be hard to detect.
1129
  There would thus seem to be a need to impose 
uniform conversion factors (or at least a formula relating whole weight to processed 
weight for different weights of fish and different processing techniques).  While the 
                                                          
1127
  Recommendation by ICCAT on a Multi-Year Conservation and Management Program 
for Bigeye Tuna, supra n 961, paragraph 5.  Note, however, that “Information Paper by Japan on 
the Import of Atlantic Bigeye Caught by Large-Scale Tuna Longline Vessels” (Appendix 6 to 
Annex 9 to ICCATSM14 Report), in ICCAT Green Book 2005/1, supra Ch IV n 910, 241 at 245 
calculates China’s 2003 overage as 3,903 tonnes, greater than the 2,500 tonnes implied by the 
decision; the combination of this discrepancy and the lack of a precise figure for China’s 
overcatch in the report suggests that the figure was disputed and that the decision ultimately 
made was a compromise. 
1128
  Appendix 3 to Annex 4.3 to ICCATSM14 Report, supra n 1005, at 123.  Failing to 
receive an answer to its specific question ibid. whether the 50% northern albacore carry-over in 
paragraph 6 of the relevant recommendation (supra n 961) was applicable to the catch limit of 
200 tonnes available by paragraph 3 to any member not mentioned by name, the following year it 
submitted to the Commission for approval its own affirmative answer: Report of the Second 
Meeting of the Key Contacts of the Working Group to Consider the Development of a 
Compendium of Recommendations and Resolutions (Madrid, Spain, June 27-28, 2005)(Annex 
4.3 to ICCAT19 Report), in ICCAT Green Book 2006/1, supra Ch V n 956, 143 at 143. 
1129
  Or, as the Commission coyly put it, “inappropriate conversion factors will influence the 
number of fish which may be taken within the quota”: CCSBT2 Report, supra Ch II n 414, at 6. 
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CCSBT has not done this, it is aware, thanks to a 1996 report from its Scientific 
Committee, that a conversion factor of 1.15 was in use by agreement of the parties’ 
scientists – but also that it is unsatisfactory.1130  According to Australia and New 
Zealand, it resulted in the total weight of the longline catch being underestimated.
1131
  
Japan, on the other hand, considered that, since the current TAC had been calculated 
on current conversion factors, if the CCSBT adopted the Scientific Committee’s new 
conversion factor, it should adjust the TAC commensurately.
1132
  Australia and New 
Zealand acknowledged this in the following year
1133
 and the CCSBT has not since 
taken any action on the matter. 
4 Farmed fish 
Farming of fish can be a complicating factor, as has been the case for Australia’s 
farming of SBT at Port Lincoln in South Australia.  The reason is twofold. 
First, because farmed fish are not killed on capture, it is much more difficult to 
ascertain their weight at the time, which is what is significant for quota purposes.  At 
the CCSBT’s Third Meeting, Japan questioned Australia’s procedure for estimating 
tonnages of farmed fish catches to debit against quota, highlighting the likely high 
                                                          
1130
  CCSBT3(1) Report, supra Ch I n 102, at 15.  In Australia, the conversion factor from 
processed to whole weight under the Fisheries Management (Southern Bluefin Tuna Fishery) 
Regulations (Cth) (Statutory Rules 1995 No 7), reg 7 is 1.176, while New Zealand law provides 
for a conversion factor for gilled and gutted SBT of 1.15 if the tail is removed, or 1.10 if the tail 
is left on: Fisheries (Conversion Factors) Notice 2005 (made under the Fisheries Act 1996 (NZ)), 
Schedule 2, Part II, item 26, at <www.fish.govt.nz/NR/rdonlyres/E264B2E8-4B02-4FA5-8540-
91B737D45499/0/CFNoticeSchedules.pdf> (visited on 15 May 2008). 
1131
  CCSBT3(1) Report, supra Ch I n 102, at 19 (Australia), 22 (New Zealand). 
1132
  Ibid., at 22.  It follows from the circumstances that the adjustment would have been 
upwards.  This appears justified since the stock assessments are conducted on the basis of 
number of fish, not weight: CCSBT4(1) Report, supra Ch I n 126, at 11, corroborated by the 
Scientific Committee’s comment that, as long as the same conversion factor is used in both the 
projections and in calculating removals from the fishery, it should not result in any bias in the 
projections: CCSBT-SC2 Report, supra Ch I n 240, at 3. 
1133
  CCSBT4(1) Report, supra Ch I n 126, at 12. 
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mortality of purse-seined fish, suggesting that they could lose weight subsequent to 
capture and emphasising the need for observers on the vessels.  In reply, Australia 
advised that all transfers were monitored by compliance staff, the fish counted using 
underwater video and sampled for weight to develop a tonnage estimate.  There was 
an obligation to report for debit against quota all mortalities occurring at capture and 
before transfer to rearing cages.  Dead fish were removed from cages during towing 
and their weight duly debited.  Mortality during towing and transferring was reported 
at 1.4 per cent in the 1995 season and 1.5 per cent in 1996.  As feeding in tow cages 
began soon after capture, they might have gained weight during the two or three 
weeks between their capture and arrival in the Port Lincoln fish farms.
1134
 
Updating this information some years later, Australia advised that in the 2000 and 
2001 seasons compliance officers from the Australian Fisheries Management 
Authority (AFMA) were deployed on farm tow vessels to observe procedures; 
AFMA also conducted boat inspections in port and monitored all transfers of fish to 
farm cages.
1135
  In response to further questioning in 2002, Australia confirmed that 
mortalities in purse seines and tow cages were factored into the catch data presented 
to the CCSBT.
1136
  At the CCSBT’s 2003 Meeting Australia described the specific 
procedures introduced for research and monitoring of SBT farming operations.  An 
independent company is contracted annually by AFMA to monitor the operations.  
All mortalities occurring during the capture and towing operations must be recorded 
on the appropriate form and be available for inspection if requested by an AFMA 
officer.  When SBT are transferred from tow cages to the fish farms, the contractor 
must make a video recording of this, which is then used to count the fish transferred 
                                                          
1134
  CCSBT3(1) Report, supra Ch I n 102, at 11. 
1135
  Attachment K-1 to CCSBT8 Report, supra Ch II n 351, at 109. 
1136
  CCSBT-EC1 Report, supra Ch I n 293, at 19 (paragraph 35).  See also Attachment 8-1 
to CCSBT-EC3 Report, supra Ch I n 143, at 62. 
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into the farm.  This count is multiplied by the mean weight derived from a sample of 
40 fish, and debited against quota using the Farm Disposal Record.
1137
 
Secondly, even if, on the strength of the procedures just listed, the reported weights 
are assumed free of any systematic downward bias, with almost all of Australia’s 
SBT catch now fattened further in the farms, the weight of these fish when ultimately 
sent to market will be substantially higher than at their time of capture.  Starting in 
1997, Japanese import statistics began to show imports of SBT from Australia higher 
than Australia’s quota of 5,265 tonnes: above 6,000 tonnes in 1997 and 1998, nearly 
7,000 tonnes in 1999, over 7,800 tonnes in 2000.
1138
 
In response to questioning by Japan of Australia’s adherence to its quota, Australia 
gave information to the CCSBT designed to show that its catch never exceeded its 
national allocation.  At the Fourth Meeting Australia reported an average mortality 
after counting of 5 per cent, average time spent in pens being around four months.  
The losses were mainly due to seals, parasites and storms.
1139
  At the CCSBT’s 
Seventh Meeting Australia advised that it would carry out a scientific assessment of 
growth rates of farmed SBT,
1140
 and at the Eighth Meeting duly presented a paper on 
growth rates on farms, reporting that weight increases in the order of 93 per cent 
were being obtained from farming SBT, and that further increases could be expected 
as techniques improved.
1141
 
                                                          
1137
  Attachment 8-1 to CCSBT-EC2 Report, supra Ch I n 169, at 66.  This requirement has 
been enacted into Australian law: see cll 22A-22D of the Southern Bluefin Tuna Fishery 
Management Plan, supra Ch I n 156. 
1138
  “Import Statistics of SBT by Japan” (Appendix 2 to “Review of Southern Bluefin Tuna 
Fisheries of Japan in 1999 Fishing Season” (Attachment F-2 to CCSBT7 Report)), in CCSBT 
Blue Book 2002, supra Ch I n 30, 39. 
1139
  “Responses to questions raised by Japan at CCSBT4 (September 1997) regarding 
Australian SBT fishing operations” (Attachment P to CCSBT4(1) Report), in CCSBT Blue Book 
1999, supra Ch I n 126, 46. 
1140
  CCSBT7 Report, supra Ch III n 449, at 6 (paragraph 31). 
1141
  CCSBT8 Report, supra Ch I n 30, at 66 (paragraph 36).  If 98% of Australia’s annual 
quota of 5,265 tonnes were farmed and exported to Japan after a weight increase of 93%, only 
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The issue remains controversial and the subject of close questioning by Japan at 
CCSBT meetings, possibly – as from 2006 onwards it has invariably been raised in 
association with the issue of Japan’s past overcatch1142 – as a tactic to divert attention 
from the latter.  Although doubts about the Australian accounting procedure were not 
fully dispelled at a special meeting on the two issues, the CCSBT as a whole appears 
to have accepted Australia’s criticisms of the statistical methods on which these 
doubts rest as flawed and took no remedial action.
1143
  If anything, the exclusion of 
fish smaller than 10 kg from the 40-fish sample produces an upward bias, which 
according to an independent expert would lead to a likely overestimation of catch by 
two to four per cent.
1144
  The Independent Review of Australian SBT Farming 
Operations Anomalies also concluded that “the regulation of the industry is a 
rigorous and well-managed process with no apparent anomalies and no scope for 
over-catch via misreporting.”1145  Instead, Australia was to carry out a study starting 
in 2007 to estimate, at Japan’s request: (a) representativeness or bias of the 40-fish 
sample used to estimate weight; (b) weight change during towing; (c) accuracy in 
counting of dead fish during towing; (d) accuracy in growth rate during farming; and 
(e) number of fish transferred into farming pens.  Australia hoped to finalise (a), (c) 
and (e) during the first year and would report to the Scientific Committee in time for 
                                                                                                                                                                    
two successive years of imports above 9,958 tonnes would indicate overcatch.  In 2001, however, 
Japan imported only 8,237 tonnes of SBT from Australia: Attachment 8-3 to CCSBT-EC2 
Report, supra Ch I n 201, at 75.  It is unclear, though, whether the 93% is gross or net of losses. 
1142
  See infra Ch VI, text accompanying nn 1331-1334. 
1143
  Two members of the independent panel found that the data were not sufficiently robust 
to support any finding of overcatch, while the other two, though agreeing, proceeded nonetheless 
to produce from those data estimates of overcatch ranging from 18% to 49.5%: CCSBT-ECSM 
Report; supra Ch IV n 683, at 2 (paragraphs 8-12) and Attachment 7, “Minimum Advice 
Requested from the SAG/SC Regarding the Impact of Overcatch Scenarios on Stock Status 
Advice”, esp the table on the second page. 
1144
  Quoted by Australia in CCSBT-EC6 Report, supra Ch I n 141, at 8 (paragraph 48). 
1145
  Quoted by Australia ibid., at 20 (paragraph 106).  It is unclear whether the original 
report, which the CCSBT has not made public, is also the source of the estimate in the previous 
footnote. 
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its July annual meeting.
1146
  This was not entirely achieved, but an extensive debate 
was held on the matter at the 2007 meeting.
1147
 
Similar arguments have been mounted by Japan in ICCAT regarding farming of 
ABT by Croatia and Turkey, with similar responses from those States,
1148
 and the 
adoption of successive recommendations on the matter.
1149
  In 2002 a working group 
debated tuna farming and in 2003 there was further discussion in Panel 2, where the 
EC said that “farming does not constitute, in itself, a threat to fish stocks, as long as 
it is carefully monitored and controlled.”  Japan, by contrast, was principally 
concerned about farming by non-members of ICCAT.
1150
 
5 Bycatch and discarding 
Although prohibition of the taking of fish below a certain size is a common fisheries 
management measure,
1151
 either directly (the only option in the case of longlining, in 
                                                          
1146
  CCSBT-EC5 Report, supra Ch I n 102, at 7-8 (paragraphs 42-44). 
1147
  CCSBT-EC6 Report, supra Ch I n 141, at 15-20 (paragraphs 91-107); see also at 8-9 
(paragraphs 48-51). 
1148
  “Information by Japan on Bluefin Tuna Catches Caged in Farming Facilities” (Appendix 
5 to Annex 9 to ICCAT19 Report), in ICCAT Green Book 2006/1, supra Ch V n 956, 230-232; 
“Information by Turkey on Bluefin Tuna Catches, Import, Export and Farming in Turkey” 
(Appendix 6 to Annex 9 to ICCAT19 Report), ibid., 233-235; “Statement by Croatia to Panel 2” 
(Appendix 9 to Annex 8 to ICCAT18 Report), in ICCAT Green Book 2004/1, supra Ch III n 
612, 206; “Statement by Japan to Panel 2” (Appendix 10 to Annex 8 to ICCAT18 Report), ibid. 
1149
  The original was Recommendation by ICCAT on Bluefin Tuna Farming (Annex 8.10 to 
ICCATSM13 Report), in ICCAT Green Book 2003/1, supra Ch II n 427, 171; the latest, which 
completely replaces its predecessor despite its title (see paragraph 13), is Recommendation by 
ICCAT to Amend the Recommendation on Bluefin Tuna Farming [Rec. 04-06], in Annex 5 to 
ICCAT19 Report, supra n 1111, at 160-163. 
1150
  Report of the 11
th
 Meeting of the Permanent Working Group for the Improvement of 
ICCAT Statistics and Conservation Measures (PWG) (Annex 11 to ICCATSM13 Report)), in 
ICCAT Green Book 2005/1, supra Ch II n 427, 235 at 235-236 (paragraphs 4.4-4.8); Annex 8 to 
ICCAT18 Report, supra n 1128, at 184 (EC) and 185 (Japan). 
1151
  For example ICCAT has had a series of minimum size limits for ABT: these are listed in 
Appendix 3 to Annex 4.3 to ICCATSM14 Report, supra n 1005, at 123. 
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which the hooks do not discriminate between fish of different sizes) or in terms of 
mesh size of nets, the CCSBT has not sought at any stage to regulate the SBT 
fisheries on this basis.  The size of fish taken is significant because of its differential 
impact on the stock per tonne of catch, should more spawning potential be lost in the 
larger number of small fish needed to make up a tonne than in a smaller number of 
large fish.  The issue has been raised at CCSBT meetings in two contexts.  One, the 
relatively greater impact on stock per tonne of catch of small fish, has already been 
discussed elsewhere.
1152
  The other calls into question the continued desirability of 
discriminating by size at all when catch is limited by tonnage. 
In 1996 Japan announced
1153
 at the Third Meeting of the CCSBT that its industry had 
adopted a policy of returning to the sea fish of less than 25 kg alive at the time of 
retrieval.  Responding to Australia’s query, Japan advised that it assumed a survival 
rate of 55 per cent of the returned fish and counted the 45 per cent mortality against 
Japan’s quota; this accounted for 711 tonnes of its declared catch for 1995 of 5,866 
tonnes, the mean weight of non-retained fish being 20.1 kg.  New Zealand called for 
the CCSBT to develop a uniform policy on non-retention of fish.
1154
  It did not do so, 
merely calling on Parties to encourage their fleets to observe consistently whatever 
policy each might adopt.
1155
  At the CCSBT’s Fourth Meeting Japan announced that 
from 1997 the policy of releasing small SBT no longer applied.
1156
 
It may be noted that, if there were a positive requirement to debit against quota all 
fish taken on board a vessel regardless of their subsequent fate, there could be no 
objection on conservation grounds to the superimposition of a policy of returning 
smaller fish to the sea if still alive, although the difficulty of enforcement possibly 
explains why this is not done.  It would depend on the balance of desirability 
                                                          
1152
  Supra Ch I n 261 and accompanying text. 
1153
  Attachment G to CCSBT3(1) Report, supra Ch I n 102. 
1154
  CCSBT3(1) Report, supra Ch I n 102, at 9-10. 
1155
  Ibid., at 28. 
1156
  CCSBT4(1) Report, supra Ch I n 126, at 6. 
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between limitation of absolute catch by weight and influencing the size composition 
of the catch.  The pendulum may be expected to swing back and forth from time to 
time, depending on the state of the stock. 
A second reason for discarding fish is that the operator catching them may have 
taken them as bycatch in circumstances where quota is necessary.  At the Sixth 
Meeting of the CCSBT in 2000, Japan, armed with Australian press clippings, raised 
allegations over the discarding of 250 to 400 tonnes of SBT by Australian east coast 
longliners for lack of quota and asked how catch discarded in this way was treated 
under Australia’s quota management regime, in particular whether and how it was 
debited against quota.  Not replying directly, Australia stated that it was prepared to 
prosecute offenders given sufficient evidence, but pointed out the economic motives 
of those making the allegations and added that there had always been SBT taken on 
the east coast, with Australian quota remaining available to cover these catches.
1157
 
The question was pursued further when the meeting resumed for a second session 
some months later.  Australia now clarified that those likely to catch SBT along the 
east coast were free to purchase or lease quota.  Implicitly admitting that there was 
substance to Japan’s allegations, Australia advised that it would nonetheless 
introduce a system of rolling closures following the progression of migrating SBT 
along the east coast, from May to September.  Henceforth only those with 500 
                                                          
1157
  CCSBT6(1) Report, supra Ch I n 219, at 6 (paragraph 33), also “Opening Statement by 
Japan” (Attachment C to CCSBT6(1) Report), in CCSBT Blue Book 2001, supra Ch I n 242, 18 
at 19.  The reference to economic motives is an allusion to the East Coast Tuna Boat Owners’ 
Association Inc having lobbied for ITQs to be made available free of charge to its members 
whose longliners caught SBT as bycatch, despite the fact that they had previously held such 
quota but sold it to South Australian operators.  The NSW longline catch was 475 tonnes in 1998, 
only 97 tonnes in 1999 when the allegations were raised, then 114 tonnes in 2000, 60 tonnes in 
2001 and 22 tonnes in 2002 (including various combinations of Queensland and Tasmanian 
longline catch and NSW pole-and-line catch in successive seasons for confidentiality reasons, as 
data from groups of less than five boats may not be released): Attachment 8-1 to CCSBT-EC2 
Report, supra Ch I n 169, at 64 and 67 (Table 1). 
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kilograms or more of quota could operate in the closed area, with the location and 
movement of vessels monitored through the requirement that each carry an approved 
satellite-based monitoring system.
1158
  At the CCSBT’s Seventh Meeting, Australia 
declared a catch in the 2000 season of 5,257 tonnes, just eight tonnes under its 
voluntary limit, of which 114 tonnes were caught off New South Wales and 
Tasmania by 37 longliners that operated off New South Wales between May and 
November 2000, with closure of waters south of Sydney between June and August to 
those lacking sufficient quota.
1159
  In the following year Australia advised that in the 
2001 season it had introduced an ongoing audit of fishing records,
1160
 and in 2003 
that access to the waters off Western Australia through which SBT migrate had also 
been restricted in the same way since 2001.
1161
 
That there is still a problem is shown by Australia’s most recent annual report to the 
CCSBT, which indicates that since 2004 the restricted access zone has been divided 
into core and buffer zones.  From 2005 operators with less than 500 kilograms of 
quota have again been allowed into both zones between May and October, but only 
with 100 per cent observer coverage.  In the buffer zone, those with more than 500 
kilograms of quota must have 25 per cent observer coverage, while in the core zone 
100 per cent coverage is required for those with less than two tonnes of quota, 75 per 
cent for those with between two and five tonnes, 50 per cent for those with between 
five and ten tonnes, then 25 per cent up to 20 tonnes, and 10 per cent coverage above 
that figure.
1162
 
                                                          
1158
  CCSBT6(2) Report, supra Ch IV n 683, at 57 (paragraph 54). 
1159
  “Review of the Australian Southern Bluefin Tuna Fishery for the 1999/00 and 
Preliminary 2000/01 Seasons” (Attachment F-1 to CCSBT7 Report), in CCSBT Blue Book 2002, 
supra Ch I n 30, 29 at 29-30. 
1160
  Attachment K-1 to CCSBT8 Report, supra Ch II n 351, at 109. 
1161
  Attachment 8-1 to CCSBT-EC2 Report, supra Ch I n 169, at 66. 
1162
  Attachment 8-1 to CCSBT-EC6 Report, supra Ch I n 141, at 4 (Table 2 and preceding 
text). 
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In the longer term, bycatch by members must be distinguished from bycatch by non-
members.  Even if a system of trading were to lead to the de facto exclusion from 
any directed fishery for SBT of those remaining outside it, this will not on its own do 
anything to reduce their bycatch of the species.  If the aim is to minimise mortality, it 
is immaterial whether the fish are dumped at sea or landed.  Since, however, only if 
they are landed is verifiable scientific information gained, this is an argument for 
using the UNCLOS Article 118 duty of cooperation to discourage dumping.
1163
  Yet, 
if there is too wide a gap between the legal consequences of deliberate catch and of 
bycatch, a perverse incentive is created to conceal the former as the latter.
1164
 
The practice in some of ICCAT’s fisheries of tolerating small catches up to a given 
limit of species under quota – for instance 200 tonnes of northern albacore1165 – may 
assist in this regard.  Since the number of States and fishing entities at any given time 
is finite, a rule which deems catch of less than, say, 10 tonnes of SBT to be bycatch 
not visited with any legal consequences under the Action Plan
1166
 would equate to a 
tolerance limit of catch by non-members under this head of around 1,900 tonnes.  
                                                          
1163
  Referring to anadromous species, Burke concludes that UNCLOS Article 66 applies to 
both directed fishing and bycatch, arguing (supra Ch I n 80, at 140) that “If a significant portion 
of the catch is beyond regulatory control, the coastal state either cannot act to take adequate 
conservation measures or can only take ineffective measures.” 
1164
  Australian legislation requires quota for all landed species subject to quota, but policy 
allows quota to be purchased or leased by the 15th day of the following month to cover over-
quota landings of bycatch species: Geen et al, supra Ch I n 162, at 84.  The same authors 
advocate use of a deemed value or surrender price method to discourage dumping of bycatch 
species without inadvertently encouraging their targeting: ibid., at 85; see also Falloon, supra Ch 
III n 566, at 57-58 – but these do not appear easily replicated on the international plane. 
1165
  Supra n 1128; see also infra Ch VI, text accompanying n 1283.  Faced with a problem of 
discarding in the northern Atlantic swordfish fishery, ICCAT designed its rebuilding plan for the 
stock on the basis that it “must account for all sources of fishing mortality”: Recommendation by 
ICCAT to Establish a Rebuilding Program for North Atlantic Swordfish (Annex 5-2 to ICCAT16 
Report), in ICCAT Green Book 2000/1, supra Ch I n 242, 69 at 69 (preamble).  Note the part 
played in this by carry-forward of unders and overs: ibid., at 71 (paragraphs 4 and 5). 
1166
  Attachment I to CCSBT6(2) Report, supra Ch IV n 727, and following text. 
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Catch over the threshold would require quota to be bought from a Member to cover 
the State’s whole catch to avoid the Action Plan measures, which could only be done 
by acceding to the 1993 Convention or becoming a cooperating a non-member if the 
trading scheme were confined to these.  For those within the system, the best policy 
may be to estimate bycatch mortality for building into TAC calculations.
1167
 
6 Fishing seasons 
The staggered fishing seasons of CCSBT Members have caused few problems to 
date.  The reason for August being named in the 1993 Convention as the month in 
which CCSBT annual meetings are to be held appears to be a tacit understanding that 
the national allocations apply to the next fishing season of each Member, whenever it 
may start.
1168
  The superimposition of quota trading, however, would at the margin 
have conservation consequences.  To avoid these, it would seem that, in any system 
that leaves the members to their own devices in transferring quota to each other, 
                                                          
1167
  Cunningham, supra Ch I n 88, at 13. 
1168
  “A scenario to illustrate possible ambiguities and one potential solution regarding some 
MP inputs” (Attachment 6 to Report of the Fourth Meeting of the Management Procedure 
Workshop, 16-21 May 2005, Canberra, Australia (hereinafter CCSBT-MPW4 Report) 
<www.ccsbt.org/docs/pdf/meeting_reports/ccsbt_12/report_of_MPWS4.pdf> (visited on 19 May 
2008)), lists the quota years: only Taiwan and the Philippines use the calendar year; Australia’s 
quota year runs from 1 December to the following 30 November, Japan’s and Korea’s from 1 
March to the end of the following February, and New Zealand’s from 1 October to the following 
30 September.  This understandably troubled participants at an earlier workshop meeting, who 
noted that any TAC change required by a given management procedure would most likely apply 
to quota years and therefore be implemented at slightly different times by different Members, 
perhaps making it impossible for a Member whose quota year starts at about the same time as the 
CCSBT’s annual meeting in October where the relevant decision would be made, to implement 
the change for at least 12 months.  This in turn would create a lag of two years between the year 
for which a management procedure is evaluated and the implementation of any consequential 
TAC change.  The CCSBT would therefore need to discuss and specify the quota year in which a 
TAC change arising from the management procedure would be implemented for each member: 
“Data Issues Relating To Management Procedures” (Appendix 6 to “Further development of 
operating model specifications” (Attachment E to CCSBT-MPW2 Report)), in CCSBT Blue 
Book 2004, supra Ch I n 32, 288 at 288. 
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either their fishing seasons would need to be aligned, or a restriction introduced such 
that a transfer can take place only from a relinquishing member to a gaining member 
whose season ends at the same time as, or later than, that of the relinquishing 
member.  Such a restriction seems undesirable, however, since the timing of season 
dates is in this context essentially an arbitrary factor, but would result over time in 
trading concentrating the allocations in members with late-finishing seasons.
1169
  
Any alignment of seasons will also need compensating allocations or deductions for 
the longer or shorter transitional season.  Depending on the pattern of catch through 
the year, it is not necessarily appropriate for these to equate a one-month adjustment 
with a twelfth of the previous national allocation (or of the new one if changed – this 
complication could be avoided, however, by making the alignment in a year when 
the TAC does not change).
1170
  While there can be no objection on conservation 
grounds to extending the duration of a season longer than 12 months, shortening of 
the season can lead to abuse if it occurs in a situation where the full quota has been 
taken in less than 365 days, and the early closure leads to a new season opening the 
next day with fresh quota.
1171
  Australia has had two seasons of 13 months or more, 
and one season of 11½ months.  The short season was preceded two years earlier by 
                                                          
1169
  In the CCSBT, for example, it would mean that New Zealand, whose season starts and 
finishes earlier than any other member’s, could never purchase quota, only sell it.  The scientists 
developing the CCSBT’s management procedure seem to have come to a similar conclusion for 
automatic adjustments under the procedure to the TAC and national allocations (pari passu or 
not): CCSBT-MPW4 Report, supra n 1168, at 24 (paragraph 100). 
1170
  On the other hand, a State that wished to make a one-off contribution to the biomass 
without jeopardising its initial share could elect to forgo compensation for a transitional year 
longer than 12 months.  Human psychology being what it is, members whose seasons start early 
may be well advised to make the process easier by not objecting to a late starting date for the new 
uniform season that will avoid any member having a transitional season of less than 12 months. 
1171
  For an egregious example of this in the groundfish fishery on the Atlantic coast of the 
United States in the 1970s, see J.L. McHugh, “The Jeffersonian Democracy and Fisheries 
Revisited” in Rothschild (ed), supra Ch III n 555, 73 at 89. 
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a 13½-month one, however, so that the three seasons together lasted 37 months; this 
may explain why no other Member objected to it.
1172
 
7 Non-commercial catch 
The nearer quota comes to being perceived as a tradable asset, the more interest 
members will have in ensuring that all sources of catch are accounted for, since it 
would be more obvious than under the traditional national allocation system that any 
perceived gain of an unfair advantage by one member comes at the other members’ 
expense.  Bycatch is the most obvious potential source of friction in this regard, but 
other forms of non-commercial catch are recreational, indigenous and scientific 
catch.  There may be some overlap among the categories.
1173
 
Recreational fishing limits typically impose a bag limit per person per day of a small 
number of fish.  As there is generally no limit to the number of persons engaging in 
recreational fishing, or on how many days per year they may fish, it follows that no 
jurisdiction has an effective upper limit to its total recreational catch.  Limits apply to 
SBT in most Australian States
1174
 and South Africa,
1175
 but not New Zealand. 
                                                          
1172
  Australia’s SBT fishing years ran from 1 October to the following 30 September in 
1988-90, 1 October 1991 to 31 October 1992, 1 November to the following 31 October in 1992 
and 1993, 1 November 1994 to 15 December 1995, 16 December 1995 to 15 December 1996, 16 
December 1996 to 30 November 1997, and 1 December to the following 30 November in 1998 
and since: Attachment 8-l to CCSBT-EC6 Report, supra Ch I n 141, at 15 (Appendix 1, “SBT 
Season Dates 1988-89 to 2005-06”). 
1173
  At the 2004 CCSBT meeting, Australia advised that discussions were underway with its 
game fish association for all recreationally caught SBT to be tagged and released, with the 
release data to be provided to the CCSBT.  Since the research tagging was opportunistic rather 
than a planned experiment, no research mortality allowance was made available to cover it; 
instead, any associated mortality would count against Australia’s national allocation: CCSBT-
EC3 Report, supra Ch I n 78, at 26-27 (paragraphs 78 and 79). 
1174
  New South Wales has a combined possession limit of two tuna (albacore, yellowfin, 
bigeye, longtail, SBT) 90 cm or longer, and five of the same species smaller than 90 cm: <www. 
dpi.nsw.gov.au/fisheries/recreational/regulations/sw/sw-bag-and-size#Finfish-Bag-and-Size-
limits> (visited on 19 May 2008); in South Australia the combined SBT and yellowfin tuna limit 
is two per person, six per boat: <www.pir.sa.gov.au/fisheries/recreational_fishing/ catch_limits_ 
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Recreational catch has become an issue within the CCSBT.  Australia said in 2002 
that it was discussing the matter with State Governments, but was far enough short of 
its national allocation to accommodate any recreational catch of SBT.
1176
  This must 
be doubted if that year’s high recreational catch of 85 tonnes, an estimate by the New 
South Wales Government,
1177
 is to be believed.  Australia’s feeble response to the 
questions posed to it at the 2007 meeting does little for its credibility, but this may 
change if it carries out its intention to report to the CCSBT on the management of its 
recreational fishery.
1178
  In 2003 New Zealand reported limited recreational fishing 
for SBT, though historical catches before records began may have been higher.
1179
  It 
                                                                                                                                                                    
and_legal_lengths> (visited on 19 May 2008); Tasmania has a “combined possession limit” per 
person of two SBT, yellowfin and bigeye tuna: <www.dpiw.tas.gov.au inter.nsf/WebPages/ 
HMUY-5TA4EU?open> (visited on 19 May 2008); Victoria’s limit is two per person: <www.dpi. 
vic.gov.au/DPI/nrenfaq.nsf/93a98744f6ec41bd4a256c8e00013aa9/6007333ef25f2ba1ca2574010
002a76c/$FILE/Limits%20and%20closed%20seasons1.pdf> (visited on 19 May 2008); Western 
Australia is divided into four regions for recreational fishing purposes, all with a combined daily 
bag limit per angler of two SBT, bigeye and yellowfin tuna: <www.fish.wa.gov.au/docs/pub/ 
SouthLimits/SouthCoastRules_2008.pdf>, <www.fish.wa.gov.au/docs/pub/WestLimits/ 
westcoast_rules2007.pdf>, <www.fish.wa.gov.au/docs/pub/GascoyneLimits/gascoyne_ 
rules2008.pdf>, <www.fish.wa.gov.au/docs/pub/ NorthLimits/NorthernCoastRules_2008.pdf> (all 
visited on 19 May 2008); no limit appears to apply in Queensland. 
1175
  In 1994 the recreational catch limit in South Africa was reported to be ten of any tuna 
species per person per day: A.J. Penney, “National Report of South Africa”, in ICCAT Green 
Book 1995/1, supra Ch III n 534, 258 at 259.  It was unchanged in 2003, with the same size 
limits in the Marine Living Resources Act 1998 also applying to the recreational sector: 
“National Report of South Africa” in ICCAT Green Book 2004/3, supra Ch I n 188, 84 at 87. 
1176
  CCSBT-EC1 Report, supra Ch I n 293, at 19 and 24 (paragraphs 35 and 75). 
1177
  Attachment 8-1 to CCSBT-EC6 Report, supra Ch I n 141, at 8 and 10 (Table 6).  The 
2002 figure is the most recent, “insufficient data” being recorded opposite all years since. 
1178
  CCSBT-EC6 Report, supra Ch I n 141, at 9 (paragraph 53) and 20 (paragraphs 108-
112). 
1179
  Attachment 8-4 to CCSBT-EC2 Report, supra Ch I n 211, at 80.  The indigenous non-
commercial catch was also counted against New Zealand’s national allocation: Attachment 8-4 to 
CCSBT-EC3 Report, supra Ch I n 203, at 76 and 79. 
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advised that it had reserved 4 tonnes of its national allocation to cover recreational 
catch, which it considered would be sufficient for its recreational fishery.
1180
  
Since the 1998-2001 dispute over Japan’s unilateral experimental fishing,1181 the 
CCSBT has also developed a history of allocating modest tonnages for scientific 
catches not counted against national allocations.  Precedent for this exists in ICCAT, 
which has exempted participants’ ABT catches of up to 15 tonnes from otherwise 
applicable conservation measures.
1182
  For the various components of the Scientific 
Research Program the Members and the Secretariat from 2001 onwards requested, 
and the CCSBT approved, mortalities of 65 tonnes for tagging programs in 2002 and 
40 tonnes in 2003, plus 3.6 tonnes of research mortality allowance for Japan in 2001, 
6.5 tonnes in 2002 and 10 tonnes in 2003 for a series of spawning ground and 
acoustic surveys.
1183
  Research mortalities of 47 tonnes were approved in 2004 for an 
acoustic survey (1 tonne) and various tagging projects (46 tonnes); the like total for 
2005 was 51 tonnes and in 2006 it was 22 tonnes.  In 2007 Australia sought 10 
tonnes to cover expected mortality of 7.5 tonnes in an experiment on stereo video 
recording of transfer of SBT into farm cages, but the meeting report does not reveal 
whether this or any other research allowance was granted to any member.
1184
 
                                                          
1180
  CCSBT-EC3 Report, supra Ch I n 78, at 27 (paragraph 80). 
1181
  Infra, Appendix 1. 
1182
  See “Recommendation by ICCAT on Bluefin Tuna Research in the Central North 
Atlantic Ocean” (Annex 7-8 to ICCATSM12 Report), in ICCAT Green Book 2001/1, supra Ch 
III n 571, 141 (paragraph 3), continued since and with a further 15 tonnes of other tunas by 
“Supplemental Recommendation by ICCAT on Bluefin Tuna Research in the Central North 
Atlantic Ocean” (Annex 9-8 to ICCAT17 Report), in ICCAT Green Book 2002/1, supra Ch I n 
228, 222 (paragraph 3). 
1183
  CCSBT8 Report, supra Ch I n 30, at 68 (paragraph 54) and 72 (paragraphs 95 and 97); 
CCSBT-EC1 Report, supra Ch I n 293, at 27 (paragraphs 97-100); CCSBT-ESC2 Report, supra 
Ch I n 32, at 130 (paragraph 106); CCSBT-EC2 Report, supra Ch II n 353, at 27 (paragraphs 70 
and 71).  Not all the allowances were caught: in 2002 only 0.8 tonnes had been used for Japan’s 
spawning ground survey and 13.28 tonnes for tagging programs: ibid., at 27 (paragraph 69). 
1184
  CCSBT-EC3 Report, supra Ch I n 78, at 27-28 (paragraphs 87-89); CCSBT-EC4 
Report, supra Ch I n 248, at paragraph 124; CCSBT-EC5 Report, supra Ch I n 102, at 18 
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ICCAT too has dealt on several occasions with non-commercial catch, for example 
in 1999 passing an across-the-board resolution on recreational fishery statistics, and 
in 2006 creating a Working Group on Sport and Recreational Fisheries.
1185
 
8 Control of fishing by nationals  
Since at international law States’ jurisdiction over their nationals applies no less to 
natural and legal persons than to vessels, a further source of perceptions of unfair 
advantage is the use by nationals of fishery commission members of vessels flagged 
to non-members.  Here again the CCSBT’s experience is instructive.  In 1998 New 
Zealand raised reports that Japanese interests had chartered bunkering vessels also 
used by fishing vessels flagged to non-members of the CCSBT, that it provided a 
market for non-member catch, and that there was considerable investment in non-
member SBT fishing operations by Japanese interests.  New Zealand advised that it 
had procedures in place to prevent New Zealand interests from entering into charter 
or joint fishing arrangements for SBT with non-members.  It was not aware of any 
bunkering of non-member vessels fishing for SBT or any investment by nationals of 
New Zealand in non-member SBT fishing operations.  Australia similarly stated that 
it prevented joint ventures with, and access to its ports by, vessels from States fishing 
for SBT outside the 1993 Convention regime.  Japan admitted that its nationals were 
crewing non-member vessels and had issued a non-binding directive advising them 
to cease this practice; for constitutional reasons it could not be binding.  It confirmed 
that it maintained no restrictions on the import of SBT and that it had a system for 
regulating investment by Japanese in non-member SBT fishing operations.
1186
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
(paragraph 103) read with CCSBT-ESC5 Report, supra Ch IV n 683, at 24-25 (paragraphs 133-
136); CCSBT-EC6 Report, supra Ch I n 141, at 16 (paragraph 93). 
1185
  Recommendation by ICCAT on Improving Recreational Fishery Statistics (Annex 5-9 to 
ICCAT16 Report), in ICCAT Green Book 2000/1, supra Ch I n 242, 78; Resolution by ICCAT to 
Establish a Working Group on Sport and Recreational Fisheries, in “Resolutions Adopted by 
ICCAT in 2006” (Annex 6 to ICCATSM15 Report), in ICCAT Green Book 2007/1, supra Ch V 
n 995, 174 at 175. 
1186
  CCSBT4(2) Report, supra Ch IV n 683, at 60. 
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In recent years the focus of attention has shifted to catch of SBT taken in Indonesian 
waters by vessels owned by Taiwanese interests but flagged to Indonesia, allowing 
Taiwan to maintain that their catch should be considered Indonesian.
1187
  This would 
have been unproblematic had Indonesia already become a member and the 
Taiwanese vessels been fishing against Indonesian quota; as it was, this is catch 
which it was in Taiwan’s power to control, with a duty to do so considering that, 
through the resolution establishing the Extended Commission of which Taiwan is a 
member, it had given a “firm commitment to respect” Article 15, paragraph 4 of the 
1993 Convention.
1188
  Although the beneficial ownership of fishing vessels is often 
kept deliberately obscure, ideally all catch of SBT by vessels owned or controlled by 
nationals of CCSBT members should be brought into their mutual accounting. 
F Conclusion: further along the property spectrum to 
permanent national allocations? 
Although international fisheries law is still at a far earlier point on the road already 
travelled on the domestic level by the States that have introduced ITQs, the argument 
for moving to permanent or tradable quota shares is essentially that it provides an 
economic incentive to conserve the stock.
1189
  How easily might it be done? 
It may be concluded from the foregoing that, although no fisheries commission has 
yet made indefinite national allocations, apart from the handful of commissions and 
treaties that either positively require the commission they establish or the parties to 
set not only a TAC but also to divide it into national allocations, there is no 
fundamental obstacle in international law to trading of quota.  Since, however, a 
national allocation is an obligation of each member erga all others to limit its catch 
to a particular amount, it follows that exceeding that amount through quota trading 
                                                          
1187
  Supra Ch IV, text at nn 882-883. 
1188
  See paragraph 6 of the resolution, reproduced infra at Appendix D. 
1189
  Arnason, supra Ch I n 105, at 648 has demonstrated that if quotas are not permanent, 
uncertainty leads to excessive discounting of future profits, diminishing the incentive to conserve 
the stock. 
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will result in breach of that obligation.  Hence either an ad hoc decision amounting to 
waiver is needed, as happens in ICCAT and NAFO, or consent is given in advance 
on a blanket basis either expressly, as in NAFO, NEAFC and the former IBSFC, or 
by setting up a trading mechanism.  At its simplest, this mechanism could simply be 
a decision of the commission to approve in advance any trade, or certain trades, the 
only condition of their validity, thus binding other members of the commission, 
being their notification to the secretariat.
1190
 
A more sophisticated system would, however, in all likelihood be needed to ensure 
that such trading as takes place is not inimical to proper conservation and 
management of the stock concerned.  Any such mechanism would need to deal with 
practical legal implications of trading, notably accounting for participants’ catch.  It 
is possible to name and describe briefly its main features. 
First, national allocation shares would need to be expressed as percentages of the 
TAC.  Secondly, they must take into account new entrants, perhaps with different 
rules for coastal States and other States.  If not all States in whose EEZs the relevant 
stocks occur are already members, those who are not will have a right to join the 
commission and receive some national allocation.
1191
  Until they do, however, the 
existing members are in effect using those non-member coastal States’ share of the 
TAC, and it is thus necessary to have some pre-agreed mechanism for how existing 
members’ national allocations will be reduced to accommodate that of any new 
coastal State members.  As this may prove very hard to achieve in practice, the 
introduction of indefinite quota shares may have to wait until all eligible coastal 
States have become members.  In the CCSBT’s case, there is thus a question of how 
                                                          
1190
  The question of whether there is any consideration, and if so its amount, is not strictly 
one for the commission.  Even so, both parties to the transaction are States, and as such may well 
have to make public the amount in their usual domestic accountability mechanisms, e.g. annual 
reports to a legislature.  Thus, in the interest of transparency, the commission would have strong 
arguments to insist on disclosure of the consideration as a condition of registering the transaction. 
1191
  See UN Fish Stocks Agreement, supra Introduction n 4, Articles 8(3) and 11. 
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the decision at its first meeting that New Zealand would have a 6 per cent share of 
the TAC once it has recovered to a certain level would be implemented, now that 
Indonesia, the Republic of Korea and Taiwan are members, and what allowance to 
make for the likelihood that South Africa (the only coastal State with respect to the 
SBT migratory path still outside the CCSBT) will eventually join them in that status. 
Other States would be able to accede to the treaty in order to become members of the 
commission, but would have to buy quota from an existing member if they wished to 
fish.  While they might object that to have to pay for the right to fish is inconsistent 
with the freedom of fishing, under UNCLOS Articles 116 and 118 this freedom is 
subject to the duty of cooperation with existing participants in the fishery.  If, it is 
submitted, these latter have through a fishery commission set up a scheme outside 
which none is free to increase its catch, they are entitled to insist that any newcomer 
cooperate with them by participating in the scheme according to its terms.  This 
conclusion is strengthened for parties to the UN Fish Stocks Agreement; its Article 8, 
paragraph 3 requires them to discharge their duty to cooperate with other States by 
joining the commission or agreeing to apply its conservation measures.  As long as 
the newcomer is ready, by doing either of these things, to accept the same conditions 
as apply to the existing members, those members cannot consistently with the same 
provision deny the newcomer’s rights to participate.1192  Rayfuse’s review of State 
                                                          
1192
  There is some evidence that this implicit treaty-based bargain may have achieved the 
status of customary international law; see for example Australia’s statement in the debate on 
Oceans and the Law of the Sea at the 2005 session of the UN General Assembly (“Statement by 
Senator Robert Ray[,] Parliamentary Adviser to the Australian Mission to the United Nations”, 
<www.australiaun.org/unny/il%5f281105.html> (visited on 19 May 2008)), where it was asserted 
that: “it is Australia’s strong view that States have an obligation to either join relevant RFMOs 
where entitled to do so, or to otherwise refrain from fishing in the RFMO regulated area unless 
they agree to apply all relevant conservation measures.”  In the 2006 session the same words 
were repeated almost verbatim (“Statement to the 61st session of the UN General Assembly 
Plenary 7 December 2006[,] Agenda item 71(a) & (b): Oceans and the Law of Sea and 
Sustainable fisheries[,] Delivered by HE Frances Lisson[,] Ambassador and Deputy Permanent 
 397 
practice supports this, showing that fishery commissions all now “demand either 
membership, cooperation or abstention [from fishing] from non-members” who in 
turn have in several ways “acquiesced in these assertions of jurisdiction”.1193 
It is clear, however, that quota shares of indefinite duration raise, in a way that time-
limited shares do not, the question of initial allocation, which has been identified by 
Pearse as a major difficulty invariably needing to be tackled when ITQs are instituted 
at the domestic level.  For, once the initial allocation is made, the commission would 
never again need to concern itself with national allocations; it simply sets the TAC 
and the members’ relative shares depend on the subsequent course of trading.  While 
one can agree with Pearse’s domestic-level analysis that the biggest obstacle to the 
introduction of ITQs is “anxiety and disputation” about the initial allocation of 
shares, the likely paucity of transactions at the international level and the consequent 
illiquidity of the market make it much more difficult to accept his statement that, 
under transferability, the initial allocation has little long-run significance for either 
the efficacy of the system or the distribution of rights.
1194
  Rather, this circumstance 
only adds to the significance of the initial allocation. 
This is borne out by the experience of the participants in the SBT fishery during the 
years in the trilateral period when major cuts were made to the TAC.  In the 1988 
meeting, while Australia argued that “[w]e have accepted a disproportionate share of 
the burden”,1195 Japan sought to maintain its share by countering that the value per 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Representative[,] Permanent Mission of Australia to the United Nations”, <www.australiaun.org/ 
unny/il%5f071206.html> (visited on 19 May 2008)). 
1193
  R.G. Rayfuse, Non-Flag State Enforcement in High Seas Fisheries (Leiden/Boston: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 2004), 373. 
1194
  P.H. Pearse, “From Open Access to Private Property: Recent Innovations in Fishing 
Rights as Instruments of Fisheries Policy”, (1992) 23 ODIL 71 at 78.  He notes ibid. that in New 
Zealand 80% of quota rights changed hands at least once within five years of their introduction – 
a level of churning unlikely to be replicated on the international plane. 
1195
  Attachment C to 7th Trilateral Management Meeting Report, supra Ch II n 359, 
Australian Statement, at 3. 
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tonne of longline catch was four times that of SBT caught by surface fishing.  
Adding that “large catches of small fish in the 1982-83 year were responsible for 
current low catch levels”, it advocated that “those who caused the decline should 
take responsibility for the consequences.”1196 
While adding the element of permanence to national allocations will not necessarily 
lead inexorably to their being traded, it is likely to generate pressures to that end, as 
producers seek to realise gains from differences in their marginal net benefits by 
reallocating effort among themselves.  No such permanence is presupposed in the 
already existing trading regimes of the within-season type, but these are reasonably 
seldom used, having emerged piecemeal from the various fisheries commissions 
grappling with allocation problems.  Any systems roughly resembling international 
equivalents of ITQs are likely to arise in the same manner, less a conscious creation 
of property rights (no single characteristic of property is crucial, but transferability is 
surely one of the most important) than as an ad hoc response to specific pressures. 
With discussion of the issue happening already in a number of fishery commissions, 
its progress is less likely to encounter the sorts of objections enumerated by the 
OECD,
1197
 which are not automatically translatable to the international level.  Firstly, 
there is no reason to expect resistance from current members, even those whose 
fisheries are less profitable than those of potential new entrants, as the choice to 
retain or sell all or part of their national allocation will remain one for them alone.
1198
  
If a member believes it derives significant non-monetary benefits from participating 
in the fishery, it is entitled to resist offers.  Secondly, while the wider concerns about 
                                                          
1196
  7th Trilateral Management Meeting Report, supra Ch II n 359, at 14.  No doubt part of 
the reason why Australia and New Zealand did not find this persuasive was that simultaneously 
Japan claimed credit for its past catches as an historic “contribution” to the fishery: ibid., at 9. 
1197
  OECD, supra Ch I n 53, at 79. 
1198
  This is not to say that such resistance if it occurs would be surprising; one reason for it 
might be that, to the extent that the initial allocation is made on the basis of past declared catch, it 
would effectively (if belatedly) penalise underreporting: Falloon, supra Ch III n 566, at 46. 
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the fairness of reserving an open-access resource for a privileged few with capital 
investment in the fishery and excluding all others have more substance, these can be 
met with two arguments: (a) at the international level those wanting to enter the 
fishery will most likely have made their investments already, and in any event there 
are few international fisheries in a healthy enough state for new investment in them 
to be encouraged; (b) their exclusion, if such it is, comes about not as a result of the 
adoption of trading by the fisheries commission, but by the parallel development of 
the putative elaboration of the customary rule of cooperation in international fisheries 
law into a requirement that non-members abide by the commission’s rules in order to 
fish, as long as these are non-discriminatory.  This test should not be hard to satisfy, 
since the would-be new entrant can at any time, by becoming a full member of the 
commission or subscribing to any formal cooperation mechanism that it operates, 
make itself eligible to offer to buy quota from an existing member – and refusal of 
any actual offer to buy quota is not in itself discriminatory.
1199
 
In the longer term, the commission may well be able to capture some of the resource 
rent generated and distribute it among the commission members.  Ideally, non-
members, even those not interested in fishing at all, should be able to become 
eligible for a modest share of this surplus by joining the cooperation mechanism, in 
effect trading any residual high seas freedom of fishing for this revenue stream.
1200
  
                                                          
1199
  In reality, to avoid wasting time and money in joining a commission without any 
guarantee of quota, would-be new entrants would be likely to offer to purchase quota first.  The 
existing member, if minded to accept, would ensure, on the commission’s behalf, that the 
transaction was not consummated until the eligibility criteria were met, on pain of remaining 
responsible to its fellow members for the purchaser’s catch if it proceeded before this had 
occurred, as the secretariat would not then register the transfer. 
1200
  Such a solution, namely the creation of a series of regional ocean organisations which 
become beneficial owners of the high seas resources and the States who are their members by 
transforming their high seas freedom to fish into a right to a share of the profits, has recently been 
proposed in G.T. Crothers and L. Nelson, “High Seas Fisheries Governance: A Framework for 
the Future?”, (2006) 21 Marine Resource Economics 341.  To the extent that the bypassing of the 
step of national allocations is implied, this is an application of Edeson’s “extreme” solution – 
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Beyond that, it is possible to imagine a future legal rule in which monetary or other 
payments would be a way of compensating States for their compulsory exclusion 
from a share of the MSY,
1201
 though the question of how to calculate the quantum of 
compensation is likely to remain vexed for many years and delay the emergence of 
any such rule. 
There remain, of course, many problems of high seas fisheries that quota trading 
cannot solve.  For one, it will not prevent stock collapse if the TAC is set too high, as 
the example of the North-West Atlantic cod fisheries shows; unless the TAC is 
                                                                                                                                                                    
supra n 1041 – of allocations direct to operators.  A similar idea was considered by Koers, supra 
Ch I n 285, at 253-258, but he concluded at 257 that, because it 
would be required to function within an extra-legal context which would be largely 
unforeseeable at the time of its creation and…would have a virtual monopoly, the price of the 
organization’s failure could be disaster.  This also explains why States will be extremely 
reluctant to create such an organization. 
This made it (at 258) “at best a blueprint for a remote future, although not necessarily…for 
utopia.”  Crothers and Nelson do not clearly state what under their scheme would become of 
existing fisheries commissions whose mandate extends to the high seas.  It is suggested, 
however, that overt creation of property rights would be more likely to provoke opposition 
than the gradual development of them by the existing commissions through trading, in the 
way that Molière’s Monsieur Jourdain resisted the idea of employing prose, only to discover 
that this was precisely what he had been doing all his life: “Par ma foi! il y a plus de quarante 
ans que je dis de la prose sans que j’en susse rien, et je vous suis le plus obligé du monde de 
m’avoir appris cela.” (Molière, Le Bourgeois Gentilhomme, Act II, Scene 4.) 
1201
  Having rejected the idea in the previous footnote, Koers, supra Ch I n 285, instead 
proposed, at 301-303, transferable rights of access to fully exploited stocks and levies for fishing 
them (as agent of the world community), which would be set at a level that made it equally 
attractive to fish or simply collect revenue, but adjusting this for the risks of fishing, so that the 
average fishing return should be somewhat higher.  This revenue Koers would have distributed 
under a formula basing a State’s share on a “reverse” relationship with its share in total world 
catch and per capita national income.  Nonetheless (at 311), it was “crucial” that any limitation 
of entry be effected at the global level, because “it should not be left to fishing nations alone to 
decide to what extent non-fishing States would have access to the…sea’s living resources.” 
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restrictive of effort, the value of allocations will be too low for them to fulfil their 
intended function of limiting entry.
1202
 
If concentration of ownership internationally is a problem, as is sometimes said to be 
the reason at national level for reluctance to move to ITQs, a similar rebuttal applies: 
absolute purity of the system is not a prerequisite.  It is perfectly possible for the 
rules adopted by a commission to place a cap on the share of the catch that a single 
member may lawfully accumulate; this would reduce somewhat the value of the 
asset, but not alter its character.  Similarly, tradable catch shares would remain 
subject to other management measures such as closed seasons and areas.  Nor need 
tradability be an immediate feature of any scheme adopted by commissions; there is 
nothing to stop them establishing their initial distribution but postponing trading for 
some time; at national level too, ITQ systems in many fisheries at first do not allow 
transfer but subsequently do.
1203
  An intermediate alternative might be to start by 
permitting trading of small absolute amounts or percentages of an allocation, which 
would rise over time until no quota remained inalienable. 
Considering the potential complexity of any accounting mechanisms,
1204
 it would 
also be sensible to have some subsidiary means for enforcement of quotas; for 
                                                          
1202
  OECD, supra Ch I n 53, at 80-82. 
1203
  Ibid., at 83. 
1204
  Despite addition, subtraction, multiplication and division being the only mathematical 
operations used, the opacity of the tables in ICCAT reports make it difficult to see how catch 
limits worked out in this way are derived; see e.g. “Compliance Tables Adopted in 2007 
(Compliance with Quotas and Catch Limits in 2006, Reported in 2007)” (Appendix 2 to Annex 
10 to ICCAT20 Report), in ICCAT Green Book 2008/1, supra Ch III n 568, 224, a problem 
which the general and stock-specific comments at 224-226 do not entirely overcome.  The 
problems that might arise under an excessively complicated accounting system are illustrated by 
Canada’s erroneous interpretation of an earlier measure (Annex 5-2 to ICCAT16 Report, supra n 
1165, at 70), taking paragraph 3(c) to mean that Canada could carry over only 10% rather than all 
of its unused dead discard quota (the reference to 10% was in fact Canada’s share of the TAC).  
Canada did not subsequently reclaim the inadvertently forgone 90%.  In M. Calcutt, S. Paul, J. 
Neilson and O. Murphy, “National Report of Canada”, in ICCAT Green Book 2004/3, supra Ch I 
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example, IBSFC members may refuse landings of quota species from vessels flagged 
to States whose quota is exhausted.
1205
 
A property system created by a multilateral treaty would survive the withdrawal of 
individual members provided a sufficient number remains; in terms of its own 
internal logic, the rights of outsiders are taken into account within the system, so 
only the status of the departing member changes.  At least one element of entry into a 
system would need to be made irrevocable, however, regardless of any subsequent 
denunciation of the treaty: a State should not be able to accede to the treaty, liquidate 
its quota for gain and then leave the system in order to fish for the species on the 
high seas again.  This could be prevented by a rule that reduction of a quota to zero 
by trading would extinguish that member’s right at international law to fish for that 
species other than by purchasing quota, even if it subsequently ceased to be bound by 
the treaty (though it should not be prevented from reacceding). 
If the aim is to overcome the tragedy of the commons besetting high seas fisheries, 
overall, it is hard to disagree with the OECD’s conclusion that the available evidence 
reinforces the need for an institutional accommodation of property rights, or with its 
advocacy of indirect enforcement by holding flag States accountable for the actions 
of their vessels and nationals, with quota or trade sanctions for non-compliance.
1206
  
This would require the effect of purchasing quota to be that the transferee member’s 
responsibility for reporting and compliance should be the same as if it had originally 
been allocated the entire amount by the commission.  The wider implication of the 
                                                                                                                                                                    
n 188, 11 at 11 there are useful worked examples in prose of how overage and unused discard 
quotas in ABT and swordfish work when carried forward to subsequent years. 
1205
  OECD, supra Ch I n 53, at 154. 
1206
  Ibid., at 158.  Kaitala and Munro (1993), supra Ch I n 120, at 325, note that, without 
some mechanism of this kind, even a successful stock-rebuilding program will remain vulnerable 
to a breakdown in cooperation caused by the shift of bargaining power in high-cost harvesters’ 
favour as the health of a stock is restored.  Because of its objection procedure, this description is 
not met by NAFO (and presumably every other fisheries commission with a similar procedure): 
at 326. 
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OECD’s call – to apply to high seas fishing a form of State responsibility not 
dependent on there being a wrongful act
1207
 – is a logical consequence of the matters 
raised in this study, but remains beyond its scope, other than as a direction for future 
research in the concluding observations to which it is now opportune to turn.    
                                                          
1207
  See infra Ch VI, section I, esp text at and following nn 1308-1328. 
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CHAPTER VI 
Conclusions: A Role for State Responsibility? 
In this final chapter, a series of propositions and questions is posed, allowing 
conclusions to be drawn as to the implications of the matters covered in the 
preceding five chapters for international management of fisheries generally, 
including mechanisms for the setting of TAC and allocation of quotas and means for 
binding third parties as well as CCSBT members into the conservation and 
management of SBT. 
If the success of a fisheries commission is gauged by the health of the stock(s) under 
its management, the CCSBT and its Members cannot be said to have succeeded in 
overcoming the problems of the past.  Two statements from and about the previous 
era of international fisheries law in the 1970s remain true of the CCSBT.  First, that 
fisheries commissions before the advent of the EEZ “were never particularly 
effective…With a few exceptions they had only limited success in preventing the 
depletion of stocks and no success in preventing economically excessive fishing 
efforts.”1208  Secondly, that this is largely because  
nation-state interests have tended to dominate the international concern about 
maintenance of fishery stocks and, with lax or nonexistent, enforcement, states have 
tended to follow their own short-term economic interests with the net result that 
the…stocks…have often received little if any assistance in terms of their ability to 
sustain an annual yield.
1209
 
Instead the pattern of the last few decades has been for international fisheries law to 
develop only in response to crises, not to anticipate and prevent them.
1210
  This is 
also true of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement, which introduced the precautionary 
approach to fisheries, requiring pre-agreed action should pre-defined acceptable 
limits for the state of the stock and the intensity of fishing be breached or 
                                                          
1208
  FAO Fisheries Circular No 853, supra Introduction n 15, at 28. 
1209
  Knight, supra Ch I n 52, at 48. 
1210
  Koers, supra Ch I n 285, at 37. 
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approached
1211
 – as a response to the Bering Sea pollock and Northwest Atlantic cod 
collapses of the early 1990s.  As a rule of thumb, therefore, it may be said that the 
prospects for development of new law are likely to be in inverse proportion to 
observed recovery of straddling and highly migratory fish stocks around the world.  
Possibly because at the time of its negotiation issues of allocation were chronic 
problems rather than acute crises, the Agreement makes no concrete advances on 
these, despite Article 11 on allocation to new entrants in particular, beyond making 
the dispute settlement system available as a second-best alternative: see paragraphs 4 
and 5 of Article 7.  Fisheries simply happens to be more affected than most areas of 
international life by the general weakness of international law in recognising interests 
of third States and common interests.
1212
 
With no strong law to guide them, allocation negotiations all too often either break 
down or succeed only because the result is too accommodating of the competing 
claims, so that either way – whether via formal TACs or the catches taken in the 
absence of one – removals regularly exceed those recommended by the scientists.  
Having failed to reduce the risk of stock collapse, in this situation all that is left for 
States is to hope for the best.  Such for example was the approach of the Taiwanese 
delegate who, after an unsuccessful attempt in ICCAT to allocate the catch of 
southern albacore, with parties announcing voluntary catch limits whose sum 
exceeded the TAC they were trying to allocate, “expressed the hope that God would 
look over the southern albacore in 1998.”1213 
                                                          
1211
  UN Fish Stocks Agreement, supra Introduction n 4, Annex II, esp paragraphs 2 and 4.  
See also paragraph 5 which provides that “Fisheries management strategies shall ensure that the 
risk of exceeding limit reference points is very low.” 
1212
  Hey, supra Ch III n 517, at 462. 
1213
  Appendix 14 to Annex 10 to ICCATSM11 Report, supra Ch III n 583, at 183.  At the 
next annual meeting it transpired that the stock was indeed robust enough to have withstood this 
combined catch – but relying on divine intervention, if that was the cause here, can hardly be an 
adequate substitute for the failure of human institutions. 
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Progress can at least be registered in Japan’s belated acceptance that capacity itself is 
not an argument for increasing a State’s share in an allocation: it is “important in an 
allocation exercise to differentiate between countries which acted responsibly to 
reduce their fleets and those that did not, as the latter would seek larger quotas than 
the former.”1214  To do otherwise would in effect be to penalise members for acting 
in the collective interest either by adopting capacity-reduction measures outright or 
by embracing ITQs which solve overcapacity problems automatically over time.
1215
 
Swept along by an undercurrent of near-intractable biological and economic factors, 
the abstract requirements of the law of highly migratory species float uneasily atop 
them and occasionally disappear beneath the surface.  One is tempted to conclude 
that the law has relatively little to offer other than a framework of legal certainty for 
decision-making on a TAC and its allocation.  Beyond the standard injunctions of 
equity and the duty to cooperate, it may well be no more sensible to expect a legal 
principle to settle the essentially political (who gets what) issue of allocation than to 
answer at the domestic level the question of whether and if so to what extent the tax 
system should attempt to redistribute income through progressive scales.  Even so, 
the field is still open for several legal policy conclusions to be derived. 
A The economists’ solution: property rights and quota 
trading 
In the context of more general criticisms of the drafting of the fisheries provisions of 
UNCLOS, Judge Oda speculated a quarter of a century ago on the consequence of 
their failure to deal with the issue of allocation.  This, he thought, was that sooner or 
later high seas fisheries would have to be brought under the same type of regime as 
Part XI of UNCLOS had just instituted for the mineral resources of the deep seabed: 
                                                          
1214
  Annex 7 to ICCAT17 Report, supra Ch III n 605, at 178 (paragraph 6.2). 
1215
  Contrast Japan’s earlier use of its overcapacity to argue for reallocation of SBT quota in 
its favour: see e.g. its 1990 statement, supra Ch II, text accompanying n 342. 
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Surely, discussions similar to those now taking place on seabed mineral resources 
will eventually be held on the new concept of the common heritage of mankind as 
applicable to ocean fishing.
1216
 
This presupposes unification of ownership or at least management of the resource by 
an international authority in which States pool their rights to the stock.  There is no 
single organisation competent to administer international fisheries, nor is anything 
short of the catastrophic collapse of many stocks at once likely to provide the 
political impetus required to create it, now that the chance to do so offered by the 
ILC has been missed.
1217
  The intermediate solution adopted in the UN Fish Stocks 
Agreement is to strengthen the role of regional fisheries management commissions, 
by requiring States fishing for the stocks they cover either to join them or cooperate 
with their management measures.  It is possible that the pacta tertiis qualification on 
its general applicability has been resolved if Rayfuse’s argument on the customary 
status of Article 8, paragraphs 3 and 4 is correct.
1218
  Be that as it may, tension is 
likely to remain between the proprietorial attitude to quota of existing participants 
who wish to exclude outsiders to the extent possible,
1219
 and those outsiders who 
resist this as a solution to global overcapacity.  Not wishing to be arbitrarily deprived 
                                                          
1216
  Oda, supra Ch III n 657, at 755.  Hayashi, however, has more recently come to the 
opposite conclusion: M. Hayashi, “Three Decades’ Progress in High Seas Fisheries Governance: 
Towards a Common Heritage Regime?”, in Nordquist et al (eds), supra Ch II n 437, 375 at 392. 
1217
  Supra Ch I nn 56-60 and accompanying text.  Note, however, the suggestions made by 
speakers at the 2005 Conference on the Governance of High Seas Fisheries and the UN Fish 
Agreement that the FAO or the UN General Assembly should act as a residual body able to step 
in to impose emergency conservation measures on States concerned when there is no existing 
organisation covering the fishery in question on the high seas with the competence to do so: 
M.W. Lodge and S.N. Nandan, “Some Suggestions Towards Better Implementation of the United 
Nations Agreement on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks of 1995”, 
(2005) 20 IJMCL 345 at 373, E.J. Molenaar, “Addressing Regulatory Gaps in High Seas 
Fisheries”, ibid., 533 at 551. 
1218
  See supra Ch V nn 1192-1193 and accompanying text. 
1219
  An initial allocation of quota only to existing participants implicitly recognises their 
property rights: G.R. Morgan, “Optimal Fisheries Quota Allocation under a Transferable Quota 
(TQ) Management System”, (1995) 19 Marine Policy 379 at 380. 
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of any future benefit from a fishery which they had no part in depleting, they prefer a 
solution much closer to a tabula rasa approach in which the existing investments in 
the fishery count for nothing. 
A practical obstacle to quota trading, should it be adopted in the interim, is the idea 
of shares varying with TAC, as implicitly accepted in the CCSBT
1220
 by New 
Zealand and used by ICCAT in relation to the western ABT fishery.
1221
  Although 
this can be an attractive solution in the short term, and fits well with the Southey/ 
Gulland model,
1222
 it risks perverse consequences in the longer term by giving high 
seas fishing States and States at the outer reaches of the stock’s migratory path, 
which would typically benefit from growing shares with a growing stock, a built-in 
incentive to resist lowering the TAC when the stock is declining.  In a quota trading 
context, it loses altogether its purpose as a solution to allocative problems, as well as 
making for very complicated accounting, thus simple flat shares not dependent on the 
size of the TAC become the natural method to adopt. 
                                                          
1220
  Supra Ch II, text following n 356. 
1221
  In “Recommendation by ICCAT to Establish a Rebuilding Program for Western Atlantic 
Bluefin Tuna” (Annex 5-7 to ICCATSM11 Report), in ICCAT Green Book 1999/1, supra Ch III 
n 576, 67 at 68 (subparagraphs 4(c)-(f)), there is one set of percentage shares of the TAC for 
Canada, Japan and the US when the TAC is below 2,413 tonnes and another when it is above 
2,660 tonnes.  Japan takes all of the difference between those tonnages.  This is continued in the 
successor provision, Supplemental Recommendation by ICCAT concerning the Western Atlantic 
Bluefin Tuna Rebuilding Program, supra Ch V n 1000, at 145 (Recommendation [06-06], 
subparagraph 6(b)). 
1222
  Southey, supra Ch IV n 924; Gulland, supra Ch IV n 924.  This is because distant-water 
fishing States can reduce a large stock to a small one by overfishing, but may be forced out of a 
fishery either by their higher costs at a point when fishing is still profitable for a small low-cost 
coastal fleet, as seems to have been the reason for Korea’s near-withdrawal from the SBT fishery 
(supra Ch I, text accompanying n 226), or because the range of the depleted stock shrinks so that 
it is thereafter found wholly or mostly only within the coastal State’s EEZ, as occurred with 
Norwegian spring-spawning herring: Churchill, supra Ch V n 1017, at 241-242 and sources there 
cited; G.R. Munro, “The Management of Shared Fish Stocks”, in FAO Fisheries Report No 695 
(Supplement), supra Ch V n 1006, 2 at 24 and sources there cited. 
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If the establishment of some form of property rights is the solution to the tragedy of 
the commons, then at this juncture it is too early to predict how that will be achieved.  
The trends observed in this work are for States to resist the notion of such rights in 
principle while nonetheless gradually and perhaps unwittingly establishing them in 
practice.  If this continues, ultimately the question of equity will be reduced to one of 
what share of the initial distribution of benefits a State should obtain.  Ironically, 
while from an economic point of view it does not matter who is the owner – a high 
seas equivalent of the International Seabed Authority which can manage the living 
resources on a common heritage basis on behalf of its member States and subject to 
their direction, or empowering fisheries commissions to carve up catch shares among 
individual owners, be they States or operators – each will be opposed on ideological 
grounds by different blocs of States.  All that can be ventured is an educated guess: 
that a sudden crisis may generate a surge of support for a common heritage regime, 
but in any other case the slow drift towards transferable rights is likely to continue. 
B Other possible solutions short of quota trading 
The real challenge in a world of limited fishing opportunities is to bring States to see 
that their interests are better served by claiming a share of the economic proceeds of 
fishing than by insisting on reserving a share of the activity of fishing for their own 
fleets.  As the FAO Secretariat noted over a decade ago, 
[t]he management of straddling and high sea stocks is basically no different from the 
management of stocks lying fully within national zones except for the kinds of 
participants and the distribution of benefits.  A first step would be to move from 
management based on physical quantities to management based on economic values.  
This step would necessitate the adoption of measures designed to maximize the net 
economic revenues that can be produced by the resources.  Such measures would be 
based on transferable use rights which might be vessel licenses, individual shares of 
total allowable catch or total revenues or individual shares of total allowable 
investment.  The choice would depend upon the characteristics of the fisheries, 
including the costs of enforcement.
1223
 
                                                          
1223
  FAO Fisheries Circular No 853, supra Introduction n 15, at 41. 
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The Secretariat envisaged that the shares would be negotiated, suggesting that 
[c]learly, a significant proportion should be allocated to the coastal states, but the 
amount might vary according to the degree in which the managed stocks are found 
within their zones.  The distant-water states, that are currently fishing in the zone, 
might also be accorded a significant share as a means for buying out their 
"historical" right of free fishing.
1224
  
Preference to coastal States would thus take the form of an increased share of the 
benefits, i.e. through the distribution process:  
The benefits would be in the form of the economic rents net of the costs of achieving 
them.  The costs would be those of the management body for administration, 
research and enforcement.  These costs are likely to be relatively small so that there 
should be substantial surplus revenues available for distribution.  
Distribution should be done in such a way that stability of the regime is assured; that 
is, that all parties feel they have more to gain by maintaining the regime than by 
proceeding on their own.
 1225
 
This last point is another way of expressing what Munro calls the “individual 
rationality constraint” – the idea that, in an unregulated fishery subject to the tragedy 
of the commons, States will voluntarily cooperate rather than destructively compete 
only if each is guaranteed at least the same benefit that it could expect to derive from 
competition.
1226
  It leads to his compensation principle, under which the preferences 
of States with low implicit discount rates (i.e. placing greater weight on future 
returns) should be allowed to become dominant in the long run.
1227
  The stability 
advocated by the FAO Secretariat then “entails allowing the most efficient producers 
to operate and compensating those who do not receive fishing privileges but who are 
in a position to affect the outcome of the regime.”1228  This recognises that, unless 
high seas catches of the given stock are so small as to be incapable of affecting total 
                                                          
1224
  Ibid., at 42. 
1225
  Ibid., at 41. 
1226
  Munro, supra n 1222, at 10. 
1227
  Munro (1987), supra Ch I n 120, at 280-282. 
1228
  FAO Fisheries Circular No 853, supra Introduction n 15, at 42. 
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yields, restricting eligibility for distribution of the benefits to coastal States would 
not succeed.  Excluded outsiders will have an individual rationality constraint of their 
own, and if they are not to be made worse off by, and hence resist, their exclusion, in 
legal terms any de facto power to exclude will need to be accompanied by some 
compensation mechanism.  This suggests that eligibility for membership of the 
commission should “include all states with a potential, as well as a current interest in 
fishing.”1229  In this it stops short of Munro’s preferred solution of creating de facto 
property rights for current members by permitting the present distant-water fishing 
States and the coastal States as the “charter members” of a commission to reserve the 
benefits for themselves, with new entrants required to purchase quota as the only 
way to avoid being excluded.
1230
  The latter would work from an economic point of 
view, but, as demonstrated in section C below, has legal flaws. 
Expressed in legal terms, this controversy turns on the question of what Article 8, 
paragraph 3 of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement means by a “real interest” giving a 
right to join a fisheries commission.  For Munro this coincides with his notion of 
charter membership, but it is not necessarily wise to resist the idea that States should 
simply be allowed to bring themselves within its terms by self-identification, for a 
State told by a commission that it lacks a real interest in a fishery can manufacture 
one by commencing to fish – the very outcome that the existing members wish to 
avoid.  Instead, it is submitted, all States (even landlocked ones and those remote 
from the fishery geographically) should be not merely permitted but compelled to 
commute their right to fish on the high seas into a right to a share of the economic 
rent from the fishery, subject to compensation to the extent of satisfying their 
individual rationality constraints, so that no State is better off by undermining the 
regime than by complying with it.  Clearly for most States this would be a very small 
sum and may well not even cover the annual assessed contribution payable for 
                                                          
1229
  Ibid. 
1230
  Munro (2000), supra Ch I n 120, at 276. 
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membership of the relevant commission.  As an incentive to avoid compulsion, 
ideally a State whose vessels do not fish in the area or for the species managed by the 
commission should be exempted from any assessment towards its costs for that year, 
but should only be entitled to a share of the economic rent that exceeds that figure if 
it can prove that its individual rationality constraint requires it.  In practice, however, 
commissions might be wiser to eschew such exemptions, lest this attract new 
members that have no interest in the fishery as such but wish merely to use their 
votes as bargaining chips, a development that has paralysed the IWC.
1231
 
C The relationship between the CCSBT’s target and the 
maximum sustainable yield standard in UNCLOS 
Broadening the categories of States that can expect a return from the fishery would 
also have the beneficial effect of helping to prevent a collective abandonment by the 
members of a fisheries commission of their conservation obligations.  As shown 
below, the CCSBT is in danger of doing just that, since at a special meeting in 2004 
all Members agreed that the former management objective of restoring the parental 
stock to its 1980 biomass (B1980) by 2020 was not feasible. 
The abandoned B1980 by 2020 management goal was not set with reference to the 
biomass that produces the MSY (Bmsy) – the 1980 level was simply one which up to 
then had seemed high enough to avoid any adverse effect on recruitment.
1232
.  Hence, 
even if this goal had been met, it would not be safe to say that there would be no 
need to rebuild the stock any further.
1233
  Nor would the CCSBT thereby have 
                                                          
1231
  E.J. Molenaar, “Participation, Allocation and Unregulated Fishing: The Practice of 
Regional Fisheries Management Organizations”, (2003) 18 IJMCL 457 at 462. 
1232
  Oral submissions to ITLOS of Counsel for Japan, Mr Greig, Transcript for morning of 
19 August, supra Ch I n 285, at 16.  For the definition of recruitment see supra Ch I n 194. 
1233
  This is comparable to the use by the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea, 
from which the European Community obtains its fisheries science advice, of impaired 
recruitment as a limit (danger) reference point, perceived as less precautionary than NAFO’s use 
of MSY: O.S. Stokke and C. Coffey, “Precaution, ICES and the Common Fisheries Policy: A 
Study of Regime Interplay” (2004) 28 Marine Policy 117 at 120.  On the adoption of MSY in 
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satisfied the target set in 2002 at the World Summit on Sustainable Development that 
action was required to 
[m]aintain or restore stocks to levels that can produce the maximum sustainable 
yield with the aim of achieving these goals for depleted stocks on an urgent basis 
and where possible not later than 2015[.]
1234
 
It is now all but inevitable that Members will have the uncomfortable task of 
explaining to any future such gathering why doing so by 2015 was not possible for 
SBT.  Yet, even before its abandonment, there was no concerted effort to meet the 
original goal.  The Chair of the Scientific Committee advised the Eighth Meeting of 
the CCSBT that the 2000 catch level of 15,579 tonnes appeared to be “roughly close 
to the replacement yield, with a 50 per cent chance that the stock could either 
decrease or increase at this harvest level.”  While no effort had yet been made to 
estimate the harvest level required to achieve recovery of the parental stock to its 
1980 level by 2020, most of the assessment results indicated low probability of 
attaining this target at that catch level.
1235
  Yet New Zealand found no support when 
it stated that “[t]he logical and responsible conclusion we draw from this is that catch 
levels must be reduced in order to achieve our stated management objectives”,1236 
reasoning that cannot be faulted. 
This should not be surprising: Burke’s New Zealand snapper example1237 shows why 
the economics of fishing produce a paradigm shift when the Bmsy barrier is breached, 
                                                                                                                                                                    
NAFO see S.M. Garcia, “The Precautionary Approach to Fisheries: Progress Review and Main 
Issues (1995-2000)”, in Nordquist and Norton Moore (eds), supra Ch I n 87, 479 at 493-495.  
1234
  WSSD Plan of Implementation, supra Ch IV n 917, paragraph 31(a).  Note that 
subparagraph (e) of the same paragraph encourages fisheries commissions to “give due 
consideration to the rights, duties and interests of coastal States and the special requirements of 
developing States when addressing the issue of the allocation of share of fishery resources for 
straddling stocks and highly migratory fish stocks, mindful of the provisions of [UNCLOS] and 
the [UN Fish Stocks Agreement], on the high seas and within exclusive economic zones”. 
1235
  CCSBT8 Report, supra Ch I n 30, at 67 (paragraph 43). 
1236
  Attachment N-4 to CCSBT8 Report, supra Ch IV n 919, at 147. 
1237
  Supra Ch I, text at and following n 113. 
 414 
so that operators will resist policies to restrict catches in order to rebuild the stock to 
Bmsy from below.  The fisheries economics literature predicts as much: if, as is 
typically the case, vessels and labour cannot be immediately redeployed elsewhere, 
the appropriate policy is not to close the depleted fishery altogether – which would 
be the quickest way to reach Bmsy – but to rebuild the stock gradually.
1238
  That it 
may be profitable to continue to fish a depleted stock at the yield far below MSY, all 
that is sustainable at that level, instead of trying to rebuild it, is evidenced by the 
$300,000 per tonne being fetched by Australian SBT quota in mid-2002.
1239
  Since 
this figure represents the present value of one 5,265th share into the indefinite future 
of whatever catch limit Australian authorities impose, anyone willing to pay this 
price must have thought the fishery’s economic prospects bright, all the more so with 
the lower price being fetched on the Japanese market at the time.
1240
 
Against this economically unpromising backdrop, the precautionary approach to 
fisheries in Annex II to the UN Fish Stocks Agreement is less likely to succeed as a 
means of reversing depletion than in preventing it in the first place for stocks not 
overfished.  Although setting Bmsy as the limit reference point serves unexploited and 
lightly or moderately exploited stocks well (i.e. those that are above Bmsy), left to 
their own devices, as the CCSBT’s attitude shows, those exploiting a stock already 
driven below Bmsy will have insufficient economic incentive to rebuild the stock at 
all, to the detriment of States that could reasonably hope to profit from access to a 
healthier, rebuilt stock.
1241
  From this perspective, it matters little whether Bmsy shifts  
                                                          
1238
  Munro and Scott, supra Ch I n 107, at 651. 
1239
  Serdy, supra Ch III n 491, at 242n. 
1240
  Supra Ch I, text following n 275.  Note, though, that there is no reason to think that 
quota as an asset would be less prone to speculative bubbles than, say, shares. 
1241
  The Western ABT stock is another example of this phenomenon: with the spawning 
stock biomass estimated in 1996 at 13% of Bmsy,, Panel 2 of ICCAT was informed that an annual 
catch of around 2,500 tonnes would roughly double it in 20 years, but to get to Bmsy in 20 years 
would require a drastic reduction in catch to 500 tonnes per annum: Annex 7-1 to ICCATSM10 
Report, in ICCAT Green Book 1997/1, supra Ch III n 573, 107 at 112 (paragraph 5.b.2).  Despite 
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to being a limit reference point under the precautionary approach from having been 
under UNCLOS a target reference point (in UN Fish Stocks Agreement Annex II 
terms); this will only become relevant after the stock has recovered.  Even recovery 
to Bmsy would be a major advance for SBT, so that for the foreseeable future it will 
be enough for the CCSBT to set its management compass by UNCLOS alone. 
Evidently, then, something more is needed to bring into alignment the legal and 
economic incentives for depleted stocks.  The biological starting point is that, grim 
though the current state of the stock is, precedents from other comparable fisheries 
indicate that recovery is possible.  Pacific halibut, for example, is similar in longevity 
and late maturity to SBT,
1242
 yet was brought back from severe depletion: “A fishery 
which had been disastrously depleted by unrestricted fishing has been so restored as 
to be one of the best stabilized and most profitable to its fishermen.”1243  Although 
doubts raised by some on this score
1244
 seem vindicated by the subsequent severe 
shortening of the fishing season and economic waste associated with the Olympic 
                                                                                                                                                                    
this Japan proposed raising the TAC to 2,500 tonnes from its then current 2,200 tonnes: at 113 
(paragraph 6.b.3), a course of action adopted first by the panel: at 114 (paragraph 6.b.17) and 
then by ICCAT itself: ICCATSM10 Report, ibid., 37 at 47 (paragraph 13.4).  Although a 20-year 
rebuilding program was adopted in 1998 (with a 20-year TAC unless amended): Annex 5-7 to 
ICCATSM11 Report, supra n 1221, at the first signs of recovery in 2000 Canada and the US 
wanted the TAC held at 2,500 tonnes, but Japan argued for an increase to 3,000 tonnes despite 
only two out of four assessments showing this as sustainable: “Statement by Canada on Atlantic 
Bluefin Tuna” and “Statement by Japan on Bluefin Tuna” (Appendices 8 and 9 respectively to 
Annex 9 to ICCATSM12 Report), in ICCAT Green Book 2001/1, supra Ch III n 571, 213 at 214 
and 215 respectively.  In 2007 the TAC was reduced to 2,100 tonnes: “Supplemental 
Recommendation by ICCAT concerning the Western Atlantic Bluefin Tuna Rebuilding 
Program”, supra Ch V n 1000, at 144 (Recommendation [06-06], paragraph 3). 
1242
  In this species individuals older than are 20 common; females maturing from age 8 to 16 
with a mean of 12 are far more susceptible to overfishing than males which do so between the 
ages of 5 and 11, on average at 9: H.A. Dunlop, “Management of the Halibut Fishery of the 
Northeastern Pacific Ocean and Bering Sea”, in UN doc A/CONF.10/7, supra Ch I n 28, 222 at 
226-227. 
1243
  Ibid., at 223.  It is not clear, though, where in relation to Bmsy the stock stood at its nadir. 
1244
  McDougal and Burke, supra Ch I n 271, at 482 and sources there cited. 
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fishery
1245
 for this species, it does not follow that one should deny the recovery was 
worth bringing about, even if it could have been done better. 
Modelling was carried out some years ago to estimate the likelihood of returning the 
SBT stock to Bmsy by 2020 under a number of management strategies if removals 
were reduced in the short term.  The significance of these is that the more successful 
models show average removals over the period to 2020 exceeding present removals, 
suggesting that the MSY itself would be over 20,000 tonnes.
1246
  For the CCSBT to 
adopt a management strategy that delays or prevents recovery of the stock to Bmsy is 
therefore, it is submitted, to deny all potential new entrants’ rights to share in the 
benefit that such a recovery would bring. 
This, however, is precisely what it seems to be doing, to judge from the debate on the 
management strategy in 2003-04.  Then only New Zealand said that any alternative 
objective to B1980 by 2020 must be consistent with the 1993 Convention and the 
wider international legal regime, and even it qualified this: until there was an agreed 
management procedure to guide Members towards the new objective, the current one 
should stay.
1247
  Because of the state of the stock, it preferred a cautious procedure 
over an aggressive policy, but viewed TAC changes every three years as suitable.
1248
  
Australia considered that the current objective should be replaced by an achievable 
one that resulted in “some re-building” of the stock – this could, but need not, be 
Bmsy.  Taiwan too believed that the current objective could not be reached and agreed 
in principle to its revision, but did not say how, beyond favouring gradual changes in 
TAC at 5-year intervals.  Japan considered that the current “very strict” objective 
                                                          
1245
  This term is defined supra Ch II, text at n 418. 
1246
  Polacheck et al, supra Ch I n 287, at 819 (Table 3).  This should be interpreted with 
caution, however, as it assumes the catch statistics on which the modellers relied were accurate: 
ibid., at 816. 
1247
  Attachment 4-4 to CCSBT-EC2 Report, supra Ch II n 352, at 49-50. 
1248
  CCSBT-EC2 Report, supra Ch II n 353, at 21-22 (paragraph 46).  New Zealand said 
there had been little progress towards achieving the current objective because there had been no 
strategy for achieving it. 
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was not achievable; Bmsy would be more appropriate, but the period for achieving it 
could be decided “once more data become available”, and it also wanted to “explore 
more moderate policies” with biomass at 100 per cent and 110 per cent of the much 
smaller 2002 level.
1249
  Korea “from an administrative perspective” said it would be 
best for the fishery to be highly productive and managed with an aggressive catch 
policy “so that a future increase in stock, if any, would be retained by members, 
without giving an incentive to non-members”.1250 
Australia and New Zealand both required an objective that would result in rebuilding 
of the stock – already an essential component of the management objective – but 
New Zealand was alone in drawing attention to how Members’ wider international 
obligations might constrain their choice of a new one.
1251
  Taiwan preferred only 
gradual TAC reductions in the short term and would have been satisfied with a 
management objective of a spawning stock biomass only 90 per cent of that in 2002 
(B2002), Japan wanted an objective based on Bmsy, while Korea could support either 
Bmsy or B2002
1252
  The management procedure finally adopted aims at a probability of 
50 per cent that the 2014 parental biomass is smaller than that of 2004, its lowest yet 
recorded, and a 10 per cent chance that by 2022 it will be below that of 2004.
1253
  
                                                          
1249
  Ibid., at 21 (paragraph 46).  Note that if Japan is saying that Bmsy by 2020 would be less 
strict than B1980 by 2020, there is a contradiction in its position unless either B1980 is greater than 
Bmsy or Japan was not advocating reaching Bmsy until long after 2020; the former is very unlikely. 
1250
  Ibid., at 22 (paragraph 46).  The Korean attitude is a straightforward manifestation of the 
disastrous but rational reasoning engendered under the tragedy of the commons: supra Ch I n 127 
and accompanying text. 
1251
  Appendix 3 to CCSBTSM4 Report, supra Ch IV n 677, at 116 (paragraph 13); see also 
“Opening Statement by New Zealand” (Attachment 4-4 to Appendix 3 to CCSBTSM4 Report), 
in CCSBT Blue Book 2005, supra Ch I n 34, 134 at 135, where New Zealand argued that any 
objective that does not rebuild the stock “would be contrary to the [1993] Convention and our 
international obligations”, although there was “flexibility around the timeframe for achieving 
rebuilding.” 
1252
  Appendix 3 to CCSBTSM4 Report, supra Ch IV n 677, at 117 (paragraph 13). 
1253
  CCSBT-ESC4 Report, supra Ch I n 114, at 8 (paragraphs 37 and 38) and 9 (paragraph 
45). 
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The proposed upper and lower bounds of parental biomass in 2022 of 1.5 and 0.7 
times B2002 were accepted, although a lower bound of 0.8 or 0.9 might be preferred; 
emphasis was laid on exploring procedures around the “moderate level” of 1.1 as a 
coefficient, i.e. aiming for the stock in 2022 to be only 10 per cent larger than its 
depleted state of 2002.  There was consensus on 3 years as the preferred TAC cycle, 
with a one-year lag before implementation and some limit on maximum magnitude 
of changes, particularly on increases so as to prevent market disruptions.
1254
  In 
settling on these parameters, Members appear to have been taking their cue from the 
views of industry representatives consulted during the CCSBT’s development of a 
management procedure discussed in sections D and E below, some preferring to aim 
to rebuild the stock to its 2002 level, others favouring merely arresting its decline, 
but none calling for rebuilding to Bmsy.
1255
 
In other words, even if the catch figures on which the CCSBT was working up to 
2006 had been accurate and the 2004 management procedure had been fully 
implemented, it is not clear when, if ever, the stock would have been rebuilt to Bmsy 
as Article 5 of Annex II to the UN Fish Stocks Agreement and (subject to economic 
and environmental factors) Article 119, paragraph 1(a) of UNCLOS both require. 
D The undesirability of delegating management decisions 
to scientists 
Despite the well documented dangers of ignoring scientific advice, it would be a 
mistake for any fishery commission to shift responsibility for management decisions 
to scientists, a temptation for States having difficulty agreeing on how to manage the 
stock.  Although a rule that simply forces managers to do what the Scientific 
Committee recommends in the absence of consensus for any alternative course of 
action has superficial appeal, to put so much weight on the scientific advice would in 
                                                          
1254
  CCSBT-EC2 Report, supra Ch II n 353, at 22-24 (paragraphs 47 and 48). 
1255
  See Report of the Industry Consultation for the Management Procedures (Attachment G 
to CCSBT-MPW2 Report), in CCSBT Blue Book 2004, supra Ch I n 32, 292 at 293 (paragraph 
7). 
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the longer term inevitably have the effect of politicising the science itself.
1256
  The 
undesirability of this was seen in the CCSBT, where the growing tensions around the 
conditions for experimental fishing were manifested by the presence in Scientific 
Committee meetings of managers: from Japan in 1996, thereafter Australia too
1257
 – 
and implicitly recognised in the establishment of the Stock Assessment Group, in 
which “[t]he participants …should be limited to scientists and discussion should be 
held on a basis of individual scientific credibility not as a representative of national 
interests.”1258  As one Member of the CCSBT put it: 
Scientists must be allowed to be scientists, free from political influence or 
interference.  It is not the role or responsibility of scientists to try and second guess 
the requirements of managers.  Managers need to specify to scientists the 
information needed to make decisions to be able to manage the fishery soundly.
1259
 
                                                          
1256
  T.L. McDorman, “Implementing Existing Tools: Turning Words into Actions – 
Decision-Making Processes of Regional Fisheries Management Organisations (RFMOs)”, (2005) 
20 IJMCL 423 at 435. 
1257
  See the relevant lists of participants annexed to Scientific Committee meeting reports, 
supra Ch IV n 683. 
1258
  Attachment E to Peer Review Workshop Report, supra Ch III n 597, at 163.  In 
proposing this, Japan appeared to distinguish between the “purely technical” aspects of the 
Scientific Committee’s functions – which were now to be devolved to the Stock Assessment 
Group – and its issuance of management recommendations to the CCSBT, which it regarded as 
political and hence requiring the presence of managers to represent national interests; ibid., at 
162-163.  The Scientific Committee’s discussion of stock assessment “should be limited to 
interpretations of results in relation to an examination of effectiveness of various management 
measures”, translating uncertainties into consequences relative to management decisions: ibid., at 
165.  Participants at the Scientific Committee’s 2001 meeting confirmed their desire to move 
away from expressing national views in the scientific process, particularly at Stock Assessment 
Group meetings, in favour of individual scientific views: CCSBT-SC6 Report, supra Ch I n 291, 
at 248 (paragraph 81).  The CCSBT’s subsequent failure to agree on a TAC despite unanimity 
being restored among the scientists (CCSBT8 Report, supra Ch I n 30, at 70 (paragraphs 70-81)) 
demonstrates that the problem had all along been at management level. 
1259
  “Opening Statement by Australia” (Attachment C to Peer Review Workshop Report, 
supra Ch III n 597), in CCSBT Blue Book 2001, supra Ch I n 242, 155 at 156.  New Zealand had 
spoken in similar vein as early as 1993 (Attachment C to November 1993 Draft Summary 
Record, supra Ch II n 387, at 2): 
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Instead, good practice would require that scientists offer managers a range of options 
based on different degrees of risk to the stock, forcing managers to make an explicit 
trade-off between maintenance of catches in the short term and the longer-term 
health of the stock.  This method appears to be favoured by the CCSBT’s scientists: 
It was agreed that the Commission should be consulted on the best way to present 
information resulting from the assessment.  A range of possibilities including the 
probability of recovery, current spawning stock biomass and fishing mortality rates 
in relation to several biological reference points were discussed.  It was considered 
that the Commission should be asked for guidance on the format for the provision of 
advice from the Scientific Committee taking into account a range of options 
proposed to it.
 1260
 
The same approach was taken into the development of a management procedure.  
The Extended Scientific Committee sought clarification from the CCSBT and its 
Members as to management objectives by posing a series of questions related to 
possible objectives such as optimising catch, optimising biomass and stability of 
TACs.
1261
  By 2003 the CCSBT as a whole had embraced this approach.  Responding 
to the Extended Scientific Committee’s questions, the Extended Commission 
provided the following guidelines: the existing objective was admitted not to be 
feasible and a new one, which be might be related to MSY, was required; but it was 
not yet ready to specify a timeframe for achieving it.  It asked for candidate 
                                                                                                                                                                    
In order to develop it [the management strategy] in more detail we need to provide guidance 
to scientists.  The managers will need to agree on the short term goals of our arrangements 
and the risks we are willing to accept in moving towards those goals. 
1260
  Report of the Stock Assessment Process Workshop, 22-26 May 2000, Tokyo, Japan 
(hereinafter Stock Assessment Workshop Report), in CCSBT Blue Book 2001, supra Ch I n 242, 
217 at 221. 
1261
  CCSBT-SAG4 Report, supra Ch I n 295, at 185 (paragraph 70).  The Committee 
decided that when it came to present options for consideration, it would provide average catch, 
average spawning biomass, spawning biomass relative to 1980 and 2002, frequency of TAC 
change and proportion of simulations exceeding specific thresholds as performance measures: 
CCSBT-ESC2 Report, supra Ch I n 32, at 116-117 (paragraph 30). 
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management procedures to be evaluated on their performance in attaining Bmsy, and 
projections and performance measures over a period of 30 years in relation to this. 
Though its implementation has had to be postponed, the process that the CCSBT 
went through to elaborate a management procedure has had a beneficial effect, 
leading to more informed debate on the trade-offs faced by managers.  This was 
shown by the Extended Commission’s recognition in 2003 that, in choosing among 
candidate management procedures, Members would face trade-offs along two axes: a 
strong inverse relationship between catch level and rebuilding of biomass, and a 
lesser one between TAC stability and magnitude of changes – frequent changes are 
likely to be smaller, but should also result in increased average catches over time.
1262
 
E Lack of management strategy as serious weakness 
One of the main obstacles to the CCSBT’s efforts to gain the cooperation of non-
members has been its lack of a management strategy.  The basic element of such a 
strategy is that it defines long-term objectives for the management of the stock, 
linking these to short-term performance in achieving those objectives as measured by 
data considered informative to this end.  Annual debates over TAC are then replaced 
by a formula for deriving each year’s TAC from the previous year’s catch and effort 
data, a particular attraction for New Zealand.
1263
  Such a strategy is essential for 
preventing the risk of Members themselves not being bound by catch limits in times 
of disagreement, leaving them with no basis for arguing that non-members should be 
bound.  Although in economic terms it is true that the advent of new entrants can 
affect existing members’ individual rationality constraints and thus make cooperation 
                                                          
1262
  CCSBT-EC2 Report, supra Ch II n 353, at 20 (paragraph 39). 
1263
  New Zealand sees the management strategy as a way of placing the political decision on 
allocation on a permanent basis, so as “to avoid protracted re-negotiation of national allocations 
every few years”: Attachment 4-4 to CCSBT-EC2 Report, supra Ch II n 352, at 50.  This may 
explain its otherwise odd statement ibid. – national allocations being a prime function of the 
CCSBT – that “we need to take the politics out of this Commission and stick to doing what we do 
best – managing fisheries.” 
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among them difficult, from a legal perspective this cannot be an excuse for failure to 
carry out their conservation obligations.  The issue of opposability of conservation 
measures to non-members cannot even arise until such measures exist. 
The formulae need not be complex: in Namibia’s hake fishery, for instance, a simple 
CPUE-based management procedure was used to make TAC revisions despite wide 
disagreement on stock trends.
1264
  A primitive form of management strategy, aimed 
more at encouraging political compromise to reach agreement than at managing the 
stock on a scientific basis, is to reduce the TAC and national allocations by a set 
percentage each year absent a positive decision to do otherwise.  This is what an 
early Australian draft of what later became the 1993 Convention did, canvassing both 
a rollover without reduction and an automatic reduction of 10 per cent: 
In the event that it is not possible to reach agreement on the total permissible level of 
catch, the total permissible level of catch for the previous management year shall 
continue to apply.*
1265
 
A stronger variant of the same idea (20 per cent reduction) was proposed recently by 
McDorman on the basis of precaution as well as an incentive to reach agreement.
1266
 
While it is a virtue of a sound management procedure that in normal circumstances it 
can operate as a “set and forget” mechanism, so that no intervention by managers is 
required,  
                                                          
1264
  Report of the Management Strategy Workshop, 29-31 May 2000, Tokyo, Japan 
(hereinafter Management Strategy Workshop Report), in CCSBT Blue Book 2001, supra Ch I n 
242, 255 at 257-258. 
1265
  Attachment B to Attachment F to 7th Trilateral Management Meeting Report, supra Ch 
II n 395, Article III(5).  The note to which the asterisk refers reads: “It may be worth considering 
changing this Article to provide that if the parties failed to agree they would have allocations, 
say, 10% less than the previous year.” 
1266
  McDorman, supra n 1256, at 440.  Since not even the 0% reduction in the Australian 
draft found its way into the 1993 Convention, however, his caveat ibid. that this “might deter 
states from becoming…members” of the commission concerned is surely an understatement. 
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[i]t is always conceivable that circumstances in any fishery or stock may alter in 
such a dramatic fashion that the stock or fishery moves outside the range for which 
the management procedures were tested.
1267
 
If this happens, the operation of the formula can always be overridden under a 
fishery commission’s ordinary decision-making procedure if there is sufficient 
agreement on the urgency of doing so. 
Among the commonly suggested objectives are maximisation of catches, minimising 
the risk of unintended depletion so as to safeguard the resource, or, in order to 
accommodate socio-economic issues, fostering industrial stability by minimising 
TAC variation and aiming to make only small changes in effort levels from year to 
year.  Thus the CCSBT’s first (2000) workshop recommended the following 
objectives reflecting general management goals on which Members already agreed: 
 maximise catch by weight in both short and long term 
 achieve the rebuilding target for the parental biomass by the target year, and 
thereafter possibly also a target reference level (in terms of either biomass or 
fishing mortality) for the long term 
 minimise the risk of the parental biomass falling below a predetermined level 
 minimise the magnitude of short-term fluctuations in the fisheries.1268 
At the same time, it noted that all objectives could not be simultaneously optimised 
and that implementation of any particular management procedure would involve 
trade-offs between them.  For example low levels of interannual TAC variability (to 
minimise disruption of industry) would likely result in lower total exploitation, 
trading off socio-economic stability against size of catch.
1269
 
                                                          
1267
  CCSBT-ESC2 Report, supra Ch I n 32, at 117 (paragraph 33). 
1268
  Management Strategy Workshop Report, supra n 1264, at 259.  See also the informative 
discussion of decision rules at 260-261. 
1269
  Ibid., at 258.  At the next meeting of the workshop it was decided that changes in TAC 
of less than 100 tonnes generated by whatever management procedure would be selected should 
not proceed, whereas the maximum change should be 3,000 tonnes: Attachment E to CCSBT-
 424 
The fishing industry’s own utterances confirm the desire for relative stability: its 
representatives wished the management procedure to be “constructed to avoid any 
large reductions with changes made gradually to allow time for adjustments to be 
made.”1270  Significantly, this applies not just to downward changes, where “the 
preferred harvesting strategy was staged ramping down of catch levels – not closure 
or large changes” but also upward: none would choose to increase catch levels by 
more than a “few hundred” tonnes per annum even under substantial increases in 
stock levels,
1271
 all fleets being sensitive to price and concerned that increases in 
global TAC could result in lower prices.
1272
 
The conclusion to be drawn is that socio-economic considerations are legitimate; 
problems arise only when managers ignore the fact that one way or another they 
must lead to lower total catch.  This they can ideally avoid by aiming for MEY rather 
than MSY, or by recognising the need for a larger cushion against uncertainty when 
dampening variations in TAC or effort – but if no account is taken of such factors, 
then the ecosystem itself imposes lower catch when the resource is lost or depleted 
through overfishing.
1273
  The Bering Sea Pollock Convention
1274
 and the later South 
                                                                                                                                                                    
MPW2 Report, in CCSBT Blue Book 2004, supra Ch I n 32, 263 at 272.  See also the remarks in 
CCSBT-MPW2 Report, supra Ch IV n 863, at 247 (paragraph 32), on the undesirability of TAC 
first increasing then decreasing or vice versa in consecutive years.  Further trade-offs emerged 
the following year, in particular regarding TAC performance in the first and second ten years – 
some rules reduced TAC immediately and by relatively large amounts, but then increased it in 
the last ten years; others reduced it much more gradually, but usually kept declining over the 
second ten years.  There was a higher risk of low spawning biomass in the short-to-medium term 
for rules that reduced TAC slowly than for those that reduced it rapidly.  See CCSBT-MPW3 
Report, supra Ch I n 306, at 295 (paragraph 17). 
1270
  Attachment G to CCSBT-MPW2 Report, supra n 1255, at 292 (paragraph 3). 
1271
  Ibid., at 292-293 (paragraph 7).  Only the New Zealand industry had indicated any desire 
to increase its catch: CCSBT-EC2 Report, supra Ch II n 353, at 19 (paragraph 37). 
1272
  CCSBT-SAG4 Report, supra Ch I n 295, at 172 (paragraph 14). 
1273
  Accord Munro and Scott, supra Ch I n 107, at 655. 
1274
  Supra Ch II n 316. 
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Tasman Rise orange roughy instruments
1275
 illuminate both sides of the coin: though 
they did not avert the collapse of the stocks which they govern because agreement on 
them was reached only afterwards, nonetheless they constitute valuable precedents 
thanks to the management strategies they enact. 
F Attrition and other allocative devices 
Since the allocation problem has apparently defeated lawyers, it is perhaps fitting 
that what may be the most promising way forward yet suggested is the “attrition” 
policy of a scientist, Butterworth.  Under this each year States would give up a small 
portion of their quota, which is then reallocated on whatever principles the fishery 
commission sees fit.
1276
  Attrition was also advocated by South Africa in ICCAT.
1277
 
                                                          
1275
  Supra Ch II n 314. 
1276
  Butterworth, supra Ch I n 87, at 38-39; Butterworth and Penney, supra Ch III n 553, at 
181-182.  As it would apply initially to only a small proportion of the TAC, this could also be a 
testing ground for an experiment with auctioning quota as a way of making benefits flow to all 
members, not just those actually fishing a given stock.  The auctioned portion of the TAC would 
at the same time be an experiment in applying the common heritage principle, while the large 
remainder would satisfy those arguing that historic catch ought to be determinative of allocation.  
As Morgan has observed, supra n 1219 at 380 and 382-384, of the three basic alternatives in 
allocating quota at national level (administrative decision, lottery and auction), auction seems to 
work best at the national level and would probably do so too within a fisheries commission – the 
problems experienced with it are not applicable to States, to which a lottery is in any event 
unlikely to be acceptable, while administrative decision has no close international equivalent 
because the commission is unable to impose its will on the States who are its members in the 
same way as a State can on its citizens.  The application of game and auction theory to practical 
problems of allocation of scarce resources has been one of the great successes of modern 
economic theory: ibid., at 385-386.  Auctioning the right to fish would require an agreement in 
advance that the highest bid from a member should be accepted.  If preventing quota holdings 
from being concentrated in the hands of just a few States is thought desirable for equity reasons, 
this can be accommodated at some cost to the value of the quota: Clark, supra Ch I n 101, at 341.  
(Clark was writing of New Zealand’s domestic experience with ITQs, but in principle the point is 
equally valid for legal relations among States.) 
1277
  Appendix 10 to Annex 9 to ICCAT16 Report, supra Ch III n 571. 
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This idea has much to recommend it.  Despite its undesirable distributive effects, the 
notion that historic catch itself should give rise to vested rights has as its underlying 
purpose a legitimate concern: to protect current investment and employment in 
troubled fisheries.  Thus the policy challenge is to find ways of doing this that do not 
extinguish others’ rights to benefit from the stock once it is restored to a healthy 
state.  Since investments are depreciated over time, it is suggested that historic catch 
arguments should be conceded some validity in the short term in return for explicit 
recognition of their temporary character, allowing new entrants to vindicate their 
rights over time.  As the latter’s catches grow, these too are factored into the equation 
and the disadvantage to them lessens.  Note, however, that in order for the States 
who depleted a stock not to be rewarded in effect for having done so, it is their shares 
of the catch in past years, rather than absolute tonnages, that should be taken into 
account, and the weight given to them each year should progressively diminish.  Any 
number of formulae could achieve this, for example weighting a fishing year by the 
reciprocal of the number of years that have since passed, so that in 2008, say, the 
shares in 1988 (twenty years ago) carry one tenth the weight of those in 2006 (two 
years ago), or a geometric decline as suggested by Butterworth and Penney, which 
gives historic shares a “half-life” rather than a limited term.1278  A minor variation 
could if desired see weight given only to the most recent fixed number of years – say 
twenty – at the time of calculation, representing the average life of a fishing vessel. 
Here again advocates of an economic or game theoretical approach have left their 
mark.  Anticipating Munro’s emphasis on the individual rationality constraint,1279 
Southey argued that recognition of historic rights can be justified as part of the 
requirement that parties should not be made worse off by changes, while the special 
status of coastal States is a possible criterion for redistributive gains.  He favoured 
gradually opening the whole TAC to bidding, with a maximum annual increment for 
                                                          
1278
  Butterworth and Penney, supra Ch III n 553, at 181. 
1279
  Munro, supra n 1222, at 10. 
 427 
each participant “to avoid extravagant rivalries”.1280  Kasahara’s advice to leave 
some quota unallocated to help accommodate new entrants has been heeded by the 
CCSBT with regard to Indonesia and South Africa.
1281
  Indeed this would appear 
particularly desirable where there are potential new entrants that are coastal States 
with respect to the stock, as that would make it clear that actual entry of any State in 
this category would have to be accommodated by existing members, who are in 
effect temporarily benefiting from using those coastal States’ future quota. 
The opposite method is also possible.  Though not as systematic as attrition, one way 
to encourage coastal States to develop their fishing industry only to a point that does 
not put excessive pressure on the stock is ICCAT’s practice in many of its fisheries 
of not regulating most members’ catches, provided they stay below a given threshold 
tonnage.  Despite the disadvantages of partly Olympic fisheries to which this leads, 
agreement may be easier to achieve in the short term if national allocations totalling 
more than the TAC are made, especially when they are sought for symbolic reasons 
rather than because of any real likelihood of catching the amount sought.  A good 
example of a total smaller than the sum of its parts is ICCAT’s 2003 North Atlantic 
albacore recommendation,
1282
 where the TAC is 34,500 tonnes but the catch limits of 
individual members clearly add up to more: 28,712 tonnes for the European 
Community, 4,453 tonnes for Taiwan, 607 tonnes for the United States, 270 tonnes 
                                                          
1280
  Southey, supra Ch IV n 924, at 61. 
1281
  H. Kasahara, “Problems of Allocation as Applied to the Exploitation of the Living 
Resources of the Sea”, in L.M. Alexander (ed), The Law of the Sea: Needs and Interests of 
Developing Countries: Proceedings of the Seventh Annual Conference of the Law of the Sea 
Institute, June 26 – June 29, 1972, University of Rhode Island (Kingston: University of Rhode 
Island, 1973), 94 at 98. 
1282
  See Annex 5 to ICCAT18 Report, supra Ch V n 961, at 144 (Recommendation [03-06], 
paragraphs 1-5).  Possibly this is what Kasahara means by recommending that quotas unfilled 
should be “declared open”, presumably to an Olympic fishery: Kasahara, supra n 1281, at 99.  In 
the light of Chapter V above, however, it is not clear why at 100 he regards it as impractical to 
provide for trading of quotas in the fishery convention itself (he would instead have it done by 
direct negotiations instead, with reallocation after some number of years based on actual catch). 
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for Venezuela, 200 tonnes each for all other members bar Japan (i.e. around 8,000 
tonnes, based on the current 46-strong membership
1283
), 6 tonnes for other 
cooperating non-members, 4 per cent of Japan’s bigeye catch.  Under the overall 
TAC of 29,000 tonnes established in 2007 for the southern albacore stock for 2008 to 
2011, members targeting the stock have no individual limits, but a 100-tonne catch 
limit is imposed on those not targeting it whose average catch in 1998-2002 was less 
than that, while those who in 1992-1996 caught more than 100 tonnes have a limit of 
110 per cent of their average catch in those years, apart from Japan which has a limit 
of 4 per cent of its bigeye catch south of 5° N.
1284
 
Further, although it does not provide a complete answer, use could be made of the 
“characteristic function game” approach of cooperative coalitions.  This introduces 
the concept of the “Shapley value”, in which a player’s share depends on its average 
marginal contribution to all possible coalitions, and the “nucleolus”, which relates 
the gain of each player to its maximum contribution to any grand coalition (of all 
players) or subcoalition.
1285
  At the other end of the scale, for obvious reasons, the 
completely egalitarian division of the spoils, in which each of n players receives one 
nth share of the catch or profit, will not satisfy the most efficient, but has the virtue 
of simplicity (apart from a predictable controversy over whether the European 
Community should have one share or 27).  Since these are pure mathematical 
operations, they may be less susceptible to manipulation than scientific advice of the 
traditional sort, and one can imagine a rule that requires each party’s share in any 
year to be no smaller than the smallest and no larger than the largest of its Shapley 
                                                          
1283
  See supra Ch IV n 900. 
1284
  Recommendation by ICCAT on the Southern Albacore Catch Limits for 2008, 2009, 
2010 and 2011, supra Ch V n 1122, at 151 (Recommendation [07-03], paragraphs 4-6).  Semble 
other States not actively fishing the stock that fall into neither of these categories, as is perfectly 
possible, have no catch limit. 
1285
  Li, supra Ch I n 120, at 252-254; Costa Duarte et al, supra Ch I n 107, at 22. 
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value, its nucleolus and its one nth share.
1286
  While fisheries managers are likely to 
prove just as hostile to placing allocative decisions in the hands of economists as 
they are to rules that appear to let scientists set, rather than advise on, catch limits, 
the mere coexistence of Shapley value and nucleolus shows that no single allocation 
is determined by economic theory as the optimum.  Thus there will still be some 
political bargaining required, as the sum of the smallest will necessarily be less than 
100 per cent and the sum of the largest more than 100 per cent – but setting these 
parameters in advance would mean that there is less at stake over which to squabble.  
The aim should be to minimise the risk of fishery commissions breaking down over 
allocation disputes, which suggests that they would be wise to heed the United 
States’ warning in ICCAT against mandating too many allocation criteria for panels 
to implement easily.
1287
 
G Why closed shops are not the answer 
The central difficulty facing any proponent of a firm rule to govern fishery allocation 
is that on allocative questions the basic legal and economic principles point in 
opposite directions.  Legal writers are now beginning to pay attention to the fisheries 
economics literature,
1288
 but for the moment the economists continue to make the 
running.  In 1997 Kaitala and Munro demonstrated that if new entrants are required 
to be offered shares of a TAC in return for agreeing to be bound by the measures of a 
                                                          
1286
  See also supra, text at n 1231.  Note that a party for whom the largest of these is less 
than its assessed contribution to the fishery commission will then be best served by remaining out 
of both the fishery and the commission. 
1287
  “Statement by the United States”, in “Opening Statements – Allocation Criteria – 
Brussels 2001” (Appendix 2 to Annex 6 to ICCAT17 Report), in ICCAT Green Book 2002/1, 
supra Ch I n 228, 147 at 148. 
1288
  Such literature is cited in F. Orrego Vicuña, “The International Law of High Seas 
Fisheries: From Freedom of Fishing to Sustainable Use”, in Stokke (ed), supra Ch I n 124, 23, 
who at 45 mentions market economy mechanisms in the context of relations among States 
(referring however to ITQs rather than international quota trading, but also with a note of 
scepticism, e.g. noting at 46 that initial allocations are not solved thereby, nor are cooperation 
and compliance guaranteed). 
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commission, the States contemplating establishing the commission in the first place 
will calculate that they cannot obtain the full value of their restraint in the interim.  
This may lead at least one of them to conclude that in the long run it would actually 
be better off by not cooperating.
1289
  Such considerations have led Munro to advocate 
that rights to a straddling or highly migratory stock be restricted to coastal States and 
existing distant-water participants in a fishery, giving them de facto joint property 
rights to the resources, with new entrants obliged to buy their way in, and the power 
to repel non-member interlopers and punish defectors within their midst.
1290
  Some 
economically oriented international fisheries lawyers are sympathetic to this view, 
e.g. Miles and Burke who see no alternative to letting coastal States, or participants 
in a straddling stock fishery, prohibit fishing by new entrants if the stock is fully 
fished.  They would, however, subject the scientific validity of any assertion of this 
condition being met to compulsory dispute settlement
1291
 – essentially the failed 
doctrine of abstention in modern guise.  This is also consistent with the position 
advanced by the United States in successive drafts it put forward of what became the 
Bering Sea pollock convention: that new entrants should be allowed into the fishery 
by invitation only.
1292
  It is also reinforced by the tendency of the rhetoric of these 
States to dwell on the hardships suffered by their fleets though catch reductions.
1293
 
                                                          
1289
  Kaitala and Munro (1997), supra Ch I n 120, at 96-97.  
1290
  Munro (2000), supra Ch I n 120, at 276-277. 
1291
  E.L. Miles and W.T. Burke, “Pressures on the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea of 1982 Arising from New Fisheries Conflicts: The Problem of Straddling Stocks” (1989) 
20 ODIL 343 at 355. 
1292
  Kwiatkowska, supra Ch III n 493, at 338-339. 
1293
  See e.g. text at supra Ch IV n 689.  Characteristically, only New Zealand (Attachment C 
to 7th Trilateral Management Meeting Report, supra Ch II n 359, New Zealand Statement, at 1-
2) argued against this approach: 
[W]hatever actions have transpired in the past are now history, whereas the job of the present 
is the pressing need for consolidation and rebuilding of the resource. 
… 
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The North Atlantic fisheries commissions and WCPFC have attempted to do as 
Munro suggests.
1294
  From a legal perspective, however, this overlooks the fact that 
history begins not at the point of deciding to establish a commission – by which time 
the resource has usually been depleted to bioeconomic equilibrium biomass (Beq) by 
the very States that decide the fishery requires such institutional protection to survive 
– but at the point when the stock is first exploited.  The dilemma is that rebuilding 
the fishery is economically impossible without enabling these States to exclude new 
entrants, but new entrants – who by definition played no part in the depletion – have 
a compelling case on equity grounds for resisting exclusion. 
One way to resolve this dilemma may be to permit their temporary exclusion by way 
of what is in effect a compulsory investment by them in the stock’s recovery, but to 
do so only on the basis that excluded States have a right to compensation for this on 
the basis of State responsibility.  In this way, the States that depleted the stock would 
indirectly be forced to account for their past catches.  Quantifying the compensable 
loss is likely to be difficult, but the sums involved may not be unmanageable, as it 
has been pertinently observed that, even under open access, relatively few States 
participate in a given fishery.
1295
  Thus, while the creation of a commission managing 
a fishery for profit may well entice a few more would-be new entrants, this should 
not be fatal under any distributive rule that gives low reward to those who contribute 
little to any cooperative coalition.  Existing members may find it unpalatable that 
they should have to buy off potentially damaging new entrants, but can console 
themselves with the thought that the compensation is not for exclusion from a share 
of the full MSY; rather, it is for some part of the difference between that share and 
the benefit that the excluded State could expect from a fishery in bioeconomic 
                                                                                                                                                                    
The actions now required of the trilateral partners should be viewed as an investment in the 
resource, given that current catches are thought to be only a fraction of what could be taken if the 
stock returned to an optimal level. 
1294
  See supra Ch III, subsections E4 and E5. 
1295
  Li, supra Ch I n 120, at 249. 
 432 
equilibrium.  Since the latter will in most cases be very little or nil, the compensation 
may not need to be much more than nominal. 
Koers too favours open membership; he reasons that the obligation to contribute to 
the commission’s expenses would keep out those not really interested, but because 
the resources are open to all to catch, “all States have a general interest in protecting 
the living resources of the high seas, irrespective of…whether or not they fish for a 
specific stock;” hence limiting membership to those with “direct interest” would be 
“unnecessary and undesirable”.1296  Van Houtte takes a similar view: because of their 
right under UNCLOS Article 116 to fish on the high seas, “those who cooperate in 
conservation and management measures in accordance with article 119 should not in 
principle be excluded from a share in TAC”.1297  This simply extends the application 
of Munro’s individual rationality constraint to new entrants: if the duty to cooperate 
means in economic terms that each must be assured of obtaining at least the same 
benefits from cooperation as it would from non-cooperation, then it follows that zero 
is in many cases not even an economically let alone a legally acceptable quota. 
On the other hand, the economic analysis should not be narrowly confined to purely 
monetary costs and benefits; there are political costs to non-cooperation too, which 
for most potential participants may outweigh the small expected gains from moving 
into a fishery that is already marginal.  The gains from non-cooperation would need 
to be large in order to tempt States into it; by the time the fishery has recovered 
sufficiently to make them so, the doctrinal currents documented in this work may 
have substantially raised the legal risks of such a course. 
                                                          
1296
  Koers, supra Ch I n 285, at 126.  He was writing in the 1970s, before fisheries 
commissions began to formalise cooperating status, which normally entails no financial 
obligations. 
1297
  A. van Houtte, “Legal Aspects in the Management of Shared Fish Stocks – A Review” 
in Papers Presented at the Norway-FAO Expert Consultation on the Management of Shared Fish 
Stocks - Bergen, Norway, 7-10 October 2002 (FAO Fisheries Report No 695, Supplement) 
(Rome: FAO, 2003), 30 at 38. 
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In this light, transferability of quota is a halfway house: the fishery commission does 
not purport to exclude new entrants, but is entitled to their cooperation, which under 
a trading scheme extends to its method of acquiring quota.  Compelling new entrants 
to buy their way into a fishery (who obtain in return a much more clearly defined 
right than would otherwise have been possible on the high seas) is thus a superior 
alternative to both their peremptory exclusion and an unconditional right of entry for 
them that destroys any economic incentive to rebuild the stock: “If… it were possible 
for prospective New Members to purchase quotas from existing members…, this 
would serve to ease the problem of quota allocation to New Members.”1298 
If all are accountable to each other thanks to their right to fish on the high seas, then 
UNCLOS Article 116, as well as being the cause of the tragedy of the commons, 
paradoxically becomes part of the solution.  Mere creation of a legal pecking order 
for access to stocks is not where the matter ends.  Because it means that those States 
at the bottom risk being left with nothing, a duty thereby arises on those higher up to 
manage the fishery in a way that maximises the likelihood that something will in due 
course be left over for them, i.e. conservatively in accordance with the precautionary 
approach to fisheries in Annex II to the UN Fish Stocks Agreement.  The paucity of 
State practice may stand in the way of a conclusion reached on classical lines that 
such a duty has achieved the status of custom, but the ultimate practical effect is 
much the same where, as here, the same conclusion can be derived from the duty of 
cooperation whose customary status is not doubted. 
H Dispute settlement as a second-best method of 
allocation 
The availability of compulsory procedures for the settlement of disputes between 
parties to UNCLOS and the UN Fish Stocks Agreement, though important in itself, 
                                                          
1298
  FAO, Report of the Norway-FAO Expert Consultation on the Management of Shared 
Fish Stocks, Bergen, Norway, 7-10 October 2002 (FAO Fisheries Report No 695; Rome: FAO, 
2003), at 13 (paragraph 63). 
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also serves a secondary function: that of providing a procedural means for arriving at 
an allocation where the members themselves have collectively been unable to do so.  
This is the virtue of the incorporation by reference of the compulsory procedures for 
dispute settlement in Part VIII of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement into other fisheries 
treaties by Article 30, paragraph 2.  Article 7, paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Agreement, 
as noted above, expressly contemplate use of the dispute settlement mechanism to 
settle allocative questions.  Because Article 7 is in Part II of the Agreement, it is not 
strictly encompassed by the incorporation by reference, but there is no reason why 
the question of catch share entitlements could not become the subject of an ordinary 
Part VIII dispute.  The more important caveat is hence that, since jurisdiction over 
disputes in the current state of international law remains firmly rooted in the express 
consent of the putative respondent State, it is not capable of being applied to non-
parties to those treaties.  For the moment, therefore, this mechanism remains 
unavailable to the CCSBT because Indonesia is not, and Taiwan cannot become, 
party to the Agreement.
1299
 
                                                          
1299
  This is an extension to secondary obligations such as dispute settlement of the confusion 
caused within fisheries commissions by differences in parties’ primary obligations, described by 
Rayfuse, supra Ch III n 525, at 113-114.  Even if all members of the Extended Commission were 
bound by the UN Fish Stocks Agreement, it may be risky to assume the correctness of the dictum 
in the Award of the Annex VII tribunal in the 1998-2001 dispute (infra Appendix A, n 1338, at 
paragraph 71) that entry into force of the Agreement as among the parties to the 1993 Convention 
would restore the jurisdiction of a Part XV forum to settle disputes among them under UNCLOS 
as well as the 1993 Convention that it found had been ousted by Article 16 of the latter – see 
infra Appendix A, text at nn 1445-1449.  D.A. Colson and P. Hoyle, “Satisfying the Procedural 
Prerequisites to the Compulsory Dispute Settlement Mechanisms of the 1982 Law of the Sea 
Convention: Did the Southern Bluefin Tuna Tribunal Get It Right?”, (2003) 34 ODIL 59 at 70 
have argued that the dictum is wrong because the incorporation by reference of Part XV of 
UNCLOS imports the continued application of Article 281(1), which was the basis of the Award, 
and “the Award offers no reason why the tribunal would not have reached the same conclusion 
regarding jurisdiction under Part XV if it had been pursuant to a referral from the UN Fish Stocks 
Agreement.”  They concede, however, that the opposite view is possible, such as that of Oxman 
who concludes that the dictum is correct on either a literal or a teleological interpretation of 
Article 30(2): literally its effect is to import Part XV of UNCLOS into other fisheries treaties as 
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Although the decision of the Annex VII arbitral tribunal in the Southern Bluefin Tuna 
case that it lacked jurisdiction has been heavily criticised,
1300
 it is significant that the 
Award went out of its way to say that the prior ITLOS decision granting provisional 
measures had been useful in bringing the parties’ positions closer together.1301  Given 
the absence of any doctrine of stare decisis at the international level, a fresh dispute 
over SBT could, in theory at least, be relitigated with a differently composed tribunal 
that could come to the opposite result, even if Australia, Japan and New Zealand 
were the only parties.
1302
  The Award is certainly not binding as between Korea or 
Indonesia and any of these States, and is in any event not applicable to non-parties to 
the 1993 Convention like South Africa.  Even if it is accepted that ultimately there is 
no jurisdiction, there is still prima facie jurisdiction within the meaning of UNCLOS 
Article 290, paragraph 5 – from the very nature of the concept,1303 so that provisional 
measures could be sought and obtained. 
Although events have not yet borne out the prediction of Ørebech et al that the UN 
Fish Stocks Agreement, “a last chance for…co-operation amongst independently 
acting states, to arrest the decline in high seas fishery resources” would lead in the 
                                                                                                                                                                    
well as into itself, and its clear purpose is to fill any jurisdictional lacunae: B.H. Oxman, 
“Complementary Agreements and Compulsory Jurisdiction”, (2001) 95 AJIL 277 at 306-307.  As 
is argued in the main text, this would certainly be the preferred outcome on policy grounds. 
1300
  E.g. A. Boyle, “Problems of Compulsory Jurisdiction and the Settlement of Disputes 
Relating to Straddling Fish Stocks”, in Stokke (ed), supra Ch I n 124, 91 at 104-105; Colson and 
Hoyle, supra n 1299; Oxman, supra n 1299. 
1301
  Annex VII Tribunal Award, infra Appendix A, n 1338, paragraphs 65 and 67. 
1302
  UNCLOS Article 296(2), modelled on Article 59(2) of the Statute of the ICJ, provides 
that a decision rendered by a court or tribunal under Part XV (which always has the jurisdiction 
to determine its own jurisdiction: Article 288(4)), “shall have no binding force except between 
the parties and in respect of that particular dispute.” 
1303
  This is because even if jurisdiction is lacking, it is clearly not manifestly lacking – at 
least until such time, if ever, as there is a string of cases applying the reasoning in the Annex VII 
Tribunal Award.  Sed contra B. Kwiatkowska, “The Southern Bluefin Tuna Arbitral Tribunal Did 
Get It Right: A Commentary and Reply to the Article by David A. Colson and Dr. Peggy Hoyle”, 
(2003) 34 ODIL 369, at 374. 
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“next generation of ocean resource treaties” to cooperation being imposed by deemed 
consent for the greater good,
1304
 they correctly foresaw that there would be no 
“stampede” to use the UN Fish Stocks Agreement’s dispute settlement provisions. 
In part this is because adjudication is reactive; its primary role thus begins only once 
a dispute has arisen, possibly about actions that have caused irreparable harm.  
Stephens rightly says that “The primary focus should therefore be on securing up-
front compliance rather than assessing subsequent reparations through a formalised 
dispute settlement process.”1305  On the other hand, the SBT dispute itself illustrates 
how the dispute settlement system’s binding nature reinforces the duty to cooperate 
through the mere fact that its availability to be invoked “may be employed to hasten 
a negotiated solution or to alter the negotiating dynamic of states in dispute.”1306  
                                                          
1304
  Ørebech et al, supra Ch II n 315, at 140-141.  There is a danger in this that a State that 
becomes party to an agreement of this type in pursuance of its obligation finds that the other 
members are not in practice prepared to cooperate with it, using the weight of their numbers to 
deny it any real role in decisions that have in effect being made in advance by caucusing.  An 
example is the Protocol on the Conservation, Rational Utilization and Management of Norwegian 
Spring Spawning Herring (Atlanto-Scandian Herring) in the North-East Atlantic, done at Oslo, 6 
May 1996, available online at <www.intfish.net/treaties/herring96.htm> (visited on 4 September 
2008), and subsequent Agreed Records – apparently of treaty status – under which the coastal 
States rather than NEAFC regulate this fishery.  In the 1990s, before it joined the European 
Community, Poland voted against a recommendation on the basis that “it was wrong in principle 
for a majority of members of NEAFC to agree to something outside NEAFC and then present it 
to a meeting of NEAFC for adoption.”  See Churchill, supra Ch V n 1017, at 244-248. 
1305
  T. Stephens, “The Limits of International Adjudication in International Environmental 
Law: Another Perspective on the Southern Bluefin Tuna Case”, (2004) 19 IJMCL 177 at 191.  
R.B. Bilder, “The Settlement of Disputes in the Field of the International Law of the 
Environment”, (1975) 144 Recueil des Cours 139 at 224-226 gives several reasons why States in 
practice prefer non-legalistic solutions to their environmental disputes. 
1306
  Ørebech et al, supra Ch II n 315, at 133; accord B. Mansfield, “Compulsory Dispute 
Settlement after the Southern Bluefin Tuna Award”, in A.G. Oude Elferink and D.R. Rothwell 
(eds), Oceans Management in the 21st Century: Institutional Frameworks and Responses 
(Leiden and Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 2004), 255 at 267.  Sed contra Stephens, supra n 1305 at 
191, who regards the deterrent effect as weak except where a high degree of legalisation exists, 
as within the supranational European legal order.  
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This does, however, require its continued availability within fisheries commissions, 
which the Southern Bluefin Tuna Case Award has done nothing to promote because 
its result is that “UNCLOS states parties which favour compulsory settlement of high 
seas fishery disputes…will be more securely protected under UNCLOS alone” than 
if they participate in regional fishery agreements.
1307
 
I Final word: State responsibility and a “theory of 
everything”? 
If a single solution exists to the dilemmas posed in this work, it may lie in restoring 
the application of an element hitherto strangely missing from international fisheries 
law discourse.  It will not have escaped notice that section E of Chapter V above on 
accounting for catch makes no mention of the doctrines of State responsibility.  It is 
striking how little attention is paid to them either in the scholarly literature or in 
fisheries commissions.
1308
  Despite the 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human 
Environment and the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development
1309
 
providing in identical terms that States have “the responsibility to ensure that 
activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment 
                                                          
1307
  Boyle, supra n 1300 at 105.  He thus criticises the Award as an “extraordinary reversal 
of the intentions underlying Part XV”, noting that it leaves high seas fishing States vulnerable to 
creeping coastal State jurisdiction if they enter a regional fishery agreement with no compulsory 
dispute settlement – “precisely the outcome UNCLOS dispute settlement was intended to deter.”  
This perverse consequence was summed up thus by counsel for Australia, Professor Crawford: 
“if you want not to co-operate with a State…, enter into a co-operation agreement with that 
State.”  (Transcript for 8 May 2000, supra Ch III n 666, at 140). 
1308
  Despite its title, B.D. Smith, State Responsibility and the Marine Environment: The 
Rules of Decision (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988) does not consider fisheries at all.  At 245, 
however, he recommends that strict liability rather than due diligence should be the basis of 
responsibility “when the flag possesses meaningful authority over the violative conduct.”  That 
is, “when the violation arises out of matters inherent or pre-existing, and thus susceptible to prior 
and effective flag state preventive action.”  
1309
 The former is reprinted in UN doc A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1, Report of the United Nations 
Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, 5-16 June 1972 (New York: UN, 1973), at 3.  
The latter forms Annex I to UN doc A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1, supra Ch III n 513. 
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of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction”,1310 a survey by 
Boyle reveals very few instances of compensation being sought and granted for any 
sort of environmental harm.
1311
  The single instance in fisheries – compensation by 
the United States to Japan in the 1950s, without admission of liability, for injury to 
fishermen on the high seas and contamination of fish by its atmospheric testing of 
nuclear weapons, did not distinguish between the physical and economic elements of 
the damage suffered.
1312
  From this Boyle concludes of State responsibility that 
there is sufficient uncertainty regarding the subject, and its utility in preference to 
alternative approaches, to pose serious doubts about the concept…The most 
important objection to a strategy which relies on state responsibility, in the form of an 
obligation for states to compensate for harm, remains the argument that it is an 
inadequate model for the enforcement of international standards of environmental 
protection.  Like tort law it can complement, but does not displace, the primary need 
for the setting and enforcement of adequate international standards of environmental 
protection.
1313
 
Instead Boyle advocates the use of private civil liability remedies against those 
directly responsible for environmental costs, and application of the polluter pays 
principle, coupled with criminal law sanctions through prosecutions by the flag 
State.
1314
  This, however, would require relevant States to be under an obligation to 
allow such litigation by injured parties in their domestic courts, of which at present, 
at least in international fisheries law, there is no sign.  Thus Leigh argues that the 
                                                          
1310
 See too Principle 13 of the Rio Declaration, by which States are to “develop further 
international law regarding liability and compensation for adverse effects of environmental 
damage caused by activities within their jurisdiction or control to areas beyond their 
jurisdiction”, language very close to Principle 22 of the earlier Stockholm Declaration. 
1311
  A.E. Boyle, “Remedying Harm to International Common Spaces and Resources: 
Compensation and Other Approaches”, in P. Wetterstein (ed), Harm to the Environment: The 
Right to Compensation and the Assessment of Damages (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 83 at 
87-88. 
1312
  See also K. Leigh, “Liability for Damage to the Global Commons”, (1992) 14 Australian 
Yearbook of International Law 129 at 136. 
1313
  Boyle, supra n 1311, at 91. 
1314
  Ibid., at 92 and 98. 
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distinction between State and civil liability can be overstated, and that “[c]ivil 
liability regimes are obligations entered into by States with respect to persons under 
their jurisdiction.  Civil liability can thus be one way of satisfying State liability.”1315  
Since what is envisaged below for State responsibility concerning fisheries is 
precisely the complementary role to international regulation that Boyle admits, and 
the insufficiency on its own of such regulation is amply demonstrated throughout this 
study, his misgivings do not appear sufficient to deter recourse to it. 
The position is no better in fisheries commissions, where the concept is seemingly 
displaced by members’ rhetoric about “responsible fishing States” rooted in the 
Cancún Declaration of 1992,
1316
 in which “responsible” seems to be no more than a 
term of general approbation devoid of any specific meaning.  So pervasive has this 
process been that the State responsibility term “countermeasures” was recently used 
in an ICCAT recommendation,
1317
 otherwise drafted in orthodox legal language, in a 
sense quite foreign to that in which it appears in Article 22 of the ILC Articles.
1318
 
                                                          
1315
  Leigh, supra n 1312, at 140. 
1316
  Declaration of the International Conference on Responsible Fishing, Cancún, Mexico, 6-
8 May 1992, available at <www.intfish.net/treaties/cancun.htm> (visited on 20 June 2008).  
Subsequently this use has been perpetuated by the soft-law FAO Code of Conduct for 
Responsible Fisheries, available at <www.fao.org/DOCREP/005/v9878e/v9878e00.htm> (visited 
on 20 June 2008). 
1317
  Recommendation by ICCAT amending the Recommendation by ICCAT to Establish a 
List of Vessels Presumed to have Carried out Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing 
Activities in the ICCAT Convention Area, in Annex 5 to ICCATSM15 Report, supra Ch V n 
995, 163 (fifth preambular paragraph). 
1318
  Draft articles on responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts, in UN doc 
A/56/10, Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-third session (23 
April–1 June and 2 July–10 August 2001), reprinted in UN, Yearbook of the International Law 
Commission 2001, Vol II, Part Two (New York and Geneva: UN, 2007), 26-30.  Taken literally, 
ICCAT would be admitting that the measures adopted in the instrument in the previous footnote 
would otherwise be contrary to international law – and, since a prior breach by the targeted State 
is necessary to justify this, they would presumably be ineffective by definition against 
unregulated as opposed to illegal fishing, even though the former is the main intended target. 
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Yet State responsibility can be of service on several levels.  At one level there is the 
attributability to States of fishing carried out by vessels of their nationality.  The UN 
Fish Stocks Agreement and the FAO Compliance Agreement both provide in very 
similar terms that parties must not authorise their vessels to fish for straddling and 
highly migratory stocks and on the high seas respectively unless they can effectively 
exercise their responsibilities in relation to these vessels.
1319
  The State party must 
ensure that its vessels comply with the conservation and management measures 
adopted by any fishery commission of which it is a member, and refrain from fishing 
for any stock managed by a commission of which it is not.
1320
  These are the seeds of 
an incipient trend towards revival of the notion of State responsibility in international 
fisheries law.  The requirement of a positive act of licensing or authorisation ensures 
at least some level of consciousness by the flag State of the level of fishing pressure 
it exerts on high seas stocks, and engenders awareness that other States expect it to 
exercise real control over fishing activities on the high seas by vessels it flags. 
In general, States are not responsible for the activities of persons or vessels having 
their nationality – but the provisions just cited could be used as the basis of an 
argument that high seas fishing is, or ought to be, an exception.  Alternatively, such 
an exception would not be necessary if the State’s responsibility were already 
engaged on the basis of its failure to prevent an outcome for which it was not directly 
responsible.  This occurred recently in the context of genocide, where the ICJ held 
that Serbia was not responsible for the massacre at Srebrenica, but had failed to 
comply with a treaty obligation to prevent it.
1321
 
                                                          
1319
  UN Fish Stocks Agreement, supra Introduction n 4, Article 18(2); FAO Compliance 
Agreement, supra Ch III n 525, Article III(3). 
1320
  UN Fish Stocks Agreement, supra Introduction n 4, Articles 17(2) and 18(1); FAO 
Compliance Agreement, supra Ch III n 525, Article III(1)(a) and (2). 
1321
  Case concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, 26 
February 2007, available at <www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/13685.pdf> (visited on 20 June 
2008), paragraphs 377-450. 
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Secondly, although State responsibility is usually conceived as confined to the 
context of a breach of international law,
1322
 this need not be a serious obstacle to this 
trend.  It should not be excessively difficult to establish a breach either of the 
obligations cited above, or of the more general obligation to cooperate on high seas 
fisheries in Articles 117-119 of UNCLOS, now thought to bind all States, even non-
parties, as customary international law.  Article 42 of the ILC’s 2001 Draft Articles 
provides that:  
A State is entitled as an injured State to invoke the responsibility of another State if 
the obligation breached is owed to:  
(a) That State individually; or 
(b) A group of States including that State, or the international community as a whole, 
and the breach of the obligation: 
(i) Specially affects that State; or  
(ii) Is of such a character as radically to change the position of all the other States to 
which the obligation is owed with respect to the further performance of the 
obligation.
1323
 
It is argued here that overfishing on the high seas in violation of these obligations 
injures the economic interest of every State that could profitably fish the stock at 
Bmsy, in other words any such State is a specially affected injured State for the 
purposes of Article 42.  His general scepticism notwithstanding, Boyle concedes that 
a State whose fishing rights on the high seas are denied, or interfered with by 
pollution, could be an “injured State” for the purposes of the ILC draft articles, so 
that there is no need to rely on dubious arguments for an actio popularis so as to give 
                                                          
1322
  The full title of the International Law Commission’s draft articles on State responsibility, 
supra n 1318, indicates this. 
1323
  Ibid., Article 42.  In any event, Article 48 complementarily provides that:  
Any State other than an injured State is entitled to invoke the responsibility of another 
State…if:  
(a) The obligation breached is owed to a group of States including that State, and is 
established for the collective interest of the group; or 
(b) The obligation breached is owed to the international community as a whole. 
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standing to any State prepared to take action.
1324
  Leigh agrees: “Environmental 
damage can also cause pure economic loss to a State or its nationals, as in the case of 
decreased fish takes due to contamination or reduction of fish stocks.”1325 
Logically, accountability for the consequences of fishing on the high seas must fall 
under one or other of State responsibility and the ILC’s incomplete work on the topic 
of International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising out of Acts Not 
Prohibited by International Law,
1326
 the injurious consequences in question being 
economic harm caused by (vessels flagged to) State A to (a fishery based in) State B.  
The latter topic was subsequently subdivided in way that made it clear that it was 
centred on transboundary harm from inherently hazardous activities,
1327
 but may 
conceivably in due course yield formulations of principle that do away with the need 
to establish a breach of some obligation in order to hold States accountable for their 
acts and omissions on the high seas.
1328
  At all events, interested States will need to 
                                                          
1324
  Boyle, supra n 1311, at 93. 
1325
  Leigh, supra n 1312, at 143 (emphasis added).  Since the loss thus formulated is that of 
States already involved in the fishery, at 144 she cautions that this leaves uncompensated loss of 
potential future use of the resource by other States.  For a possible partial answer to this problem, 
see supra text at n 1231. 
1326
  See e.g. UN doc A/49/10, Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its 
forty-sixth session (2 May – 22 July 1994), reprinted in UN, Yearbook of the International Law 
Commission 1994, Vol II, Part Two (New York and Geneva: UN, 1997), at 153-178; UN doc 
A/50/10, Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-seventh session (2 
May – 21 July 1995), reprinted in UN, Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1995, Vol 
II, Part Two (New York and Geneva: UN, 1998), at 84-99, notably at 86 (paragraph 377) where 
damage to fish stocks is specifically mentioned as an instance of harm to the environment. 
1327
  UN doc A/52/10, Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-
ninth session (12 May-18 July 1997), reprinted in UN, Yearbook of the International Law 
Commission 1997, Vol II, Part Two (New York and Geneva: UN, 2000), 1 at 59 (paragraphs 
162-168). 
1328
  Which of the two it is may depend on whether the principle sic utere tuo ut alienum non 
laedas still extends to the use of areas not under the jurisdiction of any State, notably the high 
seas; recently it has been argued to prohibit high seas fishing of straddling stocks to the extent 
that this damages the coastal State: Applebaum, supra Ch I n 124, at 301.  Although the focus on 
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be vigilant to ensure that the fact that fishing does not clearly belong in either 
category does not lead to a failure of accountability posing further risk to the stocks.  
Nor would it be desirable for fishing to be split among both topics, with one set of 
compensatory rules for breach of an actual catch limit, and another for generally 
damaging overfishing in the absence of a quantified limit. 
Thirdly, and arguably the most in need of development in its application to 
international fisheries, is the rule on the secondary obligation of reparation that arises 
as a result of the breach of a primary rule.  In the Chorzów Factory case, the 
Permanent Court of International Justice laid down the standard that: 
reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and 
re-establish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had 
not been committed.  Restitution in kind, or if this is not possible, payment of a sum 
corresponding to the value which a restitution in kind would bear; the award, if need 
be, of damages for loss sustained which would not be covered by restitution in kind 
                                                                                                                                                                    
territory as the “tuum” and “alienum” in the leading Trail Smelter arbitration, over pollution of 
land in the United States by fumes from a smelter located in Canada (Trail Smelter (United States 
v. Canada) (1941) 3 Reports of International Arbitral Awards 1905) has tended to obscure its 
wider applicability, in its origins the doctrine was seen as pertaining to rights rather than land, for 
example by the United States Supreme Court in relation to high seas navigation in the Marianna 
Flora (1825) 11 Wheat (24 US) 1 at 42, and is so treated by Molenaar, supra Ch III n 517, at 
481.  The same reasoning could equally be said to apply to damage to other States fishing on the 
high seas by virtue of their UNCLOS Article 116 right.  The high seas is expressly contemplated 
by the ILC as the place where transboundary harm may be caused (UN doc A/49/10, supra n 
1327, at 163), but (at 164) its work on this topic was intended to exclude “those activities which 
harm the so-called global commons per se but without any harm to any other State.”  A.E. Boyle, 
“State Responsibility and International Liability for Injurious Consequences of Acts Not 
Prohibited by International Law: A Necessary Distinction?”, (1990) 39 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 1 at 21-22 regards the conceptual distinction between this work and 
that on State responsibility as unsound: he believes that most of it could easily be subsumed into 
the latter, the small remainder being an almost incidental codification by the ILC of the modest 
substantive obligations of general international environmental law.  It is submitted that State 
responsibility is the preferable approach for international fisheries law for the same reason, the 
only difference being that the substantive obligation already has a well settled label – the duty to 
cooperate – but its precise content is unclear. 
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or payment in place of it – such are the principles which should serve to determine 
the amount of compensation due for an act contrary to international law.
1329
 
Possibly it is the extreme practical difficulty in applying these prescriptions to 
breaches of fishery catch limits that has deterred States from attempting to do so.  
Wiping out the consequences of any such breach would seem to entail a complex set 
of problematic and contestable biological and economic calculations in order to 
account to other States for their losses suffered by way of reduced catchability or 
availability of overfished stocks.  Reparation in kind, which is the primary remedy 
whose feasibility must be investigated first, involves establishing what the state of 
stock would have been but for the breach, and what is needed to restore it to that 
state.  This cannot simply be a matter of deducting a tonnage from future catch one 
or two years hence equal to the overcatch, with an additional penalty formula applied 
in defined circumstances, as has been the pattern to date.  On the one hand, a stock 
whose biomass is above Bmsy may not be damaged at all by the overcatch (to the 
contrary, it may even enhance the productivity of the fishery for others), while a 
stock whose biomass is below Bmsy but growing will suffer less or more damage than 
the additional catch taken, depending on how high the TAC is.  Thus, if restitution in 
kind would not restore the balance of benefits among States, an account of profits of 
some kind would be needed, though this may not be easily accommodated under the 
rubric of “damages for loss sustained”.  On the other hand, a stock in a perilous state 
can be pushed over the brink to commercial extinction by a significant overcatch.  In 
that situation, restitution in kind would not be possible and a monetary figure would 
need to be placed on the loss suffered by other actual and potential participants in the 
fishery – again, no easy matter, but one where a range of economic data will be 
available to guide those charged with the calculations.  None of this, however, is an 
argument for not trying; the result may be imperfect and inexact, and the respondent 
State(s) will doubtless be entitled to the benefit of any doubt, but the very fact of 
                                                          
1329
  Case concerning the Factory at Chorzów (Claim for Indemnity) (Merits), (1928) PCIJ 
Series A, No 17, at 47. 
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being held to account may well be enough to make States’ attitude to the fulfilment 
of their obligations significantly more rigorous. 
Indeed, increased attention to State responsibility has other potential benefits for the 
management of international fisheries.
1330
  It makes accounting properly for catch all 
the more crucial.  There are two issues here: defining and adhering to catch limits.  
As to the former, irrespective of whether quota trading hereafter becomes a reality in 
the CCSBT and other fishery commissions, it is clear that when such bodies set 
TACs, in order to guarantee that “total” means just that, they must ensure that it is 
clear whether their quota allocations cover only commercial catch or all sources of 
catch: bycatch, scientific research catch and recreational catch.  On the latter, the 
disastrous effect of misreporting catch not only for the fishery but for the science that 
supports it became clear in 2006 when, just as the CCSBT’s painstakingly developed 
management procedure was about to be implemented, the Japanese catch figures on 
which it was partly based were exposed as grossly understated.  The Chair of the 
Scientific Committee advised that implementation could not proceed, the revelations 
raising major uncertainties about the operating model, such as how much additional 
                                                          
1330
  The variety of possible uses for invocation of State responsibility is considerable.  With 
a modicum of imagination, it could have been for the CCSBT a way out of the impasse caused in 
2002 by Japan’s insistence that there was 1,000 tonnes of “spare” quota (by its trade statistics, 
Indonesia’s catch was around this much less than the figures used by the scientists), of which 500 
tonnes should be redistributed to existing Members and the rest retained for stock recovery: 
Attachment N-2 to CCSBT8 Report, supra Ch IV n 738; see also infra Appendix A, nn 1475-
1477 and accompanying text.  Instead of resisting Japan’s call, Australia and New Zealand could 
have invited Japan to assume international responsibility for Indonesia’s catch as well as its own, 
and on that basis could have consented to a combined quota for Japan and Indonesia of around 
7,000 tonnes.  Though Japan would have been wise to decline such an offer, as its confidence 
was soon proved misplaced (see the Global Catch table, Attachment 4 to CCSBT-ESC4 Report, 
supra Ch I n 141), this could only have come at the cost of being seen to lack the courage of its 
convictions.  Had it accepted, the responsibility for remedying the combined overcatch would 
have fallen entirely on Japan. 
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fishing effort had been expended to make the belatedly acknowledged catch.
1331
  The 
timeframe for adoption even of an interim replacement management procedure 
would be three to five years,
1332
 with the CCSBT’s substantial investment – efforts 
put in by the working group convened for this purpose from 2000 through a series of 
resource-intensive workshops, the engagement of a number of outside consultants as 
an Advisory Panel, culminating in a Special Meeting of the Commission
1333
 and the 
choice of a management procedure from among the ones offered by the Scientific 
Committee
1334
 – in the interim set at naught. 
Since past understatement of catches and profits will serve to diminish compensation 
due, raising the profile of State responsibility in fisheries should become a factor 
dissuading States from concealing the full extent of their fishing activity.  Concern to 
limit potential compensation could also be a far-reaching way to integrate the WTO 
Doha Round work on disciplining fishery subsidies
1335
 into the broader international 
fisheries law framework.  Since compensation at the international level is payable to 
States and not to the individual vessels or persons of their nationality who have 
                                                          
1331
  See e.g. CCSBT, Report of the Seventh Meeting of the Stock Assessment Group, 4 – 11 
September 2006, Tokyo, Japan (hereinafter CCSBT-SAG7 Report, <www.ccsbt.org/docs/pdf/ 
meeting_reports/ccsbt_13/report_of_SAG7.pdf> (visited on 27 July 2008)), at paragraphs 43 and 
57. 
1332
  CCSBT-EC5 Report; supra Ch I n 102, at 8 (paragraph 46). 
1333
  See CCSBT-MWS1 Report, supra Ch IV n 683, CCSBT-MWS2 Report, supra Ch IV n 
683, CCSBT-MWS3 Report, supra Ch IV n 683, CCSBT-MWS4 Report, supra Ch IV n 683 and 
Appendix 3 to CCSBTSM4 Report, supra Ch IV n 678. 
1334
  CCSBT-EC3 Report, supra Ch I n 78, at 23 (paragraph 51). 
1335
  The Doha negotiating mandate is in the Ministerial Declaration Adopted on 14 
November 2001, WTO doc WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 (20 November 2001), paragraph 28.  In 
paragraph 31 of the WSSD Plan of Implementation, supra Ch IV n 917, subparagraph (f) notes 
the necessity to “[e]liminate subsidies that contribute to illegal, unreported and unregulated 
fishing and to over-capacity, while completing the efforts undertaken at WTO to clarify and 
improve its disciplines on fisheries subsidies…”.  As at mid-2008, to judge from “Working 
Document from the Chairman [of the Negotiating Group on Rules]” (WTO doc TN/RL/W/232 
(28 May 2008)), any outcome was still quite some way off. 
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suffered the loss, a State faced with a claim for compensation would naturally be 
inclined to insist as to quantum that the gross losses of those individuals be 
discounted for any subsidies, which do not represent a loss to the subsidising State. 
Considerations of this kind suggest that States ought not to be able to limit their 
liability even inter se by according themselves high quotas in commissions.  To the 
extent that a quota binds other members of the commission, quotas that are part of a 
TAC that is in biological terms too high leave members without legal recourse 
against States that fish within those quotas, and limit the compensation payable if the 
quotas are exceeded.  Here too, then, the role of outsiders is crucial, as collectively 
the members have chosen to bear the risks associated with a dangerously high TAC, 
but will remain collectively responsible to non-members, if not to each other, even 
without any member exceeding its catch limit.  Accordingly, quota decisions should 
not be taken as a voluntary assumption of risk by those members objecting to it as 
too high and not subsequently exceeding their own quotas under it, or those voting 
against it for this reason if there is no objection procedure.  In this way, the revival of 
State responsibility will give States an incentive to move away from lowest common 
denominator decision-making procedures and promote efficacious alternatives in the 
fishery commissions of which they are members. 
Clearly the matters set out in these last pages require a great deal more elaboration on 
the part of interested States and scholars in the years ahead before they can take their 
place in the developing international fisheries law landscape.  For such an all-
embracing “theory of everything” to emerge, however, it should be apparent that the 
role of new entrants – as potential participants in a high seas fishery for a stock like 
SBT keen to ensure that their rights are not infringed, by quota trading or otherwise – 
will approach in importance that of the actual participants to date as they attempt to 
capture the benefits of the fishery for themselves. 
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APPENDIX A 
Third-party aspects of the dispute about Japan’s 
experimental fishing for SBT 
Although formally dating from 31 August 1998, when Australia and New Zealand 
invoked Article 16 of the 1993 Convention,
1336
 the proximate cause of the dispute, 
Japan’s unilateral experimental fishing program, had a significant pre-history and an 
underlying chain of causation of its own.  This included both scientific disagreement 
and fundamental differences in fisheries management philosophy between Australia 
and New Zealand on the one hand and Japan on the other. 
Japan had embarked unilaterally on a program of experimental fishing in excess of 
its last agreed national allocation after failing to persuade the applicants, Australia 
and New Zealand, of the utility of a joint program of such fishing, contrary to an 
agreement earlier in the CCSBT’s consideration of the concept.1337  The applicants’ 
claim was that this was in breach of Japan’s obligations of cooperation with them to 
                                                          
1336
  Southern Bluefin Tuna Case (Australia and New Zealand v. Japan), Award on 
Jurisdiction and Admissibility (2000) 39 ILM 1359 (hereinafter Annex VII Tribunal Award), at 
1359 (paragraph 1). 
1337
  In 1996, the CCSBT decided on objectives and principles for design and implementation 
of an experimental fishing program, which required that any program should be the product of 
collaboration between the parties, not jeopardise the potential recovery of the parental stock, and 
be designed to deliver scientifically valid and meaningful results: see infra, nn 1363-1366 and 
accompanying text.  A series of proposals for experimental fishing subsequently put forward by 
Japan were not accepted by Australia or New Zealand, and thus by the CCSBT itself, because 
they did not satisfy the 1996 Objectives and Principles.  In their view the proposed experimental 
fishing was misdirected relative to the true impacts of uncertainty within the stock assessment 
and the experimental design and analysis were fundamentally flawed.  The experiment targeted 
only one source of uncertainty which, even if it were resolved, would only slightly narrow the 
differences among the parties about stock recovery and appropriate TAC levels.  Thus, in the 
applicants’ view, the objectives of the experiment did not justify the significant increased risk to 
the stock, especially when other mechanisms for reducing uncertainty were available that would 
require little or no additional catch: Statement of Claim, supra Ch III n 500, paragraph 17. 
 449 
take measures required for the conservation and management of the living resources 
of the high seas, specifically SBT, under Articles 64 and 116-119 of UNCLOS.  As 
subsidiary obligations going to the manner of applying those articles they also 
invoked Article 300 (the duty to act in good faith and avoid abuse of rights) and the 
precautionary principle.
1338
 
While Articles 117 to 119 have an obvious relevance to the merits of the dispute 
(considered in section 8 below), it may be noted here that the allegation of breach of 
Article 116 is puzzling, as this provision appears to create no obligation as such that 
is capable of being breached, except the implied one of other States, correlative to 
the fishing State’s right, to refrain from prevention of, or interference with, the 
exercise of the right.  Even if Australia and New Zealand were arguing that breaches 
of the other provisions of UNCLOS mentioned in paragraph (b) or (c) of Article 116 
deprived Japan of the right to fish for SBT at all on the high seas,
1339
 that would 
                                                          
1338
  Australia and New Zealand sought by way of relief a declaration by the Annex VII 
tribunal that Japan had breached its obligations under Articles 64 and 116 to 119 of UNCLOS by 
“failing in good faith to co-operate with” them: ibid., paragraph 69(1)(d).  Counsel for New 
Zealand, Ms Geddis, clarified before the tribunal (Transcript for 8 May 2000, supra Ch III n 666, 
at 168) that this was not an independent allegation of bad faith.  There is a hint in the Annex VII 
Tribunal Award, supra n 1336, that the result might have been different had Australia and New 
Zealand invoked Article 300 in its own right.  Paragraph 64 of the Award reads: 
The Tribunal does not exclude the possibility that there might be instances in which the 
conduct of a State Party to UNCLOS and to a fisheries treaty implementing it would be so 
egregious, and risk consequences of such gravity, that a Tribunal might find that the 
obligations of UNCLOS provide a basis for jurisdiction, having particular regard to the 
provisions of Article 300 of UNCLOS.  While Australia and New Zealand in the proceedings 
before ITLOS invoked Article 300, in the proceedings before this Tribunal they made clear 
that they do not hold Japan to any independent breach of an obligation to act in good faith. 
1339
  In all likelihood the applicants were not asserting this.  Their Statement of Claim, supra 
Ch III n 500, argued only that Japan’s conduct in undertaking experimental fishing unilaterally 
was “not authorised or permitted by Article 116” (the phrase occurs in both paragraphs 60 – 
because it was “calculated to defeat the object and purpose of the 1993 Convention” and 62 – 
because it was “in breach of its obligations under Articles 117, 118 and 119”), and the orders 
they sought called merely for limitation of Japan’s catch of SBT, not its cessation: at paragraph 
69(2)(c) and (d).  Nor is it clear where such an argument would end: if a State “breaches” Article 
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entail no more than asking the Tribunal to apply Article 116 as a consequence of 
those breaches, not a request to remedy an independent breach of Article 116.  The 
better view must be that the obligations set out in paragraphs (a) to (c) condition the 
manner of exercise of the right, not its very existence. 
The arbitration and its outcome have generated a considerable literature.
1340
  The 
issue of entry of third parties to the fishery, or their presence in it, though raised in 
the written and oral pleadings in the dispute, was tangential to it. 
                                                                                                                                                                    
116 in respect of one species, does it thereby lose the right for its nationals to engage in fishing 
on the high seas for any species? 
1340
  An incomplete list consists of: A. Boyle, “The Southern Bluefin Tuna Arbitration”, 
(2001) 50 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 447; Colson and Hoyle, supra Ch VI n 
1299; C.E. Foster, “The "Real Dispute" in the Southern Bluefin Tuna Case: a Scientific 
Dispute?”, (2001) 16 IJMCL 571; M. Kawano, “L’affaire du Thon à nageoire bleue et les 
chevauchements de juridictions internationales”, (2003) XLIX Annuaire Français de Droit 
International 516; B. Kwiatkowska, “The Australia and New Zealand v Japan Southern Bluefin 
Tuna (Jurisdiction and Admissibility) Award of the First Law of the Sea Convention Annex VII 
Arbitral Tribunal”, (2001) 16 IJMCL 239; Kwiatkowska, supra Ch VI n 1303; Maguire, supra 
Ch II n 441; B. Mansfield, “The Southern Bluefin Tuna Arbitration: Comments on Professor 
Barbara Kwiatkowska’s Article”, (2001) 16 IJMCL 361; Mansfield, supra Ch VI n 1306; D.L. 
Morgan, “A Practitioner’s Critique of the Order Granting Provisional Measures in the Southern 
Bluefin Tuna Cases”, in M.H. Nordquist and J.N. Moore (eds), Current Marine Environmental 
Issues and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (The Hague/London/New York: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 2001), 173; D.L. Morgan, “Implications of the Proliferation of International 
Legal Fora: The Example of the Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases”, (2002) 43 Harvard International 
Law Journal 541; F. Orrego Vicuña, “From the 1893 Bering Sea Fur Seals Case to the 1999 
Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases: A Century of Efforts at Conservation of the Living Resources of 
the High Seas”, (1999) 10 Yearbook of International Environmental Law 40; Y. Otani “Quelques 
réflexions sur la juridiction et la recevabilité vis-à-vis de l’Affaire du thon à nageoire bleue”, in 
Ando et al (eds), supra Ch I n 113, 731; B.H. Oxman, supra Ch VI n 1299; J. Peel, “A Paper 
Umbrella Which Dissolves in the Rain?  The Future for Resolving Fisheries Disputes under 
UNCLOS in the Aftermath of the Southern Bluefin Tuna Arbitration”, (2002) 3 Melbourne 
Journal of International Law 53; T. Polacheck, “Experimental Catches and the Precautionary 
Approach: the Southern Bluefin Tuna Dispute”, (2002) 26 Marine Policy 283; V. Röben, “The 
Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases: Re-Regionalization of the Settlement of Law of the Sea 
Disputes?”, (2002) 62 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 61; C. 
 451 
1 Gestation of the dispute – interpretation of CPUE 
The fishery indicators for SBT have historically relied heavily on the interpretation 
of CPUE.
1341
  While the scientific analyses of the early 1990s were at one in 
concluding that the SBT parental stock was substantially depleted from its virgin 
biomass,
1342
 there were significant discrepancies in their projections for the stock’s 
recovery, Japan’s scientists interpreting the CPUE data in an optimistic fashion and 
those of Australia and New Zealand pessimistically.
1343
  The experimental fishing 
conducted by Japan in 1998 and 1999 was aimed at reducing one aspect of the 
uncertainty in the interpretation on which the CCSBT had been unable to develop an 
agreed approach, namely the fact that the locations in which fishing took place varied 
from year to year.
1344
  According to Polacheck,
1345
 the relative density of SBT in an 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Romano, “The Southern Bluefin Tuna Dispute: Hints of a World to Come…Like It or Not”, 
(2001) 32 ODIL 313; N. Tanaka, “Some Observations on the Southern Bluefin Tuna Arbitration 
Award”, (2001) 44 Japanese Annual of International Law 9. 
1341
  For an account of other aspects of fisheries science relevant to SBT see generally 
Appendix B infra. 
1342
  See e.g. the oral submissions to ITLOS of Counsel for Australia, Professor Crawford, 
ITLOS doc ITLOS/PV.99/20/Rev.1 (hereinafter “Transcript for morning of 18 August”), 
available online at <www.itlos.org/case_documents/2001/document_en_139.pdf>, at 34. 
1343
  This began as early as 1989, when Australia noted in the management meeting that 
catches by other parties had not been included in the virtual population analysis projections 
(explained infra Appendix B n 1517) considered by the scientists, which added to the need for a 
cautious approach: September 1989 Summary Record, supra Ch II n 368, at 27.  When the 
meeting reconvened a month later Australia said the Taiwanese and Korean catch figures 
provided by Japan were substantially lower than its own estimate; Australia would thus not 
accept without further discussion the statement by Japan that future parental biomass estimates 
still increased even with catches by Taiwan and Korea included in the estimates: October 1989 
Draft Summary Record, supra Ch II n 369, at 3-4. 
1344
  “Status of the stock and fishery indicators” (Appendix 1 to 12th Trilateral Scientific 
Meeting Report, supra Ch II n 348), at 1 (paragraph 1) cautions that, although CPUE is of great 
value in indicating general trends, interpretation of relatively small and short term changes is 
very difficult because many factors can change CPUE other than abundance, especially for small 
fish; the data available have limited capacity to correct for their effects.  The point was repeated 
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area and season in one year does not provide a reliable basis for estimating the 
relative density in that area and season in other years.  For CPUE to provide a 
statistically valid index of abundance, it would be necessary to account for the 
relative density of fish in areas and periods with no fishing.  For this purpose several 
different CPUE indices based on different mathematical models were developed, 
aggregating data typically at the monthly and 5° square level.  Two of the CPUE 
series developed for SBT represented bounds for the relative density in unfished 
areas in a given year.  The lower bound, known as the variable square model, took 
the density in the unfished squares as zero, in other words it assumed no SBT at all 
were present.  The model was intended as a simplified representation of the effect of 
fishing effort being concentrated in areas of highest density (that is, it assumed that 
fishing masters have perfect knowledge of where the fish are).
1346
  The upper bound, 
referred to as the constant square model, equated the relative density in unfished 
squares with that in the areas fished, i.e. fishing was assumed to be at random.
1347
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
in identical terms the following year: 13th Trilateral Scientific Meeting Report, supra Ch I n 46, 
at 8 (Appendix 1, (“Status of the stock and fishery indicators”), paragraph 1). 
1345
  Polacheck, supra n 1340, at 287. 
1346
  Over the years, the CCSBT Scientific Committee also considered a number of other 
models.  Of these the one given the most weight in stock assessments is based on a geostatistical 
approach which estimates the density in areas without data as a function of the relative density in 
neighbouring areas and time periods: ibid.  Note that, if the aim were purely to model fishing 
effort, the assumption of zero density would appear unjustified.  Even if a vessel could move 
instantly and costlessly from one area to another, the logical consequence of the assumption that 
fishing masters are systematically able to target areas of higher density is simply that no unfished 
square may have a density higher than the lowest density of any fished square.  The justification 
for zero density, if there is one, is that zero is a peremptory lower bound useful for modelling 
purposes.  That is, if models that give a certain weight to the premise that there are no fish in 
unfished squares are shown to be consistent with the observed data, as was the case here, even 
the fact that the premise is accepted or proved to be wrong should not, as a proposition of science 
let alone of law, prevent their use. 
1347
  See also Maguire, supra Ch II n 441, at 204-205 and Butterworth and Penney, supra Ch 
III n 553, at 178 for explanations of the constant or variable squares problem. 
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Australia and New Zealand were not opposed in principle to experimental fishing.  In 
the trilateral period, indeed, they had supported a very similar concept, when, citing 
concerns about “the problem of overfishing, other uncertainties, and the concerns at 
the historically low levels of parental biomass,” 1,000 tonnes of Australian quota was 
“frozen” in 1990-91, of which 300 tonnes were to be used in a scientific research 
program to be formulated jointly by the three States.
1348
  The detail was set out in an 
annex to the 1990 Resolution: 
…The basic conditions under which the program would operate are as follows: 
1. It will be carried out by Japanese fishing vessels unless it is specifically decided 
that Australian or New Zealand vessels should be involved. 
… 
5. Japan guarantees that the program will be implemented within the limit of 300 
tonnes. 
6. Japan will bear all reasonable costs associated with the research program…. 
7. If the understandings in relation to the program’s implementation are not met, 
then the allocation of Australian quota can be cancelled by Australia 
immediately. …1349 
Nor is experimental fishing of a highly depleted stock in itself objectionable; when 
commercial catches have been sharply restricted, experimental catch may be required 
in order to be able to monitor biomass trends.  Where, however, the experiments 
involve substantial additional catch, managers must balance their information needs 
for improved (and less risky) future decision-making against the short-term increased 
biological risks associated with increased catches.
1350
  Given the failure of the 
                                                          
1348
  “SBT Trilateral Management Discussions – Resolution”, supra Ch II n 341, at 1. 
1349
  Ibid., at 5 (Annex 2, “SBT Special Research Program”). 
1350
  Polacheck, supra n 1340, at 283-284.  Morgan, supra n 1340, at 188 argues that, if the 
stock were truly in danger, scientific catch should have taken precedence over commercial catch.  
This is defensible, but was not Japan’s position – indeed, it was closer to the Applicants’: that if 
Japan considered the experiment so vitally important, it was at liberty to conduct it unilaterally, 
provided it did so within its last agreed national allocation.  (In fact Japan had done just that some 
years earlier, adding 40 tonnes of its own allocation to a trilateral research quota because it 
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depleted SBT stock to recover,
1351
 in which the recently increasing catch of third 
parties was an element, Australia and New Zealand argued that the flaws in the 
design of the experiment itself, and of the way in which Japan proposed to use its 
results in future stock assessments, deprived it of scientific value and were 
outweighed by the significant risk posed to the stock by the greater catch. 
                                                                                                                                                                    
believed “the programme was necessary in order to understand the real state of the stock”: Draft 
1991 Summary Record, supra Ch V n 1101, at 7-8.)  On the need for additional catches as 
opposed to accommodating the experimental fishing within Japan’s previous national allocation, 
Polacheck argues at 292-293 that this need was never demonstrated in terms of the information 
supposedly to be gained; rather it was dictated by “political/economic realities”.  If the same 
information could be obtained without increasing catches, the increased short-term risks of 
additional catches would not be justifiable simply for their potential to decrease long-term risks.  
Agreeing with Morgan, Polacheck states that if, on the other hand, some form of experimental 
fishing or scientific catch were required to provide information for management or for reducing 
risk, then such catch should take priority, commercial catches being added only if the recovery 
strategy leaves scope for them.  He argues that any substantial scientific catches need to be 
considered within the context of the overall conservation and management of the stock, assessing 
increased short-term risk relative to long-term benefits linked directly to managing the stock. 
1351
  Despite the 1989 reduction in the TAC, supra Ch II, text following n 338, the size of the 
spawning stock at the time of the dispute was between 25% and 53% of the 1980 level.  Relative 
to stock levels in the fishery’s early years, Australian scientists estimated it at historically low 
levels in the order of 7-15% of its 1960 level, and Japanese scientists at 12% of the 1951 level, 
with recruitment (defined supra Ch I n 194) having declined markedly from the late 1960s to the 
mid-1990s to around a third of the 1960 level: see Statement of Claim, supra Ch III n 500, at 4 
(paragraph 6).  Polacheck, supra n 1340, at 292 states that the decades of intensive fishing of the 
SBT stock had rendered it significantly overfished and below commonly accepted thresholds for 
biologically safe parental biomass, below which the risk of poor recruitment increases.  The 
greatest concern was that natural environmental variability could combine with the vulnerable 
state of the resource to cause abrupt recruitment decline and a subsequent (and consequent) 
further decline in the parental stock.  This had been the mechanism associated with a large 
number of fisheries collapses.  The principle underlying these thresholds, defined in terms of the 
level of depletion of a stock or in terms of the rate at which it is currently being exploited, is that 
they indicate a state for the stock or fishery which should be avoided.  For SBT, the stock levels 
of the late 1990s were estimated to be below reference points based on the degree of depletion, 
while estimates of the rates of exploitation indicated a high likelihood that exploitation rate 
reference points were also being exceeded. 
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At the 1993 management meeting Japan proposed the use of non-commercial quota 
for a program to monitor the fishery in real time, but New Zealand noted that this had 
been discussed and rejected at previous meetings.  Given the increasingly serious 
concerns about the stock, Australia and New Zealand said they could not consider an 
allocation of scientific quota outside the trilateral commercial catch limits.
1352
 
The first hint of experimental fishing came in a suggestion by an invited expert at the 
1994 trilateral scientific meeting that difficulties in interpretation of CPUE could be 
addressed by the division of the TAC between currently fished areas and areas where 
fishing had been absent in recent years.
1353
  These difficulties had arisen because  
[t]he Japanese long-line fishery has contracted in recent years, and substantially in 
1993 in [5°-square] areas fished each month.  Such a contraction results in no CPUE 
data from many area-months and, because no information is available from unfished 
areas, increased uncertainty about total stock abundance.  This uncertainty is largely 
responsible for the wide range of interpretations of recent CPUE increases of 
juveniles within the fished area-months.
1354
 
A month later Japan proposed at the First Meeting of the CCSBT to instruct the 
Scientific Committee to formulate a real-time monitoring program for the 1995 
season to cover areas and periods outside the commercial fisheries with a minimum 
level of catch required for scientifically valid research, the catch taken in the course 
of the program not to be counted against the global quota.
1355
 
At the following Scientific Committee Meeting, Japanese scientists tabled a three-
page proposal for extensive experimental fishing, which Polacheck criticises for 
lacking details on the experimental design, its analysis, the way the results would be 
                                                          
1352
  October 1993 Draft Summary Record, supra Ch II n 360, at 5. 
1353
  Polacheck, supra n 1340, at 287. 
1354
  13th Trilateral Scientific Meeting Report, supra Ch I n 46, at 3 (paragraph 12).  The 
Report of the previous year’s scientific meeting had noted a recent pattern of longline fishing 
effort moving from areas that historically provided high catches of large and valuable fish to 
areas where smaller fish were now being caught: 12th Trilateral Scientific Meeting Report, supra 
Ch II n 348, at 8 (Appendix 1, “Status of the stock and fishery indicators”, paragraph 4). 
1355
  CCSBT1 Report, supra Ch I n 273, at 1 and Annex 1, Part 2, paragraphs 1 and 3. 
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used to manage the stock and the basis for the magnitude of the catch sought.
1356
  At 
the April 1995 informal meeting Japan elaborated on its research quota proposal, 
arguing that it should be allocated to vessels to fish in areas and seasons not currently 
fished, so that data would be available for resolving uncertainties in the stock 
assessment, such as the “constant vs variable squares” question.1357  Australia and 
New Zealand said it was unacceptable to contemplate quota increases, whether for 
commercial or research purposes, until a clear management strategy incorporating 
reference points had been established.
1358
 
If Australia and New Zealand did not at first take the concept of an experimental 
fishing program seriously, the explanation for this lies in the context in which Japan 
introduced it into the Commission proper.  At the Second Meeting of the CCSBT in 
September 1995, while Australia and New Zealand took the position that the TAC 
should be left as it was, with no change to Members’ national allocations, Japan 
sought an increase in the TAC of 6,000 tonnes without mentioning its earlier 
research quota proposal.
1359
  As no consensus could be reached on the TAC and 
national allocations, the CCSBT decided to continue its deliberations on this matter 
the following month by convening a special meeting, as provided under Article 6, 
paragraph 5 of the 1993 Convention.
1360
  At the Special Meeting, Japan renewed its 
call for a 6,000-tonne increase in the TAC, but now offered alternatives: a 6,000-
tonne experimental fishing quota above the TAC to be fished annually for three 
                                                          
1356
  Polacheck, supra n 1340, at 288. 
1357
  Supra, text at and immediately following n 1346. 
1358
  CCSBT1 Report, supra Ch I n 273, at 8. 
1359
  CCSBT2 Report, supra Ch II n 414, at 1.  Japan did not say how this increase should be 
divided among the Members’ national allocations. 
1360
  Article 6(5) provides that “Special meetings of the Commission shall be convened by the 
Chair at the request of a Party supported by at least two other Parties.”  A special meeting may 
consider any matter relevant to the 1993 Convention: Article 6(6). 
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years, or a combination of additional TAC and experimental quota totalling 6,000 
tonnes per annum.
1361
 
With the impasse on setting a TAC for the 1996 season persisting, at a subsequent 
session of this meeting in January 1996 it was agreed to evaluate the possible 
implementation of an experimental fishing program.
1362
  In a further special meeting 
in 1996, the CCSBT adopted a document entitled “Objectives and Principles for the 
design and implementation of an EFP” and a process both to evaluate the impact of 
additional removals and to design and evaluate experimental fishing proposals.
1363
 
The Objectives and Principles document set out the following agreed matters: 
[An EFP] could happen where there is agreement within the Commission that the 
risks of such extra removals are outweighed by the benefits. […] Prior to the 
Commission deciding to proceed with any experimental fishing program it will need 
to agree on the way in which results…would be incorporated into the stock 
assessment and the future management decision-making for the fishery.
1364
  
In addition, the development, evaluation, implementation and analysis of the 
program should be collaborative and agreed among all parties; prior to any such 
program being implemented, agreement should be reached on the specific criteria for 
determining whether any additional removals would jeopardise stock recovery.  The 
criteria for judging an experimental fishing program “should be derived from 
management objectives” and any such program “should be designed to deliver 
scientifically valid and meaningful results”, with “appropriate monitoring of any 
program, designed and conducted in a collaborative manner amongst the parties.”1365 
                                                          
1361
  CCSBTSM1(1) Report, supra Ch I n 38, at 1 and the proposal appended to Annex 2 
(“<<Japan’s Proposal>> on Special Experimental Fishing Arrangements (Additional Measures) 
for the Special Meeting of CCSBT October 1995 Canberra”). 
1362
  CCSBTSM1(2) Report, supra Ch IV n 682, at 2. 
1363
  The document forms Attachment C to CCSBTSM2 Report, supra Ch I n 289.  EFP as 
used here and elsewhere in this Appendix stands for “experimental fishing program”. 
1364
  Attachment C to CCSBTSM2 Report, supra n 1363, at 1. 
1365
  Ibid., at 2-3. 
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The evaluation process was specified in some detail, entailing three steps.  Step 1 
envisaged the reaching of agreement on the range of uncertainty to be considered in 
evaluating experimental fishing proposals, and on the weight to be placed on the 
various options within that range.  In Step 2 there would be an evaluation of the 
effect of changed catch levels on the chance of recovery, including the effects on 
recovery of resolving the main uncertainties, and suggestions as to how the latter 
might be achieved.  The aim of Step 3 would be to determine the most effective use 
of experimental catch, including the type of information provided by experimental 
fishing and how that information would be used by managers.  This would involve 
empirical analysis of past fishing experience on possible results from the proposed 
experiment, simulation of those results and their analysis by agreed methods.
1366
 
2 Japan’s experimental fishing 
Although Japan’s original 1995 proposal for experimental fishing appeared to be 
motivated more by the short-term economic benefits of increased catches than a need 
for additional information,
1367
 in 1996, the CCSBT initiated work to develop a joint 
experimental fishing program.  This was predicated on the additional catch not 
jeopardising the primary management objective for the stock: rebuilding the parental 
biomass to at least the 1980 level by 2020.
1368
  The CCSBT held several workshops 
and meetings from 1996 to mid-1998 to develop and evaluate experimental fishing 
proposals based on the agreed objectives and principles and the three-step evaluation 
process.  The failure of this process to reach consensus is attributed by Polacheck in 
part to the 
very different attitudes about the importance and rigour with which the criteria and 
process needed to be adhered to, as well as…a difference in perspective about 
whether the outcome of the process was to provide the basis for deciding on whether 
                                                          
1366
  “Scientists report for evaluating the impact of additional removals for experimental 
fishing on the recovery of the SBT stock” (Attachment D to CCSBTSM2 Report, supra Ch I n 
289), at 1-2. 
1367
  Supra, text at nn 1359-1361. 
1368
  Supra Ch I, text at n 289. 
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an EFP was worth conducting or whether fundamentally, this was already clear and 
only a technical design was required.
1369
 
According to Polacheck, the difference in perspective between Australia and New 
Zealand on one hand and Japan on the other as to what was required in terms of the 
linkage between the results from an EFP and an agreed management response was a 
key obstacle to agreement.
1370
  From the outset, the support of Australia and New 
Zealand for any such program was dependent upon a direct linkage: “Australia and 
New Zealand indicated that they would support collaborative and timely work on 
designing and evaluating an EFP, linked by means of predetermined management 
responses to clear management objectives.”1371 
Japan’s earliest proposals contained no reference to decision rules or management 
responses.  Though some later ones included a section on decision rules, these did 
not extend to specific predetermined management responses, and allowed only for 
increases in TAC if the results were positive, but not for decreases in the TAC, 
beyond a possible payback of EFP catches, if the results were negative.
1372
 
                                                          
1369
  Polacheck, supra n 1340, at 288. 
1370
  Ibid., at 291, where a number of other factors are listed on which differences in 
perspective prevented agreement from being reached.  
1371
  CCSBTSM2 Report, supra Ch I n 289, at 1. 
1372
  Polacheck, supra n 1340, at 290-291.  Japan argued that, over a timeframe longer than 
that of the additional short-term catch it proposed, the added risk of not meeting the recovery 
target could be negated by a compensating decrease in catch.  It thus offered to make such a 
compensatory reduction if its experimental catches were shown to be detrimental to the stock.  
Australia and New Zealand found this unsatisfactory because Japan had put forward no standard 
or method for measuring detriment, and placed the onus of proof on them to show that it had 
occurred.  Since the effects would not manifest themselves in the short term, without settling 
fixed time horizons and decision criteria, the default outcome would always be to prolong the 
period of additional catches and delay initiation of the compensating reductions.  While the 
marginal increase in detriment of waiting one more year would always tend to be small, the 
cumulative effect of doing so repeatedly could be devastating.  A further weakness of Japan’s 
proposal was that the risks at low stock sizes were not symmetrical nor well estimated, so that 
decrease of future catch might be of no use if the stock collapsed in the meantime: see infra 
Appendix B, text following n 1506 and Polacheck, supra n 1340, at 292. 
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The pattern of Japan seeking substantial increases in the TAC or alternatively a large 
experimental fishing quota continued for the rest of the decade.
1373
  It was Japan’s 
1998 decision to fish experimentally on its own outside this framework that 
provoked the dispute under UNCLOS and the 1993 Convention. 
In February 1998, Japan indicated that it would fish commercially at the level of 
national allocation fixed for its most recent fishing year (March 1997 to February 
1998) and an additional 2,010 tonnes of SBT for three years, for the purposes of 
unilateral experimental fishing.  From March to June 1998 Australia, Japan and New 
Zealand held talks, but these failed to resolve the differences over the Japanese 
proposal.  On 1 June 1998, Japan made a revised proposal for experimental fishing of 
1,400 tonnes to start on 1 July that year, to precede its three-year program.  Australia 
and New Zealand replied that the proposal was unacceptable by reference to the 
agreed criteria, and requested Japan not to proceed.  Despite those requests, Japan 
undertook unilateral experimental fishing in the southern Indian Ocean from 10 July 
to 31 August 1998, resulting in a combined commercial and experimental catch of 
SBT 1,464 tonnes in excess of its previously agreed national allocation.
1374
 
In response, in July 1998, New Zealand advised Japan that no Japanese SBT vessels 
would be permitted access to New Zealand ports, bringing it into line with the 
position in Australia, where Japanese access had ceased at the end of February with 
the expiry of the last subsidiary agreement for fishing access to Australia’s EEZ.1375 
Then on 31 August 1998 Australia and New Zealand invoked the formal dispute 
settlement procedures under the 1993 Convention, requesting urgent consultations 
and negotiations under Article 16, paragraph 1.  This led to consultations in 
December 1998, but no solution was reached beyond an agreement to continue 
intensive consultations in 1999 with a view to finding an acceptable joint program of 
                                                          
1373
  Polacheck, supra n 1340, at 287. 
1374
  Statement of Claim, supra Ch III n 500, paragraph 13. 
1375
  Supra Ch I n 265 (the last item listed). 
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experimental fishing for that year.
1376
  Again, however, no agreement was reached 
between the parties in this framework.
1377
  Although the Working Group’s terms of 
reference required it to “decide on appropriate decision rules governing the 
interpretation of the results for the management and conservation of SBT”, this 
proved impossible because the CCSBT had not developed a management decision-
making framework.
1378
 
Japan informed Australia and New Zealand in May 1999 that it planned to reinstitute 
its experimental fishing program; Australia and New Zealand responded on 1 June 
that its renewal would be considered a termination of the negotiations.  Japan 
proceeded with its experimental fishing program, but simultaneously maintained that 
it did not intend to curtail negotiations.
1379
  On 23 June 1999, Japan requested that 
the dispute with Australia be resolved by mediation pursuant to the 1993 Convention, 
and made the same request of New Zealand the following day.  Both applicants 
replied on 30 June 1999 that they were willing to submit the dispute to mediation if 
Japan discontinued its experimental fishing program.
1380
  When Japan rejected this, 
Australia and New Zealand notified Japan of their decision to commence compulsory 
                                                          
1376
  For this purpose the parties established an Experimental Fishing Program Working 
Group of managers and other officials, national scientists and industry representatives as well as 
three invited external scientists.  The Working Group’s terms of reference required that account 
be taken of the 1996 Objectives and Principles and listed eight specific tasks that were similar to 
and consistent with the basic development and evaluation steps agreed on previously: Polacheck, 
supra n 1340, at 288. 
1377
  Polacheck, ibid., at 289 found this unsurprising given the complexity of the tasks that 
were assigned to the Working Group and the short timeframe of four meetings between February 
and April 1999 (see the list of past CCSBT meetings, supra Ch IV n 683).  
1378
  The terms of reference are cited in Polacheck, supra n 1340, at 291.  Instead, the 
Working Group proposed a “metarule”, by which the experiment could continue into 1999 but 
not proceed into future years unless decision rules were first agreed; Australia and New Zealand 
found this unacceptable: Japanese memorial, supra Ch II n 433, at 39 (paragraph 81), Applicants’ 
Reply, supra Ch IV n 723, at 98 (paragraph A33). 
1379
  Annex VII Tribunal Award, supra n 1336, at 1367 (paragraph 26). 
1380
  Japanese memorial, supra Ch II n 433, at 44-45 (paragraph 90) and 46 (paragraph 94). 
 462 
dispute resolution under Part XV of UNCLOS, submitting the dispute to an arbitral 
tribunal constituted under Annex VII, the default dispute settlement mechanism, 
instituting these proceedings by almost identical statements of claim on 15 July 
1999.
1381
  Pending the constitution of such a tribunal, they made similarly parallel 
requests to ITLOS to prescribe provisional measures, as provided by Article 290, 
paragraph 5 of UNCLOS.
1382
 
The provisional measures requested included the cessation of Japan’s experimental 
fishing program, the restriction of Japan’s future catches to the last agreed level, less 
the experimental catch for 1998 and 1999, and other orders protecting the rights of 
the parties.
1383
  ITLOS heard the requests for provisional measures on 18-20 August 
1999 at its seat in the German port of Hamburg. 
3 The ITLOS hearing and Order 
a The hearing 
Third-party considerations made a reappearance before ITLOS.  The Australian 
Attorney-General, Mr Williams, argued that Japan’s conduct was 
setting a terrible example for third States which are themselves increasingly 
imposing extra stress on the resource.  By refusing to agree to a continuation of the 
                                                          
1381
  Under Article 287 of UNCLOS a State may at any time declare that it accepts one or 
more of four means of compulsory dispute settlement: ITLOS, the ICJ, an arbitral tribunal 
established under Annex VII or, for certain categories of disputes including fisheries disputes, a 
special arbitral tribunal established under Annex VIII.  If, as at the time proceedings were 
instituted in this case was true of all the parties to the dispute, a State has not selected a particular 
means of dispute settlement, it is deemed to have accepted arbitration under Annex VII. 
1382
  Article 290(5) of UNCLOS provides that, pending the establishment of an arbitral 
tribunal under Annexes VII or VIII, ITLOS, if it considers that prima facie the arbitral tribunal 
would have jurisdiction to hear the case, may prescribe any provisional measures it considers 
appropriate to preserve the respective rights of the parties or to prevent serious harm to the 
marine environment. 
1383
  Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases (New Zealand v Japan; Australia v Japan), Provisional 
Measures, Order of 27 August 1999, ITLOS Reports 1999, p.280, at 288-289 (paragraphs 31 
(New Zealand) and 32 (Australia)). 
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previous total allowable catch, Japan has precluded the parties from relying on the 
total allowable catch as a basis for restraining the action of third States.
1384
 
Expanding on this argument, counsel for Australia cited among the reasons for 
preferring the applicants’ pessimistic stock prediction to Japan’s optimistic one 
the most recent trends in fishing, and the relations between the Japanese EFP and 
third-party fishing.  The 1997 projections assumed a constant total catch for the next 
few years.  That assumption is already wrong.  From 1997 to 1998 the total catch 
went up by around 22% of which Japan was responsible for 43%, nearly half, with 
its EFP.  So that gives added cause for concern. 
Japan’s response to that…is to say that third parties are at least as much to blame, so 
why don’t we go off and sue the third parties.  But the answers to that are obvious 
enough.  … 
As to the argument that the Applicants could have sued third parties for substantial 
new fishing, the fact that other parties may be acting in that manner does not justify 
Japan doing so.  To the contrary, the fact of additional third State fishing provides a 
reason for reconsidering previous quotas down…, as well as taking other measures 
to contain or deter further increases.  Far from acting as a deterrent, Japan’s action 
must be a positive encouragement to third parties to grab what they can as well, in 
what has become – because of Japan’s refusal to agree to a continuation of the TAC 
– a virtually unregulated fishery.1385 
Japan objected to the jurisdiction of ITLOS on the ground that the Annex VII 
tribunal, once constituted, would lack jurisdiction to decide the dispute.  It argued 
that the dispute concerned the interpretation or application not of UNCLOS but of 
the 1993 Convention, and in the alternative that Australia and New Zealand had not 
met the preliminary requirements of UNCLOS Article 283 for invocation of the 
compulsory dispute settlement mechanism.
1386
 
                                                          
1384
  Oral submissions of the Australian Attorney-General, Mr Williams QC, Transcript for 
morning of 18 August, supra n 1342, at 14-15.  Accord the oral submissions of Counsel for 
Australia, Professor Crawford, ibid., at 33: “Japan’s action also limits the Applicants’ 
opportunity to engage third parties in relation to their fishing of SBT.”  
1385
  Oral submissions of Counsel for Australia, Professor Crawford, Transcript for afternoon 
of 18 August, supra Ch I n 190, at 18. 
1386
  ITLOS Order, supra n 1383, at 290 (paragraph 33) and 294 (paragraph 56). 
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In this phase of the dispute, however, Japan raised the question of non-party catch 
not as a ground of inadmissibility of the applicants’ claims, but as a debating point: 
Indeed, were this truly a dispute under the Law of the Sea Convention, the Applicants 
would surely have named as Respondents the other States that are both parties to 
UNCLOS and catch SBT…Australia’s and New Zealand’s scientific experts identify 
the unregulated catch of non-parties to the 1993 Convention as a source of potential 
damage to the SBT stock.  That catch, as demonstrated this morning, far exceeds the 
tonnage involved in Japan’s EFP.  Thus, if the Applicants in fact believed that this 
dispute arose under the Law of the Sea Convention, under their own theory, Japan 
could not be the only necessary party to a resolution of this matter.  The Applicants’ 
failure to join the Republic of Korea and Indonesia, for example, demonstrates the 
Applicants’ lack of consistency in their approach to this issue.1387 
Further, Japan contrasted the non-member catch both with the much smaller tonnage 
which it maintained was all that was in dispute between the parties:  
Why are the three countries in dispute between themselves for a matter of, 
figuratively speaking, a few hundreds of tonnes of SBT when a new challenge is 
emerging of, to put it mildly, a few thousand tonnes of SBT catch which is coming 
from outside the framework of the 1993 Convention?
1388
 
and with the total experimental catch tonnage:  
This non-party catch in the aggregate far exceeds the amount caught in Japan’s EFP.  
Moreover…the non-parties have been able to increase their catch despite the dire 
recovery forecasts of Australia and New Zealand.  There is, therefore, no reason to 
                                                          
1387
  Oral submissions of Professor Ando, Counsel for Japan, ITLOS doc ITLOS/PV.99/23/ 
Rev.1, available online at <www.itlos.org/case_documents/2001/document_en_142.pdf>), at 8. 
1388
  Oral submissions of the Agent for Japan, Mr Togo, Transcript for morning of 19 August, 
supra Ch I n 285, at 10.  The “few hundreds of tonnes” were the difference between Japan’s 
proposed tonnage and the amount Australia and New Zealand had indicated they were prepared 
to accept for a joint experimental fishing program, but was not the only matter in issue, given the 
significant differences between them on the design of the experiment and the use to which the 
resulting data would be put: see infra nn 1484-1488 and accompanying text, as well as the 
relevant passage of the award of the Annex VII tribunal, infra text at n 1440. 
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believe that countries such as Indonesia would not continue to increase their catch to 
more than make up for any tonnage Japan might be proscribed from catching.
1389
  
Expanding the argument, Japan used the non-members as a reason for ITLOS not to 
restrain its catch: 
[O]ther nations will not participate unless they can be assured that they will not be 
bound to national allocations absent their consent…that no one party be permitted to 
impose its view on the others…1390 
Japan also used them as a policy argument for its experimental fishing program: 
In Japan’s view, the only way to bring these non-parties into the cooperative 
framework of the 1993 Convention is to re-establish the proper functioning of that 
Convention; that is to say, scientifically establish the appropriate level of total 
allowable catch for long-term conservation and optimum utilization and offer 
appropriate allocation to each country.  Without a share in the fishing of SBT, we 
cannot imagine any of these non-parties will choose to join the cooperative 
framework of the 1993 Convention. 
Japan has been making constructive proposals to this end.  Allegations have been 
made that Japan is diverting its responsibility by blaming these outside parties.  On 
the contrary…it is only by demonstrating that the Convention for the Conservation 
of SBT can function normally and provide a reasonable basis for cooperation, based 
on a reasonable analysis of the best scientific data available that we will be able to 
induce non-parties to join its cooperative framework.  This is Japan’s goal. 
Mr President, Honourable judges, after prolonged and serious deliberations, we 
came to the conclusion that the only way to achieve our goal is to introduce and 
implement an effective mechanism of an Experimental Fishing Programme.
1391
 
In effect, the non-members were reasons in themselves to conduct experimental 
fishing:  
No state, I submit, will join the 1993 Convention unless it can be given a reasonable 
quota to make joining viable.  If the EFP were to demonstrate that Applicants’ 
                                                          
1389
  Oral submissions of Counsel for Japan, Mr Greig, Transcript for morning of 19 August, 
supra Ch I n 285, at 29. 
1390
  Oral submissions of Counsel for Japan, Mr Greig, ibid., at 16. 
1391
  Oral submissions of the Agent for Japan, Mr Togo, Transcript for morning of 19 August, 
supra Ch I n 285, at 8-9. 
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pessimistic projections are realistic it will be practically difficult to induce non-
parties to the 1993 Convention to participate.  On the other hand, if the EFP leads to 
more optimistic conclusions, bringing the Republic of Korea and other non-parties 
into a regional Southern Bluefin Tuna management arrangement should be 
feasible.
1392
 
This provoked the following retort the next day from New Zealand: 
Japan has tried to divert you Mr President from the importance of this case.  It has 
tried to say that the real issue here is not Japan's behaviour, but the behaviour of 
others.  It alleges that the catch of third parties provides a justification for Japan’s 
actions.  Mr President, we agree with Japan that the increasing catch of non-parties is 
of serious concern, and have consistently said so within the SBT Commission.  We 
do not agree that the appropriate response to third party catch is for a member of the 
SBT Commission to step outside that body and unilaterally take more fish.  It is no 
solution to the increasing catches by non-parties for a member of the Commission to 
increase its own catch.  Indeed, it only aggravates the situation.
1393
 
                                                          
1392
  Ibid., at 17.  This argument comes close to begging the question, resting as it does on the 
assumption that the experiment would vindicate Japan’s optimism, and is undermined by the 
implication that, if the findings were instead pessimistic, they would have to be suppressed for 
policy reasons in order not to make entry unattractive to the prospective new members.  This was 
not the first display of a certain naivety about the consequences of the reduction of scientific 
uncertainty.  At the 1990 trilateral meeting, noting that the recommendations of the scientists as 
to quota incorporated a discount for uncertainty, Japan’s understanding (Draft 1990 Summary 
Record, supra Ch II n 342, at 10) was that “if the catch is closely monitored and reliable 
scientific data obtained, so the uncertainties in the models are reduced, then it would be possible 
to increase catch levels this year.”  That ignores the possibility that the more reliable information 
thus obtained might reveal that a lower base level of quota was appropriate, wholly or partly 
negating the smaller discount than hitherto that could be made as consequence of the reduced 
uncertainty – but it is far from clear that Japan grasped this. 
1393
  Oral submissions of the Agent for New Zealand, Mr Caughley, Transcript for 20 August, 
supra Ch II n 434, at 22.  Note that cessation of cooperation is predicted by bioeconomic theory 
as a reaction to new entrants (see the works cited supra Ch I n 120); while this raises an 
economic issue as to whether forcing those already cooperating to continue doing so will 
discourage them from beginning to cooperate in the first place, it is submitted that to qualify the 
obligation so as to take this into account would fatally undermine the cooperative edifice of 
international fisheries law. 
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Finally, Japan used the fishing by new entrants as an argument in favour of its own 
counter-request for a provisional measure ordering the parties to resume 
negotiations,
1394
 calling on ITLOS to 
restore to the CCSBT the consensual element that is central to its functioning.  This 
in turn would provide the basis for non-parties to become parties, or to coordinate 
with parties, which is essential if the long-term management goals of the Convention 
are to be reached.
1395
 
b The Order 
ITLOS issued its decision on 27 August 1999.  Finding the applicants’ arguments 
persuasive, ITLOS held that it had jurisdiction in the dispute on the basis that prima 
facie the Annex VII arbitral tribunal would have jurisdiction over it.
1396
  Rejecting 
Japan’s argument, ITLOS found that a dispute arising under UNCLOS did exist; the 
fact that the 1993 Convention might also apply did not preclude recourse to the 
procedures of Part XV.
1397
  There being no obligation to persist with negotiations 
beyond the point where it was clear that they would not lead to settlement of the 
dispute, ITLOS was satisfied that the jurisdictional requirements of Articles 281, 283 
and 286 were met.
1398
 
                                                          
1394
  ITLOS Order, supra n 1383, at 290-292 (paragraphs 33 and 35). 
1395
  Oral submissions of Counsel for Japan, Mr Greig, Transcript for 20 August, supra Ch II 
n 434, at 33. 
1396
  ITLOS Order, supra n 1383, at 295 (paragraph 62). 
1397
  Ibid., at 294 (paragraphs 52-55). 
1398
  Ibid., at 295 (paragraphs 60 and 61).  Accord the MOX Plant Case (Ireland v. United 
Kingdom), Provisional Measures, Order of 3 December 2001 (hereinafter MOX Plant Case 
Order), ITLOS Reports 2001, p. 95 at 107 (paragraph 60: “a State Party is not obliged to continue 
with an exchange of views when it concludes that the possibilities of reaching agreement have 
been exhausted”), the view of the Annex VII tribunal infra, text at n 1446 and the Virginia 
Commentary, (S. Rosenne and L.B. Sohn (Volume Editors), Virginia Commentary, supra Ch III 
n 471, Vol V (Dordrecht/Boston/London: Martinus Nijhoff, 1989), at 23) which affirms the 
proposition that a State may submit a case to Part XV procedures whenever it concludes that the 
current procedures are no longer likely to lead to a settlement, but adds that, if the other party 
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ITLOS mentioned in its Order that “catches of non-parties to the Convention of 1993 
have increased considerably since 1996”,1399 which was one of its reasons for its 
admonition to the parties that they “should in the circumstances act with prudence 
and caution to ensure that effective conservation measures are taken to prevent 
serious harm to the stock of southern bluefin tuna”.1400 
Pending a decision of the Annex VII tribunal, ITLOS prescribed a number of 
provisional measures in the dispositif of its Order.  In particular it ordered that the 
parties should each ensure that their catches did not exceed the annual national 
allocations they had last agreed and that they should each refrain from conducting 
experimental fishing programs unless the catch was counted against the allocation, 
except with the agreement of the others.  It also ordered the parties to resume 
negotiations without delay with a view to reaching agreement on measures for the 
conservation and management of SBT.
1401
  Crucially, there was also an order, for 
which 20 judges voted and two against, that  
Australia, Japan and New Zealand should make further efforts to reach agreement 
with other States and fishing entities engaged in fishing for southern bluefin tuna, 
with a view to ensuring conservation and promoting the objective of optimum 
utilization of the stock[.]
1402
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
objects, “the tribunal or court to which the matter is submitted will have to decide this 
preliminary objection to its jurisdiction.” 
1399
  ITLOS Order, supra n 1383, at 296 (paragraph 76). 
1400
  Ibid. (paragraph 77). 
1401
  Ibid., at 297-300 (paragraph 90.1).  The orders in relation to catch limits and counting 
towards them of experimental catch and resumption of negotiations are at subparagraphs (c), (d) 
and (e) respectively.  Among the ancillary orders was the submission of an initial report on 
compliance with the substantive Order by 6 October 1999: at 300 (paragraph 90.2). 
1402
  Although ITLOS granted in essence the orders sought by Australia and New Zealand 
rather than those Japan would have preferred, the inclusion of subparagraph (f) indicates that 
evidently the third-party issue found some resonance with ITLOS.  See also ibid., at 296 
(paragraph 78). 
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The dissentients on this point were Judges Vukas and Warioba.  No reason for Judge 
Vukas’s dissent is given in his Separate Opinion, but Judge Warioba made it clear in 
his Declaration that he dissented not because he disagreed with the call, but because 
it fell outside the subject matter of the dispute, to which he considered that the Order 
ought to be confined.
1403
  Judge Laing expressed slight doubt about its utility,
1404
 but 
Judge ad hoc Shearer said that an order of this nature was within the power of 
ITLOS to make.
1405
 
Although the ITLOS Order did not refer to the precautionary principle, some judges 
in their Separate Opinions found it relevant in support of the overall decision.
1406
 
4 The interval between the ITLOS Order and the arbitral 
tribunal’s finding of lack of jurisdiction 
Following the ITLOS Order Japan stated that, as a first step towards compliance with 
subparagraph (d) of the ITLOS Order, its commercial catch for the 1999 season 
already underway would be reduced by 700 tonnes, with the remaining 1,498 tonnes 
held over to the following season.  In the event, Japan’s commercial catch fell 11 
tonnes short of the revised limit, leaving 1,487 tonnes to be repaid in 2000.
1407
 
The three parties held negotiations in Canberra in September 1999.  As they 
subsequently reported to ITLOS, progress was made on a number of issues including 
the introduction of a trade information system to assist in the management of the 
global catch of SBT and an action plan aimed at bringing the other major exploiters 
                                                          
1403
  Declaration by Judge Warioba, ITLOS Reports 1999, p. 303. 
1404
  Separate Opinion of Judge Laing, ITLOS Reports 1999, p. 305 at 309 (paragraph 11). 
1405
  Separate Opinion of Judge ad hoc Shearer, ITLOS Reports 1999, p. 320 at 329. 
1406
  Separate Opinion of Judge Laing, supra n 1404, at 309-315 (paragraphs 12-21); Separate 
Opinion of Judge Treves, ITLOS Reports 1999, p. 316 at 317-319 (paragraphs 8-11); Separate 
Opinion of Judge ad hoc Shearer, supra n 1405, at 326-327.  Maguire, supra Ch II n 441, at 217 
referred to it as a possible manifestation of the fishing industry’s “worst fear with the 
implementation of the precautionary approach”. 
1407
  Attachment F-2 to CCSBT7 Report, supra Ch V n 1138, in CCSBT Blue Book 2002, 
supra Ch I n 30, 36 at 36 and 37. 
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of SBT within the 1993 Convention, but the dispute was not resolved.  Indeed the 
actions of Japan in the IOTC in late 1999, repeating with greater intensity its attempt 
of the previous year to involve that body in the management of SBT despite the 
latter’s acknowledgement of the CCSBT’s primacy,1408 might have constituted a  
                                                          
1408
  Despite having express competence over SBT under its constitutive treaty, supra Ch I n 
7, by and large the IOTC has been content to leave management of that species to the CCSBT.  It 
noted at the First Special Session in March 1997 that several international fisheries organisations’ 
activities would be relevant to its objectives and saw the need for collaboration and possibly joint 
activities with them; among these were CCSBT and ICCAT: IOTCSS1 Report, supra Ch IV n 
719, at 5 (paragraphs 29 and 30).  Significantly, the IOTC went on to recognise CCSBT’s “prime 
responsibility for conservation and fisheries management” for SBT, while not abdicating its own 
competence in this regard: ibid., at 6 (paragraph 31).  This was a sensible step on its part.  As a 
fledgling body managing 15 species other than SBT, it would have made no sense for the IOTC 
to divert to SBT, in which its majority of developing country Members had no interest, and in 
competition with the CCSBT, effort and resources that could be devoted to the tropical tunas and 
other species in which that majority did have interests.  Australia then reported this development 
to the CCSBT’s Fourth Meeting: CCSBT4(1) Report, supra Ch I n 126, at 7.  In early 1998, 
however, the deteriorating relationship between CCSBT Members (supra text following n 1373 
and CCSBT4(3) Report, supra Ch IV n 683, at 90-94 (agenda items 2, 3 and 4.2)) had spillover 
effects on the IOTC.  In part this was a deliberate step by Japan, which indicated at one CCSBT 
meeting that, since that Commission was unable to agree on a TAC, the IOTC might be better 
placed to do so; see CCSBT4(2) Report, supra Ch IV n 683, at 61: “Japan considered that there 
was little room for future progress in the Commission and hence it saw value in moving the 
functions of the CCSBT to the IOTC.”  At the IOTC’s next meeting in December 1998, Japan 
called for the establishment of a working party either on SBT or on temperate tunas.  (In practice 
a temperate tunas working party would have spent most of its time on SBT.  This is because the 
only other temperate tuna over which the IOTC has competence is albacore – and, since Indian 
Ocean albacore is targeted almost exclusively by Taiwanese vessels (see Report of the Second 
Session of the Scientific Committee, IOTC doc IOTC/99/04 (Appendix VII to IOTC4 Report), in 
IOTC doc IOTC/S/04/99/R[E], supra Ch III n 633, 22 at 29 (paragraph 70)), there was a practical 
obstacle to examining the albacore fishery in any depth: on this aspect see Serdy, supra Ch IV n 
669, at 207-210.)  Australia opposed the move, and advanced several reasons why it would not be 
in the IOTC’s interest to take on a management role in respect of SBT.  Reluctant for the meeting 
to become entangled in a bilateral dispute, the Chair encouraged Australia and Japan to work out 
a solution to the problem themselves for inclusion in the meeting report.  They did so in the form 
of a Resolution brought to plenary by both States and adopted by the Commission, “Resolution 
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breach of subparagraph 1(a) of the Order (“ensure that no action is taken which 
might extend or aggravate the disputes submitted to the arbitral tribunal”). 
In parallel with further progress made in CCSBT meetings in November 1999 and 
March 2000, the constitution of the Annex VII tribunal proceeded pursuant to Article 
3 of that annex.  It comprised Sir Kenneth Keith (then of the New Zealand Court of 
Appeal),
1409
 Professor Chusei Yamada (the Japanese member of the ILC)
1410
 and 
Professors Florentino Feliciano (of the WTO Appellate Body), Stephen Schwebel 
(the recently retired former President of the ICJ), and Per Tresselt of Norway (then a 
Judge of the EFTA Court).
1411
   
Because Japan objected to both the tribunal’s jurisdiction and the admissibility of the 
applicants’ claims, a hearing on these preliminary points took place in Washington 
from 7 to 11 May 2000, preceded by both sides’ filing of their memorials.1412 
                                                                                                                                                                    
on Southern Bluefin Tuna”, in IOTC doc IOTC/S/03/98/R[E], Report of the Third Session of the 
Indian Ocean Tuna Commission, Mahé, Seychelles, 9-12 December 1998 (Victoria: IOTC, 
1999), at 39 (Appendix J), which in effect postponed the decision for a year.  At the next IOTC 
meeting, Japan proposed a more ambitious remit for the working party, involving the analysis of 
information collected by IOTC research and sampling programs.  Australia once more indicated 
that it could not accept such an active role for IOTC.  Despite its citation of the relevant ITLOS 
order and its argument that it would be inappropriate for the IOTC to insert itself into a dispute 
between two of its Members in another forum at the behest of one disputant party and over the 
objections of the other, the terms of the conclusion ultimately reached reveal on the IOTC’s part 
far less disposition to resist Japan’s wishes than in the previous year: see IOTC4 Report, supra 
Ch III n 633, at 3 (paragraph 24).  It may have been nothing more than the IOTC’s preference for 
consensus decision-making that allowed Australia to prevent the working party’s creation; had 
Japan insisted on a vote, it might well have been able to secure the necessary simple majority that 
would have sufficed for this: see IOTC Agreement, supra Ch I n 7, Article VI(2). 
1409
  Sir Kenneth was nominated by the applicants under paragraph (b) of Article 3. 
1410
  Professor Yamada was nominated by the respondent under paragraph (c) of Article 3. 
1411
  The other three members were jointly nominated by the parties under paragraph (d) of 
Article 3.  Professor Schwebel was chosen by the parties as president. 
1412
  Annex VII Tribunal Award, supra n 1336, at 1360 (paragraph 7).  The parties engaged 
the services of the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes to provide the 
secretariat for the Annex VII arbitral tribunal and the venue for its hearings. 
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5 The arguments of the parties before the Annex VII 
arbitral tribunal 
a Written arguments 
Despite ITLOS having held that the Annex VII tribunal would prima facie have 
jurisdiction, Japan continued to argue that its dispute with Australia and New 
Zealand related solely to the 1993 Convention and not UNCLOS, as Article 279 of 
the latter required.
1413
  Alternatively, Article 281, paragraph 1 had not been satisfied 
since the Parties had not exhausted their dispute resolution efforts under the 1993 
Convention; nor had Australia and New Zealand complied with Article 283, by 
failing to exchange views with Japan either about the dispute or on termination of 
negotiations.
1414
  Australia and New Zealand denied both that the dispute arose solely 
under the 1993 Convention and that UNCLOS was inapplicable merely because the 
1993 Convention was applicable; since both treaties were relevant, recourse to the 
UNCLOS Part XV procedures was not precluded.
1415
  Rather, the applicability of a 
treaty was a question for “objective judicial or arbitral processes” to determine.1416  
They explained that negotiations “over the best part of a year” had been “extensive” 
and “intensive” and that Japan’s continuation of the experimental fishing program 
into a second year “was rightly regarded as tantamount to a termination of 
negotiations”, exhausting any possibility of settlement.1417 
Apart from its ultimately successful argument on the relationship between the dispute 
settlement provisions of UNCLOS and the 1993 Convention, Japan put three 
arguments.  The first was that, Japan having accepted a limit of 1,500 tonnes for its 
                                                          
1413
  Ibid., at 1376 (paragraph 38(a)). 
1414
  Ibid., at 1377 (paragraph 38(h), on Article 281(1)) and 1379 (paragraph 39(d), on Article 
283)). 
1415
  Ibid., at 1380 (paragraph 41(a) and (b)). 
1416
  Ibid., at 1381 (paragraph 41(d)). 
1417
  Ibid., at 1382 (paragraph 41(g)). 
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experimental fishing program, the dispute on the tonnage was moot.
1418
  Secondly, 
the rest of the dispute was non-justiciable because it related to science rather than 
law.
1419
  Thirdly, by entering into the 1993 Convention Japan had fully discharged its 
obligations to Australia and New Zealand in respect of SBT under UNCLOS and its 
conduct was to be judged only by reference to the former.
1420
 
The Japanese Memorial now put the third parties in the fishery squarely as an 
objection to admissibility of the applicants’ claims: 
[D]espite the fact that Indonesia and the ROK are parties to UNCLOS and are, 
therefore, exposed to the institution of proceedings against them by A/NZ in the 
same way as A/NZ have begun proceedings against Japan, no such proceedings have 
been started.  This is in spite of the fact that the Indonesian catch is concentrated on 
the sole known SBT spawning ground and had long been recognized as particularly 
threatening to the stock.  The ROK catch of SBT increased twentyfold in the 1990s; 
according to the ROK itself, its catch in 1998 was more than 2000 mt.  The fact that 
A/NZ have not sued Indonesia or the ROK under UNCLOS procedures when they 
could have done so suggests that what really matters in the present proceedings is 
that the obligations involved are ones that exist under CCSBT and that Japan (unlike 
Indonesia and the ROK) is party to that convention, not that Japan is allegedly in 
breach of UNCLOS.  If the proceedings genuinely have as their object the 
implementation of the provisions of UNCLOS which have been invoked by A/NZ, 
then Indonesia and the ROK are necessary and proper parties thereto in whose 
absence the proceedings against Japan cannot properly continue.
1421
 
                                                          
1418
  See the argument of Professor Lowe, counsel for Japan, Transcript for 7 May 2000, 
supra Ch II n 433, at 198-208.  
1419
  See Japanese memorial, supra Ch II n 433, at 83-88 (paragraphs 171, 172, 174, 180 and 
181) and the argument of Professor Lowe, counsel for Japan, Transcript for 7 May 2000, supra 
Ch II n 433, at 181-193. 
1420
  See Japanese memorial, supra Ch II n 433, at 57-65 (paragraphs 116-131) and the 
argument of Sir Elihu Lauterpacht, counsel for Japan, Transcript for 7 May 2000, supra Ch II n 
433, at 53-58, 63-66 and 71-122. 
1421
  Japanese memorial, supra Ch II n 433, at 48 (paragraph 97).  See also the following 
passage at 86-87 (paragraph 178): 
[T]he Parties to the present proceedings include only three of the major countries that fish on 
the high seas for southern bluefin tuna.  If this Tribunal were to make any Award limiting 
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In addition, in support of its argument that the applicants’ claims all related to the 
1993 Convention rather than to UNCLOS, the Japanese Memorial stated: 
A/NZ have not relied upon UNCLOS provisions on their own to institute, as they 
could have, proceedings against other countries like the ROK or Indonesia, despite 
the fact these countries both fish for SBT and are parties to UNCLOS.  Nor, even if 
A/NZ’s pessimistic stock assessments and criticisms of the design of the 1999 EFP 
were credited, could it plausibly be denied that the perennial fishing activities of 
such countries threaten the SBT stock every bit as seriously as does Japan’s limited 
EFP.  Indonesia, for example, catches thousands of tonnes of SBT on the species’s 
sole known spawning ground; the ROK has dramatically escalated its catch of SBT 
by several hundred percent even as it has made ever-increasing demands upon 
Australia, Japan and New Zealand for assurances of the quota it would be allocated 
if it acceded to the CCSBT.
1422
 
In their Reply Australia and New Zealand noted that they had  
made efforts, in conjunction with Japan and separately, to engage third States and 
other entities and to persuade them, either to accede to the 1993 Convention or at 
least to restrain their fishing efforts, which have increased in recent years and are 
indeed a source of serious concern.
1423
 
But, the Reply went on, failure to proceed against third parties was no bar to the 
proceedings against Japan.
1424
  It cited a series of ICJ cases as authority for the 
proposition that the non-joinder of third States was only a ground for inadmissibility 
in very limited circumstances, absent in the instant case.
1425
  The legal interests of  
                                                                                                                                                                    
Japan’s right to fish, it would have to act on the basis of some supposition concerning the 
rights and the behaviour of countries that are fishing for southern bluefin tuna on the high 
seas (as is their legal right subject to UNCLOS) but that are not parties to the present 
proceedings.  But this Tribunal is not entitled to act on the basis of supposition. 
The Applicants replied that no such supposition was necessary: see Applicants’ Reply, supra n 
1378, at 78 (paragraph 175). 
1422
  Japanese memorial, supra Ch II n 433, at 79 (paragraph 163). 
1423
  Applicants’ Reply, supra n 1378, at 77 (paragraph 173).  
1424
  Ibid. (paragraph 174). 
1425
    The cases were Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Australia), Preliminary 
Objections (hereinafter Nauru case), where it was held that only where the legal interests of a 
third State form “the very subject matter of the decision that is applied for” would a court or 
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third States such as Indonesia and Korea were not the subject matter of the claims 
raised by Australia and New Zealand against Japan: “at most they are part, albeit 
subsidiary, of the factual matrix.”  The fact that other States had legal obligations 
under UNCLOS, and may have engaged in similar activity, did not prevent 
adjudication on the claims against Japan concerning the failure by Japan itself to 
discharge its obligations under UNCLOS, which were neither conditional on nor 
inextricably linked to any judgment as to acts of third States.
1426
  In any event, the 
respective roles of Japan and third States (with whose position Japan’s was not 
comparable) in terms of the overfishing of SBT was a matter for the merits. 
b Oral arguments 
In oral argument on the third-party issue, Sir Elihu Lauterpacht pointed out that 
Australia and New Zealand could have proceeded against both Indonesia and the 
Republic of Korea under UNCLOS Part XV “on the basis of the same violations of 
UNCLOS as are alleged against Japan”,1427 before concluding: 
Japan drew two conclusions from this consideration.  The first was that the fact that 
A/NZ have not sued Indonesia or the Republic of Korea under available UNCLOS 
procedures suggests that what really matters in the present proceedings is the 
relationship under CCSBT, not the relationship under UNCLOS. 
Otherwise, why didn’t A/NZ direct its UNCLOS attack against other UNCLOS 
parties which participate in an unregulated taking of SBT that now exceeds 5,000 
MT?  This quantity of catch is far more harmful to the SBT than is the claimed 
                                                                                                                                                                    
tribunal be precluded from adjudicating on the claim (ICJ Reports 1992, p.240 at 261 (paragraph 
55)); Monetary Gold Removed from Rome, supra Ch III n 526 and the Case concerning East 
Timor, supra Ch III n 526, both showing that the Court had only applied the principle where a 
decision against a third party was a legally necessary prerequisite to one against the respondent; 
and the Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua 
(Jurisdiction and Admissibility) (Nicaragua v. United States of America) (ICJ Reports 1984, 
p.392 at 431 (paragraph 88)) as an example of a case involving “concurrent tortfeasors” that was 
allowed to proceed against the actual respondent alone – as happened in the Nauru case itself. 
1426
  Applicants’ Reply, supra n 1378, at 78 (paragraphs 175 and 176). 
1427
  Oral submissions of counsel for Japan, Sir Elihu Lauterpacht, Transcript for 7 May 
2000, supra Ch II n 433, at 59. 
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impact of the 300 MT that separates the figure for EFP proposed by Japan and the 
figure that was acceptable to A/NZ in the negotiations. 
In its Reply…, A/NZ disregarded this point.  They focussed instead on the second 
and lesser point made in the Japanese Memorial, namely that Indonesia and the 
Republic of Korea are necessary and proper parties to the proceedings.  For present 
purposes, however, what matters is not whether A/NZ’s reaction on this lesser point 
is correct, but the fact that A/NZ chose entirely to disregard the first of the two 
points made in the Japanese Memorial… .  A/NZ has offered no explanation of why 
in their capacities as self-appointed guardians of the integrity of the SBT stock, they 
chose to limit their initiative under UNCLOS to bringing proceedings against Japan 
when they could equally well have done so against Indonesia and the Republic of 
Korea, also.  The conclusion that Japan draws from A/NZ’s failure to seek UNCLOS 
recourse against Indonesia and the Republic of Korea is that it eloquently 
demonstrates A/NZ’s realization that CCSBT is the only effective legal link between 
them and Japan in relation to SBT, and that proceedings based on UNCLOS alone 
will get nowhere.
1428
 
The task of replying to this for the applicants the next day fell to Mr Serdy.  After 
leading the Tribunal through the history of third-party fishing for SBT up to the time 
of the negotiations ordered by ITLOS,
1429
 he sought to show that the tonnages Japan 
was comparing were the wrong ones: 
The Commission has since made specific quota offers to Korea and Taiwan at levels 
that are some way below their current catch.  As the negotiations with them are 
continuing, I hope the Tribunal will forgive me if I do not mention exact tonnages.  
What I can say, though, Mr President, is that both Korea and Taiwan have 
undertaken voluntarily to restrict their catch in the interim, and that if you subtract 
the sum of the offers from the sum of those interim limits, the difference at stake is 
below – well below – 1000 tonnes per annum.  That is less than half of Japan’s 
expected catch in each year of the EFP it began in 1999, namely 2000 tonnes.  
Let me also mention Indonesia.  A complicating factor in its case is that most, if not 
all, of its SBT catch is taken as bycatch from its yellowfin and bigeye tuna fishery. 
… Australia has been leading for the Commission in discussions with Indonesia 
                                                          
1428
  Ibid., at 60-61. 
1429
  Oral submissions of counsel for Australia, Mr Serdy, Transcript for 8 May 2000, supra 
Ch III n 666, at 181-183. 
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aimed at two things: at familiarising Indonesian fisheries officials with modern 
management methods and also at introducing the Indonesian fleet to methods of 
fishing that would reduce Indonesia’s SBT bycatch to a point where its adherence to 
a quota on accession to the 1993 Convention becomes feasible.
1430
 
Having described the division of labour between Australia and Japan in dealing with 
third parties on the Commission’s behalf,1431 Mr Serdy added that  
Japan is undoing the good work and making the task of all of us harder by the 
approach to the third parties that it takes in Commission meetings…Its approach is all 
stick and no carrot.  Look at it from the third parties’ point of view.  As long as Japan 
persists in berating them for their excessive catch, while continuing to try to ratchet 
up its own catch by any available means, no wonder they hesitate to join the 
Commission.
1432
 
Turning to the specific issue of non-joinder of Korea and Indonesia raised the 
previous day by Sir Elihu, Mr Serdy continued: 
There is a sharp contrast between Japan’s factual situation and that of the third 
parties.  The plain fact is that neither Australia nor New Zealand has any dispute 
with those two States at this stage, although there are concerns.  We are in 
negotiations with them alongside Japan, and the talks have not broken down.  These 
talks are about reducing their catch of SBT, while Japan seemingly is only interested 
in expanding its.  Certainly, third parties are part of the problem, but there has never 
been a rule that you must solve your legal problems all at once and in a uniform 
fashion.  If it is more efficient to tackle them piecemeal,…then that is the natural 
way for governments to go about it. 
The Applicants’ difficulties with Japan are ripe for dispute settlement, whereas our 
collective difficulties with the third parties currently are not, and with luck they 
never will be.
1433
 
Referring to the statement in paragraph 163 of Japan’s Memorial that “The perennial 
fishing activities of such countries threaten the SBT stock every bit as seriously as 
                                                          
1430
  Ibid., at 183-185. 
1431
  Ibid., at 185. 
1432
  Ibid., at 185-186. 
1433
  Ibid., at 187-188. 
 478 
does Japan’s limited EFP”,1434 which he interpreted as Japan “saying that the entire 
third-party commercial catch is bad, unlike its own”, Mr Serdy commented: 
This point taken by Japan says a lot more about its attitude to the SBT fishery than it 
may realize.  For in the abstract, Korea has just as much right to fish for SBT as 
Japan does, while Indonesia, most if not all of whose take of SBT occurs in its own 
[EEZ], has as a coastal State even more of a legal stake in the fishery. 
[A]pplicants do not for a moment deny the threat to the stock from third-party 
fishing.  But the threat from extra fishing is cumulative, and Japan’s EFP is the 
newest and largest element of it, undertaken in full knowledge of the pressure 
already placed on the stock by other significant participants in the fishery.
1435
 
Expanding on the discussion of the absent third party objection to admissibility in the 
applicants’ Reply, Mr Serdy said of the present case that it was  
a fortiori by comparison with the Nauru case.  As in that case, to the extent that the 
obligations of Indonesia and Korea are concurrent with Japan’s, no finding on their 
legal obligations is needed as a basis for the Tribunal’s decision on our claims 
against Japan.  … [S]ince Indonesia and Korea have not been acting in concert with 
Japan, the consequences for them of a judgment that Japan has breached its 
obligations are, at most, tangential.  A generally related set of facts such as we have 
here is not the same as a relationship of logical or legal dependence.
1436
  
Referring specifically to two passages in the dissenting opinion of Judge Schwebel in 
the Nauru case,
1437
 Mr Serdy argued that  
If this arbitration does go to a judgment on the merits, Indonesia and Korea will still 
have the right, after it as before it, for their nationals to fish for SBT on the high seas 
                                                          
1434
  Supra, text at n 1422. 
1435
  Oral submissions of counsel for Australia, Mr Serdy, Transcript for 8 May 2000, supra 
Ch III n 666, at 189-190. 
1436
  Ibid., at 192. 
1437
  Nauru case, supra n 1425, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Schwebel, ICJ Reports 1992, 
p.329 at 331 (“What is dispositive is whether the determination of the legal rights of the present 
party effectively determines the legal rights of the absent party”) and 335: 
The Court should give weight to the intensity and not to the timing or logical derivation of 
the effects in question.  If the legal interests of a third State will not merely be affected but 
effectively determined by the Court’s judgment, the Court should not proceed to give 
judgment in the absence of that third State. 
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provided only they do so consistently with UNCLOS.  The most that can occur, as 
an incidental effect of the Tribunal’s Order, is that its reasoning may well afford 
them a better indication than they had before of the extent of that right.  They may be 
able to assess more accurately the legal risk they may be running, in terms of the 
relevant UNCLOS provisions, especially if they were hypothetically to increase the 
tonnage of SBT they take.  Whether or not they modify their behaviour accordingly, 
the extent of the right will itself remain unaltered and can hardly be said to be 
thereby effectively determined.  That is far from being the very subject matter of the 
decision, to return to the celebrated passage in the Monetary Gold case.
1438
  
Because the tribunal found that it lacked jurisdiction, it did not need to consider the 
competing arguments as to admissibility of the claims, of which the third-party issue 
was one, hence its Award expressed no view on them.  It is possible, however, that 
Korea’s relatively rapid progress thereafter towards accession to the 1993 
Convention may have been hastened by the knowledge that its high seas catch of 
SBT had become the subject of international legal scrutiny. 
6 The Annex VII arbitral tribunal’s Award on jurisdiction 
The arbitral tribunal constituted under Annex VII to UNCLOS issued its Award on 
Japan’s objections to its jurisdiction on 4 August 2000.  It decided that it lacked 
jurisdiction to hear the merits of the case and accordingly revoked the provisional 
measures prescribed by ITLOS.  It noted obiter, however, that revocation of the 
ITLOS Order did not mean that the parties might disregard the effects of that Order 
or their own decisions made in conformity with it.  Recalling the parties’ statements 
before it about the progress they had made in narrowing their differences, the 
tribunal reminded them that under the 1993 Convention they remained under an 
obligation to seek to resolve those differences and emphasised that they should 
refrain from any unilateral act that might aggravate the dispute before it had been 
fully resolved.
1439
 
                                                          
1438
  Oral submissions of counsel for Australia, Mr Serdy, Transcript for 8 May 2000, supra 
Ch III n 666, at 194-195. 
1439
  Annex VII Tribunal Award, supra n 1336, at 1391-1392 (paragraphs 67-70). 
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The Annex VII tribunal rejected Japan’s argument that the case was moot: Australia 
and New Zealand no longer accepted an experimental fishing program of 1500 
tonnes by the time Japan moved to do so, but  
[e]ven if that offer were today accepted, it would not be sufficient to dispose of their 
dispute, which concerns the quality as well as the quantity of the EFP, and perhaps 
other elements of difference as well, such as the assertion of a right to fish beyond 
TAC limits that were last agreed.  Japan now proposes experimentally to fish for no 
more than 1500mt, but it has not undertaken for the future to forego [sic] or restrict 
what it regards as a right to fish on the high seas for Southern Bluefin Tuna in the 
absence of a decision by the Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin 
Tuna upon a total allowable catch and its allocation among the Parties.
1440
  
It did not need to decide the question of the justiciability of scientific matters, which 
went to admissibility, but observed obiter that 
its analysis of provisions of UNCLOS that bring the dispute within the substantive 
reach of UNCLOS suggests that the dispute is not one that is confined to matters of 
scientific judgment only.
1441
  
On the relationship between UNCLOS and the 1993 Convention, the Tribunal 
recognised that  
it is a commonplace of international law and State practice for more than one treaty 
to bear upon a particular dispute. … The current range of international legal 
obligations benefits from a process of accretion and cumulation; in the practice of 
States, the conclusion of an implementing convention does not necessarily vacate the 
obligations imposed by the framework convention upon the parties to the 
implementing convention.
1442
 
Expressing scepticism about the consequence of Japan’s argument that the 
obligations of UNCLOS as to SBT no longer bound the parties to the 1993 
Convention inter se but did still bind them as against all other States Parties to 
UNCLOS, the tribunal went on: 
                                                          
1440
  Ibid., at 1386 (paragraph 46). 
1441
  Ibid., at 1391 (paragraph 65). 
1442
  Ibid., at 1387-1388 (paragraph 52). 
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Nor is it clear that the particular provisions of the 1993 Convention exhaust the 
extent of the relevant obligations of UNCLOS.  In some respects, UNCLOS may be 
viewed as extending beyond the reach of the CCSBT.
1443
 
It identified a number of UNCLOS obligations not found in the 1993 Convention 
“operative even where no TAC has been agreed in the CCSBT and where co-
operation in the Commission has broken down”, which it was prepared to view as in 
force even where no measures had become binding under the 1993 Convention.  
Moreover, a dispute concerning the interpretation and implementation of the latter 
“will not be completely alien to the interpretation or application of UNCLOS for the 
very reason that the CCSBT was designed to implement broad principles set out in 
UNCLOS.”1444 
On jurisdiction, the Annex VII tribunal began its reasoning by finding that the 
dispute, while centred on the 1993 Convention, was “a single dispute arising under 
both Conventions.”1445  It then proceeded to determine whether the prerequisites to 
its jurisdiction under UNCLOS Part XV had been met.  Characterising the 1993 
Convention as an agreement by the parties to seek settlement of the dispute by a 
peaceful means of their own choice within the meaning of Article 280, the Annex 
VII tribunal next considered whether the requirements of Article 281, paragraph 1 
had been satisfied.  It found the first condition, of no settlement having been reached 
by the agreed alternative means, met by the “prolonged, intense and serious” 
negotiations conducted under Article 16 of the 1993 Convention.  There was no 
obligation in that provision either to resort in succession to each of the listed means, 
nor “to negotiate indefinitely while denying a Party the option of concluding for 
purposes of both Articles 281(1) and 283 that no settlement had been reached.”1446  
As to the second condition, however, that the agreement “does not exclude any 
further procedure”, the Annex VII tribunal took the view that Article 16 of the 1993 
                                                          
1443
  Ibid., at 1388 (paragraph 52). 
1444
  Ibid. 
1445
  Ibid. (paragraphs 52 and 54). 
1446
  Ibid., at 1389 (paragraph 55). 
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Convention excluded the dispute settlement procedures of UNCLOS Part XV, so that 
this condition was not satisfied.  Although there was no express exclusion of other 
dispute settlement procedures, the tribunal found that this was not necessary for the 
purposes of Article 281, paragraph 1.  Rather, since under Article 16 the consent of 
all parties to the dispute was necessary for it to be heard by an arbitral panel or the 
ICJ, absent such consent the Parties were obliged to continue to seek resolution of 
the dispute only by the peaceful means there listed, to the exclusion of all other 
mechanisms.  Emphasising the consensual nature of the dispute settlement process 
under the 1993 Convention, despite the absence of any express exclusion of any 
procedure, the Annex VII tribunal read into Article 16 an intention on the part of its 
parties for this to be the sole avenue for settling disputes inter se concerning SBT, so 
removing such disputes from the compulsory processes of UNCLOS.
1447
  The 
tribunal concluded that Article 16 accordingly excluded “any further procedure 
within the contemplation of Article 281(1) of the LOS Convention.”1448  As a result, 
the tribunal held that it had no jurisdiction to proceed to the merits of the case.
1449
 
Sir Kenneth Keith dissented from this analysis.  His view was that Article 16 of the 
1993 Convention was not an agreement to resolve disputes by another method for the 
purposes of UNCLOS Article 281, paragraph 1, since it did not prescribe any 
particular method.  In any event, he found that Article 16 only applied to disputes 
concerning the 1993 Convention and did not necessarily apply to disputes concerning 
UNCLOS.
1450
  Despite the central place within UNCLOS of the compulsory dispute 
settlement scheme, to which the exceptions were well defined, Sir Kenneth was 
prepared to concede that Article 16 could impliedly exclude UNCLOS Part XV if it 
                                                          
1447
  Ibid. (paragraph 57).  As the Annex VII Tribunal saw it, the fact that the 1993 
Convention included an annex detailing its own arbitral process reinforced its reasoning. 
1448
  Ibid., at 1390 (paragraph 59). 
1449
  Ibid., at 1391 (paragraph 65). 
1450
  Separate Opinion of Justice Sir Kenneth Keith, (2000) 39 ILM 1395, at 1396-1397 
(paragraph 8).  At 1397 (paragraph 12) Sir Kenneth added: “That the disputes may or may not 
also concern the interpretation or implementation of the [1993 Convention] is beside the point.” 
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were capable of deciding all disputes among its parties under both the 1993 
Convention and UNCLOS, but in the absence of “strong and particular wording” to 
that effect, this was not the case.
1451
 
The Award has been widely criticised, most forcefully by Colson and Hoyle, who 
describe its interpretation of Article 281, paragraph 1 as “questionable” and “based 
on a view of compulsory dispute settlement under the LOS Convention that is not 
widely shared.”1452  They see Judge Wolfrum’s view in the MOX Plant Case, that 
                                                          
1451
  Ibid., at paragraphs 18 and 21-29. 
1452
  Colson and Hoyle, supra Ch VI n 1299, at 76.  The nub of their argument is at 68-70: 
they see the flaw in the Annex VII Tribunal’s approach as lying not in its exegesis of Article 
281(1) of UNCLOS, but in its interpretation of Article 16 of the 1993 Convention, in which no 
intention to exclude UNCLOS Part XV procedures is evident.  Among their criticisms is that the 
Annex VII Tribunal’s view that the dispute under the 1993 Convention was identical to that 
under UNCLOS may have led it astray, since the standards and elements for cooperation and the 
parties’ obligations under the two treaties were not necessarily the same.  If so, the 1993 
Convention might not be another “peaceful means” to settle the UNCLOS dispute, since its terms 
did not deal with the specific alleged breaches of UNCLOS; the fact that it was negotiated by 
three interested States to conserve and manage SBT did not necessarily mean that they intended 
to make it the sole vehicle for the settlement of all disputes concerning the species.  Moreover, if 
Article 281 were intended to have the broad meaning the Annex VII Tribunal gave it, Article 
282, which provides that Part XV is displaced by another agreement that prescribes different 
compulsory procedures leading to a binding outcome, would not be necessary, as the same result 
would be produced anyway by the broad interpretation of Article 281.  A further criticism was 
that the inferences drawn by the Annex VII Tribunal, though possible,  
are not in fact consistent with the reality of international fishery negotiations.  Consensual 
dispute settlement provisions find their way into conventions such as the [1993 Convention] 
because there is no consensus among the parties to make the obligations undertaken therein 
subject to compulsory dispute settlement, not because the parties agree in any affirmative 
sense to deny compulsory jurisdiction under the LOS Convention for alleged violations of 
that Convention. 
They find “a profound confusion” in paragraph 63 of the Award which justifies its conclusion by 
reference to the absence from many ocean-related agreements of compulsory dispute settlement 
mechanisms.  It was precisely in order to overcome this unsatisfactory state of affairs that 
compulsory mechanisms were sought and to a great extent achieved by the drafters of UNCLOS: 
In many regional ocean-related agreements,…states in Japan’s position will not agree to 
compulsory dispute settlement procedures, and countries in Australia and New Zealand’s 
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any intent to exclude Section 2 of Part XV must be “expressed explicitly” in 
alternative dispute resolution provisions,
1453
 as better aligned with the intent of the 
negotiators of UNCLOS and most of its States Parties. 
They highlight the Annex VII tribunal’s view that because substantial categories of 
disputes are or may be excluded by Section 3 of Part XV, “UNCLOS falls 
significantly short of establishing a truly comprehensive regime of compulsory 
jurisdiction entailing binding decisions.”1454  While there can be no quarrel with this 
conclusion, nor with the statement in paragraph 62 of the Award that if parties wish 
to contract out of Part XV inter se, Article 281, paragraph 1 allows them to do so: 
This general consideration supports the conclusion, based on the language used in 
Article 281(1), that States Parties that have agreed to seek settlement of disputes 
concerning the interpretation or application of UNCLOS by peaceful means of their 
own choice are permitted by Article 281(1) to confine the applicability of section 2 
of Part XV to cases where all parties to the dispute have agreed upon submission of 
their dispute to such compulsory procedures. 
they attack the Annex VII tribunal’s interpretation of the provision as permitting 
compulsory dispute settlement under UNCLOS to be defeated by consensual 
                                                                                                                                                                    
position must decide whether it is better to create institutional arrangements with only 
consensual dispute settlement possibilities to address the specifics of a particular set of 
circumstances.  This problem is commonplace and it is global.  Perversely, if compulsory 
dispute settlement is the sole consideration, Australia and New Zealand would have been 
better off not having a CCSBT to address the specifics of southern bluefin tuna conservation 
and management. 
Accord on the last two points the submissions to the Annex VII tribunal of counsel for Australia, 
Professor Crawford, Transcript for 8 May 2000, supra Ch III n 666, at 139-140 (on the perverse 
consequences of a finding against jurisdiction) and counsel for New Zealand, Mr Mansfield in 
the course of the Applicants’ surrebuttal, in Second Round Presentation of Australia and New 
Zealand, May 11, 2000 (hereinafter Transcript for 11 May 2000), archived under the item of 7 
May 2000 at <www.icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/ICSID/ViewNewsReleases.jsp> (visited on 23 
June 2008), at 54-56 (on dispute settlement in international fisheries treaty negotiations). 
1453
  MOX Plant Case, supra n 1398, Separate Opinion of Judge Wolfrum, ITLOS Reports 
2001, p. 131 at 132. 
1454
  Annex VII Tribunal Award, supra n 1336, at 1390 (paragraph 62). 
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arrangements even where there is no clear manifestation that the parties intended 
this.  They regard this as 
substantially not in keeping with the intent of the negotiators of the Convention.  
From the outset, the effort at the Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea was 
to establish a comprehensive dispute settlement framework relating to activities in 
the world’s oceans.  To be sure, Section 3 of Part XV excludes a range of issues 
from the Convention’s compulsory dispute settlement system.  Just as it was 
necessary to provide for a wide range of dispute settlement fora to overcome the 
predispositions of certain states to certain institutions, it was also necessary to carve 
out the exceptions to compulsory dispute settlement found in Section 3 in order to 
achieve international consensus on the entire Convention package.  Importantly, 
certain key categories of issues were not excluded by Section 3, including disputes 
concerning living resources beyond coastal state jurisdiction (and southern bluefin 
tuna is certainly in this category)…1455 
Commenting that  
[t]he approach of the Annex VII Tribunal, which in many ways mirrored Japan’s 
arguments, loses sight of the fact that the compulsory dispute settlement mechanism 
of [UNCLOS] is part of a package of issues and that there were many trade-offs to 
reach…a Convention that provides for compulsory dispute settlement on matters 
relating to the conservation and management of living resources of the high seas.
1456
 
they draw attention
1457
 to the provisional measures phase of the MOX Plant Case 
heard by ITLOS a year later.  Although the dispute as a whole between Ireland and 
the United Kingdom involved several treaties, ITLOS found that there was prima 
facie jurisdiction under Part XV of UNCLOS; in particular, the dispute before the 
Annex VII tribunal concerned UNCLOS alone.
1458
  Similarly, ITLOS expressed a 
narrow view of Article 282, restricting it to agreements that provide for dispute 
settlement with regard to the “interpretation or application of this Convention.”1459  
                                                          
1455
  Colson and Hoyle, supra Ch VI n 1299, at 67. 
1456
  Ibid., at 71. 
1457
  Ibid., at 72-73. 
1458
  MOX Plant Case Order, supra n 1398, at 106 (paragraph 52). 
1459
  Ibid. (paragraph 48). 
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The test of whether the dispute settlement mechanism under another agreement 
involves an interpretation or application of UNCLOS is whether it is capable on its 
face of resolving the UNCLOS dispute; the subject matter of the agreement is 
irrelevant.  Thus ITLOS declined to follow the SBT case, in which the Annex VII 
Tribunal had found that the same dispute arose under both UNCLOS and the 1993 
Convention, deciding instead that the matter before it was a dispute under UNCLOS 
that other agreements did not regulate unless they mentioned UNCLOS by name or it 
fell into a specifically mentioned class of treaties.
1460
 
Colson and Hoyle call for the Award not to be regarded as a precedent but instead to 
be limited to the specific facts of the case,
1461
 and conclude that ITLOS itself 
                                                          
1460
  Ibid. (paragraph 53).  Several judges delivered Separate Opinions suggesting that ITLOS 
would be right to depart from the Annex VII tribunal’s reasoning regarding Article 281(1) in the 
SBT case.  Judge Wolfrum, for example, observed (Separate Opinion of Judge Wolfrum, supra n 
1453, at 131-132) that the United Kingdom’s interpretation of Article 282 defeated the objective 
of Part XV of UNCLOS.  Since more than one treaty might bear upon a single dispute, which 
could have diverse outcomes depending upon what treaty were invoked, “an intention to entrust 
the settlement of disputes concerning the interpretation and application of the Convention to 
other institutions must be expressed explicitly”.  Judge Treves wrote (Separate Opinion of Judge 
Treves, ITLOS Reports 2001, p. 137 at 138 (paragraph 4)) that Article 282, reinforcing States’ 
“general freedom…to utilize whichever means of compulsory adjudication are available under 
treaties in force for them” was thus unlike Articles 281 and 283, which “set out obstacles to the 
possibility of resorting to compulsory adjudication in general.”  Indeed (at 139 (paragraph 6)), 
had ITLOS come to the opposite conclusion on prima facie jurisdiction, the dispute, though 
about the interpretation or application of UNCLOS, “would have been left to be considered in 
separate parts by different courts or tribunals, and taken away from the only tribunal competent 
to deal with it in its entirety.”  By contrast, while Judge Anderson “retained doubts” as to whether 
an Annex VII tribunal’s jurisdiction could ultimately be sustained, he was prepared to uphold it 
prima facie in the provisional measures phase on the basis of the applicable tests for Articles 282 
and 283, which were whether these articles “obviously exclud[ed]” the jurisdiction of the Annex 
VII tribunal: Separate Opinion of Judge Anderson, ITLOS Reports 2001, p. 124 at 125. 
1461
  Colson and Hoyle, supra Ch VI n 1299, at 70. 
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“appears to have taken steps to direct the MOX Plant case away from Southern 
Bluefin Tuna case reasoning.”1462 
7 Resolution of the dispute 
a The SBT Scientific Research Program 
Following the Award, Japan advised Australia and New Zealand that it wished to see 
a return to consensus and cooperation in the CCSBT.  Proposing high-level 
negotiations for that purpose, Japan indicated that it did not intend to conduct any 
further experimental fishing unilaterally.  In the subsequent negotiations it was 
agreed that the way to resolve the disagreement about the appropriate nature and 
extent of any experimental fishing was to engage independent external scientists to 
devise a scientific program to reduce the uncertainties concerning the SBT stock.
1463
 
At a special meeting of the CCSBT in November 2000, the parties adopted terms of 
reference for the external scientists and agreed that whatever scientific program the 
external scientists recommended would become the CCSBT’s decision unless there 
was agreement to alter it.
1464
  On this basis New Zealand the following month lifted 
the port ban it had imposed on Japanese SBT vessels at the commencement of the 
dispute.
1465
 
At its next meeting in April 2001 the CCSBT adopted the scientific research program 
developed by the independent scientists.
1466
  Providing for a wide range of research 
activities to improve understanding of the SBT stock, the program centred on work 
                                                          
1462
  Ibid., at 74. 
1463
  Mansfield, supra n 1340, at 365. 
1464
  See “Development of a SBT Scientific Research Program including a Scientific Fishing 
Component by the CCSBT External Scientists” (Attachment L to CCSBTSM3 Report), in 
CCSBT Blue Book 2001, supra Ch I n 242, 139 at 141. 
1465
  See New Zealand Ministry of Fisheries press release of 22 December 2000, “Scientists 
Brought into Tuna Dispute”, <www.fish.govt.nz/en-nz/Press/Press+Releases+2000/December+ 
2000/Scientists+Brought+Into+Tuna+Dispute.htm> (visited on 21 July 2008). 
1466
  CCSBT7 Report, supra Ch III n 449, at 4 (paragraph 12). 
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to determine the actual catch of SBT, to develop a more effective stock assessment 
model and a fish tagging program to provide a better indication of stock levels.  It 
also contemplated the placing of observers on SBT fishing vessels to monitor their 
catch.
1467
  At the same meeting the Republic of Korea indicated that it expected to be 
able to accede to the 1993 Convention towards the end of 2001.
1468
  It was also this 
meeting that adopted the Resolution creating an Extended Commission and Extended 
Scientific Committee to allow Taiwan’s participation in the CCSBT’s work.1469 
Although it would be an exaggeration to say that this resolved for all time 
disagreements about the measures necessary to manage the SBT stock, as a degree of 
difficulty and controversy is inevitable about TAC and national allocations, the 
agreed scientific research program has in time produced a much improved basis for 
decision-making.  This culminated in the adoption of a management strategy at the 
CCSBT’s 2005 meeting,1470 despite the fact that for other reasons1471 the strategy 
could not be implemented and work on a replacement for it is underway. 
b The 711 tonnes “lost” to Japan under the ITLOS Order 
The Annex VII tribunal’s lifting of the ITLOS provisional measures led to renewed 
controversy over how to treat the 711 tonnes of commercial catch Japan had forgone 
in part-compliance with the two-year catch limit under that Order: was it entitled to 
reclaim it, or was the situation covered by the tribunal’s dictum on not disregarding 
the effects of decisions made in conformity with the Order?
1472
  In the end, as part of 
                                                          
1467
  See Report of the SC to the CCSBT on the Scientific Research Program (Attachment D 
to CCSBT-SC5 Report), in CCSBT Blue Book 2002, supra Ch I n 30, 169-175. 
1468
  CCSBT7 Report, supra Ch III n 449, at 5 (paragraph 21). 
1469
  Ibid. (paragraph 23).  The resolution is reproduced infra at Appendix D. 
1470
  CCSBT-EC4 Report, supra Ch I n 248, at paragraph 69. 
1471
  See supra Ch VI, text accompanying nn 1331-1332. 
1472
  Annex VII Tribunal Award, supra n 1336, at 1391 (paragraph 67). 
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the settlement of the dispute Australia and New Zealand agreed that in 2001 Japan 
would be able to add half of this amount, or 356 tonnes, to its commercial catch.
1473
  
It is submitted, however, that it is wrong to view any of the 711 tonnes as catch that 
Japan again became entitled to take as a result of the decision on jurisdiction.  That 
would be so only if Australia and New Zealand had lost the case on the merits.  As it 
was, the decision left standing, although incapable of being decided or enforced, their 
claim for repayment by Japan of a further 2,951 tonnes (so that it would have repaid 
in full the total of 3,662 tonnes of experimental catch in 1998 and 1999), alongside 
Japan’s claim that it had never been obliged to pay back anything.  Japan’s demand 
to retake the 711 tonnes was hence logically no more persuasive than an equivalent 
demand by Australia and New Zealand that Japan pay back the remaining 2,951 
tonnes they claimed it owed the fishery.  In these circumstances it would have been 
more in keeping with the compromise spirit necessary for settlement for the status 
quo to be frozen by both sides abandoning their claims against each other. 
c The new-old quota of 2003 
The unanimity of the Scientific Committee report in August 2001
1474
 was not 
sufficient to prevent a continuation of the pattern in quota negotiations when the 
report was considered by the Eighth Meeting of the CCSBT.  Japan again demanded 
an increase, this time of 500 tonnes to be shared pro rata among Members, which 
was resisted by the other parties, resulting once more in no TAC and national 
allocations being set.
1475
  Indonesia’s catch, according to Japan, was not the 1,500 
                                                          
1473
  See the Hon Wilson Tuckey MP, Minister for Fisheries, Forestry and Conservation, 
“Tuckey Announces End to Southern Bluefin Tuna Dispute with Japan” (Press Release No 
AFFA01/42TU, 29 May 2001). 
1474
  CCSBT-SC6 Report, supra Ch I n 291. 
1475
  CCSBT8 Report, supra Ch I n 30, at 70 (paragraphs 70-81); Attachment N-2 to 
CCSBT8 Report, supra Ch IV n 738.  While there appears to have been substantial agreement on 
a “provisional catch limit based on current catch levels” (CCSBT8 Report, paragraph 75), with 
the uncertainty surrounding the Indonesian catch there was ambiguity as to what the “current” 
level actually meant; thus in the absence of an agreement on national allocations (paragraph 81) 
 490 
tonnes estimated by the Scientific Committee but 500 tonnes; half of the difference 
should be distributed among the existing Members and the rest retained for stock 
recovery.
1476
  Australia countered that it was “untenable for CCSBT members to be 
insisting on increasing their own catches while expressing justifiable concern about 
increasing catches by others.”1477 
At the Ninth Meeting in 2002 Japan stated that in setting the TAC “account needed 
to be taken of both the Scientific Committee’s recommendation and socio-economic 
issues”.  It believed that, even if the TAC were set at the level of the 2001 catch, 
there would be a surplus within it that could be reallocated to existing Members’ 
national allocations.  Japan also said it might request further adjustments to national 
allocations based on the outcome of the review of the monitoring program of 
Indonesia’s catch to be conducted by the Extended Commission.1478  This drew 
apparent support from Taiwan,
1479
 but from no other Members, so that for a sixth 
successive year no agreement on TAC and national allocations was reached.
1480
 
Agreement drew closer in April 2003 with the conclusion of participants at the 
Indonesian Catch Monitoring Review Workshop that, with improvements in 
dockside monitoring having resolved many of the uncertainties, “current Japanese 
import data should not be used to estimate total Indonesian SBT catch from 
                                                                                                                                                                    
no TAC was formally set. Nor is it clear whether Japan envisaged that the 500 tonnes should be 
divided among only the original three members, or whether Korea, newly acceded, should share 
in the increase, or both Korea and Taiwan should do so.  
1476
  Attachment N-2 to CCSBT8 Report, supra Ch IV n 738. 
1477
  Attachment N-1 to CCSBT8 Report, supra Ch IV n 738, at 143. 
1478
  CCSBT-EC1 Report, supra Ch I n 293, at 24 (paragraph 77). 
1479
  Ibid., paragraph 76. 
1480
  Ibid., paragraph 80. 
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monitored landings.”1481  Finally, at the Tenth Meeting a TAC of 14,030 tonnes was 
adopted, allocated as follows: 
 Tonnes 
Australia 5265 
Japan 6065 
Korea (Republic of) 1140 
New Zealand 420 
Taiwan (Fishing Entity of) 1140 
 ------- 
TOTAL 14030 
 
In addition a global allocation of 900 tonnes was made to cooperating non-members, 
of which 800 tonnes would be offered to Indonesia.  The remaining 100 tonnes was 
to accommodate other non-member countries; the Philippines were mentioned, but 
South Africa was not.
1482
   
Note that the allocations of the three original parties are exactly the same as in 1989-
1997, i.e. the level for which Australia and New Zealand had consistently argued in 
the intervening years but which Japan had rejected.  It is ironic that while Australia 
and New Zealand in fact won the argument, given the belated acknowledgment by 
Japan of the impossibility of meeting the 1980-by-2020 target for parental biomass, 
their position ultimately prevailed for an entirely unrelated reason: the glut of SBT 
on the Japanese market.
1483
 
                                                          
1481
  Report of the Indonesian Catch Monitoring Review Workshop, 10-11 April 2003, 
Queenstown, New Zealand, in CCSBT Blue Book 2004, supra Ch I n 32, 295 at 301 (paragraph 
19). 
1482
  CCSBT-EC2 Report, supra Ch II n 353, at 24 (paragraph 51). 
1483
  Supra Ch I, text following n 275. 
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8 Issues left unresolved because the case did not go to 
the merits 
a Best scientific evidence (design of the experimental fishing 
program and analysis of its results) 
It will be recalled that Japan’s experimental fishing sought to reduce the uncertainty 
in the interpretation of CPUE by collecting catch and effort data from area/month 
combinations in which no recent commercial fishing had taken place, in order to 
estimate the ratio of relative density in areas not fished commercially to the density 
in areas that would be fished under normal circumstances.  According to Polacheck, 
there were numerous problems with Japan’s proposed methods for analysing and 
interpreting the experimental fishing results.  These included the fact that the ratio 
concerned was unlikely to be constant spatially, temporally or across all age classes, 
confounding any extrapolation to other areas and past years.  Moreover, estimates of 
the ratio would depend on their spatial and temporal scales, the criteria used to define 
fished and unfished areas and the model used to calculate SBT densities in the area 
not fished in the experiment.  From the 1998 results, very different values for the 
ratio could be obtained depending on how these factors were dealt with.
1484
 
Further, Japan’s experimental design had no mechanism to ensure that sampling was 
distributed representatively throughout the area and time period of the experiment.  
The vessel deployment scheme did not constrain where half the vessels fished, and 
the other half had only minimal constraints.  As a result, the actual experimental 
effort of 1998 was highly concentrated in or very close to the commercially fished 
area, only 3 per cent of the total effort in the experiment occurring 120 miles or more 
– that is, twice the length of an average longline – from the commercially fished area 
(see Map 2 on the next page). 
More bizarrely yet, after refinement of its original proposal for experimental fishing, 
the reason Japan gave for the experiment that finally took place was simplified to the 
                                                          
1484
  Polacheck, supra n 1340, at 289-290. 
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Map 2.  The area for which the Japanese 1998 experimental fishing intended to 
estimate the relative density of SBT in fished and unfished 5° squares and the 
relative amount of effort within different portions of this area.
1485
 
 
  
 
point of absurdity.  The simplified reason was to disprove the variable squares 
hypothesis.  This was open to legal attack in two obvious ways and a more subtle 
one.  First, Australia and New Zealand had never asserted the hypothesis reflected 
reality, even though their models that accorded it some weight appeared to have 
predictive power (a fact that would not have changed even if the hypothesis were 
definitively shown to be false).  Secondly, even if Australia and New Zealand had 
maintained the hypothesis, an experimental catch of 6,000 tonnes over three years 
would not have been necessary to refute it; catching a single SBT in an unfished 
square for the relevant month would have sufficed.  Thirdly, if, as Japan proposed, as 
a result of being disproved the variable squares hypothesis had to be removed from 
the models, the effect of the remaining hypotheses would by definition have been to 
                                                          
1485
  Taken from Polacheck, supra n 1340, at 290.  Shaded black are the squares fished 
regularly in the 1990s.  The adjacent vertical strips represent the area within 1° and 2° of those 
fished squares, while the grey region represents the rest of the area. 
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shift the prognoses for the stock towards the optimistic end of the spectrum – and this 
irrespective of the actual state of the stock disclosed by the experiment.
1486
  
For all the understandable reluctance of legal tribunals to evaluate competing 
scientific judgements, if the applicants had succeeded in proving the facts recited in 
the previous paragraph, it is difficult to see how the Annex VII tribunal could have 
stopped short of drawing the necessary conclusion that the experiment itself, and any 
measures said to flow from its results, would have failed to meet the standard of 
being based on the “best scientific evidence available” laid down in UNCLOS 
Article 119, paragraph 3(a).  Japan would, it seems, have found it necessary to argue 
that “best…available” means “best that the commercial fleet can be persuaded to 
gather”.  Commercial catch needs would thus be acting as a constraint on scientific 
ones rather than vice versa.
1487
 
                                                          
1486
  Note also the argument of Polacheck, supra n 1340, at 289 that, although the relative 
weights given to the different CPUE models contributed to the differences in the parties’ 
estimates of the probability of recovery, they were not the principal source of differences in the 
projection estimates.  The weights assigned to the different CPUE models by Australia and Japan 
were in fact quite similar, and the estimated probabilities from the 1998 assessment were largely 
insensitive to them.  Moreover, even if the constant squares hypothesis, which was the most 
optimistic interpretation of CPUE, could be shown to be correct, the Australian scientists’ 
estimate of the recovery probability from the 1998 assessment was 36% and it was 40% for their 
New Zealand counterparts. 
1487
  In proposing a CPUE component for the Scientific Research Program to settle the 
dispute, Japan noted that “the participation and collaboration of fishing industries are essential 
and their own decision with regard to a survey should be respected.”  See Report of the Scientific 
Meeting for Development of a SRP for the CCSBT and Overview of Progress on Stock 
Assessment, 12-15 November 2000, Canberra, Australia, Japan, in CCSBT Blue Book 2001, 
supra Ch I n 242, 275 at 280 (paragraph 22).  By contrast Australia and New Zealand favoured 
minimising the constraints on the scientists: ibid. at 279 (paragraphs 16 and 17 respectively).  
Note Japanese unease about using boats from non-member countries to catch scientific quota, 
whereas Australia’s view was that the program’s objective should be to carry out research that 
would be most effective in reducing uncertainties, hence nationality of vessels should not be an 
obstacle to participation: ibid. at 281 (paragraph 33). 
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As a matter of law, it is hard to disagree with Polacheck’s conclusion that catch taken 
in the name of science cannot be an end in itself.  Had the SBT case gone to the 
merits, the main issue would have been the standard and burden of proof required for 
experimental fishing.  More specifically, could substantial increases in catches be 
justified on scientific grounds in the absence of agreement on the validity of the 
experimental design to provide meaningful results and of any specific management 
framework in which those results would be used, and without demonstrating that the 
experiment, even if conclusive, would substantially change the existing scientific 
advice?  Polacheck laments that, while the precautionary approach would require that 
the onus of proof lie on the proponents of taking increased risk, the Annex VII 
tribunal’s denial of its own jurisdiction under UNCLOS was a lost opportunity to set 
international standards.  He concedes, though, that the provisional measures phase of 
the case before ITLOS provides some guidance.
1488
 
An interpretation of this to require favouring a conservative measure over a risky one 
may be too simplistic: possibly sufficient for depleted stocks, but it may not be 
appropriate to give it normative character for all stocks.  Where scientific modelling 
is at issue, a compound condition suggests itself: if one model robust to error in 
assumptions favours conservation, and a less robust one does not (robust in the sense 
that slightly different assumptions generate slightly, not significantly different 
outcomes), then the law too should support the robust model.
1489
 
                                                          
1488
  Polacheck, supra n 1340, at 293. 
1489
  Note that the Japanese models were indeed less robust: Japan’s estimated probability in 
1997 of recovery of the parental stock to its 1980 level by 2020 was 79%, as against 36% for 
Australia and 29% for New Zealand, but additional Japanese analyses with a “slightly different” 
VPA structure gave 20%: CCSBT3(1) Report, supra Ch I n 102, at 14-15.  In Australia’s view 
this indicated that the state of VPAs given high weights by Japan (only 24 of the 216 agreed on 
by the Scientific Committee), and thus the projection results based on only 12 of these 24, did not 
provide a robust measure of the status of the stock.  Japan excluded the other 192 because it 
considered these to be outside the range of plausible hypotheses, although it was alone in this 
view: ibid., at 17; CCSBT-SC2 Report, supra Ch I n 240, at 7 and 9. 
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While one can accept Japan’s view that “[e]xcessive conservatism of not accepting 
any additional risk under any circumstance will be adverse for the achievement of 
maximum sustainable use of resources”, which Japan regarded as “clearly supported” 
in the 1993 Convention,
1490
 if this was intended to be a reference to the Australian 
and New Zealand position, then it is no more than a caricature of it.  The latter 
States’ position was not one of unwillingness to accept any additional risk, but of 
doing so only if the additional risk could be shown to produce worthwhile benefits. 
A trap into which the law should not fall is to require averaging in situations of 
scientific disagreement where the true position is much more likely to be closer to 
one of the contending camps’ view than somewhere in the middle: “an average is 
hardly likely to be correct when at least one of its components is wrong”.1491 
b The relationship between conservation and optimum utilisation 
The question here is whether the goals of conservation and optimum utilisation 
mentioned in Article 64 of UNCLOS are of equal legal importance or priority, or 
whether one – conservation – is logically anterior to the other and must first be 
assured before weight can be given to optimum utilisation.  According to Koers, 
[f]ull utilization and conservation are not opposing concepts.  The central concern of 
conservation is to prevent the waste of the living resources of the sea by over-
exploitation and to preserve their productivity for the future.  This implies that any 
long term full utilization programme must take into account the demands of 
conservation, since the long range productivity of a stock is normally adversely 
affected by exploitation beyond its maximum biological limits.
1492
  
                                                          
1490
  Ibid., at 16. 
1491
  Stock Assessment Workshop Report, supra Ch VI n 1260, at 222 (paragraph 21).  
Accord Stephens, supra Ch VI n 1305, at 188:  
Encouraging the parties to a dispute to reach a compromise may well produce more 
harmonious relations but it will not necessarily lead to optimal environmental outcomes.  In 
many cases it may serve to restore (or enhance) comity but only at the expense of the 
protection and preservation of the environment. 
1492
  Koers, supra Ch I n 285, at 45. 
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Where the balance should lie may depend on how the stock’s biomass stands in 
relation to Bmsy.  For stocks significantly below that level, it is submitted that the 
primary obligation is to restore the biomass to that level, for the benefit not only of 
the present participants in the fishery but of all who might potentially wish to enter it.  
The role of optimum utilisation in these circumstances is at most to govern the speed 
of the rebuilding, i.e. to take economic factors into account but not to the extent of 
stopping or reversing it.
1493
  This is connected with the argument advanced in the 
concluding chapter that, if the existing participants wish to maintain the fishery at its 
depleted level for economic reasons, they have no legal answer to new entrants.
1494
  
Only by active steps to rebuild the stock, which entails restricting their own short-
term take, can they mount even a moderately convincing case for restraint by third 
parties who have not themselves contributed to the depletion.  
c Meaning of high seas freedom of fishing “subject to” coastal 
States’ rights, duties and interests  
Finally, it may be asked to what extent a judgment on the merits in the dispute might 
have confirmed whether Australia and New Zealand as coastal States had a greater 
say in the management of the SBT fishery than Japan.  More pertinently, what might 
the answer have implied for the relative rights of Indonesia and South Africa on one 
hand, as new entrant coastal States, and Korea, Taiwan and the Philippines, as new 
entrants to the high seas fishery on the other, vis-à-vis each of the original three 
parties to the 1993 Convention both singly and collectively?
1495
  Sooner or later a 
                                                          
1493
  While it would have been in the applicants’ interests to adopt this view, Japan tended to 
argue that the two goals were in contradiction to, and must thus be balanced with, each other – 
see its contrast of optimum utilisation with conservation in CCSBT6(1) Report, supra Ch I n 219, 
at 5 (paragraph 24) and its advocacy of optimum utilisation in general, and as a reason for raising 
the TAC by 3000 tonnes in particular, in Attachment C to CCSBT6(1) Report, supra Ch V n 
1157, at 18-19. 
1494
  Supra Ch VI, section C. 
1495
  See in this vein Iceland’s strong statements on ABT, supra Ch III nn 573 and 574, and 
Judge Oda’s questioning of the “duties” element in particular, supra Ch III n 657, at 750-751. 
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case can be expected to be litigated on this point, but in the meantime it remains a 
fruitful, if speculative, area for research. 
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APPENDIX B 
SBT fishery science 
Maximum sustainable yield – the surplus production model of fisheries 
Although fisheries management decisions must take the form of explicitly or 
implicitly fixed numbers, fish stock assessment is an inexact science, hence the 
advice to managers from scientists on the likely biological consequences of proposed 
management actions will inevitably be affected by considerable uncertainty.  
Managers thus find themselves balancing the conflicting pressures to avoid on one 
hand the short-term economic loss of unnecessarily forgoing catches and on the other 
hand the risk of depleting the stock, leading to longer-term economic losses.  The 
history of fisheries management has revealed a propensity to favour short-term 
economic gain even in the face of evidence, in the form of actual depletion of many 
stocks, that the risk of this latter outcome is high.
1496
  This is so despite the fact that 
the mathematical models describing this risk are relatively simple.
1497
  
The surplus production model usually associated with Schaefer relies on a number of 
assumptions that, although not likely to be borne out in practice, are nonetheless 
plausible approximations of reality.
1498
  The model posits that fish populations in the 
long run and barring major environmental shocks tend to stay in dynamic balance, 
losses from mortality both from natural sources (predation, disease, old age) and by 
fishing being balanced by accessions from increased numbers and growth of 
                                                          
1496
  Polacheck, supra Appendix A n 1340, at 283. 
1497
  A useful and, for the most part, easily understood overview of the basic mathematics and 
statistics in fishery science is included as an appendix in W.H. Everhart and W.D. Youngs, 
Principles of Fishery Science, 2nd edn (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981), at 294-336. 
1498
  The following description is drawn from Schaefer, supra Ch I n 77, at 672-673.  
Scientists defend these simplifications on the basis that attempting to account for large numbers 
of variables produces models of such complexity that they cease to assist understanding of the 
underlying natural phenomena: B.J. Rothschild and A. Suda, “Population Dynamics of Tuna”, in 
J. Gulland (ed), Fish Population Dynamics (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 1977), 309 at 317. 
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individual fish.
1499
  If the rate of loss increases (or falls), so too does the rate of 
renewal, so as to restore the balance.  For each size of population, there is a certain 
average natural rate of increase, that is, the rate is a function of the population size.  
The catch is also some function of both population size and fishing effort.  The 
Schaefer model assumes that: (a) the instantaneous (logarithmic) rate of fishing 
mortality is directly proportional to fishing effort, however measured; and (b) the 
natural rate of increase of a fished stock at a given instant is directly proportional to 
the difference between its biomass at that instant and the average virgin biomass (that 
is, the environmental carrying capacity under average conditions with no fishing).  
The rate of increase is zero both when the population is zero and at virgin biomass, 
reaching a maximum at some intermediate value.  A quadratic relationship is a 
                                                          
1499
  Fish grow throughout their lives, albeit at ever slower rates as they age; the widely used 
von Bertalanffy growth equation posits that the growth rate reaches zero when the fish is 
infinitely old.  (See G.P. Kirkwood, “Estimation of von Bertalanffy Growth Curve Parameter 
using both Length Increment and Age-Length Data”, (1983) 40 Canadian Journal of Fisheries 
and Aquatic Sciences 1405 at 1406 where the equation in the form suitable for deriving age from 
length is given at equation (1); it is described at 1405 as “ubiquitous in the fisheries literature” 
and a discussion of its application to SBT follows at 1407-1409.)  If a smaller number of fish are 
competing for the same prey, this could be expected to be reflected in empirical evidence such as 
an increase in the growth rate.  Just such an increase has been observed for SBT since about 1980 
as the stock has been reduced: Attachment 6 to CCSBT-ESC3 Report, supra Ch I n 45, at 204.  
The phenomenon was first noted in Report of the 9th Meeting of Australian, Japanese and New 
Zealand Scientists on Southern Bluefin Tuna, Hobart, Australia, 17-22 September 1990 
(hereinafter 9th Trilateral Scientific Meeting Report), in Trilateral Scientific Meeting Reports 
Compendium, supra Ch I n 132, 75 at 84. 
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“reasonably good first approximation”.1500  As shown in Figure 2 on the next page, 
under this model Bmsy is often assumed to be around half of the virgin biomass.
1501
 
Figure 2 – the yield function in the production model of fisheries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Harvesting of fish by humans is thus treated as simply an additional source of 
mortality by predation, producing a compensatory increase in the rate of renewal to 
restore the balance at some lower absolute level of biomass.  A fishery is said to be 
in equilibrium when the catch is equal to the replacement yield – that is, the natural 
                                                          
1500
  Schaefer, supra Ch I n 77, at 673.  The quadratic nature of the relationship in fact 
follows necessarily by elementary integral calculus from the assumption of linearity in its rate of 
change in (b) above. 
1501
  Again this is true by definition if the equation describing the yield curve is quadratic.  
Bmsy as half of virgin biomass is described as a “rule of thumb” in D.H. Cushing, Science and the 
Fisheries (London: Edward Arnold, 1977), at 32 and is accepted by some States (see e.g. Canada 
in ICCAT13 Report, in ICCAT Green Book 1994, supra Ch IV n 816, 29 at 39 (paragraph 
16a.6)).  William W. Fox Jr, “An Exponential Surplus-Yield Model for Optimizing Exploited 
Fish Populations”, (1970) 99 Transactions of the American Fisheries Society 80 substitutes a 
logarithmic rate of change into the Schaefer model in place of the linear one, leading to the result 
(at 84) that yield is maximised when the biomass is reduced to 1/e (around 37%, e being the base 
of natural logarithms) of the virgin biomass.  The Bmsy of 30% to 44% of virgin biomass for New 
Zealand orange roughy stocks cited by Serdy, supra Ch II n 314, at 498n is consistent with this. 
 
 502 
increase for given levels of population and effort – from which it follows that under 
equilibrium the size of the biomass itself is a function of effort,
1502
 as illustrated by 
Figure 1 in Chapter I above. 
The Schaefer model takes no account of the age structure of the stock,
1503
 some 
alteration of which is inevitable by fishing and its effect on recruitment.
1504
  This is 
important for SBT for several reasons.  Firstly, SBT exhibits age-specific natural 
mortality, with mortality higher for young fish and lower for old fish.
1505
  Secondly, 
when parental biomass is reduced to less than half of its unfished level, as that of 
SBT has been,
1506
 it may no longer reliably produce recruits.  The risks at low levels 
are not symmetrical, one of the main ones for depleted stocks being that in that state 
environmental variability can cause an abrupt fall in recruitment and subsequent 
                                                          
1502
  As shown in Figure 2, the replacement yield can be low by comparison with MSY for 
stocks that are underexploited or overexploited.  Ideally the replacement yield would be close to 
the MSY, as appears to be the case for South Atlantic albacore (MSY 30,915 tonnes, replacement 
yield 29,256 tonnes): Annex 8 to ICCAT18 Report, supra Ch III n 612, at 187 (Report of the 
Meeting of Panel 3). 
1503
  The Beverton-Holt cohort model, which does take account of age structure, is much less 
amenable to economic modelling than the Schaefer surplus production model, since cohorts are 
rarely harvestable individually: Munro and Scott, supra Ch I n 107, at 625.  
1504
  The advent of fishing reduces the average age of the stock: W.E. Ricker, “Stock and 
Recruitment”, (1954) 11 Journal of the Fisheries Research Board of Canada 559 at 583.  This 
accords with common sense, as new fish of age 0 replace older fish whose removal from the 
ecosystem has made room for them, whatever the age of the latter.  Accord Caton et al, supra Ch 
I n 36, at 26: harvesting a previously unfished stock reduces the parental biomass, as it is the 
accumulated older fish that tend to be caught first in the initial “fish-down” phase of a fishery.  
Ricker shows that in the absence of fishing, certain stock-recruitment relationships with random 
variations can lead to substantial population oscillations of more or less regular periodicity, but 
the effect of even light fishing is to dampen these oscillations, while moderately heavy fishing is 
able to eliminate them: at 584-585.  Contrary to the Schaefer model, for oscillating stock-
recruitment relationships light to moderate fishing can even increase the size of the stock from its 
unexploited average: at 583. 
1505
  Attachment 6 to CCSBT-ESC3 Report, supra Ch I n 45, at 204. 
1506
  Infra, text at n 1519. 
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collapse of the parental biomass.  While present techniques do not permit prediction 
of how low parental biomass can be driven before collapse occurs, or quantification 
of the probability of collapse at a given level, fish stocks are known where this has 
occurred as the result of overfishing at low stock sizes, the cod stock off Atlantic 
Canada being a widely cited example.  Nonetheless, the lower the stock’s level and 
the longer it remains so, the higher the risk of such abrupt recruitment declines.  
Estimation of this risk requires an equation for the stock-recruitment relationship, but 
rarely is there information on this at lower stock sizes.  Nor at these sizes are 
recruitment predictions based on past observations necessarily reliable if the natural 
variability around the predicted recruitment increases relative to higher stock sizes, 
or the normal processes determining recruitment break down altogether.
1507
 
An SBT recruit to the Australian fishery is 1-2 years old.  On the basis of a yield-per-
recruit analysis, which provides information on the yield in weight which can be 
obtained for a given number of recruits to the fishery if fishing commences at 
different ages and under various effort regimes, the benefits can be compared of 
harvesting fish when they are young and most plentiful, as against when they are 
older and larger, but reduced in numbers by natural causes.  For SBT, such an 
analysis indicated that, given the intensity of fishing during the 1970s, Australia’s 
yield would be maximised by fishing as soon as fish were available, because 
migration of SBT away from the Australian fishery tended to negate any benefit 
obtained by waiting until the fish were older to catch them.  From a global 
perspective, however, yield would be increased if young fish were protected.
1508
 
                                                          
1507
  See Polacheck, supra Appendix A n 1340, at 292; Caton et al, supra Ch I n 36, at 26; 
13th Trilateral Scientific Meeting Report, supra Ch I n 46, at 5 (paragraph 25). 
1508
  Caton et al, supra Ch I n 36, at 18-19.  Thus in the report of its inquiry the IAC cited 
CSIRO estimates that if age at first capture were increased from 1 to 5, global catch sustaining 
the parental biomass at 220,000 tonnes could be increased from 33,000 tonnes to 52,000 tonnes: 
IAC, supra Ch I n 70 at 25.  See also the comparison of the relative effects of surface catch and 
longline catch, supra Ch I n 132 and accompanying text. 
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Shortcomings of the MSY 
The MSY concept itself has been seen as increasingly problematic over the years. 
Although the difficulties with it were known well before the conclusion of the Third 
UN Conference on the Law of the Sea, a qualified version of MSY is the standard 
used in UNCLOS.
1509
  Apart from having no necessary relation with maximised 
economic yield, Knight in 1976 listed several complications of MSY both as concept 
and as management goal: the need to take into consideration the year classes of fish 
caught in order to ensure adequate future recruitment, the uncertainty engendered by 
variations in environmental and other factors, the impossibility of managing more 
than one of two or more stocks in a prey-predator relationship so as to take the MSY 
(and even to do so for one stock may reduce the yield of the ecosystem as a whole 
below what would be otherwise be possible), and the danger of overfishing the stock 
through failure to take bycatch into account or from undetected breaches of the limits 
by the regulated fleets.
1510
  MSY is also inherently risky: even if the scientific 
estimate is accurate, in every second year on average the stock is being reduced, and 
if there is a run of bad years in random environmental variability, the reduction will 
go on for several years and its cumulative effect could become significant.  If in 
addition the scientific estimate errs on the side of optimism, of which there is a 50 
per cent chance, then catching the MSY as so estimated will in most if not all years 
in fact result in net removals from the stock, compounding the risk.
1511
  
                                                          
1509
  See extracts from Articles 61(3) and 119(1)(a), supra Ch I, text between nn 79 and 80. 
1510
  Knight, supra Ch I n 52, at 8, 35 and 39. 
1511
  But if effort rather than catch is limited by reference to MSY, the catch would vary 
somewhat with the state of the stock.  Taking its lead from the coastal State, Canada, NAFO for 
some years based its changing catch limits on F0.1 (Applebaum, supra Ch I n 124, at 284), which 
is defined as fishing effort at that point on the yield/effort curve where the gradient is one tenth of 
that at the origin. (Although the quadratic approximation, supra n 1500 and accompanying text, 
would make this 90% of Fmsy, yielding 99% of the MSY, according to Applebaum this level of 
effort yielded catches “significantly below” the MSY, in some cases only two thirds of it.  
Overestimation of the size of the stock and of the MSY might explain the discrepancy, if effort 
was thereby inadvertently allowed to go over the true Fmsy.) 
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Scientists have hence tended to disparage and dismiss MSY as a worthwhile goal, 
most memorably in Larkin’s 1977 epitaph: 
M.S.Y. 
1930s–1970s 
Here lies the concept, MSY. 
It advocated yields too high. 
And didn’t spell out how to slice the pie. 
We bury it with best of wishes. 
Especially on behalf of fishes. 
We don’t know yet what will take its place. 
But hope it’s as good for the human race.1512 
Yet in its qualified form it has exhibited a notable tenacity in fishery treaties, for 
which there are two reasons beyond the status of UNCLOS itself.  One is that MEY 
is not necessarily a better management goal for international fisheries than MSY: it 
would require a rule for deciding among the different MEYs of States participating in 
the fishery.  (By contrast, MSY, elusive though it is, at least has the same meaning 
for all.)  The other is that, even were there such a rule, under the dynamic economic 
model of the fishery presented in Chapter I,
1513
 B* is not necessarily greater than 
Bmsy.  The evidence supports the acerbic MSY definition attributed to Gulland:
1514
  
A quantity that biologists say does not exist.  That economists say would be 
irrelevant if it did exist.  It is, in short, the most important concept in fisheries 
management. 
So it arguably remains, albeit now under Annex II to the UN Fish Stocks Agreement 
as a limit rather than a target reference point, answering or avoiding the objection of 
“advocat[ing]” yields too high” as well as those listed above by Knight. 
                                                          
1512
  P. Larkin, “An Epitaph for the Concept of Maximum Sustainable Yield”, (1977) 106 
Transactions of the American Fisheries Society 1 at 10. 
1513
  That is, once discount rates are taken into account: supra Ch I n 107. 
1514
  M. Mangel, B. Marinovic, C. Pomeroy and D. Croll, “Requiem for Ricker: Unpacking 
MSY”, (2002) 70 Bulletin of Marine Science 763 at 778. 
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Virtual population analysis 
Unlike the position in ICCAT, where MSY is specified as the management goal in 
the 1966 Convention,
1515
 CCSBT scientific advice is not given in terms of the MSY 
(though this may change if a new management strategy is adopted) but rather in 
terms of the likelihood of rebuilding the parental biomass to the level of particular 
years under various levels of catch.
1516
  For this the technique of virtual population 
analysis
1517
 (VPA) is used.  VPA projections can show, for a given set of 
                                                          
1515
  Supra Introduction n 6; Article IV(2)(b) speaks of the “maintenance of the populations 
of tuna and tuna-like fishes in the Convention area at levels which will permit the maximum 
sustainable catch and which will ensure the effective exploitation of these fishes in a manner 
consistent with this catch”; by contrast Article 3 of the 1993 Convention, supra Introduction n 5, 
requires only the “conservation and optimum utilisation” of SBT. 
1516
  This method predates the CCSBT, having been first adopted in 1993 as part of the mid-
term management strategy, when the managers put the questions infra at n 1541 to the scientists. 
1517
  According to the definition of technical terms used by ICCAT, supra Ch I n 194, at 164-
165, a VPA proceeds by analysing the catches from a given cohort (fish of a stock spawned in the 
same year, also known as a year class) over its life in the fishery, as follows: 
If 10 fish were caught per year from the 1968 year class for ten successive years from 1970 to 
1979, then 100 fish would have been caught from that year class during its life in the fishery.  
Since 10 fish were caught during 1979, then at least 10 fish must have been alive at the 
beginning of that year.  Similarly there must have been at least 20 fish alive at the beginning 
of 1978, at least 30 at the beginning of 1977 and at least 100 at the beginning of 1970.  The 
VPA calculates the number of fish that must have been alive if some fish also died from 
causes other than fishing.  If the instantaneous natural mortality rate was known in addition to 
the 10 fish caught per year in the fishery – and normally this is known within a fairly small 
range – then the VPA calculates the number that must have been alive each year to produce a 
catch of 10 fish per year in addition to those that died from natural causes.  If the fishing 
mortality rate for the last year for which data are available is known, then the exact abundance 
of the year class can be determined in each year if the catches are known with certainty. 
Thus VPA eventually allows an estimation of the number of recruits produced each year.  Until 
the development of the technique of counting rings on the otolith (see J. Thorogood, “Age and 
Growth Rate Determination of Southern Bluefin Tuna, Thunnus maccoyii, Using Otolith 
Banding”, (2006) 30 Journal of Fish Biology 7), the age of individual fish was formerly difficult 
to assess directly, becoming progressively more so as size increases.  Instead the length 
composition of the catch was determined by sampling, from which it was possible to estimate the 
numbers of fish caught at each length of the entire catch.  These lengths were then converted to 
ages through an accepted age-length relationship.  See Kirkwood, supra n 1499; Caton et al, 
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assumptions, how the population size and structure would change under various 
catch combinations.  They are, however, extremely sensitive to the information 
inputs used to derive them, particularly the form of the stock-recruitment 
relationship.  Since the real relationship is unknown, any projection is simply a 
numerical representation of the assumptions used, both in the VPA and in the stock-
recruitment relationship.
1518
 
For SBT, the drawback of VPA is that it can take several years to determine the 
impact of recent fishing on recruitment.  In the interim, it may not be possible to 
detect a fall in recruitment sufficiently early to permit remedial reductions in catch 
that could prevent the fall becoming substantial, making it all the harder to achieve 
stock recovery.  The VPA results were open to various interpretations owing to the 
uncertainty in input data, but as the models for SBT were progressively refined over 
the 1980s, a reasonable understanding developed of the extent to which this 
uncertainty influenced the results, and the downward trend in parental biomass was 
consistent notwithstanding the uncertainties.  VPAs presented at the 1989 scientific 
meeting showed that the parental biomass in 1988 was at worst 8 per cent and at best 
25 per cent of that in 1960, which itself was below the unfished level by an unknown 
                                                                                                                                                                    
supra Ch I n 36, at 25.  The otolith is a calcareous concretion in the inner ear of fishes, laid down 
probably continuously in concentric layers which in most species have slight but observable 
colour or density variations.  The cause of these variations is unknown, but probably related to 
the passage of the seasons either directly or, through cyclical changes in diet, indirectly: Everhart 
and Youngs, supra n 1497, at 63.  For some problems and shortcomings of cohort analysis see 
T.J. Pitcher and P.J.B. Hart, Fisheries Ecology (London & Canberra: Croom Helm, 1982), at 
374-377. 
1518
  Caton et al, supra Ch I n 36, at 26.  In 1994 the scientists reported that the relationship 
between parental biomass and recruitment at the recent low levels of parental biomass was 
unknown for SBT, with all VPAs used in the assessment showing a parental biomass of about 
50% of the lowest level for which reasonably precise recruitment estimates were available.  Some 
compensation (i.e. increased recruitment per unit of parental biomass) was observed in the 
estimated recruitment between 1965 and 1989, for which the Japanese and Australian VPAs 
indicated very similar trends: 13th Trilateral Scientific Meeting Report, supra Ch I n 46, at 2 
(paragraphs 8 and 9) and 4 (paragraph 15). 
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amount, and confirmed previous predictions that a further decline for at least another 
year or two was inevitable.
1519
 
In the 1990s the accuracy of VPAs for SBT came to depend on the rate of population 
decline and the correctness of the starting value of the fishing mortality rate, which 
required additional information in the form of indices of abundance or fishing 
mortality rates (commonly referred to as tuning indices).  Indices of age-specific 
catch and effort data from the Japanese longline fishery were the primary source of 
information for tuning, but analysis of these data was limited by their aggregated 
nature, all catch and effort within 5° squares of latitude and longitude being pooled 
month by month.  Worse still, the size data used to estimate the age distribution of 
the catches were pooled quarter by quarter in blocks of 5° of latitude and 10° of 
longitude, not all of which, even at this level of aggregation, were sampled.  In 
addition, data related to changes in fleet efficiency were lacking, making it difficult 
to distinguish the effects of changes in abundance from changes in efficiency in the 
observed catch rates.  Nevertheless, the standard statistical analyses performed on 
these aggregated data indicated significant year-to-year variation in relative catch 
rates or densities among areas and seasons.
1520
 
Scientific advice to managers 
The report of the scientists’ 1988 meeting summarises the history of their joint 
endeavours.
1521
  Although at previous meetings they had stressed that SBT parental 
biomass levels below those in 1980 were likely to cause a fall in recruitment, the 
evidence had been insufficient to conclude that this was occurring.  Unsure of their 
ability to detect a decline early enough to advise managers on actions to reverse it, 
they had recommended substantial reductions in the global catches of SBT.  In 1986, 
as a consequence of the accumulating catch and effort data and improvements in 
                                                          
1519
  Caton et al, supra Ch I n 36, at 24.  See also supra Appendix A n 1343. 
1520
  Polacheck, supra Appendix A n 1340, at 285-287. 
1521
  7th Trilateral Scientific Meeting Report, supra Ch I n 132, at 42-43. 
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stock assessment methods, the scientists became more concerned about a possible 
fall in recruitment.  In 1987 the scientists recommended inter alia that 
1.  Managers should recognise that there is a risk associated with maintaining the 
current catch limits.  If catches were reduced, the risk would decrease. 
2.  Governments of the three countries take immediate steps to ensure that future 
major reductions in catch, if necessary, can be implemented quickly and 
effectively.
1522
 
By 1988, all VPA results were indicating that by 1979 biomass had fallen to a 
dangerously low proportion of its unexploited level, with recruitment having begun 
to decline before 1980 under some plausible assumptions, or fluctuated without 
apparent trend under others.  For the period 1979-1987 the VPAs again uniformly 
showed that the parental biomass had suffered a considerable additional decline.  
Largely due to the high Australian catches of the early 1980s, under most plausible 
combinations of assumptions, at the then current level of catches, both parental 
biomass and recruitment were predicted to decline even further over the next few 
years, leading to a collapse of the population. 
Though they described the need to decrease catches as “clear cut”, the scientists 
declined to specify the extent of the required reduction.  Citing the uncertainty about 
the dynamics of the SBT population, they stated that only with a complete cessation 
of catching could they be confident of the stock’s recovery – though even with zero 
catch there existed biological mechanisms that meant recovery could not be 
guaranteed.  Correctly anticipating that managers would prefer not to reduce catches 
to zero, the scientists unanimously advised that immediate reductions of at least half 
of current catches should be made to all sectors of the fishery, and not reversed until 
significant improvement to the SBT stock’s status could be demonstrated.1523 
                                                          
1522
  Report of the sixth meeting of Australian, Japanese and New Zealand scientists on 
southern bluefin tuna, Hobart, Australia, 17-21 August, 1987, in Trilateral Scientific Meeting 
Reports Compendium, supra Ch I n 132, 35 at 37. 
1523
  7th Trilateral Scientific Meeting Report, supra Ch I n 132, at 43-44.  Even this was 
accepted only with difficulty by Japan in the 1988 management meeting: stating (7th Trilateral 
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Though there was no dissent from this diagnosis, and major catch reductions were 
duly imposed in 1988 and 1989, from that point it was the prospects for the stock’s 
recovery that divided the scientists.
1524
  At the 1989 scientific meeting no agreement 
could be reached, with different Australian and Japanese views presented in the 
report.  The Australian argument was that the exclusion from the Japanese scientists’ 
analysis of historic and future Indonesian, Korean, Taiwanese and New Zealand 
catch, and of SBT bycatch in other fisheries, had the effect of underestimating the 
extent of the decline in parental biomass to 1988 and afterwards.  Moreover, their 
assumption that recruitment did not decline on average between 1960 and 1975 was 
optimistic and had led them to overestimate the likely stock recovery.
1525
  The New 
Zealand scientist present concluded that there was a risk of driving the parental 
biomass below a critical mass at which it could sustain itself.
1526
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Management Meeting Report, supra Ch II n 359, at 6) that it “could not proceed to determine 
management measures without exploring stock projections” which it expected to be more 
substantive, suggesting that the scientists be given more time “to refine analyses and come up 
with more definite recommendations”.  It listed a string of apparently positive indicators “which 
prove that the 1982 SBT cohort might not have been as damaged as is thought”.  It suggested 
“other factors associated with oceanography and climate may have influenced the stock situation 
and enquired if the scientists had considered all those factors.  Clutching at straws to forestall 
catch reduction, Japan in effect even disowned its own scientists: it “questioned the objectivity of 
the scientific report in choosing particular years so as to present more pessimistic stock 
forecasts.”  See also October 1989 Draft Summary Record, supra Ch II n 369, at 5, where Japan 
believed that catches up to 1980 were at or below the MSY for the SBT fishery (implicitly 
blaming the subsequent decline on the large Australian catches of small fish in 1982). 
1524
  It may not be coincidental that, as pointed out by Polacheck, supra Appendix A n 1340, 
at 285, while the earlier catch limits reduced catches and fishing mortality rates from the surface 
fisheries, it was not until the 1989 fishing year that the catch limits became restrictive for the 
Japanese longline fleet.  That is, until 1989 the Japanese fishery had not been able to reach its 
catch limit. 
1525
  8th Trilateral Scientific Meeting Report, supra Ch I n 158, at 53 and 61. 
1526
  Ibid., at 60.  This would be contingent on the SBT stock being subject to critical 
depensation at very low levels, which was not asserted.  If for a stock there is a biomass level 
below which the stock cannot sustain itself, so that it inevitably dies out, it is said to be subject to 
“critical depensation” – on depensation models see supra Ch II n 417 and Clark, supra Ch I n 83, 
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Little changed in the following years.  In both 1990 and 1991 Japanese scientists 
took the view that the probability was very high that the stock would increase under 
current catch levels and even under slightly higher ones.  The Australian and New 
Zealand scientists’ view was that the stock might well already be in the process of 
recruitment collapse.  Because the information was ambiguous, all were prepared to 
recommend that no increase in catch should be considered until there was clear 
scientific evidence of recovery in the parental stock.
1527
  On this point, however, 
while the Japanese scientists believed that the most reasonable range of assumptions 
led to projections which showed stock increases, their Australian and New Zealand 
                                                                                                                                                                    
at 17.  In other words the growth curve exhibits the property that for very small values of the 
population the growth rate is negative, meaning that the stock can be condemned to extinction by 
reducing it below the level at which the growth becomes negative, since beyond that point of 
minimum viability not even complete cessation of fishing will prevent its extinction.  An 
example of a natural depensatory mechanism given by Ricker, supra n 1504 at 602 is predation 
on very vulnerable fry by fish that eat their fill of them and move on, however many or few the 
fry may be.  Note that the Schaefer model, supra nn 1498-1502 and accompanying text, 
disregards depensation: Clark, supra Ch I n 83, at 50. 
1527
  9th Trilateral Scientific Meeting Report, supra n 1505, at 91; Report of the Tenth 
Meeting of Australian, Japanese and New Zealand Scientists on Southern Bluefin Tuna, 
Wellington, New Zealand, 23-29 September 1991 (hereinafter 10th Trilateral Scientific Meeting 
Report), in Trilateral Scientific Meeting Reports Compendium, supra Ch I n 132, 99 at 102 
(paragraphs 10 (Japan) and 11 (Australia and New Zealand)).  The latter meeting nonetheless saw 
agreement (ibid., at 99 (paragraph 3)) that there had been  
a continuous decline from 1980 to 1989 in the parental stock; a sharp decline from 1980 until 
1986 or 1987, and thereafter a slight increase, in the pre-adult stock; an increase in small fish 
availability in many fishing grounds, an increase in CPUE and the reappearance of middle-
sized fish on many fishing grounds, indications that escapement from the Australian surface 
fishery is increasing, but uncertainty whether present recruitment will guarantee recovery of 
the parental stock. 
Similar recommendations against increases in catch were made in 1992 and 1993: 11th Trilateral 
Scientific Meeting Report, supra Ch II n 348, at 5 (paragraph 19) and 12th Trilateral Scientific 
Meeting Report, supra Ch II n 348, at 5-6 (paragraph 22) respectively. 
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counterparts found a broader range of assumptions plausible; some of the projections 
these yielded resulted in declines.
1528
 
One of the factors in the long stasis initially was the contradictory signals from 
successive years of data.  The Australian and New Zealand scientists recommended 
in 1991 that current catch levels should not continue beyond 1992 unless there was 
sufficient evidence to refute a strong fall in recruitment since the mid-1980s.
1529
  
That evidence initially came in 1992, when new information showed that recruitment 
collapse had not occurred up to 1988, although concern remained about continued 
                                                          
1528
  10th Trilateral Scientific Meeting Report, supra n 1527, at 101 (paragraph 6).  In the 
management meeting New Zealand said that its 1991 catch of only 41% of its limit was 
“primarily thought to be a result of the poor state of the resource”: Draft 1991 Summary Record, 
supra Ch V n 1101, at 2.  By contrast, the picture provided by Japan to ICCAT was based only 
on its own optimistic assessments: Panel 3 heard that the trilateral scientific meeting determined 
that projections from current catch levels would see the parent stock “reach its lowest level in 
1990 or 1991”, after which “[m]any projections predict recovery, even under increased catches of 
up to 20,000 [tonnes], with the parent stock attaining 1980 biomass levels by 2010”, with the 
possible revision of the catch limits maintained since 1989 “currently being considered as a result 
of this year’s scientific discussions”: Report of the Meetings of Panels 1 to 4 (Annex 6 to 
Proceedings of the Seventh Special Meeting of the Commission, Madrid, November 12-16, 1990 
(hereinafter ICCATSM7 Report)), in ICCAT, Report for biennial period, 1990-91 Part I (1990), 
60 at 71-72.  A somewhat fuller story was told to the Standing Committee on Research and 
Statistics, with “socio-economic factors” (for which Japan was arguing at the time: supra Ch II, 
text between nn 341 and 344) given as an additional reason for revising the catch limits, along 
with the scientists’ recommendation “that there be no increase in present catch levels until there 
is clear scientific evidence of a recovery in the parental stock”: Report of the Standing Committee 
on Research and Statistics (SCRS) (Madrid, November 5-9, 1990) (Annex 10 to ICCATSM7 
Report)), ibid., 137 at 193. 
1529
  10th Trilateral Scientific Meeting Report, supra n 1527, at 102 (paragraph 11).  Again 
ICCAT was told only one side of the story: Panel 3 heard that lowest level should now be 
reached “in 1991 or soon thereafter”: Reports of the Meetings of Panels 1-4 (Annex 6 to 
ICCAT12 Report), in ICCAT Green Book 1992, supra Ch I n 245, 51 at 57, while the Standing 
Committee on Research and Statistics was informed (Annex 16 to ICCAT12 Report, supra Ch I 
n 245, at 135) that “most of the VPA projections show parent stock recovery.  It suggests that the 
current regulations are effective for long-term southern bluefin tuna stock recovery.” 
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decline and the possibility of a future abrupt fall while the parental biomass remained 
at its very low level.
1530
  The report stated that 
[d]ecreasing catch levels will increase the speed and possibility of recovery to the 
1980 level of parental biomass.  Maintaining the present catch level is expected to 
result in the low parental biomass seen in the 1980s continuing for many more years, 
so that the risk of an abrupt and unpredictable decline in recruitment would remain at 
about its present high level.  A decrease in catch level is preferable from the 
biological viewpoint.
1531
 
Despite this, in view of the earlier catch reductions by the three States and the 
desirability of catch reductions by others exploiting the stock, the meeting stopped 
short of recommending a change in trilateral catch limits, merely encouraging 
changes to fishing practices to decrease targeting of SBT less than 15kg and greater 
than 100kg, though it called for “urgent and decisive management action” to be taken 
in the event of significant further declines.  Instead, the meeting recommended that a 
strategy be developed for management action “to improve the chances of rebuilding 
the parental biomass to 1980 levels.”1532 
At the 1993 scientific meeting, the advent of direct ageing techniques for SBT
1533
 led 
to significant revisions of the growth assumptions.
1534
  It thus became evident (with 
                                                          
1530
  11th Trilateral Scientific Meeting Report, supra Ch II n 348, at 3 (paragraph 7). 
1531
  Ibid., at 5 (paragraph 17).  The point in the last sentence was repeated the following 
year: 12th Trilateral Scientific Meeting Report, supra Ch II n 348, at 4 (paragraph 16).  
1532
  11th Trilateral Scientific Meeting Report, supra Ch II n 348, at 5 (paragraphs 17 and 18).  
This was reflected in the report of the following year’s meeting, when the recommendation 
against raising catches until the parental biomass returned to the 1980 level, supra n 1527, was 
newly qualified by the words “unless this is part of an agreed stock rebuilding strategy that can 
be shown to have a high probability of returning the stock to biologically safe levels.” 
1533
  Supra n 1517. 
1534
  12th Trilateral Scientific Meeting Report, supra Ch II n 348, at 1 (paragraph 2) and 3 
(paragraph 7).  Specifically, the growth rate in the first year of life was faster than assumed in 
previous stock assessments; the overall growth rate of SBT had increased between the 1960s and 
1980s; and the average size at maturity, about 145 cm, was larger than assumed in previous 
analyses (about 130 cm).  The change in growth was substantial.  For example, fish 100 cm long, 
which in the past had been taken as being about 5 years old, were now interpreted as being aged 
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“very serious and detrimental” consequences for prospects of stock rebuilding) that 
several recent year-classes had not contributed to stock rebuilding.
1535
  The 
reinterpretation meant that some positive signs previously reported were no longer as 
apparent: some year-classes that had passed through the fishery since the large 
reduction in surface fishery catches were well represented in the longline fishery as 
young fish, but had not resulted in rebuilding of older age groups in subsequent 
years.  This was thought to be due to the reduced size of these year-classes and the 
large catches taken from them.  VPA results showed no convincing evidence of 
recent increases in the number of young mature fish, with parental biomass was still 
decreasing steadily to at least 1992, rather than declining slowly or having become 
stable as previously thought.  The combination of recent increases in the longline 
catch of juvenile SBT and the continuing, if reduced, Australian surface fishery 
limited the potential for recovery of the parent stock.
1536
 
A management strategy was first proposed in 1993 when the scientific meeting 
called for a stock rebuilding strategy to be developed as a matter of urgency,
1537
 a 
                                                                                                                                                                    
about 3 if caught since 1980.  The new information thus exposed a misinterpretation of the 
increased catch of middle-sized fish as a general rebuilding of the juvenile age classes; in fact 
these were faster-growing young fish, and the catch rate for fish actually of the ages concerned 
showed no significant increase. 
1535
  12th Trilateral Scientific Meeting Report, supra Ch II n 348, at 2 (paragraph 7). 
1536
  Ibid., at 3-4 (paragraphs 8-12).  The growth revision also affected the recruitment 
projections, with the decline during the early 1980s to about 50% of the 1980 level by 1985 being 
“faster and greater than expected from standard stock-recruitment relationships, raising serious 
doubts about the ability of the population to recover under current catch levels.”  Projections 
based on the improved information about growth indicted that the population was expected to 
continue declining under constant catches, with only a small probability that the parental biomass 
would increase from the current low levels by 2010, though for most assumptions about the 
stock-recruitment relationship there was “some possibility of recovery” by that year.  Projections 
using the previous growth assumptions had indicated a probable slow recovery, with the parental 
biomass expected to remain below its 1980 level for about 15 years: ibid., at 4 (paragraphs 13 
and 14). 
1537
  12th Trilateral Scientific Meeting Report, supra Ch II n 348, at 6 (paragraph 23). 
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goal elaborated the following year into a stock rebuilding strategy that “can be shown 
to have a high probability of moving the stock to biologically safe levels”, with 
return to at least 1980 levels retained as an objective for rebuilding.
1538
  In 1992 the 
three States had set the 1980 level of parental biomass as a reference level for the 
rebuilding of the stock “as soon as feasible”.1539  They confirmed this in 1993 despite 
the more pessimistic outlook engendered by the improved understanding of growth 
and new maturity information and, building on the 1992 framework, developed a 
Mid-Term Management Strategy for the SBT Fishery, initially for the years 1993-
1995.
1540
  The 1993 management meeting made a start, putting a number of questions 
to the scientists
1541
 which they were able to answer the following year.
1542
 
                                                          
1538
  13th Trilateral Scientific Meeting Report, supra Ch I n 46, at 6 (paragraph 29). 
1539
  1992 Conclusion, supra Ch II n 350, at 2. 
1540
  1993 Conclusion, supra Ch II n 348, at 2 and 27-33 (“Mid-Term Management Strategy 
for the SBT Fishery”, Attachment D).  The strategy was described thus:  
1. The objective…is to take management action that will provide for an increase in parental 
biomass and improve the potential for increase in recruitment over the term. 
2. Future adjustments to management measures in the remaining term of the strategy will be 
determined after consideration of: 
(a)  economic and social factors including the costs and benefits of rates of adjustment of 
management measures 
(b)  the results of the scientific review [commissioned at the 1993 meeting]  
(c) advice from the scientific meeting on the questions as set out in Annex I.  
1541
  “Questions to Scientific Meeting” (Annex I to Attachment D to 1993 Conclusion), in 
1993 Conclusion, supra Ch II n 348, 30.  The questions were:  
1.   When the constant catch level from 1995 is varied from 50% to 150% of the 1992 level 
at 10% intervals, what is the year when the stock condition is estimated to be restored to 
the 1980 level with 50% and 75% probability?  
Note: this assessment should be made on several sets of plausible assumptions agreed by 
the scientists (at their January 1994 workshop), of stock recruitment relationships, catch 
at age matrices, age at maturity and natural mortality and using the two accepted VPA 
calculation methods. 
2.    Which variable catch scenarios changing catch annually or on a three-yearly basis, 
starting in 1995, would provide for greater than 50% and 75% probability of a steady 
rebuild to 1980 SSB [spawning stock biomass] levels by 2005, 2010, 2015, and 2020? 
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After the gloom of the 1993 stock assessment, that of 1994 was again optimistic, 
with the scientists reporting that, although the parental biomass continued its decline 
to a historically low level in 1993, the VPA results indicated that the quota 
reductions were having an effect, with fishing mortality rates in the early 1990s 
being less than those in the 1980s.
1543
  The surface fishery catch reductions during 
the 1980s and increased recruitment in the late 1980s had resulted in an increase in 
the CPUE of the juvenile stock (fish of age 3 to 7) since 1986.  There was clear 
sequential rebuilding in CPUE of juvenile year classes, reaching 6-year-olds in 
1993.
1544
  As the recent VPA recruitment estimates were all “well above the 
minimum level required to rebuild the stock given current catch levels”, stock 
                                                                                                                                                                    
3.   Which catch scenarios result in a 50% and 75% probability of recovery of the SSB to 
1980 level by 2005, 2010, 2015 and 2020? 
4.   What catch level would allow a 50% probability for an increase in SSB by 1995?   
5. What is the probability of decline of parental biomass from 1995 when adopting each of 
the various catch scenarios described in the items 1 and 2? 
6. What is the minimum change in parental biomass from 1992 that can be detected after 
the 1995 fishing year? 
7. What percentage change in recruitment in the period from 1990 to 1993 can be detected 
after the 1995 fishing year with confidence as a result of examination of the catch data, 
tagging and the results of aerial surveys? 
8. What are the implications of altering age compositions, particularly the proportion of 
very small (2-3 years old) and very large (12+ years old) fish in the catch scenarios in 
question 1 and 2 above? 
1542
  Responses to “Questions to the Scientific Meeting” asked by the Management Group 
(Appendix 2 to 13th Trilateral Scientific Meeting Report, supra Ch I n 46), 11 at 12-13. 
1543
  13th Trilateral Scientific Meeting Report, supra Ch I n 46, at 8-9 (Appendix 1 (“Status 
of the stock and fishery indicators”), paragraph 4). 
1544
  Ibid., at 9 (Appendix 1, paragraphs 5 and 6).  By sequential rebuilding is meant the fact 
that the large increase in 3-year-olds in 1990 could be followed successive years of catch rate 
data through to SBT aged 4 in 1991, aged 5 in 1992 and aged 6 in 1993, though its magnitude 
depended on the interpretation of the 1993 data.  Sounding a cautionary note, the scientists added 
that the simultaneous increase in 1993 in the catch rate of all ages of SBT from 3 to 10 suggested 
a general increase in catchability superimposed on the sequential rebuilding of age groups, i.e. 
only an unknown part of the increased catches reflected an actual rise in abundance. 
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recovery would be “assured” if these recruitments and catches were maintained 
during the 1990s.  If the stock-recruitment relationship were highly compensatory, 
then these recruitment levels could be expected to be maintained on average, but not 
if it were only moderately compensatory.
1545
 
Most of the VPAs predicted an increase in parental biomass for 1994.  This was due 
to continued relatively constant catch rates of fish aged 12 and older, confounding 
the assumptions used in previous years, which had projected that by 1993 there 
would be insufficient fish of these ages to sustain the catches actually observed.
1546
  
Given the estimated age structure of the current population, all projections indicated 
                                                          
1545
  Ibid., at 5 (paragraph 26).  The Japanese analysis used two stock-recruitment 
relationships (one highly compensatory, the other moderately so) within one particular VPA and 
one interpretation of catch rates, while the Australian analysis used a range of VPAs and catch 
rate interpretations with a single moderately compensatory stock-recruitment relationship; ibid., 
at 4 (paragraph 17).  Under a highly compensatory relationship high recruitment is maintained, 
on average, even at very low parental biomass levels.  A moderately compensatory relationship 
predicts that average recruitment decreases as parental biomass decreases.  While the Australian 
scientists regarded the highly compensatory relationship as an unlikely description of average 
recruitment for SBT, their Japanese counterparts considered both highly and moderately 
compensatory relationships equally likely.  With a moderately compensatory relationship the 
parental biomass was expected to remain below the 1980 level for many more years, while under 
the highly compensatory hypothesis recovery would be faster.  See ibid. (paragraphs 23-25). 
1546
  13th Trilateral Scientific Meeting Report, supra Ch I n 46, at 3 (paragraphs 10 and 11).  
Even so, almost all VPAs indicated that parental biomass had continued to decline, albeit at a 
slowing rate, up to 1993.  Though the Japanese and Australian VPAs differed in their estimates 
of the actual amount of parental biomass, they gave similar trends of change in that biomass.  Its 
absolute scale, while difficult to estimate from VPA, did not greatly influence the trend: ibid., at 
2-3 (paragraph 9).  All 1994 VPAs showed that the recruitment each year from 1986 to 1989 was 
higher than the low level of 1985, though with higher uncertainty surrounding the more recent of 
these estimates.  The interpretations ranged from a pattern of substantial increase to 1989 to a 
moderate increase to 1987 followed by smaller declines in each of 1988 and 1989 to a level 
slightly above that in 1985: ibid., at 3 (paragraph 13) and 10 (Appendix 1, paragraph 8). 
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that the parental biomass would increase from the 1993 level over the next few years 
if the age composition of the long-line catch remained similar to the past.
1547
 
In the years leading up to the 1998-2001 dispute over Japan’s unilateral experimental 
fishing program, the SBT stock assessments continued to be characterised by large 
uncertainties in the input data and the biological parameters, which were ultimately 
to culminate in the dispute.  These included recent catch levels, natural mortality 
rates, age of maturity, different models for estimating the size of the older age classes 
of the population and the CPUE indices, which remained the primary tuning indices 
for the VPA.  In the 1998 assessments, varying assumptions about the mean age of 
maturity made the trend in the parental biomass after 1994 uncertain, but all results 
for ages of maturity greater than age 8 indicated that it had continued to decline.  In 
addition, recruitment was estimated to have markedly declined from the late 1960s to 
about a third of the 1960 level.  The 1998 data also indicated that there was no 
increase in recruitment between 1988 and 1992 (the most recent cohort for which a 
direct estimate was available because of the VPA time lag), but CPUE and other 
indices for the 1992 to 1998 cohorts suggested that recruitment had remained low.
1548
 
Because of inconsistencies among the temporal trends in standardised CPUE indices 
for the different age-classes, a range of possible interpretations, hypotheses and 
model structures were considered, and weighted averages of the results were used to 
provide managers with advice on the current and projected stock status.  The stock 
assessments undertaken by national scientific delegations within the CCSBT relied 
on different sets of hypotheses, model structures and weightings.  Even so, they 
yielded robust conclusions about the status of the stock relative to historical levels, 
                                                          
1547
  Ibid., at 4 (paragraph 18).  Subsequent change would depend on the level of recruitment 
of the early 1990s and the catch levels in the next few years, most projections indicating a 
levelling off or slight decline in five or six years.  This dip would last for about five years and be 
followed by increases or decreases depending on the year-class strength of fish spawned in the 
1990s and the catch level: ibid. (paragraph 19). 
1548
  Polacheck, supra Appendix A n 1340, at 285. 
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all indicating that it was highly depleted.  The Scientific Committee repeatedly 
concluded that “the continued low abundance of the SBT parental biomass is cause 
for serious biological concern”.1549 
Stock projections under current catch levels indicated a wide range of possibilities, 
from rapid recovery to further substantial decline, depending upon which specific 
hypotheses were used to model uncertainties.  The differences depended on the 
uncertainties considered, the weights assigned to different hypotheses and models, 
and the criteria (or lack of them) used for rejecting model prediction for lack of fit 
with the observed data.  Thus, in 1998, the estimates by Australian and New Zealand 
scientists indicated a low probability of recovery of 14 per cent or less, while those 
of the Japanese scientists were in a much higher range: 76 per cent to 87 per cent.  
The Australian and New Zealand estimates also put at greater than 50 per cent the 
probability that the parental biomass would continue to decline. Retrospective 
analyses of the 1998 stock projections indicated that the estimates of probability of 
recovery decreased when updated with an additional year’s catch and effort data.  
This was consistent with the pattern of past years, when the projections on which the 
Scientific Committee had based its advice were repeatedly shown to be overly 
optimistic in the light of subsequent stock assessment results.
1550
  
The CCSBT was unable to develop an agreed approach for dealing with the 
underlying disparity and uncertainty in the VPA projection results.  The differences 
in the national delegations’ estimates of the probability of recovery were attributable 
                                                          
1549
  Ibid.  The phrase is used in the 1995 and 1998 reports of the Scientific Committee: 
CCSBT, Report of the first meeting of the Scientific Committee of the Commission for the 
Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna: Report to the Commission, Shimizu-shi, Japan, 10-19 
July 1995 (unpublished), at 4 (paragraph 17); CCSBT-SC4 Report, supra Ch IV n 683, at 102 
and was also used in the trilateral meeting reports to management in 1992 to 1994: 11th Trilateral 
Scientific Meeting Report, supra Ch II n 348, at 3 (paragraph 6, “serious” preceded by “very”); 
12th Trilateral Scientific Meeting Report, supra Ch II n 348, at 2 (paragraph 6); 13th Trilateral 
Scientific Meeting Report, supra Ch I n 46, at 2 (paragraph 7). 
1550
  Polacheck, supra Appendix A n 1340, at 285-286. 
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to the different weights – which in some cases were zero expressly or by implication 
– that they assigned to the different hypotheses and models used to quantify the 
underlying uncertainty in the stock assessments.  Over time the major identified 
factors changed somewhat as new data became available and as the assessment 
models evolved.  In the late 1990s these included the form of the stock-recruitment 
relationship, natural mortality rates, the model for estimation of the numbers of older 
fish, interpretation of CPUE as indices of abundance and lack of fit of models to the 
observed data.
1551
 
Since the end of the dispute the stock assessment reports have again been unanimous, 
though on occasion they refer to differences of emphasis among the delegations.
1552
  
At first their advice was that since the full surplus was being taken, the stock had an 
equal chance of growing or declining;
1553
 but from 2004 they have again turned 
pessimistic because of successive years of low recruitment.
1554
  In 2005 the 
indicators reinforced the evidence of the previous year that the 2000 and 2001 year 
classes were considerably smaller than their predecessors and taken together 
convinced the Stock Assessment Group that “there have been at least two very low 
recruitments”.1555  The spawning biomass was at a “low fraction of its original 
biomass and well below the 1980 level…[or]…the level that could produce 
maximum sustainable yield.”1556  It was “highly likely that current levels of catch 
will results in further declines in spawning stock and exploitable biomass”.1557 
                                                          
1551
  Ibid., at 286.  By comparison, in 1990 the factors highlighted had also included an 
unknown stock-recruitment relationship and uncertainty in both the natural mortality rate and the 
relationship between CPUE and abundance, but at that time the others were catches not fully 
accounted for, uncertainty in the age composition of the catch and the time lag in estimation of 
recruitment: 9th Trilateral Scientific Meeting Report, supra n 1505, at 75. 
1552
  CCSBT-SAG2 Report, supra Ch I n 46; CCSBT-SAG3 Report, supra Ch I n 46; 
CCSBT-SAG4 Report, supra Ch I n 295; CCSBT-SAG5 Report; supra Ch I n 34. 
1553
  Supra Ch VI n 1235 and accompanying text. 
1554
  Supra Ch I, text at nn 298-299. 
1555
  CCSBT-SAG6 Report, supra Ch IV n 866, at 7 (paragraph 31). 
1556
  Ibid. (paragraph 36). 
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The major catch anomalies revealed in 2006 showed that in fact the spawning 
biomass was between 2.2 and 3.4 times as large as until then believed, but still 
required substantial cuts from the last TAC of 14,925 tonnes for recovery of the 
stock to occur.  Interpolation between the figures given in the tables produced for 
various catch scenarios leads to the conclusion that the catch limit of 11,810 tonnes 
adopted in 2006
1558
 is unlikely to have much effect by 2014, but may lead to a 
modest increase in the parental biomass by 2022.
1559
  The most recent report, that of 
2007, has no new modelling, but states that the evidence is now stronger that the 
2002 year class was also weak, and there are conflicting indications as to whether the 
2003 and 2004 cohorts have returned to 1990s levels.
1560
  Recovery of the SBT stock 
to Bmsy thus remains a long way off under any management strategy involving 
continued fishing.  
                                                                                                                                                                    
1557
  Ibid., at 8 (paragraph 37). 
1558
  Supra Ch I n 278 and accompanying text. 
1559
  CCSBT-SAG7 Report, supra Ch VI n 1331, at 19 (paragraph 94).  This did not, 
however, negate the evidence of poor recruitment in 2000 and 2001 and remaining since below 
the levels of 1994-98: at 32-33 (paragraph 156). 
1560
  CCSBT, Report of the Eighth Meeting of the Stock Assessment Group, 4 - 8 September 
2007, Hobart, Australia (<www.ccsbt.org/docs/pdf/meeting_reports/ccsbt_14/report_of_ 
sag8.pdf> (visited on 27 July 2008)), at 16-17 (paragraphs 99 and 113). 
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APPENDIX C 
Part I 
Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna 
 
THE PARTIES TO THIS CONVENTION:  
CONSIDERING their mutual interest in southern bluefin tuna;  
RECALLING that Australia, Japan and New Zealand have already taken certain 
measures for the conservation and management of southern bluefin tuna;  
PAYING DUE REGARD to the rights and obligations of the Parties under 
relevant principles of international law;  
NOTING the adoption of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
in 1982;  
NOTING that States have established exclusive economic or fishery zones 
within which they exercise, in accordance with international law, sovereign 
rights or jurisdiction for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and 
managing the living resources;  
RECOGNISING that southern bluefin tuna is a highly migratory species which 
migrates through such zones;  
NOTING that the coastal States through whose exclusive economic or fishery 
zones southern bluefin tuna migrates exercise sovereign rights within such zones 
for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the living 
resources including southern bluefin tuna;  
ACKNOWLEDGING the importance of scientific research for the conservation 
and management of southern bluefin tuna and the importance of collecting 
scientific information relating to southern bluefin tuna and ecologically related 
species;  
RECOGNISING that it is essential that they cooperate to ensure the 
conservation and optimum utilisation of southern bluefin tuna;  
HAVE AGREED as follows:  
Article 1  
This Convention shall apply to southern bluefin tuna (Thunnus maccoyii).  
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Article 2  
For the purposes of this Convention:  
(a) "ecologically related species" means living marine species which are 
associated with southern bluefin tuna, including but not restricted to both 
predators and prey of southern bluefin tuna;  
(b) "fishing" means:  
(i) the catching, taking or harvesting of fish, or any other activity which can 
reasonably be expected to result in the catching, taking or harvesting of fish; or  
(ii) any operation at sea in preparation for or in direct support of any activity 
described in sub-paragraph (i) above.  
Article 3  
The objective of this Convention is to ensure, through appropriate management, 
the conservation and optimum utilisation of southern bluefin tuna.  
Article 4  
Nothing in this Convention nor any measures adopted pursuant to it shall be 
deemed to prejudice the positions or views of any Party with respect to its rights 
and obligations under treaties and other international agreements to which it is 
party or its positions or views with respect to the law of the sea.  
Article 5  
1. Each Party shall take all action necessary to ensure the enforcement of this 
Convention and compliance with measures which become binding under 
paragraph 7 of Article 8.  
2. The Parties shall expeditiously provide to the Commission for the 
Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna scientific information, fishing catch and 
effort statistics and other data relevant to the conservation of southern bluefin 
tuna and, as appropriate, ecologically related species.  
3. The Parties shall cooperate in collection and direct exchange, when 
appropriate, of fisheries data, biological samples and other information relevant 
for scientific research on southern bluefin tuna and ecologically related species.  
4. The Parties shall cooperate in the exchange of information regarding any 
fishing for southern bluefin tuna by nationals, residents and vessels of any State 
or entity not party to this Convention.  
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Article 6  
1. The Parties hereby establish and agree to maintain the Commission for the 
Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (hereinafter referred to as "the 
Commission").  
2. Each Party shall be represented on the Commission by not more than three 
delegates who may be accompanied by experts and advisers.  
3. The Commission shall hold an annual meeting before 1 August each year or at 
such other time as it may determine.  
4. At each annual meeting the Commission shall elect from among the delegates 
a Chair and a Vice-Chair. The Chair and the Vice-Chair shall be elected from 
different Parties and shall remain in office until the election of their successors at 
the next annual meeting. A delegate, when acting as Chair, shall not vote.  
5. Special meetings of the Commission shall be convened by the Chair at the 
request of a Party supported by at least two other Parties.  
6. A special meeting may consider any matter of relevance to this Convention.  
7. Two-thirds of the Parties shall constitute a quorum.  
8. The rules of procedure of the Commission and other internal administrative 
regulations as may be necessary to carry out its functions shall be decided upon 
at the first meeting of the Commission and may be amended by the Commission 
as occasion may require.  
9. The Commission shall have legal personality and shall enjoy in its relations 
with other international organisations and in the territories of the Parties such 
legal capacity as may be necessary to perform its functions and achieve its ends. 
The immunities and privileges which the Commission and its officers shall enjoy 
in the territory of a Party shall be subject to agreement between the Commission 
and the Party concerned.  
10. The Commission shall determine the location of its headquarters at such time 
as a Secretariat is established pursuant to paragraph 1 of Article 10.  
11. The official languages of the Commission shall be Japanese and English. 
Proposals and data may be submitted to the Commission in either language.  
Article 7  
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Each Party shall have one vote in the Commission. Decisions of the Commission 
shall be taken by a unanimous vote of the Parties present at the Commission 
meeting.  
Article 8  
1. The Commission shall collect and accumulate information described below:  
(a) scientific information, statistical data and other information relating to 
southern bluefin tuna and ecologically related species;  
(b) information relating to laws, regulations and administrative measures on 
southern bluefin tuna fisheries;  
(c) any other information relating to southern bluefin tuna.  
2. The Commission shall consider matters described below:  
(a) interpretation or implementation of this Convention and measures adopted 
pursuant to it;  
(b) regulatory measures for conservation, management and optimum utilisation 
of southern bluefin tuna;  
(c) matters which shall be reported by the Scientific Committee prescribed in 
Article 9;  
(d) matters which may be entrusted to the Scientific Committee prescribed in 
Article 9;  
(e) matters which may be entrusted to the Secretariat prescribed in Article 10;  
(f) other activities necessary to carry out the provisions of this Convention.  
3. For the conservation, management and optimum utilisation of southern bluefin 
tuna:  
(a) the Commission shall decide upon a total allowable catch and its allocation 
among the Parties unless the Commission decides upon other appropriate 
measures on the basis of the report and recommendations of the Scientific 
Committee referred to in paragraph 2(c) and (d) of Article 9; and  
(b) the Commission may, if necessary, decide upon other additional measures.  
4. In deciding upon allocations among the Parties under paragraph 3 above the 
Commission shall consider:  
(a) relevant scientific evidence;  
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(b) the need for orderly and sustainable development of southern bluefin tuna 
fisheries;  
(c) the interests of Parties through whose exclusive economic or fishery zones 
southern bluefin tuna migrates;  
(d) the interests of Parties whose vessels engage in fishing for southern bluefin 
tuna including those which have historically engaged in such fishing and those 
which have southern bluefin tuna fisheries under development;  
(e) the contribution of each Party to conservation and enhancement of, and 
scientific research on, southern bluefin tuna;  
(f) any other factors which the Commission deems appropriate.  
5. The Commission may decide upon recommendations to the Parties in order to 
further the attainment of the objective of this Convention.  
6. In deciding upon measures under paragraph 3 above and recommendations 
under paragraph 5 above, the Commission shall take full account of the report 
and recommendations of the Scientific Committee under paragraph 2(c) and (d) 
of Article 9.  
7. All measures decided upon under paragraph 3 above shall be binding on the 
Parties.  
8. The Commission shall notify all Parties promptly of measures and 
recommendations decided upon by the Commission.  
9. The Commission shall develop, at the earliest possible time and consistent 
with international law, systems to monitor all fishing activities related to 
southern bluefin tuna in order to enhance scientific knowledge necessary for 
conservation and management of southern bluefin tuna and in order to achieve 
effective implementation of this Convention and measures adopted pursuant to it.  
10. The Commission may establish such subsidiary bodies as it considers 
desirable for the exercise of its duties and functions.  
Article 9  
1. The Parties hereby establish the Scientific Committee as an advisory body to 
the Commission.  
2. The Scientific Committee shall:  
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(a) assess and analyse the status and trends of the population of southern bluefin 
tuna;  
(b) coordinate research and studies of southern bluefin tuna;  
(c) report to the Commission its findings or conclusions, including consensus, 
majority and minority views, on the status of the southern bluefin tuna stock and, 
where appropriate, of ecologically related species;  
(d) make recommendations, as appropriate, to the Commission by consensus on 
matters concerning the conservation, management and optimum utilisation of 
southern bluefin tuna;  
(e) consider any matter referred to it by the Commission.  
3. A meeting of the Scientific Committee shall be held prior to the annual 
meeting of the Commission. A special meeting of the Scientific Committee shall 
be called at any time at the request of a Party provided that such request is 
supported by at least two other Parties.  
4. The Scientific Committee shall adopt and amend as necessary its rules of 
procedure. The rules and any amendments thereto shall be approved by the 
Commission.  
5. (a) Each Party shall be a member of the Scientific Committee and shall 
appoint to the Committee a representative with suitable scientific qualifications 
who may be accompanied by alternates, experts and advisers.  
(b) The Scientific Committee shall elect a Chair and a Vice-Chair. The Chair and 
the Vice-Chair shall be elected from different Parties.  
Article 10  
1. The Commission may establish a Secretariat consisting of an Executive 
Secretary to be appointed by the Commission and appropriate staff on conditions 
as may be determined by the Commission. The staff shall be appointed by the 
Executive Secretary.  
2. Until such time as a Secretariat is established, the Chair of the Commission 
shall nominate from within his or her Government an official to act as Secretary 
to the Commission to perform the secretariat functions set out in paragraph 3 
below for a term of one year. At each annual meeting of the Commission, the 
Chair shall advise the Parties of the name and address of the Secretary.  
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3. The Secretariat functions shall be prescribed by the Commission, and shall 
include the following:  
(a) receiving and transmitting the Commission's official communications;  
(b) facilitating the collection of data necessary to accomplish the objective of this 
Convention;  
(c) preparing administrative and other reports for the Commission and the 
Scientific Committee.  
Article 11  
1. The Commission shall decide upon an annual budget.  
2. The contributions to the annual budget from each Party shall be calculated on 
the following basis:  
(a) 30% of the budget shall be divided equally among all the Parties; and  
(b) 70% of the budget shall be divided in proportion to the nominal catches of 
southern bluefin tuna among all the Parties.  
3. Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 7, any Party that has not paid its 
contributions for two consecutive years shall not enjoy the right to participate in 
the decision-making process in the Commission until it has fulfilled its 
obligations, unless the Commission decides otherwise.  
4. The Commission shall decide upon, and amend as occasion may require, 
financial regulations for the conduct of the Commission and for the exercise of 
its functions.  
5. Each Party shall meet its own expenses arising from attendance at meetings of 
the Commission and of the Scientific Committee.  
Article 12  
The Commission shall collaborate with other inter-governmental organisations 
which have related objectives, inter alia, to obtain the best available information 
including scientific information to further the attainment of the objective of this 
Convention and shall seek to avoid duplication with respect to their work. The 
Commission may make arrangements with such inter-governmental 
organisations to these ends.  
Article 13  
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With a view to furthering the attainment of the objective of this Convention, the 
Parties shall cooperate with each other to encourage accession by any State to 
this Convention where the Commission considers this to be desirable.  
Article 14  
1. The Commission may invite any State or entity not party to this Convention, 
whose nationals, residents or fishing vessels harvest southern bluefin tuna, and 
any coastal State through whose exclusive economic or fishery zone southern 
bluefin tuna migrates, to send observers to meetings of the Commission and of 
the Scientific Committee.  
2. The Commission may invite inter-governmental or, on request, non-
governmental organisations having special competence concerning southern 
bluefin tuna to send observers to meetings of the Commission.  
Article 15  
1. The Parties agree to invite the attention of any State or entity not party to this 
Convention to any matter relating to the fishing activities of its nationals, 
residents or vessels which could affect the attainment of the objective of this 
Convention.  
2. Each Party shall encourage its nationals not to associate with the southern 
bluefin tuna fishery of any State or entity not party to this Convention, where 
such association could affect adversely the attainment of the objective of this 
Convention.  
3. Each Party shall take appropriate measures aimed at preventing vessels 
registered under its laws and regulations from transferring their registration for 
the purpose of avoiding compliance with the provisions of this Convention or 
measures adopted pursuant to it.  
4. The Parties shall cooperate in taking appropriate action, consistent with 
international law and their respective domestic laws, to deter fishing activities for 
southern bluefin tuna by nationals, residents or vessels of any State or entity not 
party to this Convention where such activity could affect adversely the 
attainment of the objective of this Convention.  
Article 16  
1. If any dispute arises between two or more of the Parties concerning the 
interpretation or implementation of this Convention, those Parties shall consult 
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among themselves with a view to having the dispute resolved by negotiation, 
inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement or other peaceful 
means of their own choice.  
2. Any dispute of this character not so resolved shall, with the consent in each 
case of all parties to the dispute, be referred for settlement to the International 
Court of Justice or to arbitration; but failure to reach agreement on reference to 
the International Court of Justice or to arbitration shall not absolve parties to the 
dispute from the responsibility of continuing to seek to resolve it by any of the 
various peaceful means referred to in paragraph 1 above.  
3. In cases where the dispute is referred to arbitration, the arbitral tribunal shall 
be constituted as provided in the Annex to this Convention. The Annex forms an 
integral part of this Convention.  
Article 17  
1. This Convention shall be open for signature by Australia, Japan and New 
Zealand.  
2. This Convention is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval by these 
three States in accordance with their respective internal legal procedures, and 
will enter into force on the date of deposit of the third instrument of ratification, 
acceptance or approval.  
Article 18  
After the entry into force of this Convention, any other State, whose vessels 
engage in fishing for southern bluefin tuna, or any other coastal State through 
whose exclusive economic or fishery zone southern bluefin tuna migrates, may 
accede to it. This Convention shall become effective for any such other State on 
the date of deposit of that State's instrument of accession.  
Article 19  
Reservations may not be made with respect to any of the provisions of this 
Convention.  
Article 20  
Any Party may withdraw from this Convention twelve months after the date on 
which it formally notifies the Depositary of its intention to withdraw.  
Article 21  
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1. Any Party may at any time propose an amendment to this Convention.  
2. If one-third of the Parties request a meeting to discuss a proposed amendment 
the Depositary shall call such a meeting.  
3. An amendment shall enter into force when the Depositary has received 
instruments of ratification, acceptance or approval thereof from all the Parties.  
Article 22  
1. The original of this Convention shall be deposited with the Government of 
Australia, which shall be the Depositary. The Depositary shall transmit certified 
copies thereof to all other Signatories and acceding States.  
2. This Convention shall be registered by the Depositary pursuant to Article 102 
of the Charter of the United Nations.  
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorised thereto, have 
signed this Convention.  
DONE at Canberra on the tenth day of May 1993, in a single original, in the 
English and Japanese languages, each text being equally authentic.  
For Australia:  
[Signed:]  
SIMON CREAN  
For Japan:  
[Signed:]  
KAZUTOSHI HASEGAWA  
For New Zealand:  
[Signed:]  
EDWARD WOODFIELD  
 
 
 
ANNEX FOR AN ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL  
1. The arbitral tribunal referred to in paragraph 3 of Article 16 shall be composed 
of three arbitrators who shall be appointed as follows:  
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(a) The party commencing proceedings shall communicate the name of an 
arbitrator to the other party which, in turn, within a period of forty days 
following such notification, shall communicate the name of the second arbitrator. 
The parties shall, within a period of sixty days following the appointment of the 
second arbitrator, appoint the third arbitrator, who shall not be a national of 
either party and shall not be of the same nationality as either of the first two 
arbitrators. The third arbitrator shall preside over the tribunal.  
(b) If the second arbitrator has not been appointed within the prescribed period, 
or if the parties have not reached agreement within the prescribed period on the 
appointment of the third arbitrator, that arbitrator shall be appointed, at the 
request of either party, by the Secretary-General of the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration, from among persons of international standing not having the 
nationality of a State which is a Party to this Convention.  
2. The arbitral tribunal shall decide where its headquarters will be located and 
shall adopt its own rules of procedure.  
3. The award of the arbitral tribunal shall be made by a majority of its members, 
who may not abstain from voting.  
4. Any Party which is not a party to the dispute may intervene in the proceedings 
with the consent of the arbitral tribunal.  
5. The award of the arbitral tribunal shall be final and binding on all parties to 
the dispute and on any party which intervenes in the proceedings and shall be 
complied with without delay. The arbitral tribunal shall interpret the award at the 
request of one of the parties to the dispute or of any intervening party.  
6. Unless the arbitral tribunal determines otherwise because of the particular 
circumstances of the case, the expenses of the tribunal, including the 
remuneration of its members, shall be borne by the parties to the dispute in equal 
shares.  
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Part II 
International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic 
Tunas, Article VIII 
 
1. a) The Commission may, on the basis of scientific evidence, make 
recommendations designed to maintain the populations of tuna and tuna-like 
fishes that may be taken in the Convention area at levels which will permit the 
maximum sustainable catch. These recommendations shall be applicable to the 
Contracting Parties under the conditions laid down in paragraphs 2 and 3 of this 
Article.  
b) The recommendations referred to above shall be made: 
(i) at the initiative of the Commission if an appropriate Panel has not been 
established or with the approval of at least two-thirds of all the Contracting 
Parties if an appropriate Panel has been established;  
(ii) on the proposal of an appropriate Panel if such a Panel has been established;  
(iii) on the proposal of the appropriate Panels if the recommendation in question 
relates to more than one geographic area, species or group of species. 
2. Each recommendation made under paragraph 1 of this Article shall become 
effective for all Contracting Parties six months after the date of the notification 
from the Commission transmitting the recommendation to the Contracting 
Parties, except as provided in paragraph 3 of this Article.  
3. a) If any Contracting Party in the case of a recommendation made under 
paragraph 1 (b) (i) above, or any Contracting Party member of a Panel concerned 
in the case of a recommendation made under paragraph 1 (b) (ii) or (iii) above, 
presents to the Commission an objection to such recommendation within the six 
months period provided for in paragraph 2 above, the recommendation shall not 
become effective for an additional sixty days.  
b) Thereupon any other Contracting Party may present an objection prior to the 
expiration of the additional sixty days period, or within forty-five days of the 
date of the notification of an objection made by another Contracting Party within 
such additional sixty days, whichever date shall be the later.  
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c) The recommendation shall become effective at the end of the extended period 
or periods for objection, except for those Contracting Parties that have presented 
an objection.  
d) However, if a recommendation has met with an objection presented by only 
one or less than one-fourth of the Contracting Parties, in accordance with 
subparagraphs (a) and (b) above, the Commission shall immediately notify the 
Contracting Party or Parties having presented such objection that it is to be 
considered as having no effect.  
e) In the case referred to in subparagraph (d) above the Contracting Party or 
Parties concerned shall have an additional period of sixty days from the date of 
said notification in which to reaffirm their objection. On the expiry of this period 
the recommendation shall become effective, except with respect to any 
Contracting Party having presented an objection and reaffirmed it within the 
delay provided for.  
f) If a recommendation has met with objection from more than one-fourth but 
less than the majority of the Contracting Parties, in accordance with 
subparagraphs (a) and (b) above, the recommendation shall become effective for 
the Contracting Parties that have not presented an objection thereto.  
g) If objections have been presented by a majority of the Contracting Parties the 
recommendation shall not become effective.  
4. Any Contracting Party objecting to a recommendation may at any time 
withdraw that objection, and the recommendation shall become effective with 
respect to such Contracting Party immediately if the recommendation is already 
in effect, or at such time as it may become effective under the terms of this 
Article.  
5. The Commission shall notify each Contracting Party immediately upon receipt 
of each objection and of each withdrawal of an objection, and of the entry into 
force of any recommendation. 
 
Part III 
Convention for the Conservation and Management of Highly 
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Migratory Fish Stocks of the Western and Central Pacific 
Ocean, Article 20 
 
Decision-making 
1. As a general rule, decision-making in the Commission shall be by consensus. 
For the purposes of this Article, “consensus” means the absence of any formal 
objection made at the time the decision was taken. 
2. Except where this Convention expressly provides that a decision shall be made 
by consensus, if all efforts to reach a decision by consensus have been exhausted, 
decisions by voting on questions of procedure shall be taken by a majority of 
those present and voting. Decisions on questions of substance shall be taken by a 
three-fourths majority of those present and voting provided that such majority 
includes a three-fourths majority of the members of the South Pacific Forum 
Fisheries Agency present and voting and a three-fourths majority of non-
members of the South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency present and voting and 
provided further that in no circumstances shall a proposal be defeated by two or 
fewer votes in either chamber. When the issue arises as to whether a question is 
one of substance or not, that question shall be treated as one of substance unless 
otherwise decided by the Commission by consensus or by the majority required 
for decisions on questions of substance.  
3. If it appears to the Chairman that all efforts to reach a decision by consensus 
have been exhausted, the Chairman shall fix a time during that session of the 
Commission for taking the decision by a vote. At the request of any 
representative, the Commission may, by a majority of those present and voting, 
defer the taking of a decision until such time during the same session as the 
Commission may decide. At that time, the Commission shall take a vote on the 
deferred question. This rule may be applied only once to any question.  
4. Where this Convention expressly provides that a decision on a proposal shall 
be taken by consensus and the Chairman determines that there would be an 
objection to such proposal, the Commission may appoint a conciliator for the 
purpose of reconciling the differences in order to achieve consensus on the 
matter.  
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5. Subject to paragraphs 6 and 7, a decision adopted by the Commission shall 
become binding 60 days after the date of its adoption.  
6. A member which has voted against a decision or which was absent during the 
meeting at which the decision was made may, within 30 days of the adoption of 
the decision by the Commission, seek a review of the decision by a review panel 
constituted in accordance with the procedures set out in Annex II to this 
Convention on the grounds that:  
(a) the decision is inconsistent with the provisions of this Convention, the 
Agreement or the 1982 Convention; or  
(b) the decision unjustifiably discriminates in form or in fact against the member 
concerned.  
7. Pending the findings and recommendations of the review panel and any action 
required by the Commission, no member of the Commission shall be required to 
give effect to the decision in question.  
8. If the review panel finds that the decision of the Commission need not be 
modified, amended or revoked, the decision shall become binding 30 days from 
the date of communication by the Executive Director of the findings and 
recommendations of the review panel.  
9. If the review panel recommends to the Commission that the decision be 
modified, amended or revoked, the Commission shall, at its next annual meeting, 
modify or amend its decision in order to conform with the findings and 
recommendations of the review panel or it may decide to revoke the decision, 
provided that, if so requested in writing by a majority of the members, a special 
meeting of the Commission shall be convened within 60 days of the date of 
communication of the findings and recommendations of the review panel. 
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APPENDIX D 
(CCSBT) Resolution to Establish an Extended 
Commission and an Extended Scientific Committee 
The Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (the 
Commission): 
RECOGNISING that ensuring the sustainability of the Southern Bluefin Tuna 
(SBT) stock requires that all those States and entities or fishing entities fishing 
this species work together through the Commission; 
CONSIDERING that continued fishing for SBT by States and entities or fishing 
entities not adhering to the Commission’s conservation and management 
measures substantially diminishes the effectiveness of those measures; 
RECOGNISING the continuing need to encourage all States eligible to accede to 
the Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (the Convention) 
to do so, and to encourage entities or fishing entities with vessels fishing for SBT 
to implement the Commission’s conservation and management measures; 
Decides as follows: 
1.  Acting under Articles 8.3(b) and 15.4 of the Convention, the Commission 
hereby establishes an Extended Commission for the Conservation of Southern 
Bluefin Tuna (the Extended Commission) and an Extended Scientific 
Committee, whose Members shall be comprised of the Parties to the Convention 
and any entity or fishing entity, vessels flagged to which have caught SBT at any 
time in the previous three calendar years, that is admitted to membership by the 
Extended Commission pursuant to this Resolution. 
2. The Extended Commission and the Extended Scientific Committee shall 
perform the same tasks as the Commission and the Scientific Committee 
including, but not limited to, deciding upon a total allowable catch and its 
allocation among the Members.  All Members shall have equal voting rights.  
The provisions of the Convention relating to the Commission and the Scientific 
Committee (Articles 6 to 9, except for 6.9 and 6.10) shall apply mutatis mutandis 
with regard to the Extended Commission and the Extended Scientific Committee.  
Any dispute concerning the interpretation or implementation of this Resolution, 
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including the articles of the Convention specified in the Resolution, or the 
Exchange of Letters referred to in paragraph 6, shall be resolved by negotiation, 
inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration or other peaceful means agreed by 
the parties to the dispute. 
3. The Secretariat of the Commission shall function as the Secretariat of the 
Extended Commission. 
4. The Extended Commission shall report forthwith to the Commission if the 
latter is in session, and in any other case before the latter’s next meeting or 
session of a meeting, all decisions it adopts.  Decisions so reported shall become 
decisions of the Commission at the end of the session of the meeting to which 
they were reported, unless the Commission decides to the contrary.  Any 
decision of the Commission that affects the operation of the Extended 
Commission or the rights, obligations or status of any individual Member within 
the Extended Commission should not be taken without prior due deliberation of 
that issue by the Extended Commission. 
5. The Rules of Procedure for the Extended Commission shall be as annexed to 
this Resolution.  Any revision to the Rules shall be made by the Extended 
Commission. 
6. Any entity or fishing entity, vessels flagged to which have caught SBT at any 
time in the previous three calendar years, may express its willingness to the 
Executive Secretary of the Commission to become a member of the Extended 
Commission.  The Executive Secretary of the Commission, on behalf of the 
Commission, will conduct an Exchange of Letters with the representative of such 
entity or fishing entity to this effect.  In so doing, the applicant shall give the 
Commission its firm commitment to respect the terms of the Convention and 
comply with such decisions of the Extended Commission as become decisions of 
the Commission pursuant to paragraph 4. 
7. If the Extended Commission decides to admit the applicant, it shall negotiate 
with the applicant a formula to govern the level of catch of SBT by the applicant 
pending the next decision of the Commission setting a total allowable catch and 
its allocation among the Members.  Upon the successful completion of the 
negotiations referred to in the previous sentence, the Executive Secretary will 
exchange letters with the applicant as referred to in paragraph 6; the applicant 
shall thereupon assume the status of Member of the Extended Commission. 
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8. Any Member of the Extended Commission that is not a Member of the 
Commission shall be entitled to appoint one representative, to be accompanied 
by experts and advisers, as an Observer to meetings of the Commission and its 
subsidiary bodies, including the Scientific Committee.  Such representative shall 
be entitled to be present and speak as an Observer at meetings of the 
Commission and its subsidiary bodies. 
9. The Extended Commission shall decide upon an annual budget.  The 
contributions to the budget of an applicant that is admitted as its Member shall be 
determined by application mutatis mutandis of Article 11 of the Convention. 
10. The provisions of this Resolution relating to participation by entities or 
fishing entities in the operations of the Extended Commission are solely for the 
purposes of the Convention. 
11. The Rules of Procedure are amended by omitting paragraph 3 of Rule 5 and 
substituting the following: 
“3.  A provisional agenda for each annual meeting shall be prepared by the 
Executive Secretary in consultation with the Chair.  The provisional agenda shall 
be despatched by the Executive Secretary to all the Members not less than 60 
days before the date for the opening of the meeting.  The provisional agenda 
shall include: 
(a)  approval of decisions taken by the Extended Commission; 
(b)  all items which the Commission has previously decided to include in the 
provisional agenda; and 
(c)  all supplementary items the inclusion of which have been requested by any 
Member of the Commission.” 
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Annex 
 
Rules of Procedure of the Extended Commission for the Conservation 
of Southern Bluefin Tuna 
 
Rule 1 
Representation 
1. Each Member shall be represented on the Extended Commission by not more 
than three delegates who may be accompanied by experts and advisers.  Each 
Member shall inform the Executive Secretary of the Extended Commission of 
the names of its delegates to the Extended Commission including identification 
of the head of the delegation and experts and advisers accompanying such 
delegates, and of any change thereof, as far in advance as possible before the 
commencement of each meeting of the Extended Commission. 
2. Each Member shall designate a correspondent who shall have primary 
responsibility for liaison with the Executive Secretary during the periods 
between meetings and shall promptly inform the Executive Secretary of the name 
and address of such a correspondent and of any change thereof. 
Rule 2 
Other matters 
Except for Rule 4(3) and Rule 9, the Rules of Procedure of the Commission for 
the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna apply mutatis mutandis to the 
Extended Commission on other matters. 
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Draft Summary Record Reconvened Trilateral Management Meeting for SBT Canberra 
8 – 18 October 1989. 
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Summary Record, Canberra, 22-26 November 1993. 
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New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs file 40/12/10 “New Zealand 
Affairs: Economic Relations – Japan – Fishing”, Part 22  
Cable No 3027, 22 October 1982, from New Zealand High Commission, Canberra to 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Wellington. 
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December+2000/Scientists+Brought+Into+Tuna+Dispute.htm>. 
Hon Wilson Tuckey MP, Minister for Fisheries, Forestry and Conservation, “Tuckey 
Announces End to Southern Bluefin Tuna Dispute with Japan” (Press Release No 
AFFA01/42TU, 29 May 2001). 
“Moosa suspends Japanese Fishing in SA Waters”, <www.info.gov.za/speeches/ 
2002/02080510461002.htm>. 
“Statement by Senator Robert Ray[,] Parliamentary Adviser to the Australian Mission to 
the United Nations”, <www.australiaun.org/unny/il%5f281105.html>. 
“Statement to the 61st session of the UN General Assembly Plenary 7 December 2006[,] 
Agenda item 71(a) & (b): Oceans and the Law of Sea and Sustainable fisheries[,] 
Delivered by HE Frances Lisson[,] Ambassador and Deputy Permanent 
Representative[,] Permanent Mission of Australia to the United Nations”, <www. 
australiaun.org/unny/il%5f071206.html>. 
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Websites not elsewhere included 
 
<ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/external_relations/rfos/ibsfc_en.htm> 
<treaties.un.org/Pages/Treaties.aspx?id=21&subid=0&lang=en> 
<treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&id=454&chapter=21&lang=en> 
(Status list for Convention on the High Seas)  
<treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&id=455&chapter=21&lang=en> 
(Status list for Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the 
High Seas)  
<treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&id=457&chapter=21&lang=en> 
(Status list for Optional Protocol of Signature concerning the Compulsory Settlement of 
Disputes)  
<treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&id=460&chapter=21&lang=en> 
(Status list for the Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United 
Nations Convention for the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the 
Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish 
Stocks) 
<www.afma.gov.au/information/glossary.htm> 
<www.ccsbt.org/docs/pdf/about_the_commission/financial_regulations.pdf> 
<www.ccsbt.org/docs/pdf/about_the_commission/rules_of_procedure_of_the_ 
commission.pdf> 
<www.ccsbt.org/docs/pdf/meeting_schedule/ccsbt_previous_meetings.pdf> 
<www.dpi.nsw.gov.au/fisheries/recreational/regulations/sw/sw-bag-and-size#Finfish-
Bag-and-Size-limits>  
<www.dpi.vic.gov.au/DPI/nrenfaq.nsf/93a98744f6ec41bd4a256c8e00013aa9/6007333ef
25f2ba1ca2574010002a76c/$FILE/Limits%20and%20closed%20seasons1.pdf> 
<www.dpiw.tas.gov.au/inter.nsf/WebPages/HMUY-5TA4EU?open>  
<www.fao.org/fishery/collection/asfis> (Aquatic Sciences and Fisheries Information 
System electronic database maintained by the FAO) 
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<www.fao.org/Legal/treaties/013s-e.htm> (Status list for the Agreement Establishing 
the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission)  
<www.fao.org/Legal/treaties/014s-e.htm> (Status list for the International Convention 
for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas)  
<www.fish.govt.nz en-nz/Publications/Historical+Documents/Environment+and+ 
Sustainability+Archive/Regulatory+Impact+Statements+and+Business+Compliance+ 
Costs+Statements/2002/Proposal+to+Amend+the+Definition+of+Southern+Bluefin+ 
Tuna+and+Introduction+of+Defence+Provision+for.htm> 
<www.fish.wa.gov.au/docs/pub/GascoyneLimits/gascoyne_rules2008.pdf> 
<www.fish.wa.gov.au/docs/pub/NorthLimits/NorthernCoastRules_2008.pdf> 
<www.fish.wa.gov.au/docs/pub/SouthLimits/SouthCoastRules_2008.pdf> 
<www.fish.wa.gov.au/docs/pub/WestLimits/westcoast_rules2007.pdf> 
<www.iattc.org/HomeENG.htm> 
<www.iccat.int/en/contracting.htm> 
<www.intfish.net/docs/2003/ibsfc/rules.htm> 
<www.moneymadeclear.fsa.gov.uk/tools.aspx?Tool=loan_calculator> 
<www.pir.sa.gov.au/fisheries/recreational_fishing/catch_limits_and_legal_lengths> 
<www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/chinese_taipei_e.htm> 
